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  1. The Pareto Argument for Inequality Revisited.A. R. J. Fisher & Edward F. McClennen - manuscript
    One of the more obscure arguments for Rawls’ difference principle dubbed ‘the Pareto argument for inequality’ has been criticised by G. A. Cohen (1995, 2008) as being inconsistent. In this paper, we examine and clarify the Pareto argument in detail and argue (1) that justification for the Pareto principles derives from rational selfinterest and thus the Pareto principles ought to be understood as conditions of individual rationality, (2) that the Pareto argument is not inconsistent, contra Cohen, and (3) that the (...)
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  2. Power by Association.Travis Lacroix & Cailin O'Connor - manuscript
    We use tools from evolutionary game theory to examine how power might influence the cultural evolution of inequitable norms between discernible groups in a population of otherwise identical individuals. Similar extant models always assume that power is homogeneous across a social group. As such, these models fail to capture situations where individuals who are not themselves disempowered nonetheless end up disadvantaged in bargaining scenarios by dint of their social group membership. Thus, we assume that there is heterogeneity in the groups (...)
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  3. Conspiring with the Enemy: The Ethic of Cooperation in Warfare.Yvonne Chiu - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press.
    *North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP) Book Award 2019.* -/- *International Studies Association (ISA) - International Ethics Section Book Award 2021.* -/- Although military mores have relied primarily on just war theory, the ethic of cooperation in warfare (ECW)—between enemies even as they are trying to kill each other—is as central to the practice of warfare and to conceptualization of its morality. Neither game theory nor unilateral moral duties (God-given or otherwise) can explain the explicit language of cooperation in (...)
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  4. Game Theory and the Self-Fulfilling Climate Tragedy.Matthew Kopec - 2017 - Environmental Values 26 (2):203-221.
    Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some possible (...)
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  5. Games for Civic Renewal.Joshua Miller, Sarah Shugars & Daniel Levine - 2017 - The Good Society 26 (2).
  6. What is Wrong with Nimbys? Renewable Energy, Landscape Impacts and Incommensurable Values.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2017 - Environmental Values 26 (6):711-732.
    Local opposition to infrastructure projects implementing renewable energy (RE) such as wind farms is often strong even if state-wide support for RE is strikingly high. The slogan “Not In My BackYard” (NIMBY) has become synonymous for this kind of protest. This paper revisits the question of what is wrong with NIMBYs about RE projects and how to best address them. I will argue that local opponents to wind farm (and other RE) developments do not necessarily fail to contribute their fair (...)
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  7. Explaining Universal Social Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Michael Vlerick - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):291-300.
    Universal social institutions, such as marriage, commons management and property, have emerged independently in radically different cultures. This requires explanation. As Boyer and Petersen point out ‘in a purely localist framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences’ . According to Boyer and Petersen, those institutions emerged naturally out of genetically wired behavioural dispositions, such as marriage out of mating strategies and borders out of territorial behaviour. While I agree with Boyer and Petersen that ‘unnatural’ institutions cannot thrive, this one-sided (...)
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  8. The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game.Luc Bovens - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge University Press. pp. 156-176.
    The Tragedy of the Commons is often associated with an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. But it can also have the structure of an n-person Game of Chicken, an Assurance Game, or of a Voting Games (or a Three-in-a-Boat Game). I present three historical stories that document tragedies of the commons, as presented in Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume and argue that the descriptions of these historical cases align better with Voting Games than with any other games.
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  9. A Game of Poverty and Tragic Deliberation.Linell Ajello - 2014 - Constellations 21 (1):134-152.
  10. Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law.Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan - 2014 - University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
  11. Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice.John Thrasher - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):683-699.
    For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal (...)
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  12. Investment and Repayment in a Trust Game After Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage.Giovanna Moretto, Manuela Sellitto & Giuseppe di Pellegrino - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
    Although trust and reciprocity are ubiquitous in social exchange, their neurobiological substrate remains largely unknown. Here, we investigated the effect of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)—a brain region critical for valuing social information—on individuals’ decisions in a trust game and in a risk game. In the trust game, one player, the investor, is endowed with a sum of money, which she can keep or invest. The amount she decides to invest is tripled and sent to the other player, (...)
