Future Generations

In this paper, I propose a refined version of Seana Shiffrin’s consent argument for anti-natalism and argue that longtermism is best justified not through the traditional consequentialist approach, but from an anti-natalist perspective. I first reformulate Shiffrin’s consent argument, which claims that having children is pro tanto morally problematic because the unconsented harm the child will suffer could not be justified by the benefits they will enjoy, by including what I call the trivializing requirement to better accommodate various criticisms. Based (...) on this iteration of anti-natalism, I argue that future generations should not be seen as far away strangers who are merely anonymous bearers of well-being, but rather as collective victims of the wrongful acts of procreation. As a result, anti-natalism provides us with a rational ground to put a key moral priority on improving the future, not only as restitution to future generations for the unconsented harm imposed on them, but also as part of a long-term effort to nullify the anti-natalist criticism, since the consent argument would no longer apply if our society eventually becomes so utopian that the positive aspects of the average person’s life vastly outweigh its negative aspects. (shrink)

Wie sollen individuelle, miteinander konkurrierende Ansprüche gegeneinander abgewogen werden? Die gerechtigkeitstheoretischen Herausforderungen wachsen, wenn künftige Personen mit einbezogen werden. Mit dem Schritt von rein intra- zu intergenerationeller Gerechtigkeit sind die Ansprüche nicht mehr nur im Raum, sondern auch in der Zeit verteilt. Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der Frage, auf welche Weise die so verteilten Ansprüche zusammengeführt werden sollen. Dazu wird zwischen einer synchronen und einer diachronen Gerechtigkeitskonzeption unterschieden. Erstere sieht die zeitliche Dimension als Erweiterung der räumlichen: Zunächst setzt sie jene (...) Ansprüche, die zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt innerhalb einer Generation existieren, zueinander in Beziehung. Die so zusammengeführten generationellen Ansprüche werden anschließend entlang der Zeit gegeneinander abgewogen. Letztere hingegen verwirft die Generation als relevante Gruppe, um die Bedürfnisse des Individuums zu vertreten. Stattdessen basiert sie auf der Idee transgenerationeller Gemeinschaften. Sie stellt individuelle Ansprüche zunächst innerhalb der jeweiligen, zeitlich ausgedehnten Gemeinschaft einander gegenüber. Anschließend setzt sie dann diese Gemeinschaften zueinander in Beziehung. Bestehende Theorien generationenübergreifender Gerechtigkeit verfolgen dabei zumeist eine Extensionsstrategie: Sie erweitern eine bestehende intragenerationelle Theorie um die zeitliche Dimension hin zur Intergenerationalität. Dies entspricht einer synchronen Konzeption, die jedoch oftmals nichts expliziert wird. Demgegenüber entwickelt der Beitrag zwei Argumente für die diachrone Alternative. Konzentrieren wir uns weniger auf Forderungen ganzer Generationen, sondern auf Bedürfnisse künftiger Mitglieder unserer transgenerationellen Gemeinschaften, so werden wir, erstens, der motivationalen Herausforderung besser gerecht werden. Sie besteht in der Beantwortung der Frage, warum wir im heutigen Handeln überhaupt Raum für nachfolgende Interessen schaffen sollten. Innerhalb transgenerationeller Gemeinschaften stehen diese nachfolgenden Interessen jedoch nicht in Isolation, sondern sind durch Interaktion innerhalb der Gemeinschaft geprägt und erlauben uns damit, unsere eigenen Interessen über das eigene Leben hinaus zu verwirklichen. Zweitens können wir so auch der epistemischen Herausforderung begegnen. Diese stellt sich angesichts der Frage, worin eigentlich die nachfolgenden Interessen bestehen. Greifen wir sie nicht als kollektive Wünsche ganzer Generationen auf, sondern als die Pläne und Projekte künftiger Mitglieder unserer Gemeinschaft, so wird es leichter sein, vom Heute auf die Zukunft und ihre Bedürfnisse zu schließen. Die Forderung, künftige Ansprüche im heutigen Handeln zu berücksichtigen, wirft die Frage nach dem ‚Warum‘ und die nach dem ‚Wie‘ auf. Beiden kann eine diachrone Konzeption intergenerationeller Gerechtigkeit eher begegnen. (shrink)

Demonstrates the fertility of the phenomenological tradition of philosophy for intergenerational justice and climate ethics.--In the face of the current environmental crisis, relations with future people—overlapping generations and more distant ones—have moved to the top of political and scholarly agendas. The anthology proposed here seeks to demonstrate the enormous fertility of philosophical phenomenology in accounting for relations among different generations. This is due to phenomenology’s rich reflections on the role of time in the constitution of the social-historical world and its (...) relation to the environment. The volume will boast 11 chapters from different authors across the spectrum of phenomenological currents and subfields, from Husserl and Heidegger to Jonas, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. A connecting thread will be the relations among mortality, natality, and generativity in connecting as well as separating generations. Authors will reflect on the social-ontological and normative significance of these connections, paying particular attention to political and environmental obligations to people living in the future. (shrink)

