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  1. Functionalism and the Emotions.Juan R. Loaiza - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-34.
    Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...)
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  2. El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: extensión, corporización y enactivismo.Federico Burdman - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (19):475-495.
    In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I first consider critically a proposal put forward by Rowlands (2010), which identifies the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I find in this proposal lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches.
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  3. On the Naturalisation of Teleology: Self-Organisation, Autopoiesis and Teleodynamics.Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas - 2021 - Adaptive Behavior.
    In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three reasons: First, (...)
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  4. Deep Learning and Artificial Intelligence: X, XX, XXX.Ilexa Yardley - 2017 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
  5. Consciousness as a Mode of Being.S. Ginsburg & E. Jablonka - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):148-162.
    We suggest a teleological approach to subjective experiencing or phenomenal consciousness. Like living, subjective experiencing is a teleology-constituting mode of being, which is made up of coupled, functional processes. We explicate our notion of a 'teleological mode of being' and distinguish between three different modes: a living (non-sentient) mode of being, a sentient mode of being, and a rational-symbolic (human) mode of being, which correspond to the three levels of soul suggested by Aristotle. These evolved teleological modes of being are (...)
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  6. Pain Experiences and Their Link to Action: Challenging Imperative Theories.Sabrina Coninx - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):104-126.
    According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although (...)
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  7. Mental Representation and the Cognitive Architecture of Skilled Action.Thomas Schack & Cornelia Frank - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    The aim of this paper is to understand the functional role of mental representations and intentionality in skilled actions from a systems related perspective. Therefore, we will evaluate the function of representation and then discuss the cognitive architecture of skilled actions in more depth. We are going to describe the building blocks and levels of the action system that enable us to control movements such as striking the tennis ball at the right time, or grasping tools in manual action. Based (...)
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  8. Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms.Frances Egan - 2017 - In Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science 145-163. Oxford, UK: pp. 145-163.
    A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...)
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  9. 色觉奥妙和哲学基本问题(Mystery of Color Vision and Fundamental Questions in Philosophy).Chenguang Lu - 1987 - Hefei: Science &Tech. university press.
    Author’s Preface in English: My Two Discoveries and Their Philosophical Significance As long as a person opens his eyes to face this world, he will meet the problems discussed in this book. Is the red color of flowers and the green color of grass displayed in front of our eyes only sensations in our minds or objective existence as the same as we see? Is a color perception similar to or different from a natural light that objectively exists? The further (...)
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  10. Richard Swinburne Are We Bodies or Souls? . Pp. 188. $19.95 . ISBN 9780198831495.Tyron Goldschmidt - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-3.
  11. Qualia.David Villena Saldaña - 2016 - Escritura y Pensamiento 39 (39):79-103.
    This paper shows why qualia constitute a problem for any theory of mental phenomena. We use the term ‘qualia’ in reference to non-intentional features of mental states which are eminently qualitative, i.e. perceptions, emotions, moods and body sensations. These non-intentional features are usually described as intrinsic, ineffable, infallible, atomic, private, direct and irreducible to the physical. The paper also explains the absent qualia argument which is addressed as a critique to functionalism.
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  12. ¿Qué es el funcionalismo?David Villena Saldaña - 2017 - Letras 88 (27):130-155.
    This paper explains the main theses of functionalism about mental states. This view is taken as a response addressed to the metaphysical aspect of the mind-body problem. It is explained what distinguishes functional properties as second-order properties, and how to understand supervenience and multiple realizability. The paper applies these ideas to machine functionalism and analytic functionalism, the two main versions of functionalism.
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  13. Empirical Incoherence and Double Functionalism.Sam Baron - 2019 - Synthese:1-27.
    Recent work on quantum gravity suggests that neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entites exist at a fundamental level. The loss of both brings with it the threat of empirical incoherence. A theory is empirically incoherent when the truth of that theory undermines the empirical justification for believing it. If neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entities exist as a part of a fundamental theory of QG, then such a theory seems to imply that there are no observables and so no way (...)
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  14. Mental Disorder: Ameliorating Stigmatization and Reconceptualizing Treatment.Jennifer Gleason - 2019 - Dissertation, Ohio State University
    In this dissertation, I examine our mental health concepts to see what work they are currently doing as well as what work they could be doing. In 1976, Christopher Boorse stated that the mental health literature is a “web of obscurities” (p. 51). To resolve some of this confusion, I argue that we need to consider the goals we should have for our mental health concepts and then give accounts of those concepts that meet our stated goals. I argue that (...)
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  15. Are There Teleological Functions to Compute?Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):431-452.
