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  1. added 2020-05-21
    Anscombe on Acting for Reasons.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.
    This chapter discusses some of Anscombe’s contributions to the philosophy of practical reason. It focuses particularly on Anscombe’s view of what it is to act for reasons. I begin by discussing the relationship between acting intentionally and acting for reasons in Anscombe's theory of action. I then further explicate her view by discussing her rejection of two related views about acting for reasons: causalism (the view that reasons are a kind of cause of actions) and psychologism (the view that reasons (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-31
    Anscombe and the Unity of Intention.Noam Melamed - 2020 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 64:113-133.
    The conviction that ‘intention’ is not semantically ambiguous but has a single and distinctive meaning frames the argument of Anscombe’s masterwork Intention. What this meaning is, however, is barely recognizable in her book. One reason for this difficulty is that Intention starts from a threefold division of the appearance of the concept in our natural language and proceeds to develop its various accounts piecemeal. Another is the obscurity of the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ it introduces, precisely for shedding the light (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-10
    Anscombe's Intentions.Constantine Sandis - 2016 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 35:74-89.
  4. added 2020-03-06
    Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):578-602.
    The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characterizations converge on (...)
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  5. added 2020-02-08
    Intention and Mental Causation.Rémi Clot-Goudard - forthcoming - Foundations of Science.
    Many philosophers nowadays take for granted a causalist view of action explanation, according to which intentional action is a movement caused by mental antecedents. For them, “the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our mental states – our beliefs, desires, and intentions – have causal effects in the physical world: in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways” (Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge (MA), (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-08
    Book Review:An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus G. E. M. Anscombe.James D. Carney - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (4):408-408.
  7. added 2019-11-08
    Anscombe on the Philosophy of Psychology as Propaedeutic to Ethics.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2014 - In Matteo Galletti (ed.), La mente morale. Persone, ragioni, virtù. Rome, Italy: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. pp. 17-62.
    The chapter reconstructs and criticizes one of Anscombe's famous three these, namely the claim that a ‘philosophy of psychology’ is a preliminary task to the construction of any possible ethical theory, or that moral philosophy ‘should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. The claim is that Anscombe’s idea of a philosophy of psychology cannot be simply identified with that of moral psychology with which we are familiar (...)
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  8. added 2019-11-03
    On Anscombe's Philosophical Method [Reprint From Klesis Revue Philosophique].Ulf Hlobil & Katharina Nieswandt - 2019 - In John Haldane (ed.), The Life and Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe. Exeter: Imprint Academic. pp. 42-61.
    While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from current alternatives in metaphilosophy. Here (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-08
    Somervilleskolans filosofiska program.Frits Gåvertsson - 2019 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 40 (3):39-47.
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  10. added 2019-10-08
    Affinity and Reason to Love.Alexander Jech - 2013 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):117-136.
    What is the nature of our reasons for loving something? Why does a particular person or activity stimulate our imagination and hopes more deeply than others do? Is the reason in the object of our affection or in ourselves? Much philosophical debate revolves around this dichotomy between objective and subjective reasons for loving. In this paper I will instead propose that our reasons are primarily relational, having to do with the concept of affinity. Affinity, defined as “fitness” between two parties, (...)
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  11. added 2019-09-30
    No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism, Written by James Doyle. [REVIEW]Rachael Wiseman - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):357-363.
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  12. added 2019-09-30
    What Am I and What Am I Doing?Rachael Wiseman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (10):536-550.
    There is a deep connection between Anscombe’s argument that ‘I’ is not a referring expression and Intention’s account of practical knowledge and knowledge without observation. The assumption that the so-called “no-reference thesis” can be resisted while the account of action set out in her book INTENTION is embraced is based on a misunderstanding of the argument of “The First Person” and the status of its conclusion; removing that misunderstanding helps to illuminate the concept of practical knowledge and brings into view (...)
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  13. added 2019-09-30
    Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Anscombe’s Intention.Rachael Wiseman - 2016 - Routledge.