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  13. Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. pp. 7--38.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Matt Ridley's "The origins of virtue", surveying the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches to the emergence and evolution of cooperation and altruism.
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  14. Where Did Mill Go Wrong? Why the Capital-Managed Rather Than the Labor-Managed Enterprise is the Predominant.Schwartz Justin - 2012 - Ohio State Law Journal 73:220-85.
    In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is (...)
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  15. Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero-Sum Games in the State of Nature.Daniel Eggers - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):193-226.
    The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...)
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  16. Rational Choice Theory.Cedric Paternotte - 2011 - In I. Jarvie & J. Zamorra-Bonilla (eds.), Chapter 14 of The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Sage Publications. pp. 307.
  17. Welfarist Evaluations of Decision Rules Under Interstate Utility Dependencies.Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann - 2010 - Social Choice and Welfare 34 (2):315-344.
    We provide welfarist evaluations of decision rules for federations of states and consider models, under which the interests of people from different states are stochastically dependent. We concentrate on two welfarist standards; they require that the expected utility for the federation be maximized or that the expected utilities for people from different states be equal. We discuss an analytic result that characterizes the decision rule with maximum expected utility, set up a class of models that display interstate dependencies and run (...)
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  18. Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game.Lisa Carlson & Raymond Dacey - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):105-123.
    Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of "when, how, and to what degree" norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37: 1-27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political scientists, (...)
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  19. Negociaciones y teoría de los juegos. [REVIEW]David Villena Saldaña - 2010 - le Monde Diplomatique (Peruvian Edition) 12:39.
    Review of Aníbal Sierralta Ríos's book on negotiations and game theory.
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  20. Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game.Michael Moehler - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):297-326.
    In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish (...)
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  21. Scelta, Contratto, Consenso.Anthony de Jasay - 2008 - Rubbettino/Leonardo Facco.
  22. Game Theory Meets Threshold Analysis: Reappraising the Paradoxes of Anarchy and Revolution: Articles.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):579-617.
    I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some political theorists apply game theory to analyze the paradox of anarchy: War is apparently inevitable in anarchy even though all warring parties prefer peace over war. Others apply tipping threshold analysis to resolve the paradox of revolution: Joining a revolution is apparently always irrational even when an overwhelming majority of the population wish to replace their regime. The usual game theoretic analysis of anarchy yields the conclusion (...)
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  23. Who Should Own Access Rights? A Game-Theoretical Approach to Striking the Optimal Balance in the Debate Over Digital Rights Management.Yu-Lin Chang - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):323-356.
    The development of access rights as, perhaps, a replacement for copyright in digital rights management (DRM) systems, draws our attention to the importance of ‚the balance problem’ between information industries and the individual user. The nature of just what this ‚balance’ is, is often mentioned in copyright writings and judgments, but is rarely discussed. In this paper I focus upon elucidating the idea of balance in intellectual property and propose that the balance concept is not only the most feasible way (...)
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  24. A Dynamic Systems View of Economic and Political Theory.Christian Fuchs & John Collier - 2007 - Theoria 54 (113):23-52.
    Economic logic impinges on contemporary political theory through both economic reductionism and economic methodology applied to political decision-making (through game theory). The authors argue that the sort of models used are based on mechanistic and linear methodologies that have now been found wanting in physics. They further argue that complexity based self-organization methods are better suited to model the complexities of economy and polity and their interactions with the overall social system.
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  25. Connecting Economic Models to the Real World: Game Theory and the Fcc Spectrum Auctions.Anna Alexandrova - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):173-192.
    Can social phenomena be understood by analyzing their parts? Contemporary economic theory often assumes that they can. The methodology of constructing models which trace the behavior of perfectly rational agents in idealized environments rests on the premise that such models, while restricted, help us isolate tendencies, that is, the stable separate effects of economic causes that can be used to explain and predict economic phenomena. In this paper, I question both the claim that models in economics supply claims about tendencies (...)
