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  1. Order From Disorder: The Role of Noise in Creative Processes. A Special Issue On Game Theory And.Derek Abbott & Paul C. W. Davies - unknown
    The importance of applying game theory to the evolution of information in the presence of noise has recently become widely recognized. This Special Issue addresses the theme of spontaneously emergent order in both classical and quantum systems subject to external noise, and includes papers directly related to game theory or the development of supporting techniques. In the following editorial overview we examine the broader context of the subject, including the tension between the destructive and creative aspects of noise, and foreshadow (...)
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  2. Positivity of Bid-Ask Spreads and Symmetrical Monotone Risk Aversion.Moez Abouda & Alain Chateauneuf - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (2):149-170.
    A usual argument in finance refers to no arbitrage opportunities for the positivity of the bid-ask spread. Here we follow the decision theory approach and show that if positivity of the bid-ask spread is identified with strong risk aversion for an expected utility market-maker, this is no longer true for a rank-dependent expected utility one. For such a decision-maker only a very weak form of risk aversion is required, a result which seems more in accordance with his actual behavior. We (...)
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  3. Game Theory Can Build Higher Mental Processes From Lower Ones.George Ainslie - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):16-18.
    The question of reductionism is an obstacle to unification. Many behavioral scientists who study the more complex or higher mental functions avoid regarding them as selected by motivation. Game-theoretic models in which complex processes grow from the strategic interaction of elementary reward-seeking processes can overcome the mechanical feel of earlier reward-based models. Three examples are briefly described. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  4. Divide-the-Dollar Game Revisited.Nejat Anbarci - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (4):295-303.
    In the Divide-the-Dollar (DD) game, two players simultaneously make demands to divide a dollar. Each player receives his demand if the sum of the demands does not exceed one, a payoff of zero otherwise. Note that, in the latter case, both parties are punished severely. A major setback of DD is that each division of the dollar is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Observe that, when the sum of the two demands x and y exceeds one, it is as if Player (...)
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  5. Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - 1995 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
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  6. Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information.Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...)
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  7. Logic and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory: Special Issue.Michael O. L. Bacharach & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):1-6.
    An introduction to the special issue on epistemic logic and the foundations of game theory edited by Michael Bacharach and Philippe Mongin. Contributors are Michael Bacharach, Robert Stalnaker, Salvatore Modica and Aldo Rustichini, Luc Lismont and Philippe Mongin, and Hyun-Song Shin and Timothy Williamson.
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  8. Deciding Where to Meet for Dinner: Simple Problems and Joint Intentionality.Robert Bass - manuscript
    Certain apparently simple problems of coming to an agreement are surprisingly difficult to analyze in terms of individually rational behavior with a given set of preferences and beliefs. Though initially the solution appears obvious, the reasoning that would be needed to reach the solution on the part of a pair of rational individuals seems baroque and doubtful. This is used to suggest that a more fruitful tack is to analyze the situation in terms of a kind of joint or shared (...)
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  9. Financial Markets Can Be at Sub-Optimal Equilibria.Mark Bedau - manuscript
    We use game theory and Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market, an agent-based model of an evolving stock market, to study the optimal frequency for traders to revise their market forecasting rules. We discover two things: There is a unique strategic Nash equilibrium in the game of choosing forecast revision rates, and this equilibrium is sub-optimal in the sense that traders’ earnings are not maximized an the market is inefficient. This strategic equilibrium is due to an analogue of the prisoner’s dilemma; (...)
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  10. Modelling Simultaneous Games in Dynamic Logic.Johan Van Benthem, Sujata Ghosh & Fenrong Liu - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):247 - 268.
    We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player's powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of 'concurrent game logic' CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.
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  11. Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction.Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.) - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the formal models of (...)
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  12. The Logic of Strategy.Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form (...)
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  13. An Embarrassment of Riches : Modeling Social Preferences in Ultimatum Games.Cristina Bicchieri & Jiji Zhang - unknown
    Experimental results in Ultimatum, Trust and Social Dilemma games have been interpreted as showing that individuals are, by and large, not driven by selfish motives. But we do not need experiments to know that. In our view, what the experiments show is that the typical economic auxiliary hypothesis of non-tuism should not be generalized to other contexts. Indeed, we know that when the experimental situation is framed as a market interaction, participants will be more inclined to keep more money, share (...)
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  14. Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief.Giacomo Bonanno - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (1):49-52.
    The logic of common belief does not always reflect that of individual beliefs. In particular, even when the individual belief operators satisfy the KD45 logic, the common belief operator may fail to satisfy axiom 5. That is, it can happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly believed. We identify the intersubjective restrictions on individual beliefs that are incorporated in axiom 5 for common belief.
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  15. Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory.Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.) - 2008 - Amsterdam University Press.
