Gay Rights

Politics of Reality includes nine essays that examine sexism, the exploitation of women, the gay rights movement and other topics from a feminist perspective. -/- The essays "The Problem That Has No Name" and "A Note On Anger" have been translated into Spanish by Maria Lugones for circulation in la Asociacion Argentina de Mujeres en Filosofia.

When we think about postmodernism we have to consider its implication in every aspect of society and none would doubt that homosexuality is one of these major implication especially for the contemporary church. The influence of relativism and the paradigm shift in humanity made homosexuality not just acceptable, but in many cases a norm. For a long time the church barricaded herself not only behind her Jewish-christian worldview and theological values, but also behind the absolutes of science that just has (...) to agree that in the beginning there were only male and female. For long time homosexuality has been viewed as a behavior option, but what about if science has come up with a new discovery so called Gay Gene? That is exactly what we want to discuss in this essay. (shrink)

This article defends the thesis that, in light of the postulates of liberal ethics, it is not possible to put forward universal arguments in support of any form of marriage. The existing forms of marriage should be either deemed unjust or founded on specific arguments recognized within a particular political community and determining the understanding of justice in a particular society. It defends the thesis that the requirement of universality, and consequently of impartiality, is not met, since behind every form (...) of marriage there is a certain “minimum” anthropological approach. Marriage is discussed as a privilege granted to particular groups by the political community. The comments are made with reference to the discussion between Krzysztof Saja and Tomasz Sieczkowski concerning the problem of discrimination against same-sex couples in Polish legislation. (shrink)

This paper makes an ethical and a conceptual case against any purported duty to come out of the closet. While there are recognizable goods associated with coming out, namely, leading an authentic life and resisting oppression, these goods generate a set of imperfect duties that are defeasible in a wide range of circumstances, and are only sometimes fulfilled by coming out. Second, practices of coming out depend on a ‘lump’ picture of sexuality and on an insufficiently subtle account of responsible (...) disclosure. We value and promote the goods of out best when we leave the framework of the closet, and not merely the closet door, behind. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that anyone who accepts a Rawlsian account of justice should favor granting family-based immigration benefit to same-sex couples. I first provide a brief over-view of the most relevant aspects of Rawls's position, Justice as Fairness. I then explain why family-based immigration benefits are an important topic and one that everyone interested in immigration and justice must consider. I then show how same-sex couples are currently systematically excluded from the benefits that flow from family-based immigration rights. (...) Next I argue that people in the constitutional and legislative stages of Rawls's original position would act to protect family-based immigration rights for themselves and show how these rights are rights of the current citizens of a state to bring in certain outsiders and not rights of outsiders seeking to enter. Importantly, this argument takes place entirely within the bounds of Rawls's domestic theory of justice and does not make reference to his more controversial views found in his account of international justice. I then show that there is no acceptable reason to restrict these rights to opposite-sex couples and good reason to extend them to same-sex couples. Finally I consider two objections to my account and show why they do not threaten my conclusion. (shrink)

This paper examines constitutional issues concerning same-sex marriage. Although same-sex relations concern broader ethical issues as well, I set these aside to concentrate primarily on legal questions of privacy rights and equal protection. While sexual orientation is neither a suspect classification like race, nor a quasi classification like gender, there are strong reasons why it should trigger heightened scrutiny of legislation using sexuality as a standard of classification. In what follows, I argue that equal-protection doctrine is better suited for including (...) same-sex couples where legal benefits and burdens of marriage are at stake. (1) I reconstruct arguments from privacy and the controversial ruling of Bowers v. Hardwick but discount this strategy for problematic legal reasons. (2) In order for equal protection to apply, sexual orientation must meet the criteria of suspect classification that the Court has established. (3) Since sexual orientation meets these criteria, heightened scrutiny should be applied to such legislation on equal-protection grounds. (4) Finally, I rely on some familiar Rawlsian arguments of public justification that demonstrate why this extension of marriage rights is consistent with basic constitutional principles. (shrink)

In ‘Aeon’ magazine, 2 August 2017, Professor Paul Russell maintains that identities such as race, gender and sexual orientation have equal ethical standing because they cannot be discarded and they are not constituted by beliefs, values or practices. We should, he says, resist attempts to present those who identify as gay as making a choice and affirming certain values and practices that they are capable of shedding. However, such identities can be discarded and they are in part constituted by beliefs, (...) values or practices. Russell’s defence of homosexual equality, because it focuses on the inclination to homosexuality, is pointless and useless. A proper defence of homosexual equality focuses on homosexual lifestyles and argues that the choice of such lifestyles is not wrong. Whether people who choose homosexual lifestyles do so because of a natural and unchangeable inclination, or whether environment or choice plays a part in bringing about that inclination, is an interesting question for science but of no concern for politics. (shrink)

