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  1. Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. [REVIEW]R. A. A. - 1956 - Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):516-516.
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  2. Far-Sighted Equilibria in 2 X 2, Non-Cooperative, Repeated Games.Jan Aaftink - 1989 - Theory and Decision 27 (3):175.
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  3. Quantum Markov Model for Data From Shafir-Tversky Experiments in Cognitive Psychology.Luigi Accardi, Andrei Khrennikov & Masanori Ohya - 2009 - In Institute of Physics Krzysztof Stefanski (ed.), Open Systems and Information Dynamics. World Scientific Publishing Company. pp. 16--04.
  4. Logics for Qualitative Coalitional Games.Thomas Agotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge - 2009 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 17 (3):299-321.
    Qualitative Coalitional Games are a variant of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. Our goal in this paper is to develop and (...)
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  5. Personal Identity: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis.Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Maria Paz Espinosa & Luis M. Miller - 2010 - Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (3):261-275.
    This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity enters in individuals' utility function when facing a dictator game decision is then presented. Finally, this ?identity-based? utility function is studied experimentally. The experiment allows us to (...)
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  6. A Spatial Similarity Measure Based On Games: Theory And Practice.M. Aiello - 2002 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 10 (1):1-22.
    Model comparison games can be used not only to decide whether two specific models are equivalent or not, but also to establish a measurement of difference among a whole class of models. We show how this is possible in the case of the spatial modal logic S4u of Bennett. The approach results in a spatial similarity measure based on topological model comparison games. After establishing the theoretical framework, we move towards practice by giving an algorithm to effectively compute the similarity (...)
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  7. A Strategic Foundation for the Cooperator's Advantage.Scott H. Ainsworth - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (2):101-110.
    Orbell and Dawes develop a non-game theoretic heuristic that yields a ‘cooperator's advantage’ by allowing players to project their own ‘cooperate-defect’ choices onto potential partners (1991, p. 515). With appropriate parameter values their heuristic yields a cooperative environment, but the cooperation depends, simply, on optimism about others' behavior (1991, p. 526). In earlier work, Dawes (1989) established a statistical foundation for such optimism. In this paper, I adapt some of the concerns of Dawes (1989) and develop a game theoretic model (...)
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  8. Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”.Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):357-369.
    The pioneering contributions of Bewley, Gilboa and Schmeidler highlighted important weaknesses in the foundations of economics and game theory. The Bayesian methodology on which these fields are based does not answer such basic questions as what makes beliefs reasonable, or how agents should form beliefs and expectations. Providing the initial impetus for debating these issues is a contribution that will have the lasting value it deserves.
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  9. Experimental Evidence of the Emergence of Aesthetic Rules in Pure Coordination Games.Federica Alberti - manuscript
    When people coordinate in one-shot, pure coordination games they rely on existing concepts of salience. In an experiment with pure coordination games, concepts of salience emerged when players were given a set of different but related coordination problems with randomly generated labels. The same players were also given a set of different but related coordination problems with culture-laden labels and common features between labels across problems. The players could develop concepts of salience in the first set of games and appeared (...)
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  10. The Co‐Evolution of Cooperation and Complexity in a Multi‐Player, Local‐Interaction Prisoners' Dilemma.Peter S. Albin & Duncan K. Foley - 2001 - Complexity 6 (3):54-63.
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  11. Cheap Talk, Reinforcement Learning and the Emergence of Cooperation.J. McKenzie Alexander - unknown
    Cheap talk has often been thought incapable of supporting the emergence of cooperation because costless signals, easily faked, are unlikely to be reliable. I show how, in a social network model of cheap talk with reinforcement learning, cheap talk does enable the emergence of cooperation, provided that individuals also temporally discount the past. This establishes one mechanism that suffices for moving a population of initially uncooperative individuals to a state of mutually beneficial cooperation even in the absence of formal institutions.
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  12. Expectations and Choiceworthiness.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):803-817.
    The Pasadena game is an example of a decision problem which lacks an expected value, as traditionally conceived. Easwaran (2008) has shown that, if we distinguish between two different kinds of expectations, which he calls ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the Pasadena game lacks a strong expectation but has a weak expectation. Furthermore, he argues that we should use the weak expectation as providing a measure of the value of an individual play of the Pasadena game. By considering a modified version of (...)
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  13. Game Theory.J. McKenzie Alexander - unknown
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  14. Review of Robert Koons's Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. [REVIEW]G. A. Antonelli - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9:305-305.
