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  1. Deciding Where to Meet for Dinner: Simple Problems and Joint Intentionality.Robert Bass - manuscript
    Certain apparently simple problems of coming to an agreement are surprisingly difficult to analyze in terms of individually rational behavior with a given set of preferences and beliefs. Though initially the solution appears obvious, the reasoning that would be needed to reach the solution on the part of a pair of rational individuals seems baroque and doubtful. This is used to suggest that a more fruitful tack is to analyze the situation in terms of a kind of joint or shared (...)
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  2. Interpretations of the Concepts of Resilience and Evolution in the Philosophy of Leibniz.Vincenzo De Florio - manuscript
    In this article I interpret resilience and evolution in view of the philosophy of Leibniz. First, I discuss resilience as a substance’s or a monad’s “quantity of essence” — its “degree of perfection” — which I express as the quality of the Whole with respect to the sum of the qualities of the Parts. Then I discuss evolution, which I interpret here as the autopoietic Principle that sets Itself in motion and creates all reality, including Itself. This Principle may be (...)
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  3. Risk, Ignorance, and What We Ought to Do.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    I consider cases in which risk or ignorance create barriers to our discovery of what we ought to do. I argue that neither expected utility theory, nor the maximin principle, nor a timid gambling temperament, is relevant to discovering what we ought to do in one-off or infrequently recurring types of decisions involving risk, or to decisions involving ignorance. I argue, contra Kolodny and MacFarlane, that the miners case does not require us to give up any classical logical principle in (...)
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  4. Game Theory.Author unknown - unknown - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. Intentional Cooperation and Acting as Part of a Single Body.Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284.
    According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action (...)
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  6. An Argument Against Causal Decision Theory.Jack Spencer - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):52-61.
    This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.
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  7. A History Based Logic for Dynamic Preference Updates.Can Başkent & Guy McCusker - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (3):275-305.
    History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework.
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  8. The Termination Risks of Simulation Science.Preston Greene - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):489-509.
    Historically, the hypothesis that our world is a computer simulation has struck many as just another improbable-but-possible “skeptical hypothesis” about the nature of reality. Recently, however, the simulation hypothesis has received significant attention from philosophers, physicists, and the popular press. This is due to the discovery of an epistemic dependency: If we believe that our civilization will one day run many simulations concerning its ancestry, then we should believe that we are probably in an ancestor simulation right now. This essay (...)
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  9. Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:252–272.
    Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce three notions of manipulability for a (...)
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  10. Implementing Equal Division with an Ultimatum Threat.Esat Doruk Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):223-236.
    We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded; if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh (...)
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  11. L'ingranaggio della cooperazione. Teorie dei giochi, cooperazione spontanea e produzione di beni pubblici.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2014 - In Carlo Lottieri & Daniele Velo Dalbrenta (eds.), La città volontaria. IBL Libri. pp. 23-63.
    A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.
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  12. Pragmatics, Semantics and the Case of Scalar Implicatures.Salvatore Pistoia-Reda (ed.) - 2014 - Palgrave.
    This book contains an advanced debate on the nature of scalar implicatures, one of the most popular topics in philosophical linguistics over the past 20 years. Leading authorities in the study of the semantics–pragmatics interface have contributed chapters from a range of perspectives; they address the crucial components of scalar implicatures, including the exhaustivity operator, alternatives and contextual optionality. The book offers an up-to-date presentation of the phenomenon of scalar implicatures in a way that will help readers to orient themselves (...)
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  13. A Threshold for Biological Altruism in Public Goods Games Played in Groups Including Kin.Hannes Rusch - 2014 - MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, altruistic self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and contribution to the production of public goods in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories trying to explain human prosocial preferences and behavior. Many of these focus on direct and indirect reciprocity, assortment, or (cultural) group selection. Here, I investigate analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and experimentally investigate collective action problems: the public (...)
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  14. Natural Resources and Institutional Development.David Wiens - 2014 - Journal of Theoretical Politics 26 (2):197-221.
    Recent work on the resource curse argues that the effect of resource wealth on development outcomes is a conditional one: resource dependent countries with low quality institutions are vulnerable to a resource curse, while resource dependent countries with high quality institutions are not. But extant models neglect the ways in which the inflow of resource revenue impacts the institutional environment itself. In this paper, I present a formal model to show that where domestic institutions do not limit state leaders' discretion (...)
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  15. The Mathematical Facts Of Games Of Chance Between Exposure, Teaching, And Contribution To Cognitive Therapies: Principles Of An Optimal Mathematical Intervention For Responsible Gambling.Catalin Barboianu - 2013 - Romanian Journal of Experimental Applied Psychology 4 (3):25-40.
    On the question of whether gambling behavior can be changed as result of teaching gamblers the mathematics of gambling, past studies have yielded contradictory results, and a clear conclusion has not yet been drawn. In this paper, I bring some criticisms to the empirical studies that tended to answer no to this hypothesis, regarding the sampling and laboratory testing, and I argue that an optimal mathematical scholastic intervention with the objective of preventing problem gambling is possible, by providing the principles (...)
