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  1. Analytic Narratives: What They Are and How They Contribute to Historical Explanation.Philippe Mongin - forthcoming - In Claude Diebolt & Michael Haupert (eds.), Handbook of Cliometrics. Berlin: Springer.
    The expression "analytic narratives" is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport to explain specific historical events by combining the usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory, especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical choice. (...)
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  2. Temptation and Preference-Based Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - forthcoming - In José Bermudez (ed.), Self-control, decision theory and rationality. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...)
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  3. Prisoner.Marilyn Buck - 2004 - Feminist Studies 30 (2):269.
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  4. How to Be Fairer.Conrad Heilmann & Stefan Wintein - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3475-3499.
    We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable (...)
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  5. Toward a Formal Analysis of Deceptive Signaling.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy. However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The (...)
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  6. Paul Erickson, The World the Game Theorists Made. [REVIEW]Philip Mirowski - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):160-163.
  7. Beyond Team-Directed Reasoning: Participatory Intentions Contribute to a Theory of Collective Agency.Duijf Hein - forthcoming - Logique Et Analyse.
    Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning, which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning (...)
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  8. Explaining Universal Social Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Michael Vlerick - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):291-300.
    Universal social institutions, such as marriage, commons management and property, have emerged independently in radically different cultures. This requires explanation. As Boyer and Petersen point out ‘in a purely localist framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences’ . According to Boyer and Petersen, those institutions emerged naturally out of genetically wired behavioural dispositions, such as marriage out of mating strategies and borders out of territorial behaviour. While I agree with Boyer and Petersen that ‘unnatural’ institutions cannot thrive, this one-sided (...)
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  9. Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme. The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms (...)
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  10. Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules.Robert Sugden & Paul Weirich - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):425.
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  11. The Protracted Game; A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy.Chauncey S. Goodrich & Scott A. Boorman - 1972 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (4):588.
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  12. The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy.Benjamin E. Wallacker & Scott A. Boorman - 1972 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (1):152.
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  13. The Last Dictator Game? Dominance, Reactivity, and the Methodological Artefact in Experimental Economics.María Jiménez-Buedo - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):295-310.
    The Dictator Game, one of the best-known designs in experimental social science, has been extensively criticized, and declared by some to be defunct, on the grounds that its results are the product of a research artefact. Critics of the DG argue that the behaviour observed in the game is not the outcome of genuine pro-social preferences but must, instead, be interpreted as a response to the cues given by the experimental design, where these cues signal that the game is about (...)
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  14. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining.Alvin E. Roth (ed.) - 1985 - Cambridge University Press.
    Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is (...)
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  15. Experimental Investigation of Human Adaptation to Change in Agent's Strategy Through a Competitive Two-Player Game.Kazunori Terada, Seiji Yamada & Akira Ito - 2012 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 27 (2):73-81.
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  16. Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining.Alvin E. Roth & Michael W. Malouf - 1979 - Psychological Review 86 (6):574-594.
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  17. A Bargaining Theory of Coalition Formation.S. S. Komorita & Jerome M. Chertkoff - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (3):149-162.
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  18. Identification in Games : Changing Places.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
    This paper offers a novel ‘changing places’ account of identification in games, where the consequences of role swapping are crucial. First, it illustrates how such an account is consistent with the view, in classical game theory, that only outcomes are significant. Second, it argues that this account is superior to the ‘pooled resources’ alternative when it comes to dealing with some situations in which many players identify. Third, it shows how such a ‘changing places’ account can be used in games (...)
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  19. Payoff-Based Learning Explains the Decline in Cooperation in Public Goods Games.Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew, Heinrich H. Nax & Stuart A. West - unknown
    Economic games such as the public goods game are increasingly being used to measure social behaviours in humans and non-human primates. The results of such games have been used to argue that people are pro-social, and that humans are uniquely altruistic, willingly sacrificing their own welfare in order to benefit others. However, an alternative explanation for the empirical observations is that individuals are mistaken, but learn, during the game, how to improve their personal payoff. We test between these competing hypotheses, (...)