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  15. Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Koons Robert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, Xii + 174 Pages. [REVIEW]Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (2):305.
  16. History as a Coordination Device.Rossella Argenziano & Itzhak Gilboa - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):501-512.
    Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar coordination games played in the past, possibly by other players. We analyze a simple model in which a large population plays a game that exhibits strategic complementarities. We assume a dynamic process that faces different populations (...)
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  17. Quantum-Like Model for Decision Making Process in Two Players Game.Masanari Asano, Masanori Ohya & Andrei Khrennikov - 2011 - Foundations of Physics 41 (3):538-548.
    In experiments of games, players frequently make choices which are regarded as irrational in game theory. In papers of Khrennikov (Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological and Anomalous Phenomena. Fundamental Theories of Physics, Kluwer Academic, Norwell, 2004; Fuzzy Sets Syst. 155:4–17, 2005; Biosystems 84:225–241, 2006; Found. Phys. 35(10):1655–1693, 2005; in QP-PQ Quantum Probability and White Noise Analysis, vol. XXIV, pp. 105–117, 2009), it was pointed out that statistics collected in such the experiments have “quantum-like” properties, which can not be explained in (...)
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  18. Acting Rationally with Irrational Strategies.David Atkinson - manuscript
    When the Parrondo effect was discovered a few years ago (Harmer and Abbott 1999a, 1999b), it was hailed as a possible mechanism whereby, in a kind of collaboration of failure, losing strategies could be combined to yield profit. The precise relevance of the Parrondo effect to natural and social phenomena is however still unclear. In this paper we give specific examples, first in the artificial setting of a gambling machine, and then in more natural applications to genetics and to environmental (...)
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  19. On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory.Robert Axelrod - 2000 - Analyse & Kritik 22 (1):130-151.
    The symposium included in this issue of ANALYSE & KRITIK extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod's 'Evolution of Cooperation' . This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original paradigm of the two person iterated Prisoner's (...)
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  20. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory.Michael Bacharach - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
    This is a revision of game theory which takes account of agents' own descriptions of their situations, and which allows people to reason as members of groups.
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  21. A Theory of Rational Decision in Games.Michael Bacharach - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (1):17 - 55.
  22. Sex Differences in Cooperation: A Meta-Analytic Review of Social Dilemmas.Daniel Balliet, Norman P. Li, Shane J. Macfarlan & Mark van Vugt - unknown
    Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here, we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex differences in cooperation, and we conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes—sampled across 50 years of research—on (...)
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  23. Information and Strategy in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Kaushik Basu - 1977 - Theory and Decision 8 (3):293.
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  24. The Social Network Game.David Bate - 2012 - Philosophy of Photography 3 (1):29-35.
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  25. Perceptron Versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.Sylvain Béal - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):183-204.
    We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of (...)
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  26. Indefinitely Repeated Games: A Response to Carroll.Neal C. Becker & Ann E. Cudd - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (2):189-195.
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  27. Social Functions of Knowledge Attributions.James R. Beebe - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--242.
    Drawing upon work in evolutionary game theory and experimental philosophy, I argue that one of the roles the concept of knowledge plays in our social cognitive ecology is that of enabling us to make adaptively important distinctions between different kinds of blameworthy and blameless behaviors. In particular, I argue that knowledge enables us to distinguish which agents are most worthy of blame for inflicting harms, violating social norms, or cheating in situations of social exchange.
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  28. Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem: Why Lewis's Argument Fails.José Luis Bermúdez - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):423-429.
    According to David Lewis, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) and Newcomb's problem (NP) are really just one dilemma in two different forms (Lewis 1979). Lewis's argument for this conclusion is ingenious and has been widely accepted. However, it is flawed. As this paper shows, the considerations that Lewis brings to bear to show that the game he starts with is an NP equally show that the game is not a PD.
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  29. Rational Decisions , Ken Binmore. Princeton University Press, 2009, X + 200 Pages. [REVIEW]José Luis Bermúdez - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):95-101.
  30. Network Formation in Repeated Interactions: Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Behaviour. [REVIEW]Michele Bernasconi & Matteo Galizzi - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (2):193-228.