    I analyze a tension at the core of the mechanistic view of computation generated by its joint commitment to the medium independence of computational vehicles and to computational systems possessing teleological functions to compute. While computation is individuated in medium-independent terms, teleology is sensitive to the constitutive physical properties of vehicles. This tension spells trouble for the mechanistic view, suggesting that there can be no teleological functions to compute. I argue that, once considerations about the relevant function-bestowing factors for computational (...)
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  16. Misplacing Memories? An Enactive Approach to the Virtual Memory Palace.Anco Peeters & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 76:102834.
    In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its efficacy. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users. Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to solve these practical challenges, but currently fall short of delivering (...)
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  17. Passive Causation; Making Interactionism Work.P. Lewtas - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):139-162.
    This paper advances a theory of interactionist mental causation within a non-physicalist property dualist framework. It builds from Chalmers' argument that non-physical experiences can't have causal powers. It reinterprets this as a constraint, then identifies the unique model satisfying it. This has the experience existing passively with physical nature responding actively to it. The paper explores the causal theory presupposed thereby; applies its model to standard property dualism and particulate property dualism ; shows how the model coheres with science; integrates (...)
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  18. Multiple Realization and Compositional Variation.Kevin Morris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2593-2611.
    It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in The Multiple Realization Book, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple realization demanding enough to yield such nonreductive (...)
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  19. Does Functionalism Entail Extended Mind?Kengo Miyazono - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3523-3541.
    In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto’s beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in (...)
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  20. Functionalism and the Qualia Wars.Ekai Txapartegi - 2006 - Abstracta 2 (2):180-196.
    The debate concerning the reality of qualia has stagnated. The dominant functionalist approach to qualia concentrates largely on the filter-strategy as applied to color experiences. The filter-strategy takes color experiences as material-to-be-functionally-filtered under the assumption that qualia as such cannot be filtered. However, despite the speculative efforts made in this direction, the debate between phenomenalists and representationalists remains unresolved. The main idea of this paper is to show that the lack of success settling “the qualia war” has to be understood (...)
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  21. The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism.David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):71-88.
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  22. The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
    Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goalhere is not to evaluatc their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism. recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify (...)
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  23. Aristotle and Functionalism: A Re-Examination of Their “Natural” Disagreement.Corinne Painter - 2004 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1):53-77.
    In this paper I provide a compelling argument against the thesis that Aristotle’s understanding of the relation between the soul and the body can be construed asfunctionalist, despite some passages that would seem to support such an interpretation. Toward this end, in section I of the essay I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the soul-body relation that emphasizes the non-contingent nature of the connection between the soul and a specific kind of body, arguing that Aristotle’s account of the (...)
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  24. Some Puzzles Concerning Relations Between Minds, Brains, and Bodies.Rick Grush - 2016
    In this article I explore a number of questions that have not been adequately investigated in philosophy of mind circles: are minds located in the same place as the brains (or other computing machinery) supporting them? Must they exist at the same location as the body? Must they exist at the same time? Could a single mind be implemented in multiple brains, or multiple minds in a single brain? Under what conditions might a single mind persist despite being implemented successively (...)
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  25. Functionalism and Multirealizability, On Interaction Between Structure and Function.Joëlle Proust - unknown
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  26. The Substance Theory of Mind and Contemporary Functionalism.A. E. M. & Thomas J. Ragusa - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (9):248.
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  27. XIII—‘Functionalism’ in Philosophy of Psychology.Norman Malcolm - 1980 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1):211-230.
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  28. Functionalism, Psychological Theory, and the Uniting Sciences: Some Discussion Remarks.Herbert Feigl - 1955 - Psychological Review 62 (3):232-235.
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  29. Discussion of Probabilistic Functionalism.Ernest R. Hilgard - 1955 - Psychological Review 62 (3):226-228.
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  30. Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry.Kengo Miyazono - 2018 - Routledge.
  31. Corvids Infer the Mental States of Conspecifics.Ashley Keefner - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):267-281.
    It is well known that humans represent the mental states of others and use these representations to successfully predict, understand, and manipulate their behaviour. This is an impressive ability. Many comparative psychologists believe that some non-human apes and monkeys attribute mental states to others. But is this ability unique to mammals? In this paper, I review findings from a range of behavioural studies on corvids, including food caching, food recaching and food sharing studies. In order to protect their caches from (...)
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  32. Belief, Assertion and Moore’s Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395-414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore's Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief, the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion, the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions are absurd, (...)
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  33. Kim's Functionalism.Marian David - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):133-148.
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  34. Structuralism, Functionalism, and the Four Aristotelian Causes.Olivier Rieppel - 1990 - Journal of the History of Biology 23 (2):291-320.
  35. Proper Functionalism.Kenneth Boyce - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Proper Functionalism ‘Proper Functionalism’ refers to a family of epistemological views according to which whether a belief was formed by way of properly functioning cognitive faculties plays a crucial role in whether it has a certain kind of positive epistemic status (such as being an item of knowledge, or a … Continue reading Proper Functionalism →.