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  20. Notes on Coordination, Game Theory and the Evolutionary Basis of Language.Don Ross - 2012 - Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 13 (1):50-65.
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  21. Aristotle’s Dilemma.A. F. Mackay - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):533-549.
    In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appears to use an elegant short argument to attack Plato's doctrine of the good, which argument equally appears to attack Aristotle's own doctrine of the good. I consider these two questions: First: Why does Aristotle reverse the judgment of Socrates/Plato on the issue: Which is better - things that are good in themselves, or things that are both good in themselves and good for their consequences? Second: Why does Aristotle attack Plato's doctrine that the Form (...)
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  22. Predicting Human Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Using Case-Based Decision Theory.Todd Guilfoos & Andreas Duus Pape - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (1):1-32.
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  23. Games with Zero-Knowledge Signaling.Edward Epsen - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):403-414.
    We observe that in certain two-player repeated games of incomplete information, where information may be incomplete on both sides, it is possible for an informed player to signal his status as an informed player to the other without revealing any information about the choice of chance. The key to obtaining such a class of games is to relax the assumption that the players’ moves are observable. We show that in such cases players can achieve a kind of signaling that is (...)
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  24. An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games.Adam Brandenburger & H. Jerome Keisler - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (2):211-240.
    A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes that.
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  25. Decision-Theoretic Finitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas.J. W. Carroll - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):249-256.
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  26. McClennen, Harsanyi and the General Theory of Games: Some Philosophical Questions in the Construction and Justification of a Theory of Decision-Making.R. E. Freeman - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (2):123-131.
  27. Moral Intuitions Versus Game Theory: A Response to Marcoux on Résumé Embellishing.John Douglas Bishop - 2006 - Journal of Business Ethics 67 (2):181-189.
    Marcoux argues that job candidates ought to embellish non-verifiable information on their résumés because it is the best way to coordinate collective action in the résumé ‚game’. I do not dispute his analysis of collective action; I look at the larger picture, which throws light on the role game theory might play in ethics. I conclude that game theory’s conclusions have nothing directly to do with ethics. Game theory suggests the means to certain ends, but the ethics of both the (...)
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  28. In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):29-59.
    I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support (...)
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  29. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure.Brian Skyrms - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much (...)
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  30. Game Change.Maximo Cortez - 2015 - Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics 5 (2):E5-E7.
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  31. Risk-Neutral Equilibria of Noncooperative Games.Robert Nau - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (2):171-188.
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  32. Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences.John Duffy & Félix Muñoz-García - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):45-75.
    This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players’ concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding “inequity aversion.” In this environment, we show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained, in which a player type who is unconcerned about fairness initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player type who is concerned about fairness. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in (...)
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  33. Implementing Equal Division with an Ultimatum Threat.Esat Doruk Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):223-236.
    We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded; if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh (...)
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  34. The Neuropharmacologist's Dilemma.George B. Koelle - 1976 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 19 (3):402-403.
  35. The 'Changing Places' Model of Identification in Game Theory.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
    If one cares about one’s opponent in a game – if one identifies with one’s opponent – then this may affect how one ought to play. But how should we treat this in game theory? Rowbottom would present a novel, 'changing places', model of identification; the key insight is to introduce probabilities for outcomes to be swapped when games conclude. First, he would argue that this model is superior to its main rival, the ‘pooled resources’ view, in treating some multiplayer (...)
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  36. Common Reasoning in Games: A Lewisian Analysis of Common Knowledge of Rationality.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):285-329.
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  37. Introduction to Game Theory: A Linguistic History.Martin J. Osborne - 2009 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioural sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory International Edition, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economics, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an (...)
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  38. Sex Differences in Cooperation: A Meta-Analytic Review of Social Dilemmas.Daniel Balliet, Norman P. Li, Shane J. Macfarlan & Mark van Vugt - unknown
    Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here, we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex differences in cooperation, and we conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes—sampled across 50 years of research—on (...)
