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1 — 50 / 115
  1. added 2020-05-28
    Pain Experiences and Their Link to Action: Challenging Imperative Theories.Coninx Sabrina - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfill, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In the paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although (...)
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  2. added 2020-02-28
    A tese da mente estendida à luz do externismo ativo: Como tornar Otto responsivo a razões?Eros Carvalho - forthcoming - Trans/Form/Ação 43.
    The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...)
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  3. added 2019-10-12
    A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...)
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  4. added 2019-10-10
    Finding Space in a Nonspatial World.David Chalmers - forthcoming - In Christian Wüthrich, Baptiste Le Bihan & Nick Huggett (eds.), Philosophy Beyond Spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  5. added 2019-08-14
    On Ordered Pluralism.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1).
    This paper examines Miranda Fricker’s method of paradigm-based explanation and in particular its promise of yielding an ordered pluralism. Fricker’s starting point is a schism between two conceptions of forgiveness, Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness. In the light of a hypothesis about the basic point of forgiveness, she reveals the unity underlying the initially baffling plurality and brings order into it, presenting a paradigmatic form of forgiveness as explanatorily basic and other forms as derivative. The resulting picture, she claims, (...)
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  6. added 2019-08-05
    Two theories of group agency.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1901-1918.
    Two theories dominate the current debate on group agency: functionalism, as endorsed by Bryce Huebner and Brian Epstein, and interpretivism, as defended by Deborah Tollefsen, and Christian List and Philip Pettit. In this paper, I will give a new argument to favour functionalism over interpretivism. I discuss a class of cases which the former, but not the latter, can accommodate. Two features characterise this class: First, distinct groups coincide, that is numerically distinct groups share all their members at all time. (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    A Formal Rebuttal of the Central Argument for Functionalism.Vadim Batitsky - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (2):201-220.
    The central argument for functionalism is the so-called argument from multiple realizations. According to this argument, because a functionally characterized system admits a potential infinity of structurally diverse physical realizations, the functional organization of such systems cannot be captured in a law-like manner at the level of physical description. I offer a rebuttal of this argument based on formal modeling of its premises in the framework of automata theory. In this formal model I exploit the so-called minimal realizations of automata (...)
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  8. added 2019-04-22
    Charles T. Wolfe. Materialism: A Historico-Philosophical Introduction. Dordrecht: Springer, 2016. Pp. Ix+134. $54.99.Noga Arikha - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2):386-391.
  9. added 2019-03-18
    Varieties of Cognitive Integration.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Noûs.
    Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in (...)
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  10. added 2018-08-20
    The Swapping Constraint.Henry Schiller - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):605-622.
    Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same (...)
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  11. added 2018-06-20
    Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory D. Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283.
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
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  12. added 2018-03-06
    Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):1-20.
    In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word ‘process’. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive—as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-17
    Natural Minds.Thomas W. Polger - 2004 - Bradford.
    In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain -- that sensations are brain processes -- and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties -- a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily indentical to brains, a position held by (...)
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  14. added 2018-02-17
    Functional Concepts, Referentially Opaque Contexts, Causal Relations, and the Definition of Theoretical Terms.Michael Tooley - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (3):251-279.
    In his recent article, "Self-Consciousness", George Bealer has set out a novel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophy of mind. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannot be sustained. In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main theses. The first is connected with the problem of defining theoretical predicates that occur in theories where the following two features are present: first, the theoretical predicate in question occurs within both extensional and non-extensional contexts; (...)
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  15. added 2018-02-17
    Philosophical Functionalism: A Reply to Double.Andrew Ward - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):155-158.
    In his recent article "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism," Richard Double argues that there are some fairly forceful a priori arguments showing that Philosophical Functionalism cannot provide adequate explanations for phenomenal states, the nonphenomenal conscious states of common sense, and the theoretical states of cognitive psychology and linquistics. In this paper it is argued that none of Double's arguments are successful.
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  16. added 2017-08-10
    Some Concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s View.Mark Couch - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430.
    This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors’ framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say about (...)
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  17. added 2017-01-26
    Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...)
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  18. added 2017-01-18
    Multiple Realizability: Also a Difficulty for Functionalism.Mehdi Nasrin - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):25-34.