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  36. Natural Minds.Thomas W. Polger - 2004 - Bradford.
    In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain -- that sensations are brain processes -- and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties -- a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily indentical to brains, a position held by (...)
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  37. Formalizing Preference Utilitarianism in Physical World Models.Caspar Oesterheld - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).
    Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing ethics and ultimately the question of how to “make the world better” with a formal (...)
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  38. Common-Sense Functionalism and the Extended Mind.Jack Wadham - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):136-151.
    The main claim of this paper is that Andy Clark's most influential argument for ‘the extended mind thesis’ (EM henceforth) fails. Clark's argument for EM assumes that a certain form of common-sense functionalism is true. I argue, contra Clark, that the assumed brand of common-sense functionalism does not imply EM. Clark's argument also relies on an unspoken, undefended and optional assumption about the nature of mental kinds—an assumption denied by the very common-sense functionalists on whom Clark's argument draws. I also (...)
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  39. Pathways to Pluralism About Biological Individuality.Beckett Sterner - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):609-628.
    What are the prospects for a monistic view of biological individuality given the multiple epistemic roles the concept must satisfy? In this paper, I examine the epistemic adequacy of two recent accounts based on the capacity to undergo natural selection. One is from Ellen Clarke, and the other is by Peter Godfrey-Smith. Clarke’s position reflects a strong monism, in that she aims to characterize individuality in purely functional terms and refrains from privileging any specific material properties as important in their (...)
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  40. Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability.Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):881-902.
    The Mind-Brain Identity Theory lived a short life as a respectable philosophical position in the late 1950s, until Hilary Putnam developed his famous argument on the multiple realizability of mental states. The argument was, and still is, taken as the definitive demonstration of the falsity of Identity Theory and the foundation on which contemporary functionalist computational cognitive science was to be grounded. In this paper, in the wake of some contemporary philosophers, we reopen the case for Identity Theory and offer (...)
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  41. As Close to the Definitive Dennett as We 'Re Going to Get'.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 50:98-102.
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  42. 5. The Functionalist Model.John Kultgen - 1988 - In Ethics and Professionalism. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 72-98.
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  43. With Commentary.Jarrett Leplin - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (2):169.
  44. A Critical Examination of Hilary Putnam's Refutation of Computational Functionalism.Jeff Buechner - 2003 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    In his seminal work, Representation and Reality and elsewhere in publications throughout the 1980's and 1990's, Hilary Putnam attempts an ingenious refutation of computational functionalism. His refutation centers upon three main pillars: the use of the Godel incompleteness theorems, his precise articulation of a triviality thesis and his argument that there can be no local computational reductions . ;We argue that each pillar is riddled with severe problems. His rescue of the Godel incompleteness theorems from the logical error committed by (...)
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  45. Explaining Action: A Functionalist Approach.Peter Gregory Dlugos - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Virginia
    My dissertation is an attempt to reconcile two plausible and widely held claims: first, that reasons explain actions, and second, that actions have sufficient physical causes. These claims come into conflict when we make the following three common assumptions: one, that beliefs, desires and other intentional states are irreducible to physical states; two, that a physical causal explanation of a particular event will make redundant a mental causal explanation of that same event; and three, that reason-giving explanations are causal explanations. (...)
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  46. Functionalism and Propositional Content.Stephen Lindsay White - 1981 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Functionalism represents the most promising as well as the most severely criticized approach to the philosophy of mind. In this dissertation functionalism is defended as a theory of the propositional content of intentional states. The first chapter is a criticism of the competing theories of propositional content: anti-mentalism, instrumentalism, and nonfunctionalist materialism. Theories of the first two kinds are open to straightforward counterexamples. Theories of the third sort are open to counterexamples on the assumption that the distinction between physical and (...)
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  47. Ryle's Last Letter to Daniel Dennett.Gibert Ryle - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
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  48. The Causal Theory of Mind.Scott Warren Calef - 1987 - Dissertation, University of Oregon
    In this dissertation I challenge the functionalist theory of mental states, which asserts that mental types such as "pain" are "multiply realizable" causal relations. ;I begin by providing historical and theoretical background which is necessary for one to fully appreciate functionalism. I show why formerly fashionable theories of mind have fallen out of favor, review Davidson's arguments that reasons are causes, and give a brief account of "folk psychology." ;In discussing functionalism proper, I distinguish between two forms of the thesis: (...)
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  49. Daniel C. Dennett, Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds. [REVIEW]Wayne Henry - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19:95-97.
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  50. John Symons, On Dennett. [REVIEW]Dan O'brien - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23:289-291.
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