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  39. The Prisoner's Dilemma.Martin Peterson (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most fiercely debated thought experiments in philosophy and the social sciences, presenting the simple insight that when two or more agents interact, the actions that most benefit each individual may not benefit the group. The fact that when you do what is best for you, and I do what is best for me, we end up in a situation that is worse for both of us makes the Prisoner's Dilemma relevant to a broad (...)
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  40. Productive Versus Destructive Cooperation.Sheldon Wein & Radu Neculau - 2012 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, Zenker, F. (ed.) (Windsor: OSSA 2012). Windsor, ON, Canada:
    Many of the problems we face can usefully be modeled as prisoners’ dilemmas. All the standard game-theoretic solutions to prisoners’ dilemmas lead, in the real world, to assurance games. But too often some aspects of our social interaction are as much obscured by, as illuminated by, game theory. Removing some of the epistemic constraints often accepted by game theorists will enable us to distinguish between productive and destructive prisoners’ dilemmas. Doing so is an important step in understanding the nature of (...)
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  41. The Interrogative Model of Inquiry Meets Dynamic Epistemic Logics.Yacin Hamami - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1609-1642.
    The Interrogative Model of Inquiry and Dynamic Epistemic Logics are two central paradigms in formal epistemology. This paper is motivated by the observation of a significant complementarity between them: on the one hand, the IMI provides a framework for investigating inquiry represented as an idealized game between an Inquirer and Nature, along with an account of the interaction between questions and inferences in information-seeking processes, but is lacking a formulation in the multi-agent case; on the other hand, DELs model various (...)
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  42. Appendix to Chapter Two: Determinacy in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.Russell Hardin - 2013 - In Indeterminacy and Society. Princeton University Press. pp. 139-140.
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  43. Zu M. Taylors Analysen des Gefangenendilemmas.Hartmut Kliemt & Bernd Schauenberg - 1982 - Analyse & Kritik 4 (1):71-97.
    The theory of garnes, though at first greeted with great expectations by some social scientists, soon became a source of frustrated hopes to many of them. Too much of the theory seemed to be devoted to "zero-sum" and "one-shot" games. But most social contexts are not zero-sum and involve repeated interaction too. There was a certain lack of such game theoretic models which could be successfully adapted to social phenomena as were apt to appear in reality. Recently the theory of (...)
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  44. Kooperative Strategien Im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation Eines N-Personen-Spiels.Andreas Diekmann & Klaus Manhart - 1989 - Analyse & Kritik 11 (2):134-153.
    Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod's research on iterative prisoner's dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player-version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners, dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some 'nice' strategies like 'tit-for-tat' are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, (...)
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  45. Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary.Herbert Gintis - 2005 - Analyse & Kritik 27 (1):48-72.
    It is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived from the interaction and aggregation of (...)
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  46. A Note on the Concept of Game.Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2015 - In Anna Wehofsits, David Löwenstein, Dirk Koppelberg & Gregor Betz (eds.), Weiter Denken - Über Philosophie, Wissenschaft Und Religion. De Gruyter. pp. 205-210.
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  47. It's Game Time!: Games to Enhance Classroom Learning.Nicholas J. Rinaldi - 2015 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    It's Game Time!: Games to Enhance Classroom Learning enables the teacher to decide when and how to use games to effectively complement their teaching philosophy and style to meet the needs of their students by providing over 40 games that can be used in any class at any level.
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  48. The Implications of Learning Across Perceptually and Strategically Distinct Situations.Daniel Cownden, Kimmo Eriksson & Pontus Strimling - 2016 - Synthese:1-18.
    Game theory is a formal approach to behavior that focuses on the strategic aspect of situations. The game theoretic approach originates in economics but has been embraced by scholars across disciplines, including many philosophers and biologists. This approach has an important weakness: the strategic aspect of a situation, which is its defining quality in game theory, is often not its most salient quality in human cognition. Evidence from a wide range of experiments highlights this shortcoming. Previous theoretical and empirical work (...)
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  49. Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, "Prisoner's Dilemma".W. G. Runciman - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3/4):394.
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  50. Prisoner's Dilemma.Anatol Rapoport & Albert M. Chammah - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3):394-395.
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