Se realizó un breve repaso al pensamiento ambientalista jonasiano, de inspiración aristotélica y kantiana, pero con novedosos aportes. El fin fue demostrar la utilidad (y actualidad) de la teleología de Hans Jonas en el desarrollo de las éticas ambientales; finalidad ésta, de especial importancia para el mundo iberoamericano debido a la aún poca difusión de su obra y a la no pérdida de vigencia. Para el efecto, presentamos los temas núcleo de su ética ambiental de manera analítica y crítica, a (...) través de una lectura lógica especulativa de sus principales textos y de algunas interpretaciones actuales de reconocidos autores. Recorrimos desde la cuestión de la «irrupción» de las generaciones futuras en el horizonte teórico, anterior a él pero de poco desarrollo en el ámbito de la ciencia; la necesidad de una nueva ética, de carácter ambiental, a la cual desarrolló «actualizando» la propuesta kantiana; el papel de la técnica moderna (tecnología) y el poder enorme que deriva de la misma, a pesar de su ligazón al cortoplacismo; y, finalmente el teleologismo, una manera original de abordar la cuestión ambiental y que situó al autor en la frontera entre el antropocentrismo y el ecocentrismo. Como resultado, su filosofía apostó por conceder valores intrínsecos a la Naturaleza y estableció un principio de responsabilidad, el cual que resultará en un importante fuente teórica para el principio de precaución hoy tan vigente en la legislación europea y de otros países, con sus aplicaciones medioambientales y para la salud humana. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a neglected aspect of the value of hope in Kant’s philosophy. I do so by homing in on Section III of the 1793 essay “On the Common Saying.” In my interpretation, Kant argues that if one recognizes obligations to help future generations while also encountering people who violate these obligations, one is more likely to isolate oneself from society—what Kant calls the hatred of humanity or misanthropy. Thus, the paper argues that hope is valuable for (...) combating misanthropy, especially in the pursuit of intergenerational moral goals. (shrink)

This chapter advocates for a naturalistic ethical framework that bases normative components in basic human functions, such as emotions, as an effective approach to address intergenerational ethics questions. Using Mencius’s ethical framework as an example, which establishes emotional pivot points to incorporate others’ concerns and worries into moral deliberation, the chapter argues that this approach provides significant theoretical advantages over frameworks that rely on a familial-role-based relational understanding of Confucian ethics and moral cultivation through rituals. The chapter also highlights the (...) flexibility and adaptability of Mencian ethics, which was redeveloped over a thousand years later during the Neo-Confucian flowering and serves as evidence of its philosophical framework’s ability to connect people emotionally and ethically across time. (shrink)

Grill (2023) defends the sum of averages view (SAV), on which the value of a population is found by summing the average welfare of each generation or birth cohort. A major advantage of SAV, according to Grill, is that it escapes the Egyptology objection to average utilitarianism. But, we argue, SAV escapes only the most literal understanding of this objection, since it still allows the value of adding a life to depend on facts about other, intuitively irrelevant lives. Moreover, SAV (...) has a decisive drawback not shared with either average or total utilitarianism: it can evaluate an outcome in which every individual is worse off as better overall, even when exactly the same people exist in both outcomes. These problems, we argue, afflict not only Grill's view but any view that uses a sum of subpopulation averages, apart from the limiting cases of average and total utilitarianism. (shrink)

To what extent do we value future generations? It may seem from our behavior that we don’t value future generations much at all, at least in relation to how much we value present generations. However, in his book _Death and the Afterlife_, Samuel Scheffler argues that we value the future even _more_ than we value the present, even though this is not immediately apparent to us. If Scheffler’s argument is sound, then it has important ramifications: It would give us a (...) strong motivation to put more energy into abating environmental crises like climate change, and it supports at least a limited form of ethical _longtermism_. However, in this paper, I show that Scheffler’s argument is fallacious. Scheffler claims that we do not regard the fact that we in the present generation will all die relatively soon as a catastrophe, but we do regard the non-existence of future generations as a catastrophe. But the particular scenario used by Scheffler to illustrate this point—the plot of the book _The Children of Men_—is one in which _both_ the present generation will perish _and_ there will be no future generations, and it is this _conjunction_ that is catastrophic, thus giving no information about which is worse. I suggest other ways to compare our valuations of present and future generations, and recommend that philosophers who are interested in the moral psychology of how we value future generations ought to engage with social science, as it is an empirical issue. (shrink)