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  16. Decision Theory, Philosophical Perspectives.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
    Decision theory is concerned with how agents should act when the consequences of their actions are uncertain. The central principle of contemporary decision theory is that the rational choice is the choice that maximizes subjective expected utility. This entry explains what this means, and discusses the philosophical motivations and consequences of the theory. The entry will consider some of the main problems and paradoxes that decision theory faces, and some of responses that can be given. Finally the entry will briefly (...)
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  17. Co–Operation and Communication in Apes and Humans.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):484–501.
    We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse these ways of (...)
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  18. Ultimatum Games.Terence C. Burnham - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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  19. Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia, 37 ECON.Lisa A. Cameron - 1999 - Economic Inquiry 37 (1).
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  20. The Backward Induction Argument.John W. Carroll - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.
    The backward induction argument purports to show that rational and suitably informed players will defect throughout a finite sequence of prisoner's dilemmas. It is supposed to be a useful argument for predicting how rational players will behave in a variety of interesting decision situations. Here, I lay out a set of assumptions defining a class of finite sequences of prisoner's dilemmas. Given these assumptions, I suggest how it might appear that backward induction succeeds and why it is actually fallacious. Then, (...)
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  21. Implementing Equal Division with an Ultimatum Threat.Esat Doruk Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):223-236.
    We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded; if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh (...)
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  22. Giochi, dilemmi sociali e scelte collettive.Gustavo Cevolani - 2008 - In Anthony de Jasay (ed.), Scelta, Contratto, Consenso. Rubbettino/Leonardo Facco. pp. 13--56.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Anthony de Jasay's "Choice, contract, and consent. A restatement of liberalism".
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  23. L'ingranaggio della cooperazione. Teorie dei giochi, cooperazione spontanea e produzione di beni pubblici.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2014 - In Carlo Lottieri & Daniele Velo Dalbrenta (eds.), La città volontaria. IBL Libri. pp. 23-63.
    A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.
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  24. Giochi di anarchia. Beni pubblici, teoria dei giochi e anarco-liberalismo.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 29 (1-2):163-180.
    The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.
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  25. Pure-Strategy Equilibria with Non-Expected Utility Players.Ho-Chyuan Chen & William S. Neilson - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (2):201-212.
    A pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem is extended to include games with non-expected utility players. It is shown that to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, the linearity of preferences in the probabilities can be replaced by the weaker requirement of quasiconvexity in the probabilities.
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  26. Beyond Rationality: Rigor Without Mortis in Game Theory.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):180-192.
    Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behavior (...)
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  27. Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...)
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  28. Game Theory and the History of Ideas About Rationality: An Introductory Survey.Ann E. Cudd - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):101.
    Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality that claim it is fundamentally (...)
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  29. Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to (...)
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  30. Interpretations of the Concepts of Resilience and Evolution in the Philosophy of Leibniz.Vincenzo De Florio - manuscript
    In this article I interpret resilience and evolution in view of the philosophy of Leibniz. First, I discuss resilience as a substance’s or a monad’s “quantity of essence” — its “degree of perfection” — which I express as the quality of the Whole with respect to the sum of the qualities of the Parts. Then I discuss evolution, which I interpret here as the autopoietic Principle that sets Itself in motion and creates all reality, including Itself. This Principle may be (...)
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  31. Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Robertson.Kenny Easwaran & Bradley Monton - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):681-685.
    Pascal’s Wager holds that one has pragmatic reason to believe in God, since that course of action has infinite expected utility. The mixed strategy objection holds that one could just as well follow a course of action that has infinite expected utility but is unlikely to end with one believing in God. Monton (2011. Mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager. Analysis 71: 642–45.) has argued that mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager, while Robertson (2012. Some mixed strategies can evade Pascal’s (...)
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  32. Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: A Case for Methodological Individualism.Jon Elster - 2003 - In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Theory and Society. Routledge, in Association with the Open University. pp. 453.
  33. Risk, Ignorance, and What We Ought to Do.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    I consider cases in which risk or ignorance create barriers to our discovery of what we ought to do. I argue that neither expected utility theory, nor the maximin principle, nor a timid gambling temperament, is relevant to discovering what we ought to do in one-off or infrequently recurring types of decisions involving risk, or to decisions involving ignorance. I argue, contra Kolodny and MacFarlane, that the miners case does not require us to give up any classical logical principle in (...)
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  34. The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory.Emmanuel J. Genot - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):271-289.
    I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative games, (...)
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  35. How Can Questions Be Informative Before They Are Answered? Strategic Information in Interrogative Games.Emmanuel J. Genot & Justine Jacot - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):189-204.
    We examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.
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  36. Is the Ultimatum Game a Three-Body Affair?Gigerenzer Gerd & Gigerenzer Thalia - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):823-824.