    G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention is a classic of twentieth-century philosophy. The work has been enormously influential despite being a dense and largely misunderstood text. It is a standard reference point for anyone engaging with philosophy of action and philosophy of psychology. In this Routledge Philosophy GuideBook, Rachael Wiseman: situates _Intention_ in relation to Anscombe’s moral philosophy and philosophy of mind considers the influence of Aquinas, Aristotle, Frege, and Wittgenstein on the method and content of _Intention_ adopts a structure for (...)
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  14. added 2019-09-30
    Anscombe's Intention: A Review of Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland , Essays on Anscombe's 'Intention'[REVIEW]Rachael Wiseman - 2015 - Jurisprudence 6 (1):182-193.
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  15. added 2019-08-26
    Elizabeth Anscombe on Consequentialism and Absolute Prohibitions.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2012 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 47:7-39.
    I discuss the third of Anscombe’s theses from “Modern Moral Philosophy”, namely that post-Sidgwickian consequentialism makes the worst action acceptable. I scrutinize her comprehension of “consequentialism”, her reconstruction of Sidgwick’s view of intention, her defence of casuistry, her reformulation of the double-effect doctrine, and her view of morality as based on Divine commands. I argue that her characterization of consequentialism suffers from lack of understanding of the history of utilitarianism and its self-transformation through the Intuitionism-Utilitarianism controversy; that she uncritically accepted (...)
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  16. added 2019-08-13
    G.E.M. Anscombe: guida alla lettura di Intention.Elisa Grimi - 2018 - Roma RM, Italia: Carocci.
    L’opera più importante per la filosofia dell’azione dopo l’Etica di Aristotele: così Donald Davidson ha definito il libro di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Intention, che Elisa Grimi ci presenta oggi attraverso questa preziosa guida alla lettura, il primo testo di questo genere in lingua italiana. dalla Prefazione di Cyrille Michon. Che cosa sia un’intenzione, quale sia il ruolo che essa svolge all'interno di un’azione, se vi si possa trovare traccia della vera intenzione del soggetto guardando l’azione che compie: questi e (...)
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  17. added 2019-08-13
    Anscombe e il problema della sostanza.Elisa Grimi - 2016 - Per la Filosofia 1 (1):99-108.
    IT_Nel panorama analitico emerge la gura di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. Ella, accanto a suo marito Peter Geach e al losofo Anthony Kenny, è stata indicata da John Haldane, tra i promotori di una nuova corrente denominata “tomismo analitico”. In questo saggio, oltre a sottolineare le debolezze che sono presenti in tale dicitura e allo stesso tempo il carattere innovativo della ri essione di questi loso , si è scelto di ripercorrere in modo critico le pagine che Anscombe dedica ad (...)
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  18. added 2019-08-13
    Anscombe y el problema de la percecion.Elisa Grimi - 2015 - Reflexiones Marginales 28 (5).
    -- abstract is not requested by the Editor.
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  19. added 2019-08-13
    Tomismo analitico: una nozione discutibile. Filosofia analitica e religione cristiana. La proposta di G.E.M. Anscombe.Elisa Grimi - 2014 - In P. Bettineschi & R. Fanciullacci (eds.), Tommaso d’Aquino e i filosofi analitici. Napoli NA, Italia: pp. 63-72.
    --- abstract not requested by the Editor.
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  20. added 2019-08-13
    G.E.M. Anscombe. The Dragon Lady.Elisa Grimi - 2014 - 53100 Siena SI, Italia: Cantagalli.
    Questo studio costituisce la prima monografia italiana su una delle più complesse pensatrici dell’ultimo millennio. Filosofa dal pensiero formidabile, così ne parlò Sarah Boxer sul New York Times, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, moglie di Peter Geach e madre di sette figli, ha sempre battagliato per la verità. In lei vita, passione e filosofia sono un tutt’uno e in tale unità si cela l’irriducibilità e il fascino del suo pensiero. In compagnia dei classici dell’antichità, dei moderni e di quei filosofi del (...)
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  21. added 2019-08-13
    La rinascita delle virtù. Aristotele e Anscombe.Elisa Grimi - 2014 - In M. S. Vaccarezza & S. Langella (eds.), Emozioni e virtù. Percorsi e prospettive di un tema classico. Napoli NA, Italia: pp. 121-132.
    ---abstract not requested by the Editors.