The authors of the papers in A Simple Matter of Justice? reject something they label “heterosexism.” Their writing is obscure, but it seems they desire a state-regimented conformity, with state-approved roles for gays, for lesbians and for others, with state hand-outs and other privileges for all manner of favoured groups, and with no possibility of anyone indulging in the pleasures of “commercial consumerism.” None of the authors appears concerned with the demand that, provided he/she does not violate anyone’s rights, the (...) state should not put any barriers in the way of the sexually active citizen. The Geography of Perversion is a dull and ponderous history of European ideas about male homosexual behaviour, which in places seems to be little more than lists of what various people said. It is appallingly written in grandiloquent language larded with daft Marxist clichés. (shrink)

One way to help ensure the future of human life on the planet is to reduce the total number of people alive, as a hedge against dangers to the environment. One commentator has proposed withdrawing government and insurance subsidies from all fertile people, to help reduce the number of births. Any proposal of this kind does not, however, offer a solution commensurate with current problems of resource use and carbon emissions. Closing off fertility medicine to some people – or even (...) to all – would have only negligible effects in environmental protection. Moreover, the proposal to withdraw financial subsidies from fertile people would have prejudicial effects on lesbian and gay people, who must always reach beyond their same-sex relationships for help in having children. It is, moreover, entirely unclear why some people turning to fertility medicine for help in having children should have to pay their own way even though they contribute to the pool of money available for government and insurance subsidies. Entitlements based on an alleged moral difference between the ‘fertile’ and the ‘infertile’ cannot support such a conclusion. (shrink)

This article, forthcoming in the international legal philosophy journal Ratio Juris, responds to an article by Francis J. Beckwith arguing that the consistent application of liberal principles requires that same-sex marriage not be recognised in civil law. This response demonstrates that Beckwith’s article contains a series of interpretative and substantive flaws that render his argument unsuccessful. These relate to a misinterpretation of core liberal principles and a sidestepping of the matter of undue bias against same-sex partners. In correcting these flaws (...) I tentatively propose a ‘Voltarian argument’ in favour of same-sex civil marriage for those citizens with moral qualms about same-sex relationships derived from their reasonable comprehensive doctrine. (shrink)

I support Cheshire Calhoun's argument that there is a distinctive type of sexuality injustice addressed to lesbians and gays, but challenge her definitional strategy regarding the concepts of "lesbian" and "gay" and the "universalistic essentialist" distinction that she draws between patriarchy and compulsory heterosexuality. Finally, I take issue with the political implications of her claim that lesbians' and gays' special oppression stems from our exclusion from the legal prerogatives of marriage and parenthood.

In the political arena, lesbian and gay issues have been contested typically on grounds of human rights, but with variable success. Using a moral developmental framework, the purpose of this study was to explore preferences for different types of moral arguments when thinking about moral dilemmas around lesbian and gay issues. The analysis presented here comprised data collected from 545 students at UK universities who completed a questionnaire, part of which comprised a moral dilemma task. Findings of the study showed (...) that respondents do not apply moral reasoning consistently, and do not (clearly) favour human rights reasoning when thinking about lesbian and gay issues. Respondents tended to favour reasoning supporting existing social structures and frameworks, therefore this study highlights the importance of structural change in effecting widespread attitude change in relation to lesbian and gay rights issues. The implications of the findings for moral education are also discussed. (shrink)

Despite a paucity of psychological research exploring the interface between lesbian and gay issues and human rights, a human rights framework has been widely adopted in debates to gain equality for lesbians and gay men. Given this prominence within political discourse of human rights as a framework for the promotion of positive social change for lesbians and gay men, the aim of this study was to explore the extent to which rights?based arguments are employed when talking about lesbian and gay (...) issues in a social context. An analysis of six focus group discussions with students showed that when lesbian and gay issues are discussed, rights?based reasoning is employed intermittently, and in relation to certain issues more so than others. The implications of these findings for moral education aimed at promoting positive social change for lesbians and gay men are discussed. (shrink)