La imaginación es una facultad que permite al ser humano ponerse en el lugar del otro y tener presentes diferentes puntos de vista. En este artículo examino de qué manera la imaginación puede concebirse en una dimensión ampliada no solo en el espacio sino también en el tiempo, en el sentido de una «visita al otro» futuro. Para este fin, primero examino diversos ejercicios de la imaginación: en tanto que simpatía tal y como la formuló Adam Smith y compromiso según (...) Amartya Sen, pero también en la lectura política que Hannah Arendt realiza de la facultad de juzgar de la filosofía kantiana. Esta idea de la imaginación es promisoria para fundar una responsabilidad basada en lo público y en la deliberación orientada a la construcción del mundo en común, haciéndonos cargo de las necesidades de las generaciones futuras. Pero la imaginación por sí sola no es suficiente, se necesita también una educación del individuo, a la vez que estructuras políticas y económicas que fomenten una ciudadanía activa, crítica y responsable. (shrink)

The focus of this work is to explore the idea of limits within certain scopes where they arguably matter most: those of intergenerational justice and a prospective ethics of the future. When limits are conceived in a nuanced and emancipatory way – as the autonomy and capability to place limits in the current context of environmental crisis, while taking into account our finite nature – the possibility arises to build a concept of responsibility that cares for the well-being of present (...) and future generations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I motivate ‘Origin Conventionalism’—the view that which facts about one’s origins are essential to one’s existence depends partly on our person-directed attitudes. One important upshot is that the view offers a novel and attractive solution to the Nonidentity Problem. That problem typically assumes that the sperm-egg pair from which a person originates is essential to that person’s existence; in which case, for many future persons that come into existence under adverse conditions, had those conditions not been realized, the individuals (...) wouldn’t have existed. This is problematic because it delivers the counter-intuitive conclusion that it’s not wrong to bring about such adverse conditions since they don’t harm anyone. Origin Conventionalism, in contrast, holds that whether a person’s sperm-egg origin is essential to their existence depends on their person-directed attitudes. I argue that this provides a unique and attractive way of preserving the intuition that the actions in the ‘nonidentity cases’ are morally wrong because of the potential harm done to the individuals in question. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the non-reciprocity problem does not apply to intergenerational justice. Future generations impact, here and now, on the well-being of people now living. I firstly illustrate the economic-synchronic model of direct intergenerational reciprocity (DIR): future generations allow people now living to maintain the economic system future-oriented and capital-preserving. The rational choice for people now living is to guarantee transgenerational sufficiency to future generations. I then analyse the axiological-synchronic model of DIR: future generations give meaning and (...) value to many of the activities that people now living carry out, and this is a compelling reason for the latter to worry about the former. I argue that only the economic-synchronic model of DIR can consistently explain why we need future generations. I conclude by discussing the limits of indirect intergenerational reciprocity. (shrink)

In this article, we claim that recent developments in climate science and renewable energy should prompt a reframing of debates surrounding climate change mitigation. Taken together, we argue that these developments suggest (1) global climate collapse in this century is a non-negligible risk, (2) mitigation offers substantial benefits to current generations, and (3) mitigation by some can generate social tipping dynamics that could ultimately make renewables cheaper than fossil fuels. We explain how these claims undermine familiar framings of climate change, (...) wherein mitigation is understood as self-sacrifice that individuals and governments must be morally persuaded or incentivized to undertake. [Open access]. (shrink)

Joseph Heath sometimes plays the role of a gadfly in climate and environmental ethics. He often defends conventional, economics-focused claims which rub many philosophers the wrong way—claims that are at the heart of issues raised in these pages, claims such as that discounting is justifiable, growth is good, or cost-benefit analysis is appropriate in liberal democracies. I think we can all agree that sophisticated defences of conventional positions play an important part in the ecosystem. For philosophers, a gadfly can challenge (...) entrenched conceptions. If we agree that these goals are worthwhile, then this book serves as a useful summary and synthesis of the ways Heath has ably defended conventional claims about climate policy. (shrink)

Many people hold the constraint against doing harm, the view that the reason against doing harm is stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. Mogensen and MacAskill (2021) have recently argued that when considering indirect long-term consequences of our everyday behavior, the constraint against doing harm faces a problem: it has the absurd implication that we should do as little as possible in our lives. In this paper, I explore the view that, for behavior that (...) does not increase anyone’s ex ante risk of suffering harm, the reason against doing harm is not stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. I argue that this view is plausible, show how it solves the paralysis problem, and defend it against objections. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates conceptions of responsibility at work in contemporary intergenerational nuclear waste policy. It argues that articulations of responsibility at work in current policy unduly privileges resemblance to the present as a condition for that responsibility holding as an intergenerational relation. The dissertation begins by arguing that current waste disposal practices depend on a view of responsibility contingent on the presumption that future generations will be minimally epistemologically, socially, and politically continuous with present generations. Extant policy is therefore found (...) to place an asymmetric and unjust burden on future generations. The dissertation thus concludes that responsibilities to future generations require that responsibility be thought prior to particular determinations of the possible identity of our inheritors. (shrink)