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  26. Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory, Nicola Giocoli, Edward Elgar, 2003, X + 464 Pages. [REVIEW]Andy Denis - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):159-166.
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  27. Consequentialism and Preference Formation in Economics and Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:111-130.
    When students first study expected utility, they are inclined to interpret it as a theory that explains preferences for lotteries in terms of preferences for outcomes. Knowing U and U, the agent can calculate that the utility of a gamble of $100 on a fair coin coming up heads is U/2 + U/2. Utilities are indices representing preferences, so in calculating the utility of the gamble, one is apparently giving a causal explanation for the agent’s preference for the gamble.
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  28. Science Studies and the Theory of Games.Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla - 2006 - Perspectives on Science 14 (4):525-557.
    Being scientific research a process of social interaction, this process can be studied from a game-theoretic perspective. Some conceptual and formal instruments that can help to understand scientific research as a game are introduced, and it is argued that game theoretic epistemology provides a middle ground for 'rationalist' and 'constructivist' theories of scientific knowledge. In the first part , a description of the essential elements of game of science is made, using an inferentialist conception of rationality. In the second part (...)
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  29. Radical Contingency in Sharing Behavior and its Consequences.Todd Davies - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):821-821.
    The data of Henrich et al., when combined with other research, suggest that sharing behavior probably varies systematically across cultures, situations, and individuals. Economic policies founded on recognition of this “radical contingency” would, I argue, nurture economic pluralism rather than attempting to bring the world under one system.
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  30. Game Theory and Global Environmental Policy.Alfred Endres - 2004 - Poiesis and Praxis 3 (s 1-2):123-139.
    Economists interpret global environmental quality to be a pure public good. Each country should contribute to its provision. However, this is hard to achieve because each government is tempted to take a free ride on the other governments' efforts. Not only has this dilemma been analysed with game theoretical methods but game theory has also been used to think about how to make amends. This paper reviews the game theoretical discussion on how international policy frameworks may be designed to improve (...)
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  31. Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: A Case for Methodological Individualism.Jon Elster - 2003 - In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Theory and Society. Routledge, in Association with the Open University. pp. 453.
  32. Towards a Resolution of Terrorism Using Game Theory.C. Maria Keet - 2003 - In Luke Ashworth & Maura Adshead (eds.), Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration.
    Both terrorism and game theory are contested concepts within the social sciences, but in this paper, I will show that a rational approach (game theory) towards the emotion-laden idea and practice of terrorism does aid understanding of the “terrorist theatre”. First, an outline will be provided on the type of actors (game players) that are, or may be, involved to a more or lesser extend in (supporting) terrorism. Then several game models will be assessed on their applicability. This includes averting (...)
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  33. Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?Christian List - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):229 - 260.
    On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful, and "hence" impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empirically underdetermined and, if we also deny (...)
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  34. Why We Can’T All Just Get Along: Human Variety and Game Theory in Hobbes’s State of Nature.Graham G. Dodds - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):345-374.
    This paper critically examines several game theoretic interpretations of Hobbes' state of nature, including Prisoner's Dilemma and Assurance Game, and argues instead that the best matrix is that of a combination of the two, an Assurance Dilemma. This move is motivated by the fact that Hobbes explicitly notes two distinct personality types, with different preference structures, in the state of nature: dominators and moderates. The former play as if in a Prisoner's Dilemma, the latter play as if in an Assurance (...)
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  35. Production Under Uncertainty and Choice Under Uncertainty in the Emergence of Generalized Expected Utility Theory.John Quiggin - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):125-144.
    This paper presents a personal view of the interaction between the analysis of choice under uncertainty and the analysis of production under uncertainty. Interest in the foundations of the theory of choice under uncertainty was stimulated by applications of expected utility theory such as the Sandmo model of production under uncertainty. This interest led to the development of generalized models including rank-dependent expected utility theory. In turn, the development of generalized expected utility models raised the question of whether such models (...)
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  36. The Stag Hunt.Brian Skyrms - 2001 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2):31 - 41.