Abstract: This essay explores recent trends and major issues related to gay and lesbian philosophy in ethics (including issues concerning the morality of homosexuality, the natural function of sex, and outing and coming out); religion (covering past and present debates about the status of homosexuality and how biblical and qur'anic passages have been interpreted by both sides of the debate); the law (especially a discussion of the debates surrounding sodomy laws, same-sex marriage and its impact on transsexuals, and whether the (...) law should be used to enforce morality); scientific research into the origins of homosexuality (including discussion of arguments against such research); and metaphysics (especially the question of whether homosexuality is socially constructed during particular times and in particular cultures, or whether sexual orientation is an essential trait cutting across times and cultures). (shrink)

We take up questions of passing/outing as they arise for those with queer femme identities. We argue that for persons with female-identified bodies and queer, feminine (‘femme’) gender identities, the possibilities above may not exist as distinct options: for example, what it means to ‘pass’ or ‘cover’ is not always distinguishable – conceptually or in practice – from living authentically and resisting heteronormative identification: i.e. the conditions of being ‘out’. In some ways, these conflations privilege queer femmes; in others, femmes (...) find themselves implicated in a political double bind. We contend that this example problematizes the very concepts of passing and outing, and the political and ethical demands that are taken to arise from them. We conclude by exploring what it means to live queer femme identity responsibly and what this means for the ethics of sexual identity more generally. (shrink)

This is a review of the book by John Corvino and Maggie Gallagher, _Debating Same-Sex Marriage_.

My paper is a reaction to polemic of Tomasz Sieczkowski "Discrimination nonetheless. A reply to Krzysztof Saja” [ICF "Diametros" (36) 2013] that he wrote against my paper "Discrimination against same-sex couples" [ICF “Diametros" (34) 2012]. The purpose of the paper is to refute Sieczkowski’s objections that rely on wrong interpretation of the structure of my main argument. I will describe the proper course of the reasoning that I have expressed in the first article and undermine the Sieczkowski’s proposal to justify (...) gay marriages by referring to values such as dignity, freedom and equality. (shrink)

With the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases finding the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional and removing impediments to same-sex marriage in California,as well as a number of recent successes in special elections and with legislators inthe U.S. and other countries, we might wonder whether there is still need for a book debating same-sex marriage. Is not the tide of history inevitably movingtowards marriage equality? While that position seems tempting, it is too quick.

I argue that same-sex divorce presents a different kind of potential constraint to the agency of persons pursuing the dissolution of their marriage; a constraint upon one’s counterstory and the reconstitution of one’s personal identity. The dialectic within the paper mirrors the movements that I have had to make as I have sought to constitute and reconstitute myself throughout my divorce process. Beginning from a juridical perspective, I examine how the constraints on same-sex divorce present constraints on one’s agency that (...) are antithetical to the spirit of a liberal democratic conception of freedom of movement. I then explore the role of narrative in my self-(re)constitution, as well as the limits of the narrative and counterstories, when the institutional framework of the State fails to acknowledge the change in my State-sanctioned personal relationship. I end by arguing that this view from the law ignores the ways in which we relationally constitute ourselves, and in so doing covers over the harms done to persons that find themselves in a married-yet-not state of limbo. (shrink)

After stating "I am gay" Navy Lieutenant Paul G. Thomasson was honorably discharged from the military. In Thomasson v. Perry (1996), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed Thomasson's discharge. Thomasson is now considered the leading case evaluating the U.S. military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. In this paper, I show that the court's analysis of the Department of Defense policy rests of two unarticulated and undefended assumptions about sexuality. The first is that an act of (...) sex is essentially defined in terms of the sexual orientation of the persons engaging in that act. The second is that whether or not a person is an open homosexual determines the essential nature of the homosexual acts of others. I conclude that both assumptions are untenable, therefore the "don't ask, don't tell" policy is indefensible. (shrink)

In many ways, the struggle for gay and lesbian rights has come of age, and mainstream politics in the USA shows signs of embracing the votes and monetary contributions of organized gay and lesbian constituents. But the author warns that a movement for sexual liberation pays too high a price when it mimics a conservative language of “family values.” Since the framework of “family” language is implicated in structures of heteronormativity and patriarchy, sexual liberation that plays the “family language” game (...) will be drawn into a narrowing politics of nondiscrimination. Furthermore, argues the author, the right to marry cannot be considered a human right, since it is always bound to local statutes and custom. Therefore, gay and lesbian liberation that seeks truly universalizable principles will do better to not ensnare its struggle in “family values.”. (shrink)