It is plausible that current generations owe something to future generations. One possibility is that we have a duty to not harm them. Another possibility is that we have a duty to protect them. In either case, however, to satisfy the duties to future generations from environmental or political degradation, we need to engage in widespread collective action. But, as we are, we have a limited ability to do so, in part because we lack the self-discipline necessary for successful collective (...) action. Given that having an obligation hinges on being able to satisfy it, the apparent duty to future generations is at odds with our apparent inability to satisfy it. Thus, we either need to rethink our duties to future generations or rethink the nature of our abilities. I argue in this chapter that we should rethink the nature of our abilities. Specifically, we should enhance our self-discipline, which is distinct from enhancements of motivation, judgment, or emotion. Even the most intelligent, motivated, and empathetic actor is likely to slip up, which encourages others to withdraw their cooperation. Without the necessary self-discipline to sustain our public cooperative behavior, collective action is likely to fail, leaving us with one alternative: to abandon our duties to future generations. (shrink)

The notion of transgenerational community is usually based on two diachronic interactions. The first interaction consists of present generations taking up the legacy (not only economic, but also institutional, artistic, cultural, and so forth) of past generations and giving it continuity, exercising a form of active agency. The second interaction occurs when present generations pass on their legacy to future generations. This is supposed to expand the boundaries of the community in a transgenerational sense (both backward- and forward-looking). In this (...) article we argue that the transgenerational community can be grounded on a different ontological insight: future generations play the role of fictional actors for present generations, i.e., present generations entertain a present-time interaction with future generations, insofar as future generations are functional for the realization of transgenerational actions. This lays the foundations for more solid community-based bonds of intergenerational justice. (shrink)

The environmental crisis challenges the adequacy of traditional moral theories, particularly in the case of act consequentialism – the view that an act is morally right if and only if it brings about the best available outcome. Although anthropogenic climate change threatens the well-being of billions of humans and trillions of non-human animals, it is difficult for an act consequentialist to condemn actions that contribute to it, as each individual action makes no difference to the probability of whether climate change (...) will occur. Or so one argument goes. This chapter examines the limits and possibilities of a consequentialist approach to climate ethics. It discusses various types of consequentialist theories applicable to the current environmental situation. It outlines outcome-based strategies to address the no-difference problem and to promote individual climate action. Finally, it considers environmental cases of evaluative uncertainty and how a consequentialist could deal with them. (shrink)

قد يكون الانقراض البشري مادة كوابيس تُنذر بتدمير الحضارة الحديثة برُمتها، ولئن كانت الثقافة الشعبية تميل إلى التركيز فقط على أكثر الاحتمالات إثارة؛ كتوقع اصطدام كويكب عملاق بالأرض (فيلم الخيال العلمي الأمريكي «أرمجدون»: 1998)، أو توقع غزو فضائي للأرض (فيلم الخيال العلمي الأمريكي «يوم الاستقلال»: 1996)، فإن التركيز على مثل هذه السيناريوهات قد يعني تجاهل أخطر التهديدات التي تُواجهنا في عالم اليوم، والتي يُمكن أن نفعل شيئًا للحد منها بتبيانها كخطرٍ وجودي، وتكثيف التعاون الدولي لصياغة وتنفيذ التدابير المحتملة للحد من (...) آثارها. (shrink)

I consider whether a positive rate of pure intergenerational time preference is justifiable in terms of agent-relative moral reasons relating to partiality between generations, an idea I call ​discounting for kinship​. I respond to Parfit's objections to discounting for kinship, but then highlight a number of apparent limitations of this approach. I show that these limitations largely fall away when we reflect on social discounting in the context of decisions that concern the global community as a whole.

Kant’s ethics provides surprising resources for addressing duties with respect to climate change. First, I show how Kant’s moral metaphysics, according to which the self is a phenomenon, provides a distinctive ground to mitigate the harm of climate change for future generations. In short, the physical appearances of our actions are grounded in an atemporal existence from which our intrinsic moral value derives. As such, the a priori basis for addressing climate duties to the present is no different from that (...) of duties to address climate duties to the future, though we must consider present circumstances in order to act effectively. Second, I show that recent helpful contributions towards understanding the resources of Kantian ethics for addressing climate face the following prima facie dilemma: perfect duties to reduce emissions are overly demanding because it requires reduction below subsistence levels, while imperfect duties to reduce emissions are not demanding enough to address the climate crisis. Without ruling out the existence of perfect duties to address climate, I analyze the latter horn of the dilemma and show how imperfect duties can be more demanding than one might have thought, given that we are in a climate emergency. Recent work on the role of emergency in Kant’s ethics has shown that there are resources for making sense of the prioritization of some concerns as more pressing. Overall, the aim of this contribution is to highlight some of the prospects and problems that face Kantian approaches to climate ethics. (shrink)