    The Ultimatum Game is commonly interpreted as a two-person bargaining game. The third person who donates and may withdraw the money is not included in the theoretical equations, but treated like a neutral measurement instrument. Yet in a cross-cultural analysis it seems necessary to consider the possibility that the thoughts of a player – strategic, altruistic, selfish, or concerned about reputation – are influenced by both an anonymous second player and the non-anonymous experimenter.
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  37. The Contribution of Game Theory to Experimental Design in the Behavioral Sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):411-412.
    Methodological practices differ between economics and psychology because economists use game theory as the basis for the design and interpretation of experiments, while psychologists do not. This methodological choice explains the “four key variables” stressed by Hert-wig and Ortmann. Game theory is currently the most rigorous basis for modeling strategic choice.
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  38. Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and ten Intuitive Contradictions.Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt & Rouss Hall - unknown
    This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction (...)
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  39. What Does the Ultimatum Game Mean in the Real World?Randolph C. Grace & Simon Kemp - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):824-825.
    The predictive validity of the ultimatum game (UG) for cross-cultural differences in real-world behavior has not yet been established. We discuss results of a recent meta-analysis (Oosterbeek et al 2004), which examined UG behavior across large-scale societies and found that the mean percent offers rejected was positively correlated with social expenditure.
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  40. Paradigmatic Experiments: The Ultimatum Game From Testing to Measurement Device.Francesco Guala - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):658-669.
    The Ultimatum Game is one of the most successful experimental designs in the history of the social sciences. In this article I try to explain this success—what makes it a “paradigmatic experiment”—stressing in particular its versatility. Despite the intentions of its inventors, the Ultimatum Game was never a good design to test economic theory, and it is now mostly used as a heuristic tool for the observation of nonstandard preferences or as a “social thermometer” for the observation of culture‐specific norms. (...)
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  41. Has Game Theory Been Refuted?Francesco Guala - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (5):239-263.
    The answer in a nutshell is: Yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. Nobody noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed choices by ‘refining’ players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (a tautology). None of these (...)
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  42. An Experimental Study of the Generosity Game.Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):51-63.
    We study ultimatum and dictator variants of the generosity game. In this game, the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is not confronted with the typical trade-off between her own and the other’s payoff. For each variant of the game, we study three treatments that vary the range of potential pie sizes so as to assess the influence of (...)
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  43. Decision Theory.Sven Ove Hansson - unknown
    This text is a non-technical overview of modern decision theory. It is intended for university students with no previous acquaintance with the subject, and was primarily written for the participants of a course on risk analysis at Uppsala University in 1994.
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  44. How to Play the Ultimatum Game: An Engineering Approach to Metanormativity.Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Paul Thagard - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):173 – 192.
    The ultimatum game is a simple bargaining situation where the behavior of people frequently contradicts the optimal strategy according to classical game theory. Thus, according to many scholars, the commonly observed behavior should be considered irrational. We argue that this putative irrationality stems from a wrong conception of metanormativity (the study of norms about the establishment of norms). After discussing different metanormative conceptions, we defend a Quinean, naturalistic approach to the evaluation of norms. After reviewing empirical literature on the ultimatum (...)
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  45. Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
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  46. “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe & John Q. Patton - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):795-815.
    Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...)
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  47. K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game.Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier & Michel Le Breton - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):129-137.
    In this note we introduce the notion of K–player additive extension of a symmetric two-player game and prove a result relating the equilibria in mixed strategies in the two games. Then we apply the result to the Borda electoral competition game.
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  48. Is Trust the Result of Bayesian Learning?Bernd Lahno - 2004 - Jahrbuch Für Handlungs- Und Entscheidungstheorei 3:47-68.
  49. Spiele mit Zeichen.Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Zeitschrift Für Semiotik 23 (3-4):347-364.
    Kommunikation kann als eine besondere Form der strategischen Interaktion verstanden werden. Die Spieltheorie stellt ein formales Instrumentarium zur Analyse strategischer Probleme zur Verfügung. Einige Grundkonzepte der Spieltheorie werden vorgestellt, und ihre Anwendung auf Probleme der Kommunikation an einfachen Modellen vom Typ des Signalspiels illustriert. Es wird argumentiert, dass Kommunikation durch ein typisches Dilemma individueller Rationalität gefährdet sein kann. Obwohl eine korrekte Anwendung von Regeln, die die Verwendung eines verfügbaren Zeichens festlegen, für alle Akteure vorteilhaft wäre, gelingt es rationalen Akteuren unter (...)
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  50. Trust and Strategic Rationality.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - Rationality and Society 7 (4):442-464.
    The extent to which trust prevails can be measured by the subjective probability with which an agent expects another one to act in desired ways. An agent´s trust in other agents forms in repeated social interactions which typically have the structure of an elementary game of trust. The process of trust formation in such interactions may be described by a reputation function. It is argued that in view of real world processes of trust formation any adequate reputation function must satisfy (...)
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