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  22. added 2019-08-13
    G.E.M. Anscombe and Rediscovery of Practical Syllogism.Elisa Grimi - 2012 - Acta Philosophica 21 (II):351-362.
    The present paper proposes to analyse the role of the practical syllogism in G.E.M. Anscombe’s theory of action. To this end, I have rst of all chosen to examine, even if in broad terms, the conception of practical syllogism as it is present in the Aristotelian doctrine, and to reveal/delineate some critical points found within it. The following section is the central part of the paper, where, starting from § 33 of Intention, a re ection is carried out on the (...)
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  23. added 2019-03-23
    G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action.Christopher Frey & Jennifer A. Frey - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):202-247.
    Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;” (ii) intentional descriptions are typically vague and indeterminate; and (...)
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  24. added 2019-03-17
    A Splitting “Mind-Ache”: AN ANSCOMBEAN CHALLENGE TO KANTIAN SELF-LEGISLATION.Reshef Agam-Segal - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:43-68.
    I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fail to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused. Interpreters today take Kant’s legal language to be merely metaphorical. The language of ‘self-legislation,’ in particular, is replaced by such interpreters with a (...)
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  25. added 2019-03-17
    A Splitting “Mind-Ache”: Challenge to Kantian Self-Legislation.Reshef Agam-Segal - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:43-68.
    I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fail to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused. Interpreters today take Kant’s legal language to be merely metaphorical. The language of ‘self-legislation,’ in particular, is replaced by such interpreters with a (...)
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  26. added 2019-03-17
    Is Self-Legislation Possible?: Kantian Ethics After Anscombe.Reshef Agam-Segal - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 3-14.
    Anscombe criticism of Kant on Self-Legislation.
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  27. added 2019-01-08
    Coping with Ethical Uncertainty.John R. Welch - 2017 - Diametros 53:150-166.
    Most ethical decisions are conditioned by formidable uncertainty. Decision makers may lack reliable information about relevant facts, the consequences of actions, and the reactions of other people. Resources for dealing with uncertainty are available from standard forms of decision theory, but successful application to decisions under risk requires a great deal of quantitative information: point-valued probabilities of states and point-valued utilities of outcomes. When this information is not available, this paper recommends the use of a form of decision theory that (...)
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  28. added 2019-01-08
    A Thomistic Argument for Respecting Conscientious Refusals.Michał Głowala - 2016 - Diametros 47:19-34.
    The paper presents an argument for respecting conscientious refusals based on the Thomistic account of conscience; the argument does not employ the notion of right. The main idea is that acting against one’s conscience necessarily makes the action objectively wrong and performed in bad faith, and expecting someone to act against his or her conscience is incompatible with requiring him or her to act in good faith. In light of this idea I also examine the issue of obligations imposed on (...)
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  29. added 2018-11-12
    G.E.M. Anscombe – „Intention“.David Hommen - 2016 - Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL-Online).
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  30. added 2018-05-01
    Logic, Truth and Meaning : Writings of G.E.M. Anscombe. [REVIEW]Simon Hewitt - 2017 - New Blackfriars 98 (1077):626-628.
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  31. added 2018-03-07
    Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action.Will Small - 2012 - In Günter Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology Volume 2. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 133-227.
    I argue that there is a cognition condition on intention and intentional action. If an agent is doing A intentionally, she has knowledge in intention that he is doing A. If an agent intends to do A, she has knowledge in intention that she is going to do A. In both cases, the agent has knowledge of eventual success, in this sense: she knows that it will be no accident if she ends up having done A. In both cases, the (...)
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  32. added 2018-01-02
    Argumentando Dios desde la filosofía analítica: Cracovia, Oxford y los comienzos de una nueva disciplina.Alejandro Pérez - 2017 - Quarentibus 9:68-87.
    El presente artículo introduce el lector a la filosofía analítica de la religión desde un punto de vista histórico y haciendo énfasis en su evolución. El objetivo es doble: primero dar a conocer una nueva disciplina que se ha desarrollado de manera notoria dentro del habla inglesa pero que ha sido ignorada dentro de la filosofía de habla hispana; segundo, comprender su nacimiento y algunas de sus principales características.
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  33. added 2017-02-08
    Miss Anscombe on the 'General Propositional Form'.William W. Gustason - 1972 - Analysis 32 (6):195 - 196.