In “Diversifying Effective Altruism’s Longshots in Animal Advocacy”, Matthew C. Halteman acknowledges the value of aspects of the EA method but considers two potential critical concerns. First, it isn’t always clear that effective altruism succeeds in doing the most good, especially where long-shots like foiling misaligned AI or producing meat without animals are concerned. Second, one might worry that investing large sums of money in long-shots like these, even if they do succeed, has the opportunity cost of failing adequately to (...) combat systemic injustice in the shorter term. This chapter explains each of these reservations and goes on to suggest some exciting new initiatives—institution-building in Black veganism, higher education, and religious communities—that could mitigate these reservations, energize and diversify the movement, and remain true to the EA method of supporting underexploited but potentially high-impact causes that produce non-fungible goods otherwise unlikely to be funded. (shrink)

This contribution provides an overview of the main principles discussed in the literature regarding the global allocation of climate mitigation and adaptation duties. I distinguish between historically informed and non-historically informed views. Concerning historically informed views, I highlight the main strengths and weaknesses of the PPP and different versions of the BPP. At the same time, I analyse the APP as the main example of a non-historically informed view on how to globally allocate climate duties. I explain how both kinds (...) of principles need to accommodate justice-based and feasibility-based concerns. (shrink)

The problem of future generations is a growing ethical issue. There are ongoing discussions about what kind of earth we are leaving and what we should leave to future generations as a result of the delayed awareness – if not ignorance – of the fact that this World does not belong to us exclusively. When we look at the example of Turkey, we can see that there is a huge conflict between environmental utilization and environmental education. On the one hand, (...) we have classes on the environment and its health; on the other hand, it is a reality that we have a not-so-eco-friendly government policy, which takes no notice of any kind of environmental issues or requirements. To mention but few, governmental insistence on real estate investments in green spaces, even by covering grade 1 natural site areas, a decline in the extent of agricultural land due to uncontrollable urbanization, and hydroelectric power plant projects are among recent events. These are the instances of conflicts between inscriptive and operative environmental policies in Turkey. The purpose of this article is to call attention to this dilemma and to assert that ecocide might be just another kind of genocide for Turkey, i.e., the genocide-yet-to-come. (shrink)

In constructivist contractualist theories, such as Rawls’, principles of justice should mirror beliefs that we all, in some sense, share. One would then arrive at principles that everybody could, in that sense, accept. These principles should specify, among other things, to whom to distribute the relevant benefits and burdens and to whom to assign responsibility for the distribution. In addition to this classical assignment problem, however, constructivist contractualism must also deal with a new, and quite different, assignment problem sincewhat to (...) count as beliefs that weall share depends on how the set of people that make up the “we” is delimited. Thus, for constructivist contractualism, the questions of whom to assign a part in the justification procedure and whom to exclude, and how to justify these inclusions and exclusions, are of crucial importance. In this chapter we consider the inclusion or exclusion of future generations, and how this case illuminates a general problem for constructivist contractualism. (shrink)

Climate change is one of the most important and complex problems of the modern age. The sheer scale of the harm produced, coupled with the fact that the changes are human-induced, necessitates a duty to prevent climate-induced impacts. There is a growing literature exploring how costs and benefits should be shared at national, state and generational levels. This chapter adds to this literature by exploring how normatively guided plans could be hindered by barriers beyond distributive justice frameworks and their subsequent (...) applications. Even if we recognise a prima face duty to mitigate climate change impacts, there are motivational barriers that could block people from making the requisite changes – motivational barriers that ultimately curtail the effectiveness of climate mitigation strategies. After outlining each of these barriers, this chapter then argues that insights from local food movements could provide novel strategies to potentially address each of the barriers above, as they have leveraged normative arguments to motivate individual and collective action. Lessons from food-focused activism, coupled with normatively guided strategies for sharing costs and benefits, has the potential to help communities work towards effectively addressing climate change. (shrink)

