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6 found
  1. Elusive vehicles of genetic representation.Riin Kõiv - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (1):1-24.
    The teleosemantic theory of representational content is held by some philosophers to imply that genes carry semantic information about whole-organism phenotypes. In this paper, I argue that this position is not supported by empirical findings. I focus on one of the most elaborate defenses of this position: Shea’s view that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes. I distinguish between two ways of individuating genes in contemporary biological science as possible vehicles of representational content—as molecular genes and as difference-maker genes. I show that (...)
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  2. Why genes are like lemons.F. Boem, E. Ratti, M. Andreoletti & G. Boniolo - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 57 (June):88-95.
    In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on particular cases presented by the scientific empirical advancements. Moreover, in the literature there are no explicit and reasonable arguments about why a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene is needed. In our paper, we claim that a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene (...)
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  3. Life and Ownership: Intellectual Property limits, from Genes to Synthetic Biology.Constantin Vica - 2015 - Ethics in Biology, Engineering and Medicine 6 (1-2):139-149.
    The purpose of this analysis is to widen and clarify the debate which arose during the last years around granting patents (and other ownership rights) upon different methods and mechanisms of manipulating and engineering life. In doing so, I draw a limited, prima facie argument against many sorts of entitlements or granting rights to those capable of manipulating life at its core level. The general tendency nowadays is to put pressure on the institutional setting in order to accept and promote (...)
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  4. The genome as a developmental organ.Ehud Lamm - 2014 - Journal of Physiology 592 (11):2237-2244.
    This paper applies the conceptual toolkit of Evolutionary Developmental Biology (evo‐devo) to the evolution of the genome and the role of the genome in organism development. This challenges both the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, the dominant view in evolutionary theory for much of the 20th century, and the typically unreflective analysis of heredity by evo‐devo. First, the history of the marginalization of applying system‐thinking to the genome is described. Next, the suggested framework is presented. Finally, its application to the evolution of (...)
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  5. Lenny Moss: What Genes Can’t Do. [REVIEW]Alan C. Love - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (2):247-250.
    Philosophy of Science, 73 (April 2006) pp. 247–257. 0031-8248/2006/7302-0007$10.00 Copyright 2006 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. 247 BOOK REVIEWS Lenny Moss, What Genes Can’t Do . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2004), 256 pp., $21.00 (paper). Many philosophers of science will have encountered the core distinction between two different gene concepts found in What Genes Can’t Do . Moss argues that contemporary uses of the term ‘gene’ that denote an infor- mation bearing entity result from the conflation (...)
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  6. Genes: A Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Karola Stotz - 2004 - Isis 95:172-173.