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  34. added 2017-02-08
    The Grocers of Miss Anscombe and Mr. Phillips.Colwyn Williamson - 1968 - Analysis 28 (6):179 - 182.
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  35. added 2017-01-22
    The Limitations of Miss Anscombe's Grocer.D. Z. Phillips - 1969 - Analysis 29 (3):97 - 99.
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  36. added 2017-01-22
    Miss Anscombe's Grocer.D. Z. Phillips - 1968 - Analysis 28 (6):177 - 179.
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  37. added 2017-01-22
    Miss Anscombe's Retractation.Erik Stenius - 1967 - Analysis 27 (3):86 - 96.
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  38. added 2016-12-21
    On Anscombe’s Philosophical Method.Ulf Hlobil & Katharina Nieswandt - 2016 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 35:180-198.
    While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from current alternatives in metaphilosophy. Here (...)
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  39. added 2016-11-11
    Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning: Aquinas's Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombe's Fallacy.Scott MacDonald - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):31-66.
  40. added 2016-08-07
    Response to Michael Friedman.Juliet Floyd - 2004 - In Schneewind J. (ed.), Teaching New Histories of Philosophy. pp. 225-234.
  41. added 2016-04-11
    Praxeology, Imperatives, and Shifts of View.Benj Hellie - 2018 - In Rowland Stout (ed.), Process, action, and experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 185--209.
    Recent neo-Anscombean work in praxeology (aka ‘philosophy of practical reason’), salutarily, shifts focus from an alienated 'third-person' viewpoint on practical reason to an embedded 'first-person' view: for example, the 'naive rationalizations' of Michael Thompson, of form 'I am A-ing because I am B-ing', take up the agent's view, in the thick of action. Less salutary, in its premature abandonment of the first-person view, is an interpretation of these naive rationalizations as asserting explanatory links between facts about organically structured agentive processes (...)
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  42. added 2016-03-02
    Anscombe, Zygotes, and Coming‐to‐Be.Guy Rohrbaugh - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):699-717.
    In some quarters, it is held that Anscombe proved that a zygote is not a human being on the basis of an argument involving the possibility of identical twins, but there is surprisingly little agreement on what her argument is supposed to be. I criticize several extant interpretations, both as interpretations of Anscombe and as self-standing arguments, and offer a different understanding of her conclusion on which the non-specificity of creation processes and their goals is at issue.
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  43. added 2015-10-19
    The Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):714-724.
    According to the doctrine of the guise of the good, all that is desired is seen by the subject as good to some extent. As a claim about action, the idea is that intentional action, or acting for a reason, is action that is seen as good by the agent. I explore the thesis' main attractions: it provides an account of intentional behavior as something that makes sense to the agent, it paves the way for various views in meta-ethics and (...)
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  44. added 2015-10-19
    Anscombe on Practical Inference.Candace A. Vogler - 2001 - In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press. pp. 437--464.
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  45. added 2015-04-04
    WITTGENSTEIN, L. - "On Certainty", Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. Von Wright, Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe.). [REVIEW]A. Palmer - 1972 - Mind 81:453.
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  46. added 2015-04-02
    Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste?Marie Guillot - 2012 - Repha (6):55-72.
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  47. added 2015-03-28
    Zettel Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. Von Wright. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright - 1967
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  48. added 2014-11-19
    Understanding 'Practical Knowledge'.John Schwenkler - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    The concept of practical knowledge is central to G.E.M. Anscombe's argument in Intention, yet its meaning is little understood. There are several reasons for this, including a lack of attention to Anscombe's ancient and medieval sources for the concept, and an emphasis on the more straightforward concept of knowledge "without observation" in the interpretation of Anscombe's position. This paper remedies the situation, first by appealing to the writings of Thomas Aquinas to develop an account of practical knowledge as a distinctive (...)
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  49. added 2014-04-03
    Présentation de MmeG.E.M. Anscombe.James Mcevoy - 1990 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 88 (2):297-301.
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  50. added 2014-04-02
    Essential Aims and Unavoidable Responsibilities: A Response to Anscombe.Michael J. Coughlan - 1990 - Bioethics 4 (1):63–65.
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