Climate change increasingly impacts the resilience of ecosystems and agricultural production. On the one hand, changing weather patterns negatively affect crop yields and thus global food security. Indeed, we live in an age where more than one billion people are going hungry, and this number is expected to rise as climate-induced change continues to displace communities and thus separate them from their means of food production (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). In this context, if one accepts a humancentric ethic, then (...) the focus would be on addressing impacts to agricultural production, and thus food security (Borlaug 1997; Navin 2012). On the other hand, ecological resilience is also being impacted by climate change, as species go extinct or migrate due to fluctuating temperatures and shifting weather patterns. This reduction of resilience negatively impacts ecosystem services and the ability of the natural world to support life (Palmer and Larson 2014; Urban 2015). From an environmental holist perspective, then, one could argue that the ethical path would be to focus on reducing negative impacts to species and/or local ecosystems rather than increasing crop yields. Thus, there appears to be a tension between the prioritization of crop yields and the mitigation of ecosystem impacts. While this tension is well established in the agricultural literature (Kirschenmann 2010; Noll 2018), climatezas lochange exacerbates the situation, as agricultural lands are stressed and climate-induced migrations increase already high demands for foodstuffs, thus bringing the conflict to the forefront (Macdonald et al. 2015; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2017a). (shrink)

Despite recognizing many adverse impacts, the climate science literature has had little to say about the conditions under which climate change might threaten civilization. Discussions of the mechanisms whereby climate change might cause the collapse of current civilizations has mostly been the province of journalists, philosophers, and novelists. We propose that this situation should change. In this opinion piece, we call for treating the mechanisms and uncertainties associated with climate collapse as a critically important topic for scientific inquiry. Doing so (...) requires clarifying what "civilization collapse" means and explaining how it connects to topics addressed by climate scientists. [Open access] -/- . (shrink)

Written both for general readers and college students, Dialogues on Climate Justice provides an engaging philosophical introduction to climate justice, and should be of interest to anyone wanting to think seriously about the climate crisis. -/- The story follows the life and conversations of Hope, a fictional protagonist whose life is shaped by a terrifyingly real problem: climate change. From the election of Donald Trump in 2016 until the 2060s, the book documents Hope’s discussions with a diverse cast of characters. (...) As she ages, her conversations move from establishing the nature of the problem, to engaging with climate skepticism, to exploring her own climate responsibilities, through managing contentious international negotiations, to considering big technological fixes, and finally, as an older woman, to reflecting with her granddaughter on what one generation owes another. Following a philosophical tradition established by Plato more than two thousand years ago, these dialogues are not only philosophically substantive and carefully argued, but also distinctly human. The differing perspectives on display mirror those involved in real-world climate dialogues going on today. (shrink)

The collapse of society is inevitable, even if it is in the distant future. When it collapses, it is likely to do so within the lifetimes of some people. These people will have matured in pre-collapse society, experience collapse, and then live the remainder of their lives in the post-collapse world. I argue that this group of people—the transitional generation—will be the worst off from societal collapse, far worse than subsequent generations. As the transitional generation, they will suffer disparately. This (...) intergenerational disparity in suffering is inequitable. Given that other disparities in suffering are worthy of remediation, this intergenerational disparity in suffering is worthy of remediation. However, the only way to do so is to target the mental states of the members of the transitional generation. (shrink)

Political actions by Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, and other climate activists often involve violations of legal regulations – such as compulsory education requirements or traffic laws – and have been criticized for this in the public sphere. In this essay, I defend the view that these violations of the law constitute a form of morally justified civil disobedience against climate policies. I first show that these actions satisfy the criteria of civil disobedience even on relatively strict conceptions of civil (...) disobedience. I then argue that they meet plausible justification conditions for civil disobedience because they are directed against serious and clear injustices, which legal means of influence have failed to remedy for decades. Finally, I reject the objection that civil disobedience against climate policy violates basic democratic principles because it claims authority to override democratically enacted agreements. When addressed to Fridays for Future activists, the objection misfires for the reason alone that these activists are largely minors that are excluded from democratic participation. Moreover, disobedience even by adult activists is justified by the existence of serious democratic deficits in our climate policies, especially since it can help to correct them. Such deficits include the lack of representation of the interests of people affected by climate change in the future and globally. (shrink)

Individual and collective agents, especially affluent ones, are not doing nearly enough to prevent and prepare for the worst consequences of the unfolding climate crisis. This is, I suggest, partly because our existing conceptual repertoires are inadequate to the task of motivating climate-stabilizing activities. I argue that the concept CLIMATE LEGACY meets five desiderata for concepts that, through usage, have significant potential to motivate climate action. Contrasting CLIMATE LEGACY with CARBON FOOTPRINT, CLIMATE JUSTICE, and CARBON NEUTRALITY, I clarify some advantages (...) of thinking in terms of the former. I conclude by discussing some climate legacy-enhancing practical proposals that merit consideration. (shrink)

