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  1. added 2019-01-13
    The Irreducibility of Collective Obligations.Allard Tamminga & Frank Hindriks - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-01
    Hume's Natural History of Justice.Mark Collier - 2011 - In C. Taylor & S. Buckle (eds.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 131-142.
    In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange and collective (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-28
    Skyrms on the Possibility of Universal Deception.Don Fallis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):375-397.
    In the Groundwork, Immanuel Kant famously argued that it would be self-defeating for everyone to follow a maxim of lying whenever it is to his or her advantage. In his recent book Signals, Brian Skyrms claims that Kant was wrong about the impossibility of universal deception. Skyrms argues that there are Lewisian signaling games in which the sender always sends a signal that deceives the receiver. I show here that these purportedly deceptive signals simply fail to make the receiver as (...)
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  4. added 2018-11-23
    Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility.Brian Kogelmann & Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):371-389.
    In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting—we communicate a desire (...)
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  5. added 2018-08-20
    Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch, & Matthias Uhl , Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-4.
    It would be unkind but not inaccurate to say that most experimental philosophy is just psychology with worse methods and better theories. In Experimental Ethics: Towards an Empirical Moral Philosophy, Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch, and Matthias Uhl set out to make this comparison less invidious and more flattering. Their book has 16 chapters, organized into five sections and bookended by the editors’ own introduction and prospectus. Contributors hail from four countries (Germany, USA, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and five disciplines (...)
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  6. added 2018-07-27
    Book Note: Danielson, P *Artificial Morality*.Luc Bovens - 1993 - Political Studies 41:719.
  7. added 2017-12-04
    Investment and Repayment in a Trust Game After Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage.Giovanna Moretto, Manuela Sellitto & Giuseppe di Pellegrino - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
    Although trust and reciprocity are ubiquitous in social exchange, their neurobiological substrate remains largely unknown. Here, we investigated the effect of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)—a brain region critical for valuing social information—on individuals’ decisions in a trust game and in a risk game. In the trust game, one player, the investor, is endowed with a sum of money, which she can keep or invest. The amount she decides to invest is tripled and sent to the other player, (...)
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  8. added 2016-09-08
    Collective Obligations, Group Plans and Individual Actions.Allard Tamminga & Hein Duijf - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):187-214.
    If group members aim to fulfill a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfills the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members' individual actions, (...)
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  9. added 2016-07-11
    Game Theory and the Self-Fulfilling Climate Tragedy.Matthew Kopec - 2017 - Environmental Values 26 (2):203-221.
    Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some possible (...)
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  10. added 2016-02-25
    On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):3-22.
    A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
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  11. added 2015-09-08
    Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice.John Thrasher - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):683-699.
    For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal (...)
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  12. added 2015-04-14
    Is the Minimum Wage Ethically Justifiable? An Order-Ethical Answer.Nikil Mukerji & Christoph Schumacher - 2016 - In Christoph Luetge & Nikil Mukerji (eds.), Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy. Springer. pp. 279-292.
    Is the minimum wage ethically justifiable? In this chapter, we attempt to answer this question from an order-ethical perspective. To this end, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an order-ethical viewpoint. Our investigation yields a twofold conclusion. Firstly, order ethicists should prefer a tax-funded wage subsidy over minimum wages, if they assume that labour markets are perfectly competitive. Secondly, order ethics suggests that the minimum wage can be ethically (...)
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  13. added 2014-12-23
    Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law.Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan - 2014 - University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
  14. added 2014-04-03
    Economic Analysis, Common-Sense Morality and Utilitarianism.J. Moreh - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (1):115 - 143.
    Economic concepts and methods are used to throw light on some aspects of common-sense ethics and the difference between it and Utilitarianism. (1) Very few exceptions are allowed to the rules of common-sense ethics, because of the cost of information required to justify an exception to Conscience and to other people. No such stringency characterizes Utilitarianism, an abstract system constructed by philosophers. (2) Rule Utilitarianism is neither consistent with common-sense ethics, nor does it maximize utility as has been claimed for (...)
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  15. added 2014-04-02
    A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Professional Rights and Responsibilities.James C. Gaa - 1990 - Journal of Business Ethics 9 (3):159 - 169.
    Professions are granted autonomy by society, to regulate their own affairs. In return for the economic benefits autonomy grants to professions, society expects professions to act in a socially responsible manner. This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the relationship between society and professions, which shows that the relationship is unstable in the face of opportunities for professions to renege on the social contract. It also shows how periodic controversies regarding the degree to which professionals act in the public interest (...)
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  16. added 2014-03-28
    Game Theory as a Model for Business and Business Ethics.Robert C. Solomon - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):11-29.
    Fifty years ago, two Princeton professors established game theory as an important new branch of applied mathematics. Gametheory has become a celebrated discipline in its own right, and it now plays a prestigious role in many disciplines, including ethics,due in particular to the neo-Hobbesian thinking of David Gauthier and others. Now it is perched at the edge of business ethics. I believethat it is dangerous and demeaning. It makes us look the wrong way at business, reinforcing a destructive obsession with (...)
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  17. added 2014-03-28
    Game Theory and Decentralisation.Alan Carter - 1999 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 16 (3):223–234.
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  18. added 2014-03-24
    Financial Statement Audits,a Game of Chicken?Charles J. Coates, Robert E. Florence & Kristi L. Kral - 2002 - Journal of Business Ethics 41 (1-2):1 - 11.
    This paper uses the intuition from the game of chickento model client-auditor financial reporting and audit effort strategies. Within an ethical context, our model is concerned with the client misreporting and its detection by the auditor. The paper uses a welfare game(similar to the game of chicken) to more formally model client-auditor strategies. The welfare game is then extended to provide additional insight into ethical and audit effort issues.Such a welfare gameprovides equilibrium in mixed strategies. This mixed strategy solution makes (...)
