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  1. Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games.M. Kojima, A. Okada & S. Shindoh - 1985 - Mathematics of Operations Research 10:650-663.
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  2. Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games.Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet - 1984 - International Journal of Game Theory 13:129-144.
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  3. Essential Equilibrium Points of N-Person Non-Cooperative Games.Wu Wen-Tsün & Jiang Jia-He - 1962 - Scientia Sinica 11:1307-1322.
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  4. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit.Reinhard Selten - 1965 - Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121:301-324, 667-689.
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  5. On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points.Akira Okada - 1981 - International Journal of Game Theory 10:67-73.
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  6. Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.Roger B. Myerson - 1978 - International Journal of Game Theory 7:73-80.
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  7. Sequential Equilibria.David Kreps - 1982 - Econometrica 50:863-894.
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  8. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria.Eric Van Damme - 1987 - Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
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  9. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof.John Harsanyi - 1973 - International Journal of Game Theory 2:235-250.
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  10. Game Theory: A Survey.Ken Binmore & Partha Dasgupta - 1986 - In Ken Binmore & Partha Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games. Oxford:
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  11. Game Theory: Concepts and Applications.Frank C. Zagare - 1984 - Sage.
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  12. The 2x2 Game.Anatol Rapoport, Melvin J. Guyer & David G. Gordon - 1976 - University of Michigan Press.
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  13. Games as Models of Social Phenomena.Henry Hamburger - 1979 - New York: W. H. Freeman.
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  14. Rational Choice.Jon Elster (ed.) - 1986 - New York University Press.
  15. Beyond Team-Directed Reasoning: Participatory Intentions Contribute to a Theory of Collective Agency.Duijf Hein - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse.
    Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning, which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning (...)
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  16. Minimal Cooperation and Group Roles.Katherine Ritchie - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency.
    Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members of organized groups (...)
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  17. Toward a Formal Analysis of Deceptive Signaling.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2019 - Synthese (6):2279-2303.
    Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy. However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The (...)
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  18. Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility.Jean Baccelli - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):367-387.
    In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...)
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  19. Temptation and Preference-Based Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - In José Bermudez (ed.), Self-control, decision theory and rationality. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...)
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  20. Texas Hold'em Poker Odds for Your Strategy, with Probability-Based Hand Analyses.Catalin Barboianu - 2011 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
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  21. Understanding and Calculating the Odds: Probability Theory Basics and Calculus Guide for Beginners, with Applications in Games of Chance and Everyday Life.Catalin Barboianu - 2006 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
  22. Probability Guide to Gambling: The Mathematics of Dice, Slots, Roulette, Baccarat, Blackjack, Poker, Lottery and Sport Bets.Catalin Barboianu - 2006 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
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  23. Roulette Odds and Profits: The Mathematics of Complex Bets.Catalin Barboianu - 2008 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
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  24. The Mathematics of Lottery: Odds, Combinations, Systems.Catalin Barboianu - 2009 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
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  25. Dancing at Gunpoint. A Review of Herbert Gintis's The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, 304 Pp. [REVIEW]Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2010 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):111.
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  26. Analytic Narratives: What They Are and How They Contribute to Historical Explanation.Philippe Mongin - 2019 - In Claude Diebolt & Michael Haupert (eds.), Handbook of Cliometrics. Berlin: Springer.
    The expression "analytic narratives" is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport to explain specific historical events by combining the usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory, especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical choice. (...)
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  27. Prisoner.Marilyn Buck - 2004 - Feminist Studies 30 (2):269.
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  28. Paul Erickson. The World the Game Theorists Made. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. Pp. 384. $35.00.Philip Mirowski - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):160-163.
  29. How to Be Fairer.Conrad Heilmann & Stefan Wintein - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3475-3499.
    We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable (...)
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  30. Game Theory Modeling for the Cold War on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain.Harald Hagemann, Vadim Kufenko & Danila Raskov - 2016 - History of the Human Sciences 29 (4-5):99-124.
    The bi-polar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA involved many leading game theorists from both sides of the Iron Curtain: Oskar Morgenstern, John von Neumann, Michael Intriligator, John Nash, Thomas Schelling and Steven Brams from the United States and Nikolay Vorob’ev, Leon A. Petrosyan, Elena B. Yanovskaya and Olga N. Bondareva from the Soviet Union. The formalization of game theory took place prior to the Cold War but the geopolitical confrontation hastened and shaped its evolution. In our article (...)
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  31. On the Foundations of Nash Equilibrium: Hans Jørgen Jacobsen.Hans J.ørgen Jacobsen - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):67-88.
    The most important analytical tool in non-cooperative game theory is the concept of a Nash equilibrium, which is a collection of possibly mixed strategies, one for each player, with the property that each player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players. If we do not go into normative game theory, which concerns itself with the recommendation of strategies, and focus instead entirely on the positive theory of prediction, two alternative interpretations of the Nash equilibrium concept (...)
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  32. Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”: Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Jonathan Weinstein.Nabil I. Al-Najjar - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):357-369.