The article reviews on the technical attributes on current technologies deployed in outer space and those that are being developed and mass produced. The article refutes the Chinese state-controlled Xinhua News’ propaganda several years ago on objecting America’s deployment of nuclear technologies in outer space with rigorous scientific evidence. Furthermore, the article warns on the dangers of physical signals applied in outer space technologies that can threaten the solar system, especially the Mozi quantum satellite with photon beams. The article concludes (...) with the illicit practices by the Chinese state party with militant ambitions in the supposedly scientific institutions. It violates the spirit on the peaceful use of outer space, and goes against the 2222 (XXI) resolution adopted by the general assembly, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. (shrink)

Much of the climate justice discussion revolves around how the remaining carbon budget should be globally allocated. Some authors defend the unjust enrichment interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). According to this principle, those states unjustly enriched from historical emissions should pay. I argue that if the BPP is to be constructed along the lines of the unjust enrichment doctrine, countervailing reasons that might be able to block the existence of a duty of restitution should be assessed. One might (...) think that the duty to provide restitution no longer has moral weight if many benefits were already consumed, if the particular benefits obtained from historical emissions cannot be transferred from one country to another, or if present members of developed countries framed their life plans based upon the expectation of continued possession of those benefits. I show that none of these reasons negate the duty to provide restitution. (shrink)

Katz denies that organisms created in a lab as part of a de-extinction attempt will be authentic members of the extinct species, on the basis that they will lack the original species’ defining biological and evolutionary history. Against Katz, I note that an evolutionary lineage is conferred on an organism through its inheriting genes from forebears already possessed of such a lineage, and that de-extinction amounts to a delayed, human-assisted reproductive process, in which genes are inherited from forebears long dead. (...) My conclusion is that de-extinct organisms can perfectly well have an ancient evolutionary history, contrary to what Katz claims. (shrink)

Emissions trading, also known as cap-and-trade systems, has not yet fulfilled its function of mitigating overall global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The reasons for this failure are manifold and have been broadly discussed at political and empirical levels in the last decades. However, much can still be said from a philosophical perspective. Such an analysis is not limited to the evaluation of cap-and-trade systems’ lack of efficiency and the consequences arising from it but goes deeper into the moral questions underlying (...) cap-and-trade systems. This is how this paper attempts to contribute to and expand the debate on emissions trading at different levels. By examining a popular analogy between traditional and climate commons, I challenge some of the economic and normative assumptions at the core of cap-and-trade systems. I argue that these assumptions lead to misguided conclusions in responding to the causes of climate change. This will partly explain why, although emissions trading is intended to fulfil a duty to mitigate greenhouse gases, we should not pin all our hopes on it just yet. (shrink)

In this article, I present a view on the future of nuclear war which takes into account the expected technological progress as well as global political changes. There are three main directions in which technological progress in nuclear weapons may happen: a) Many gigaton scale weapons. b) Cheaper nuclear bombs which are based on the use of the reactor-grade plutonium, laser isotope separation or are hypothetical pure fusion weapons. Also, advanced nanotechnology will provide the ability to quickly build large nuclear (...) arsenals and AI could be used in designing, manufacturing and nuclear strategy planning. c) Specialized nukes like nuclear-powered space lasers, hafnium bombs and nuclear-powered space ships as kinetic weapons. Meanwhile, the nuclear war strategy also has changed as the bipolar world has ended and as new types of weapons are becoming available. The first strategy change is that Doomsday weapons for blackmail will become attractive for weaker countries which can’t use ICBM to penetrate the anti-missile defense of the enemies. Secondly, the cheaper nukes will become available to smaller actors, who may be involved in “worldwide guerilla”. Cheaper nukes and a larger number of actors also encourage nuclear terrorism and anonymous or false-flag warfare. This will result in the normalization of the use of nuclear weapons in war and growing nuclear arsenals, now distributed between many countries. The third change of the strategy is the use of nukes not against primary military targets but on other objects, which could increase their effects: nuclear power plants, supervolcanos, EMP, tsunamis, taiga fires for global cooling, and even more hypothetical things like asteroid deflection to Earth. All these unconventional means and strategies of nuclear war could become available somewhere in the 21st century and may cause or contribute to the civilizational collapse and even human extinction. (shrink)

O homem no decorrer de sua evolução social sempre pôs a natureza como um objeto e dificilmente pensou ela como sendo parte de um complexo sistema influenciável pelos fatores humanos. Apesar da atualidade desse debate, a constituição brasileira de 1988 apresenta em diversas normas, a proteção do meio ambiente e a defesa do desenvolvimento sustentável como valor constitucional. Porém, desde a materialização desses princípios, pode-se perceber que as concepções defendidas não estão sendo defendidas ou interpretadas de acordo com o que (...) as normas expressam. (shrink)

