Georg Lukacs

"Lukács 1933-1942. Irrationalism in the Age of Fascism". This essay reconstructs the philosophical and historiographical premises to Georg Lukács’ research on irrationalism conducted during the period of Nazi rule in Germany. To this end, the Author focuses chiefly on two posthumous works: How Did Fascist Philosophy Arise in Germany? (1933) and How Did Germany Become the Centre of reactionary Ideology? (1941-1942). After a brief historical contextualization, the Author illustrates the main purpose of these texts: to free German philosophy and culture (...) between the XIX and XX century from those irrationalistic elements asserted and nourished by Fascist philosophy. He then analyzes Lukács’ concept of reason in its three fundamental aspects, namely the methodological link with Marx’s historical image of the political development of Europe during the XIX century, the theoretical debt to Hegel’s critique of immediacy and the connection with some ethical points already discussed during the Goethezeit. (shrink)

This book examines how 20th century theorists have used a discourse of “crisis” to frame their conceptualizations of modernity. Through an investigation of four key thinkers (Georg Lukács, Hannah Arendt, Reinhart Koselleck and Jürgen Habermas), Gilbert argues that scholars in the social sciences and humanities should be cautious of treating crises as explananda for research. Instead, the book calls for sociological analysis of the role of “crisis” within social scientific discourse, and examines how “crisis” has been used as a conceptual (...) frame for legitimating theoretical agendas. Gilbert’s “sociology of concepts” approach presents crisis as a paradigm of modern thought, and, more generally, reflects on how concepts can become the carriers of diverse intellectual traditions and debates. -/- The Crisis Paradigm will be of interest to students and scholars of social and critical theory, politics, sociology and history, as well as those working in the fields of media studies, communication and discourse analysis. (shrink)

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.

Interjú az Új Symposion örökségéről, Jugoszláviáról, a vajdasági magyarság baloldali radikális hagyományáról, az avantgárdról stb.

From 1930 onwards, György Lukács considers ‘uneven development’ the typical relational form between economic progress and the corresponding evolution of other fields of human activity. In the early thirties Lukács focuses on the problem of elaborating an independent Marxist aesthetics, but then necessarily find himself having to deal with the general configuration of Marx’s alleged philosophy. The general theory illustrated in The Ontology of Social Being is where this philosophy, considered as a Weltanschauung, is given its final framework. His reflection (...) on the ‘specificity’ of the aesthetic experience, as part of the broader framework of the main fields of art, science and everyday life, is the theoretical medium Lukács used in the fifties and sixties to fine-tune the need that had arisen decades earlier to attribute Marxism with genuine philosophical universality. (shrink)

This essay critically reconstructs the concept of ‘democratic dictatorship’ which Georg Lukács’s outlines in Blum Theses of 1928. The essay tackles the birth of the Communist Party of Hungary, particularly focusing on its factional struggles during the 1920s. Secondly, the main contents of the Blum Theses, compared with the debate on the ‘Republican Assembly’ in the Italian Communist Party will be discussed. Finally, the essay examines the two most rooted interpretive prejudices concerning the Blum Theses, i.e. their alleged forecasting character (...) towards ‘Popular Front’ strategy and their purported distance from ‘Socialfascism’. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to deal with some aspects of Axel Honneth’s reading of reification faced in his 2005 Verdinglichung. Eine Anerkennungstheoretische Studie. To this purpose, I critically analyse the interpretation of Marx by Lukács as it is expressed in Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat. Secondly, I claim that Lukács’ fetishism analysis is grounded in a significant misunderstanding of the core issue of Marx’s Critique of political economy. Furthermore, I suggest that Honneth’s reification concept uncritically accepts, (...) to some extent, the main theses on Marx as they are outlined in Lukács’ text. I conclude by arguing that the Marxian heritage advocated by Honneth is methodologically more deeply linked to Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness than to Marx’s Capital. (shrink)

Ursprünglich als eine kurze Einführung in die „Ethik“ konzipiert, ist die „Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins“ seit 1964 das nahezu ausschließliche Objekt des theoretischen Engagements Georg Lukács’ (1885-1971). Obwohl Lukács’ ontologisches Projekt ein ziemliches Forschungsinteresse erzeugt hat, mangelt es bisher an einer befriedigenden kritischen Rekonstruktion des Lukács’schen „Ontologie“-Begriffs. Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, genau diese Lücke zu füllen. Laut Lukács steht das „gesellschaftliche Sein“ an der Spitze einer Ontologie, der schon die zwei „Schichten“ des „anorganischen Seins“ und des „organischen Seins“ (...) zugrunde liegen. Die drei ontologischen „Schichten“ haben die drei Marx’schen „grundlegenden ontologischen Feststellungen“ gemeinsam, nämlich die Gegenständlichkeit, die Geschichtlichkeit als Irreversibilität der Prozesse sowie das objektive Wesen der Kategorien. Kritisch erforscht die vorliegende Studie die Gestaltung dieser „Feststellungen“ und die theoretischen Voraussetzungen des ontologischen Ansatzes, die in der Lukács’schen Produktion nach der „großen Wendung“ 1930 wiederzufinden sind. -/- . (shrink)

This paper examines Lukács’ interpretation of Lenin, with particular focus on his Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought (1924), and the Postscript which was added to the book in January 1967. From 1924 onward, Lukács mainly focuses on the methodological basis of Lenin’s political thought, which vital point lays in applying the category of totality in order to grasp the complexity of the socio-historical conjuncture. In addition, Lukács deals with some ethical aspects of Lenin’s personality, i.e. his (...) human attitude. The ethical aspects are but the weakest point in Lukács’ interpretation. Diametrically opposed to any form of decisionism, Lenin embodies for Lukács both a politician and a political scientist. (shrink)