    Here, we present some experiments of non-cooperative games of network formation based on Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68:1181–1229, 2000 ). We have looked at the one-way and the two-way flow models, each for high and low link costs. The models come up with both multiple equilibria and coordination problems. We conducted the experiments under various conditions which allowed for repeated interactions between subjects. We found that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria was not an easy task to achieve, even in (...)
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  31. Neural Game Theory and the Search for Rational Agents in the Brain.Gregory S. Berns - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):155-156.
    The advent of functional brain imaging has revolutionized the ability to understand the biological mechanisms underlying decision-making. Although it has been amply demonstrated that assumptions of rationality often break down in experimental games, there has not been an overarching theory of why this happens. I describe recent advances in functional brain imaging and suggest a framework for considering the function of the human reward system as a discrete agent.
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  32. An Axiomatic Approach to Predictability of Outcomes in an Interactive Setting.Sebastian Bervoets - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (3):311-323.
    This article is an axiomatic approach to the problem of ranking game forms in terms of the predictability they offer to individuals. Two criteria are proposed and characterized, the CardMin and the CardMax. Both compare game forms on the basis of the number of distinct outcomes that can result from the choice of a CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy. The CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy is defined as a strategy leading to the smallest (resp. highest) number of different outcomes. In both cases, (...)
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  33. Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction.Bicchieri Cristina & Dalla Chiara Maria Luisa (eds.) - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the formal models of (...)
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  34. Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior.C. Bicchieri - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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  35. Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not.C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  36. Knowing and Supposing In.Cristina Bicchieri - unknown
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a su cient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, (...)
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  37. Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
    A large class of games is that of non-cooperative, extensive form games of perfect information. When the length of these games is finite, the method used to reach a solution is that of a backward induction. Working from the terminal nodes, dominated strategies are successively deleted and what remains is a unique equilibrium. Game theorists have generally assumed that the informational requirement needed to solve these games is that the players have common knowledge of rationality. This assumption, however, has given (...)
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  38. Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
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  39. Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma.Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. pp. 175.
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  40. Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press.
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  41. Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis.Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On - 2007 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):139-168.
    University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...)
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  42. Common Reasoning About Admissibility.Cristina Bicchieri & Oliver Schulte - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):299 - 325.
    We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form, and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common (...)
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  43. Rationality and Coordination.Cristina Bicchieri & Brian Skyrms - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
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  44. An Embarrassment of Riches : Modeling Social Preferences in Ultimatum Games.Cristina Bicchieri & Jiji Zhang - unknown
    Experimental results in Ultimatum, Trust and Social Dilemma games have been interpreted as showing that individuals are, by and large, not driven by selfish motives. But we do not need experiments to know that. In our view, what the experiments show is that the typical economic auxiliary hypothesis of non-tuism should not be generalized to other contexts. Indeed, we know that when the experimental situation is framed as a market interaction, participants will be more inclined to keep more money, share (...)
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  45. Using Game Theory in Social Science A Review of Kaushik Basu's Prelude to Political Economy.K. Binmore - 2002 - Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (3):379-383.
    David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature famously fell `deadborn from the press’ because it was too far ahead of its time. Basu’s book is one of a number published in recent years that suggest we are at last ready to put its precepts into action.1 Modern game theory provides a framework that makes Hume’s insights genuinely applicable, and I totally agree with Basu that this is not only the right way forward, but that it now looks increasingly likely that this (...)
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  46. Backward Induction and Rationality.K. G. Binmore & London School of Economics and Political Science - 1995 - London School of Economics, Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences.
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  47. Interpersonal Comparison in Egalitarian Societies.Ken Binmore - unknown
    When judging what is fair, how do we decide how much weight to assign to the conflicting interests of different classes of people? This subject has received some attention in a utilitarian context, but has been largely neglected in the case of egalitarian societies of the kind studied by John Rawls. My Game Theory and the Social Contract considers the problem for a toy society with only two citizens. This paper examines the theoretical difficulties in extending the discussion to societies (...)
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  48. Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge?Ken Binmore - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27.
    Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action (...)
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  49. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. II: Just Playing.Ken Binmore - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):168-171.
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  50. Rationality and Backward Induction.Ken Binmore - 1997 - Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):23-41.
    This paper uses the Centipede Game to criticize formal arguments that have recently been offered for and against backward induction as a rationality principle. It is argued that the crucial issues concerning the interpretation of counterfactuals depend on contextual questions that are abstracted away in current formalisms. I have a text, it always is the same, And always has been, Since I learnt the game. Chaucer, The Pardoner's Tale.
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