    The pioneering contributions of Bewley, Gilboa and Schmeidler highlighted important weaknesses in the foundations of economics and game theory. The Bayesian methodology on which these fields are based does not answer such basic questions as what makes beliefs reasonable, or how agents should form beliefs and expectations. Providing the initial impetus for debating these issues is a contribution that will have the lasting value it deserves.
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  33. Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games: Wlodek Rabinowicz.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95-126.
    According to the standard objection to backward induction in games, its application depends on highly questionable assumptions about the players' expectations as regards future counterfactual game developments. It seems that, in order to make predictions needed for backward reasoning, the players must expect each player to act rationally at each node that in principle could be reached in the game, and also to expect that this confidence in the future rationality of the players would be kept by each player come (...)
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  34. Harsanyi Before Economics: An Introduction*: Philippe Fontaine.Philippe Fontaine - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):343-348.
    Upon learning that John C. Harsanyi was awarded the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, in 1994, for his pioneering work in game theory, few economists probably questioned the appropriateness of that choice. The Budapest-born social scientist had already been recognized as a first-rank contributor to non-cooperative game theory for some time. However, as many readers of this journal will be aware, Harsanyi first contributed to welfare economics, not game theory. More importantly, he was (...)
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  35. Game Theory: A Practitioner's Approach: Thomas C. Schelling.Thomas C. Schelling - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):27-46.
    To a practitioner in the social sciences, game theory primarily helps to identify situations in which interdependent decisions are somehow problematic; solutions often require venturing into the social sciences. Game theory is usually about anticipating each other's choices; it can also cope with influencing other's choices. To a social scientist the great contribution of game theory is probably the payoff matrix, an accounting device comparable to the equals sign in algebra.
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  36. Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of Anarchy: David D. Friedman.David D. Friedman - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):319-327.
  37. Fraternity, Intrinsic Motivation and Sacrifice: A Reply to Gui and Nelson: Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden.Luigino Bruni - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):195-198.
    This paper responds to Gui and Nelson's separate comments on our paper ‘Fraternity’, which analysed sociality in markets as joint commitment to mutual assistance. We argue that our analysis is fundamentally different both from Nelson's analysis and from that provided by theories of warm glow or guilt aversion, as discussed by Gui. We agree with Gui that, in initiating and maintaining cooperative relationships, individuals sometimes incur personal costs to benefit others without any certainty of reciprocation, but we argue that the (...)
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  38. Rationality and Coordination.Cristina Bicchieri - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
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  39. Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme. The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this in terms (...)
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  40. Cooperation or Conflict?: The Church in the Brazilian Transition.Thomas C. Bruneau - 1988 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 63 (3):291-307.
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  41. Augustlne’s Confesslons as Game Play.Travis Foster - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):45-51.
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  42. An Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse Class Game.Wafik Lotfallah - 2004 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 50 (2):179-188.
    This paper introduces a new Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type game that is played on two classes of models rather than just two models. This game extends and generalizes the known Ajtai-Fagin game to the case when there are several alternating moves played in different models. The game allows Duplicator to delay her choices of the models till the very end of the game, making it easier for her to win. This adds on the toolkit of winning strategies for Duplicator in Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type (...)
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  43. Conservatism and the Scientific State of Nature.Erich Kummerfeld & Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1057-1076.
    Those who comment on modern scientific institutions are often quick to praise institutional structures that leave scientists to their own devices. These comments reveal an underlying presumption that scientists do best when left alone—when they operate in what we call the ‘scientific state of nature’. Through computer simulation, we challenge this presumption by illustrating an inefficiency that arises in the scientific state of nature. This inefficiency suggests that one cannot simply presume that science is most efficient when institutional control is (...)
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  44. Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules.Robert Sugden & Paul Weirich - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):425.
    Like many theorists before him, Paul Weirich has set out to find the Holy Grail of classical game theory: the solution concept that identifies the uniquely rational solution to every non-cooperative game. In this book, he reports an intermediate stage in his quest. He cannot actually identify the unique solution for every game but, he believes, he has found a new concept of equilibrium that is a necessary property of that solution.
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  45. The Protracted Game; A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy.Chauncey S. Goodrich & Scott A. Boorman - 1972 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (4):588.
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  46. The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy.Benjamin E. Wallacker & Scott A. Boorman - 1972 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (1):152.
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  47. The Last Dictator Game? Dominance, Reactivity, and the Methodological Artefact in Experimental Economics.María Jiménez-Buedo - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):295-310.
    The Dictator Game, one of the best-known designs in experimental social science, has been extensively criticized, and declared by some to be defunct, on the grounds that its results are the product of a research artefact. Critics of the DG argue that the behaviour observed in the game is not the outcome of genuine pro-social preferences but must, instead, be interpreted as a response to the cues given by the experimental design, where these cues signal that the game is about (...)
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  48. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining.Alvin E. Roth (ed.) - 1985 - Cambridge University Press.
    Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is (...)
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  49. State Anarchy and Collective Decisions: Some Applications of Game Theory to Political Economy.Hugh Ward - 2003 - Contemporary Political Theory 2 (1):135-136.
  50. Experimental Investigation of Human Adaptation to Change in Agent's Strategy Through a Competitive Two-Player Game.Kazunori Terada, Seiji Yamada & Akira Ito - 2012 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 27 (2):73-81.
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