Medical practitioners, health care workers, policy-makers, and educators often fail to talk about, or even consider, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI) people. Little or no thought is given to how the right to health of these individuals is being violated, or could be better protected. This invisibility, and associated isolation and marginalization, can have tragic consequences for the health and well-being of many members of LGBTI communities. This is an unacceptable affront to human dignity, particularly given the startling (...) statistics that have been well known for many years: LGBTI people, especially LGBTI youth, are highly susceptible to poor health and health risks. Creating a society that is more accepting of diversity, including diversity in gender and sexual practices, is a task for both health professionals and human rights advocates. This book chapter addresses violations of the right to the highest attainable standard of health in relation to LGBTI persons, beginning with outlining the problems posed by heteronormativity, homophobia as a health hazard, and the failure to take into account LGBTI people in health policy setting. It then addresses the topic of protecting LGBTI persons and their right to health, including the protections offered by international human rights law (case law of the UN Treaty Bodies and the European Court of Human Rights), and the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the coherency and reasonableness of legal restrictions against same-sex marriage. The population of focus is transgender individuals and their partners. Focusing on trans-marriage makes clear that the restriction of marriage to one man and one woman is misguided in that the law rests on the assumption that the categories of sex and gender comprise two disjoint, exhaustive, and unambiguous groupings. The primary argument here is not that the restrictions of same-sex marriage are harmful to certain transpersons who (...) participate in legal marriage, although they certainly are, but rather that this legal restriction fails to meet the minimum requirements of any reasonable law. This analysis compares the current marriage restriction and its reliance on the above mentioned false belief with judgments of the Race Classification Appeal Board of Apartheid era South Africa. I employ two actual cases and the legal philosophy of Lon L. Fuller in my argument. (shrink)

This article will examine the recent surge in litigation arising from assertions by homosexuals of their constitutional rights - cases that reflect the law in flux and conflict - and will demonstrate that both constitutional principles and social philosophy generally require resolution of the conflicts in favor of equality, without regard to sexual preference.

Building on a behavioral economics game that I play with students in our law school's Women and the Law course, I argue for the existence of a pre-natal taste for heterosexuality in would-be parents using feminist theory and socioeconomics. I also argue that legal doctrine about heterosexual marriage and reproduction reflect and perpetuate a similar heterosexuality premium or gay discount in the context of two recent state equal protection cases - Hernandez v. Robles (N.Y. 2006) and Morrison v. Sadler (Ind. (...) 2005) - which exclude homosexuals from marriage. I draw heavily on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social reproduction to examine how heterosexual offspring serve as status goods for middle and upper-middle class parents. Although sympathetic to gay and lesbian scholarship and queer perspectives, my argument rejects post-modern approaches on these issues in order to ground the inquiry in more conventionally modern terms. (shrink)

The author argues that the minority homosexual section of our population--a larger minority than, for example, the ethnic minorities section--is more often than not excluded by the 'helping professions' from the right to be parents. The author appeals to the lack of scientific data supporting such exclusion and asks that homosexual parents and their children receive the same care from our institutions as other parents and children. Some instances of lack of care are cited. The paper was presented to the (...) 1983 annual conference of the London Medical Group, 'Human Rights in Medicine'. (shrink)

Richard Mohr emphasizes the importance of dispelling false beliefs about lesbians and gay men, and establishing legislation that protects the rights of sexual minorities. He argues that homophobic policies originate in the belief that gay men and lesbians are categorically less morally valuable than others, rather than deserving of unequal treatment because of their behaviors or actions. In response, I show that homophobic panic over lesbian or gay sex acts is actually quite influential, and argue that Mohr fails to take (...) account of the political and philosophical significance of sexual freedom, and the inextricability of sexual being and sexual doing. (shrink)

That a homosexual -- man or woman -- is neither a sinner nor a sick person is the thesis of this paper by an authority on sexual deviation. Therefore, such a man or woman neither needs penance and pardon nor cure in the medical sense. Nevertheless such individuals sometimes need the help of doctors and must be treated with understanding. The medical profession also has, in the view of the behaviourist school of psychiatrists, of which Dr Bancroft is a member, (...) the duty of influencing social attitudes towards homosexuals. Obviously homosexuals who come into conflict with the law are special cases, and must be treated as such but this is not 'medical' treatment so much as social control even if drugs and other forms of therapy are used. (shrink)

In recent years, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and Spain have recognized marriages between people of the same sex. Several other countries recognize civil unions with similar legal effect. An even wider range of countries have laws against discrimination on the basis of a person’s sexual orientation, in areas like housing and employment. Yet in the world’s largest democracy, India, sex between two men remains a crime punishable, according to statute, by imprisonment for life.