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  16. The Mathematics of Slots: Configurations, Combinations, Probabilities.Catalin Barboianu - 2013 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
  17. Decision Theory, Philosophical Perspectives.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
    Decision theory is concerned with how agents should act when the consequences of their actions are uncertain. The central principle of contemporary decision theory is that the rational choice is the choice that maximizes subjective expected utility. This entry explains what this means, and discusses the philosophical motivations and consequences of the theory. The entry will consider some of the main problems and paradoxes that decision theory faces, and some of responses that can be given. Finally the entry will briefly (...)
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  18. Wisdom of the Crowds Vs. Groupthink: Learning in Groups and in Isolation.Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin Zollman & David Danks - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):695-723.
    We evaluate the asymptotic performance of boundedly-rational strategies in multi-armed bandit problems, where performance is measured in terms of the tendency (in the limit) to play optimal actions in either (i) isolation or (ii) networks of other learners. We show that, for many strategies commonly employed in economics, psychology, and machine learning, performance in isolation and performance in networks are essentially unrelated. Our results suggest that the appropriateness of various, common boundedly-rational strategies depends crucially upon the social context (if any) (...)
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  19. Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?Cédric Paternotte & Jonathan Grose - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):551-587.
    Recent years have witnessed an increased number of game-theoretic approaches to social norms, which apparently share some common vocabulary and methods. We describe three major approaches of this kind (due to Binmore, Bicchieri and Gintis), before comparing them systematically on five crucial themes: generality of the solution, preference transformation, punishment, epistemic conditions and type of explanation. This allows us to show that these theories are, by and large, less compatible than they seem. We then argue that those three theories struggle (...)
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  20. What Niche Did Human Cooperativeness Evolve In?Hannes Rusch - 2013 - Ethics and Politics 15 (2):82-100.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is widely used to model social interaction between unrelated individuals in the study of the evolution of cooperative behaviour in humans and other species. Many effective mechanisms and promotive scenarios have been studied which allow for small founding groups of cooperative individuals to prevail even when all social interaction is characterised as a PD. Here, a brief critical discussion of the role of the PD as the most prominent tool in cooperation research is presented, followed by (...)
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  21. Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Robertson.Kenny Easwaran & Bradley Monton - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):681-685.
    Pascal’s Wager holds that one has pragmatic reason to believe in God, since that course of action has infinite expected utility. The mixed strategy objection holds that one could just as well follow a course of action that has infinite expected utility but is unlikely to end with one believing in God. Monton (2011. Mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager. Analysis 71: 642–45.) has argued that mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager, while Robertson (2012. Some mixed strategies can evade Pascal’s (...)
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  22. How Can Questions Be Informative Before They Are Answered? Strategic Information in Interrogative Games.Emmanuel Genot & Justine Jacot - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):189-204.
    We examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.Send (...)
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  23. An Experimental Study of the Generosity Game.Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):51-63.
    We study ultimatum and dictator variants of the generosity game. In this game, the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is not confronted with the typical trade-off between her own and the other’s payoff. For each variant of the game, we study three treatments that vary the range of potential pie sizes so as to assess the influence of (...)
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  24. Collective Acts.Paul Weirich - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):223-241.
    Groups of people perform acts. For example, a committee passes a resolution, a team wins a game, and an orchestra performs a symphony. These collective acts may be evaluated for rationality. Take a committee’s passing a resolution. This act may be evaluated not only for fairness but also for rationality. Did it take account of all available information? Is the resolution consistent with the committee’s past resolutions? Standards of collective rationality apply to collective acts, that is, acts that groups of (...)
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  25. Giochi di anarchia. Beni pubblici, teoria dei giochi e anarco-liberalismo.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 29 (1-2):163-180.
    The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.
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  26. Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to (...)
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  27. 1 Game Theory and Gricean Pragmatics.Salvatore Pistoia-Reda - 2010 - In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context. Peter Lang. pp. 2--269.
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  28. The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory.Emmanuel Genot - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):271-289.
    I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative games, (...)
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  29. Modelling Simultaneous Games in Dynamic Logic.Johan Van Benthem, Sujata Ghosh & Fenrong Liu - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):247 - 268.
    We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player's powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of 'concurrent game logic' CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.
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  30. Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory.Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.) - 2008 - Amsterdam University Press.
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  31. Giochi, dilemmi sociali e scelte collettive.Gustavo Cevolani - 2008 - In Anthony de Jasay (ed.), Scelta, Contratto, Consenso. Rubbettino/Leonardo Facco. pp. 13--56.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Anthony de Jasay's "Choice, contract, and consent. A restatement of liberalism".
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  32. Paradigmatic Experiments: The Ultimatum Game From Testing to Measurement Device.Francesco Guala - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):658-669.
    The Ultimatum Game is one of the most successful experimental designs in the history of the social sciences. In this article I try to explain this success—what makes it a “paradigmatic experiment”—stressing in particular its versatility. Despite the intentions of its inventors, the Ultimatum Game was never a good design to test economic theory, and it is now mostly used as a heuristic tool for the observation of nonstandard preferences or as a “social thermometer” for the observation of culture‐specific norms. (...)