    Functionalism argues that since any mental state can be realized by different physical systems, it is therefore wrong to define or identify a mental state of an organism by the corresponding physical-chemical state of its body . In this paper, I argue that since a single mental state can also be realized in different functional patterns, multiple realizability creates the same problem for functionalism. This means that it is wrong to implicitly define a mental state by its causal role in (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-08
    Against A Posteriori Functionalism.Marc A. Moffett - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-08
    Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective.Thomas Hofweber & Paul M. Churchland - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33 - 50.
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    Functionalism as a Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:185-204.
    A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...)
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  22. added 2016-10-09
    Realization and Multiple Realization, Chicken and Egg.Thomas W. Polger - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):862-877.
    A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain (...)
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  23. added 2016-09-16
    Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind.Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.) - 2007 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  24. added 2016-05-25
    Responsibility and Vigilance.Samuel Murray - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):507-527.
    My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some (...)
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  25. added 2016-01-05
    Plantinga, Sosa, and the Swampman.Jim Slagle - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (4):687-700.
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  26. added 2015-10-16
    Representation Without Symbol Systems.Stephen M. Kosslyn & Gary Hatfield - 1984 - Social Research 51:1019-1045.
    The concept of representation has become almost inextricably bound to the concept of symbol systems. the concepts is nowhere more prevalent than in descriptions of "internal representations." These representations are thought to occur in an internal symbol system that allows the brain to store and use information. In this paper we explore a different approach to understanding psychological processes, one that retains a commitment to representations and computations but that is not based on the idea that information must be stored (...)
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  27. added 2015-10-15
    Representation and Rule-Instantiation in Connectionist Systems.Gary Hatfield - 1991 - In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    There is disagreement over the notion of representation in cognitive science. Many investigators equate representations with symbols, that is, with syntactically defined elements in an internal symbol system. In recent years there have been two challenges to this orthodoxy. First, a number of philosophers, including many outside the symbolist orthodoxy, have argued that "representation" should be understood in its classical sense, as denoting a "stands for" relation between representation and represented. Second, there has been a growing challenge to orthodoxy under (...)
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  28. added 2015-08-20
    The Tale of Bella and Creda.Scott Sturgeon - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types (...)
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  29. added 2015-06-29
    On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth.Cory D. Wright - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
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  30. added 2015-06-20
    Embodied Functionalism and Inner Complexity: Simon’s 21st-Century Mind.Robert D. Rupert - 2016 - In R. Frantz and L. Marsh (ed.), Minds, Models, and Milieux: Commemorating the Centennial of the Birth of Herbert Simon. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 7–33.
    This chapter argues that Simon anticipated what has emerged as the consensus view about human cognition: embodied functionalism. According to embodied functionalism, cognitive processes appear at a distinctively cognitive level; types of cognitive processes (such as proving a theorem) are not identical to kinds of neural processes, because the former can take various physical forms in various individual thinkers. Nevertheless, the distinctive characteristics of such processes — their causal structures — are determined by fine-grained properties shared by various, often especially (...)
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  31. added 2015-04-11
    From Aristotle’s Teleology to Darwin’s Genealogy: The Stamp of Inutility, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 (Pdf: Contents, Introduction).Marco Solinas - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Starting with Aristotle and moving on to Darwin, Marco Solinas outlines the basic steps from the birth, establishment and later rebirth of the traditional view of living beings, and its overturning by evolutionary revolution. The classic framework devised by Aristotle was still dominant in the 17th Century world of Galileo, Harvey and Ray, and remained hegemonic until the time of Lamarck and Cuvier in the 19th Century. Darwin's breakthrough thus takes on the dimensions of an abandonment of the traditional finalistic (...)
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  32. added 2015-04-03
    The Causal Role Argument Against Doxasticism About Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
  33. added 2015-03-08
    The Functionalist's Body.Robert D. Rupert - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (2):258-268.
  34. added 2015-01-15
    Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization.Kevin Morris - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
    Realization can be roughly understood as a kind of role-playing, a relationship between a property that plays a role and a property characterized by that role. This rough sketch previously received only moderate elaboration; recently, however, several substantive theories of realization have been proposed. But are there any general constraints on a theory of realization? What is a theory of realization supposed to accomplish? I first argue that a view of realization is viable, in part, to the extent that physical (...)