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  19. added 2014-03-24
    Game Theory and Moral Norms.B. Verbeek - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):337-352.
    This paper provides an overview of developments in the application of game theory to moral philosophy. Game theory has been used in moral theory in three ways. First, as a tool to analyze the function of moral norms. Secondly, to characterize bargaining about moral norms. Thirdly, the paper demonstrates how game theory can make sense of the authority of moral norms in a way that renders the concept suitable for further analysis.
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  20. added 2014-03-18
    Reflections on Ethics and Game Theory.Steven T. Kuhn - 2004 - Synthese 141 (1):1 - 44.
    Applications of game theory to moral philosophy are impededby foundational issues and troublesome examples. In the first part of this paper,questions are raised about the appropriate game-theoretical frameworks for applications to moralphilosophy and about the proper interpretations of the theoretical devices employed inthese frameworks. In the second part, five examples that should be of particular interest to thoseinterested in the connections between ethics and game theory are delineated and discussed. Thefirst example comprises games in which there is an outcome unanimously (...)
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  21. added 2014-03-12
    Wetware, Game Theory, and the Golden Rule.Abraham D. Graber & Mark A. Graber - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (5):30 – 31.
  22. added 2014-03-09
    Review of Morton's The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics[REVIEW]Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):359 – 361.
    Book Information The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics Adam Morton , London; New York: Routledge , 2002 , 240 , US$95 ( cloth ), US$29.95 ( paper ) By Adam Morton. London; New York: Routledge. Pp. 240. US$95 (cloth:), US$29.95 (paper:).
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  23. added 2014-03-07
    The Relevance of Decision Theory to Ethical Theory.Jan Narveson - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):497-520.
    Morality for the purposes of this paper consists of sets of rules or principles intended for the general regulation of conduct for all. Intuitionist accounts of morality are rejected as making reasoned analysis of morals impossible. In many interactions, there is partial conflict and partial cooperation. From the general social point of view, the rational thing to propose is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation. This is what it is rational to propose to reinforce, and to assist (...)
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  24. added 2014-02-20
    Rationality in Decision Theory and in Ethics.Hilary Putnam - 1986 - Critica 18 (54):3 - 16.
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  25. added 2013-12-17
    From Game Theoretical Accounts of Cooperation to Meta-Ethical Choices.Arif Ahmed - 2013 - Studies in Christian Ethics 26 (2):176-183.
  26. added 2013-06-06
    Indirect Reciprocity, Golden Opportunities for Defection, and Inclusive Reputation.Max Albert & Hannes Rusch - 2013 - MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, reputation mechanisms can stabilize cooperation even in severe cooperation problems like the prisoner’s dilemma. Under certain circumstances, conditionally cooperative strategies, which cooperate iff their partner has a good reputation, cannot be invaded by any other strategy that conditions behavior only on own and partner reputation. The first point of this paper is to show that an evolutionary version of backward induction can lead to a breakdown of this kind of indirectly reciprocal cooperation. Backward induction, (...)
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  27. added 2011-11-18
    Book Review:Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. John S. Dryzek. [REVIEW]Mark Sagoff - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):192-.
  28. added 2011-10-17
    Devil's Bargains and the Real World.David Lewis - 1984 - In Douglas Maclean (ed.), The Security Gamble: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age. Rowman & Allenheld. pp. 141-154.
  29. added 2011-06-08
    The Moral Poker Face: Games, Deception, and the Morality of Bluffing.James McBain - 2003 - Contemporary Philosophy (5&6):55-60.
    Bluffing is essentially nothing more than a type of deception. But, despite its morally questionable foundation, it is not only permissible in certain contexts, but sometimes encouraged and/or required (e.g., playing poker). Yet, the question remains as to whether it is permissible to bluff in other contexts – particularly everyday situations. In this paper, I look at László Mérő’s argument – one based in game theory and Kantian ethics – to the end that bluffing is morally permissible in everyday contexts. (...)
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  30. added 2011-02-12
    Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions.Mark Colyvan, Damian Cox & Katie Steele - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):503-529.
  31. added 2011-02-11
    Ethics and Game Theory.John R. Chamberlin - 1989 - Ethics and International Affairs 3:261–276.
    Chamberlin insists on its validity in contributing to our thinking about the place of ethics in international affairs and in clarifying both the dangers and potential areas of cooperation inherent in many international relationships.
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  32. added 2011-02-11
    Mating, Dating, and Mathematics: It's All in the Game.Mark Colyvan - unknown
    Why do people stay together in monogamous relationships? Love? Fear? Habit? Ethics? Integrity? Desperation? In this paper I will consider a rather surprising answer that comes from mathematics. It turns out that cooperative behaviour, such as mutually-faithful marriages, can be given a firm basis in a mathematical theory known as game theory. I will suggest that faithfulness in relationships is fully accounted for by narrow self interest in the appropriate game theory setting. This is a surprising answer because faithful behaviour (...)
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  33. added 2011-02-08
    On Sen's Second-Order Preferences, Morals, and Decision Theory.Friedel Bolle - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (2):195 - 205.
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  34. added 2008-12-31
    Game Theory and Ethics.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Game theory is the systematic study of interdependent rational choice. It should be distinguished from decision theory, the systematic study of individual (practical and epistemic) choice in parametric contexts (i.e., where the agent is choosing or deliberating independently of other agents). Decision theory has several applications to ethics (see Dreier 2004; Mele and Rawlings 2004). Game theory may be used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate human behavior in contexts where the outcome of action depends on what several agents (...)
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