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  33. How to Play the Ultimatum Game: An Engineering Approach to Metanormativity.Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Paul Thagard - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):173 – 192.
    The ultimatum game is a simple bargaining situation where the behavior of people frequently contradicts the optimal strategy according to classical game theory. Thus, according to many scholars, the commonly observed behavior should be considered irrational. We argue that this putative irrationality stems from a wrong conception of metanormativity (the study of norms about the establishment of norms). After discussing different metanormative conceptions, we defend a Quinean, naturalistic approach to the evaluation of norms. After reviewing empirical literature on the ultimatum (...)
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  34. Kinship, Family, and Gender Effects in the Ultimatum Game.Shane J. Macfarlan & Robert J. Quinlan - 2008 - Human Nature 19 (3):294-309.
    Kinship and reciprocity are two main predictors of altruism. The ultimatum game has been used to study altruism in many small-scale societies. We used the ultimatum game to examine effects of individuals’ family and kin relations on altruistic behavior in a kin-based horticultural community in rural Dominica. Results show sex-specific effects of kin on ultimatum game play. Average coefficient of relatedness to the village was negatively associated with women’s ultimatum game proposals and had little effect on men’s proposals. Number of (...)
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  35. A Graphic Measure for Game-Theoretic Robustness.Randy Au Patrick Grim, Robert Rosenberger Nancy Louie, Evan Selinger William Braynen & E. Eason Robb - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):273-297.
    Robustness has long been recognized as an important parameter for evaluating game-theoretic results, but talk of ‘robustness’ generally remains vague. What we offer here is a graphic measure for a particular kind of robustness (‘matrix robustness’), using a three-dimensional display of the universe of 2 × 2 game theory. In such a measure specific games appear as specific volumes (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, etc.), allowing a graphic image of the extent of particular game-theoretic effects in terms of those games. The (...)
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  36. Game Theory.Don Ross - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37. Game Theory Can Build Higher Mental Processes From Lower Ones.George Ainslie - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):16-18.
    The question of reductionism is an obstacle to unification. Many behavioral scientists who study the more complex or higher mental functions avoid regarding them as selected by motivation. Game-theoretic models in which complex processes grow from the strategic interaction of elementary reward-seeking processes can overcome the mechanical feel of earlier reward-based models. Three examples are briefly described. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  38. Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information.Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...)
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  39. Intentions and Plans in Decision and Game Theory.Martin van Hees & Olivier Roy - 2007 - In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate.
  40. Has Game Theory Been Refuted?Francesco Guala - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (5):239-263.
    The answer in a nutshell is: Yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. Nobody noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed choices by ‘refining’ players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (a tautology). None of these (...)
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  41. Is the Ultimatum Game a Three-Body Affair?Gigerenzer Gerd & Gigerenzer Thalia - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):823-824.
    The Ultimatum Game is commonly interpreted as a two-person bargaining game. The third person who donates and may withdraw the money is not included in the theoretical equations, but treated like a neutral measurement instrument. Yet in a cross-cultural analysis it seems necessary to consider the possibility that the thoughts of a player – strategic, altruistic, selfish, or concerned about reputation – are influenced by both an anonymous second player and the non-anonymous experimenter.
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  42. What Does the Ultimatum Game Mean in the Real World?Randolph C. Grace & Simon Kemp - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):824-825.
    The predictive validity of the ultimatum game (UG) for cross-cultural differences in real-world behavior has not yet been established. We discuss results of a recent meta-analysis (Oosterbeek et al 2004), which examined UG behavior across large-scale societies and found that the mean percent offers rejected was positively correlated with social expenditure.
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  43. “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe & John Q. Patton - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):795-815.
    Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...)
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  44. Is Trust the Result of Bayesian Learning?Bernd Lahno - 2004 - Jahrbuch Für Handlungs- Und Entscheidungstheorei 3:47-68.
  45. Co–Operation and Communication in Apes and Humans.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gardenfors - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):484–501.
    We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse these ways of (...)
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  46. Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...)
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  47. Beyond Rationality: Rigor Without Mortis in Game Theory.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):180-192.
    Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behavior (...)
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  48. Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: A Case for Methodological Individualism.Jon Elster - 2003 - In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Theory and Society. Routledge, in Association with the Open University. pp. 453.
  49. Positivity of Bid-Ask Spreads and Symmetrical Monotone Risk Aversion.Moez Abouda & Alain Chateauneuf - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (2):149-170.
    A usual argument in finance refers to no arbitrage opportunities for the positivity of the bid-ask spread. Here we follow the decision theory approach and show that if positivity of the bid-ask spread is identified with strong risk aversion for an expected utility market-maker, this is no longer true for a rank-dependent expected utility one. For such a decision-maker only a very weak form of risk aversion is required, a result which seems more in accordance with his actual behavior. We (...)
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  50. Ultimatum Games.Terence C. Burnham - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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