Discussions of the non-identity problem presuppose a widely shared intuition that actions or policies that change who comes into existence don't, thereby, become morally unproblematic. We hypothesize that this intuition isn’t generally shared by the public, which could have widespread implications concerning how to generate support for large-scale, identity-affecting policies relating to matters like climate change. To test this, we ran a version of the well-known dictator game designed to mimic the public's behavior over identity-affecting choices. We found the public (...) does seem to behave more selfishly when making identity-affecting choices, which should be concerning. We further hypothesized that one possible mechanism is the notion of harm the public uses in their decision-making and find that substantial portions of the population seem to each employ distinct notions of harm in their normative thinking. These findings raise puzzling features about the public’s normative thinking that call out for further empirical examination. (shrink)

There are two accounts of the normative foundation of intergenerationel business ethics, agent-variant theories and agent-invariant theories. Each of them faces a specific challenge: agent-variant theories have to deal with the inverse non-identity problem, while agent-invariant theories are vulnerable to the moral crowding-out effect. Both are particularly difficult to deal with within a reductivist approach that conceives of corporations as distinct moral agents whose responsibility cannot be reduced to the responsibility of either individual agents or higher-level institutions. This might be (...) a reason to favour reductivist approaches in intergenerational contexts. (shrink)

We claim the climate crisis is the proper baseline for establishing the terms of debate about the viability of a post-work future. In this paper, we aim to assess the viability of a post-work future in which automation replaces a significant portion of human labor. We do this by laying out the possible outcomes of what such a future will look like based on three related axes: technological capacity, politics and social distribution, and alternative conceptions of the good. The purpose (...) in tracking these outcomes is to have a clear picture of those outcomes we should be pursuing in contrast to those we ought to avoid. Put another way, to achieve a post-work future that is egalitarian in character will require ensuring that technological capacity is used to improve the prospects for all humanity. The argument proceeds along the following lines. First, we summarize the scientific consensus about the causes and consequences of climate change, as well as the tools of mitigation and adaptation it recommends. The causes are primarily rooted in the global system of production and consumption that has developed over the last century. We refer to this pattern of development as the “Growth Model” since it primarily relies on energy created from burning fossil fuels and the exponential consumption of resources to promote more growth (Rose 2020). Second, we construct a range of possible outcomes regarding the climate crisis that are based on different trajectories of development. We do so by examining each of two cases located on the poles of three different axes. These axes include technology, political organization and social distribution, and conceptions of the good, yielding eight possible outcomes. The point of considering these cases and how they intersect along these axes is two-fold: to clarify the features that define them and compare their merits and drawbacks, enabling us to formulate the means for avoiding some outcomes and strive for others. Third, we then consider the viability of a post-work future in terms of these outcomes. Some of these outcomes point in a direction where automation replaces labor, and its benefits are shared widely. Others indicate a future in which some groups benefit at the expense of others, while some appear to preclude the emergence of such a future altogether. Finally, we conclude with some observations about the viability of a post-work future given our evaluation of these outcomes. (shrink)

Large-scale, self-sufficient space colonization is a plausible means of efficiently reducing existential risks and ensuring our long-term survival. But humanity is by and large myopic, and as an intergenerational global public good, existential risk reduction is systematically undervalued, hampered by intergenerational discounting. This paper explores how these issues apply to space colonization, arguing that the motivational and psychological barriers to space colonization are a special—and especially strong—case of a more general problem. The upshot is not that large-scale, self-sufficient space colonization (...) will never occur, but that, absent institutional change, the conditions under which it is most likely to occur are precisely those conditions where the threat of suffering risks might be most high. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the relationship between the supersession thesis and the rights of future people. In particular, I show that changes in circumstances might supersede future people’s rights. I argue that appropriating resources that belong to future people does not necessarily result in a duty to return the resources in full. I explore how these findings are relevant for climate change justice. Assuming future generations of developing countries originally had a right to use a certain amount of the (...) carbon budget, changing circumstances could result in rights-supersession. Consequently, members of future generations of industrialized countries may be allowed to use part of the share of the carbon budget belonging to developing countries. (shrink)

Representing unborn generations to more suitably include future interests in today's climate policymaking has sparked much interest in recent years. In this review we survey the main proposed instruments to achieve this effect, some of which have been attempted in polities such as Israel, Philippines, Wales, Finland, and Chile. We first review recent normative work on the idea of representing future people in climate governance: The grounds on which it has been advocated, and the main difficulties that traditional forms of (...) representation have encountered when applied to this particular case. We then survey existing institutional means to represent generations to come. We separate out representation in courts, in parliament, and by independent bodies, and review specific instruments including climate litigation, parliamentary commissions, future representatives, youth quotas, and independent offices for future generations. We examine the particular forms whereby each of these may suitably represent future people, including audience representation, surrogate representation, and indicative representation, and discuss the main challenges they encounter in so doing. (shrink)