    If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." Rousseau's story of the hunt leaves many questions open. What are the values of a hare and of an individual's share of the deer given a successful hunt? What is the probability that (...)
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  37. Book ReviewKen Binmore,. Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998. Pp. Xxiii + 589. $50.00. [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 2001 - Ethics 111 (4):794-797.
  38. Uncertainty, Production, Choice, and Agency: The State-Contingent Approach.Robert G. Chambers & John Quiggin - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book demonstrates that the state-contingent approach provides the best way to think about all problems in the economics of uncertainty, including problems ...
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  39. Too Much (and Not Enough) of a Good Thing: How Agent Neutral Principles Fail in Prisoner's Dilemmas.Michael J. Almeida - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 94 (3):309-328.
  40. Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1999 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):325-358.
  41. On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract.Mohammed Dore - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239.
    This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents a real alternative to (...)
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  42. Simulation and Interpersonal Utility.A. Goldman - 1996 - In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Ethics. MIT Press. pp. 709-726.
  43. The Diminishing Utility of Economic Growth: From Maximizing Security Toward Maximizing Subjective Well‐Being.Ronald Inglehart - 1996 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 10 (4):509-531.
    Abstract Twenty years ago, Tibor Scitovsky questioned the assumption, embedded in neoclassical economics, that human happiness will be augmented if the level of consumption either rises or becomes more uniform over time. Evidence from the 1990?1993 World Values Survey suggests that his doubts were well?founded: although economic gains apparently make a major contribution to subjective well?being as one moves from societies at the subsistence level to those with moderate levels of economic development, further economic growth seems to have little or (...)
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  44. Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume 1: Playing Fair, Binmore Ken. The MIT Press, 1994, Xxii + 364 Pages. [REVIEW]David Gauthier - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):391.
  45. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons.Daniel M. Hausman - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):473-490.
  46. Inducing Fair Trade Out of Hegemonic Trade.Raymond Dacey - 1994 - Synthese 100 (3):497 - 504.
    This paper provides a model of the transition from hegemonic trade to contemporary (or fair) trade. Hegemonic trade is an instance of the two player game called Bully (Poundstone 1992) and Called Bluff (Snyder and Diesing 1977); contemporary trade is an instance of Prisoner's Dilemma (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991). In this paper, I show that a nation under the thumb of a hegemon, called the conciliatory nation, can induce fair trade. Further, I show that to induce fair trade, the conciliatory (...)
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  47. The Microeconomic Interpretation of Games.Chantale LaCasse & Don Ross - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:379 - 387.
    This paper is part of a larger project defending of the foundations of microeconomics against recent criticisms by philosophers. Here, we undermine one source of these criticisms, arising from philosophers' disappointment with the performance of microeconomic tools, in particular game theory, when these are applied to normative decision theory. Hollis and Sugden have recently articulated such disappointment in a sophisticated way, and have argued on the basis of it that the economic conception of rationality is inadequate. We argue, however, that (...)
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  48. Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility. [REVIEW]Hans Lottenbach - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48.
    In recent attempts at deriving morality from rationality expected utility theory has played a major role. In the most prominent such attempt, Gauthier'sMorals by Agreement, a mode of maximizing utility calledconstrained maximization is defended. I want to show that constrained maximization or any similar proposal cannot be coherently supported by expected utility theory. First, I point to an important implication of that theory. Second, I discuss the question of what the place of constrained maximization in utility theory might be. Third, (...)
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  49. Book Review:Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. John S. Dryzek. [REVIEW]Mark Sagoff - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):192-.
  50. On Arguments From Self-Interest for the Nash Solution and the Kalai Egalitarian Solution to the Bargaining Problem.Luc Bovens - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (3):231-260.
    I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz. relative proportionate utility loss from conceding to one's opponent's proposal and relative non-proportionate utility loss from not conceding to one's opponent's proposal, if she were not to concede as well. The first consideration can adequately be captured by the information contained in vNM utilities. The second requires measures of utility which allow for an interpersonal comparison of utility differences. These considerations (...)
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