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  35. added 2015-01-15
    Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras.Kevin Morris - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657.
    In his recent article ‘Consciousness and Reduction’, Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws. Introduction Nagelian Reduction, Functional Reduction, and Bridge Laws Marras on Functional Reduction (...)
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  36. added 2014-04-02
    Minimal Strong Functionalism.Don Ross - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:237-268.
    This paper is motivated by the concern that increasingly fewer philosophers of mind seem prepared to call themselves ‘functionalists’ these days. I suggest that this has less to do with explicit arguments presented against functionalism than with a gradual decay in the clarity of the term’s reference. This decay has two sources: functionalism has involved several different, logically independent research commitments, and it has become tightly associated, to an unnecessary degree, with classical computationalism, a program which is now under severe (...)
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  37. added 2014-04-02
    Functionalism's Impotence.John Weckert - 1990 - Philosophical Inquiry 32 (1-2):32-43.
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  38. added 2014-04-01
    Psychophysical Reductionism Without Type Identities.Justin Tiehen - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):223-236.
    Nonreductive physicalists have a causal exclusion problem. Given certain theses all physicalists accept, including psychophysical supervenience and the causal closure of the physical realm, it is difficult to see how irreducible mental phenomena could make a causal difference to the world. The upshot, according to those who push the problem, is that we must embrace reductive physicalism. Only then is mental causation saved. -/- Grant the argument, at least provisionally. Here our focus is the conditional question: What form should one's (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-31
    Self-Consciousness.George Bealer - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless it incorporates (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-27
    Functionalism’s Methodological Predicament.Brie Gertler - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):77-94.
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  41. added 2014-03-26
    More Trouble for Functionalism.Alan Weir - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):267-293.
    In this paper I highlight certain logical and metaphysical issues which arise in the characterisation of functionalism-in particular its ready coherence with a physicalist ontology, its structuralism and the impredicativity of functionalist specifications. I then utilise these points in an attempt to demonstrate fatal flaws in the functionalist programme. I argue that the brand of functionalism inspired by David Lewis fails to accommodate multiple realisability though such accommodation was vaunted as a key improvement over the identity theory. More standard accounts (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-25
    Animal Animation.Andrew Gleeson - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):137-169.
    The original publication can be found at www.springerlink.com.
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  43. added 2014-03-25
    Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh.George Bealer - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.
    This paper begins with a brief summary of the Self-consciousness Argument, developed in the author’s paper “Self-consciousness.” (This argument is designed to refute the extant versions of functionalism -- American functionalism, Australian functionalism, and language-of-thought functionalism.) After this summary is given, two thesis are defended. The first is that the Self-consciousness Argument is not guilty of a Fregean equivocation regarding embedded occurrences of mental predicates, as has been suggested by many commentators, including Mark McCullagh. The second thesis is that the (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-25
    Functionalism and Self-Consciousness.Mark McCullagh - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.
    I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-24
    Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking has No Functional Definition.George Bealer - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328.
    Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-20
    Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism.David Pineda - 2001 - Theoria 16 (40):43-63.
    Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of these difficulties (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-19
    In Defence of Functionalism.Jing Zhu - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):95-99.
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  48. added 2014-03-19
    The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail.George Bealer - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can be defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction of ontologically prior realizations. Ideological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only be defined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of their interaction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argument establishes: ontological functionalism is mistaken because its proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations into the contents of self-consciousness; ideological functionalism is the only viable alternative for functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-17
    Functionalism and Logical Analysis.Paul Livingston - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 19.
    After more than thirty-five years of debate and discussion, versions of the functionalist theory of mind originating in the work of Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and David Lewis still remain the most popular positions among philosophers of mind on the nature of mental states and processes. Functionalism has enjoyed such popularity owing, at least in part, to its claim to offer a plausible and compelling description of the nature of the mental that is also consistent with an underlying physicalist or (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-15
    Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub‐Types.Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1 – 17.
    The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub-types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim's argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub-types. Each of these sub-types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, (...)
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