Against the background of the European debates about humanism and realism, in the 1930s and 40s Lukács developed a certain notion of humanist philosophical anthropology, regarding the interrelation of human capacities. Was it really, as Ferenc Fehér once suggested, a "traditional" concept of humanism, that was re-activated by Lukács? Trying to answer this question, the article examines his humanist anthropology at that time. Even though Lukács's notion epistemologically is characterized by its rationalist approach, it would not simply prefer the capacity (...) of reason to all other capacities, but rather emphasized a Spinozist-inspired insistence on a "harmony of emotion, understanding, and reason", as Lukács formulated it in Das wirkliche Deutschland, an article, written in 1941/42, which has only recently been published in German. In his essays referring to Goethe as well as, famously, to Gottfried Keller's Der grüne Heinrich, (but also, among others, to Lessing), Lukács interpreted their concepts of humanism through their formations of (especially female) characters. Particularly the role of emotions played a decisive part in these interpretations. Emotions, rather than being understood merely as immediate realizations of the self, or as expressions of an inner core, also, and more importantly, were conceived as serving certain present – reasonable or non-reasonable – interests, reaffirming or at least flattering them. Alongside with his remarks in Der historische Roman, Lukács thus gave instructive hints concerning the concepts of 'instinct', 'intuition', and 'genius', which would neither lead to a 'tyranny of reason', nor to a 'tyranny of emotion' – nor, for that matter, of understanding. (shrink)

György Lukács’s Marxist phase is usually associated with his passage from neo-Kantianism to Hegelianism. Nonetheless, Nietzschean influences have been covertly present in Lukács’s philosophical development, particularly in his uncompromising distaste for the bourgeois society and the mediocrity of its quotidian values. A closer glance at Lukács’s corpus discloses that the influence of Nietzsche has been eclipsed by the Hegelian turn in his thought. Lukács hardly ever mentions the weight of Nietzsche on his early thinking, an influence that makes cameo appearances (...) throughout his lifetime writings. During the period of his adherence to a Stalinist approach to communism, his new subjectivity seems to be re-constituted through a disavowal of his earlier romantic anti-capitalism. Implicit in Lukács’s attack on Nietzsche in the Destruction of Reason (1952) is an acerbic reaction to the mute presence of the latter in his earlier thought. Apart from his ignorance of the unreliability of the collection of the Will to Power edited by Peter Gast and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, his battle against the anti-proletariat Nietzsche in the Destruction is waged on a metaphysical, non-historical plain. Lukács’s pre-Marxist works (Soul and Form, On Poverty of Spirit, and The Theory of the Novel) in a sense betray the instance of a writer who writes most of someone where he omits his name. Thus perceived, Lukács’s early corpus lends itself to a symptomatic reading. -/- This essay seeks to extract the Nietzschean undercurrents of Lukács’s work through a reflection on the romantic anti-capitalist tendencies that the young Lukács shared with Nietzsche. For although it may appear that Nietzsche lacked a clear politics, his criticism of the bourgeois ethos as a structure based on debt/guilt [Schuld], and his critique of modern value-system and nihilism paved the way for the emergence of Lukács’s theory of reification. Nietzsche’s category of 'transvaluation of values’ suggests a total transfiguration of reality, a radical rupture with the ordinary state of things, and as such carries within itself a revolutionary promise. Drawing a distinction between political romanticism and romantic politics, I argue that romantic anti-capitalism contains a potential for the latter. The essay further traces the link between Lukács’s ‘romantic politics’ and the persistence of a thought of the tragic (a ‘tragic vision’) in his texts that, despite its temporary decline during his realist period, is undismissable in different constellations of his thought. (shrink)

The current image of Georg Lukács (1885-1971) is widely swayed by an interpretative standard grounded on a deep partition between his young (1910-1918),intermediate (1918-1930) and mature (1930-1971) intellectual production. Despite rejecting an undeniable discontinuity in Lukács’ philosophical evolution,especially between his pre-Marxist works (The Soul and the Forms and Theory of Romance) and the post-1918 Marxist production, I aim for a global reconsideration of Lukács’ philosophy, evaluating a greater unity in his thought. A reflection on ethical problems, specifically on the matter (...) of responsibility, emerges – and not by chance – during different turning points of Lukács’ personal life. On the poverty of Spirit (1913), Tactic and Ethic (1918) and The social responsibility of the philosopher (1960 ca.) are the three essays in which Lukács attempts in different ways to give a philosophical legitimation of some decisive biographical choices, such as his separation from Irma Seidler (1911), his adhesion to the Communist Party (1918) and his acceptance of Socialism, even after the dramatic events of Budapest in 1956. A more unitary consideration of Lukács’ thought could be reached only through a deeper reflection on the content of the ethical problem of responsibility in his thinking. Despite their differences, the essays mentioned above are united in terms of the meaning of a true responsibility,which Lukács conceives always in a direct connection – maybe in an excessively binding way ‒ between individual choice and the course of history. (shrink)

This paper proposes reformulating the theory and critique of reification around the democracy-undermining consequences of reification in law. In contradistinction to Axel Honneth’s attempts to revive reification as an orienting concept for critical theory using moral and psychological categories, I reconstruct the elements of a theory of legal reification from Marx’s and Lukács’ writings, both of whom suggest the formality of modern legal systems tends to render legally mediated social relations in an ossified, nature-like manner, although I argue that neither (...) could assemble a full theory of legal reification absent insights from the theory of constitutional democracy and legal realism. I close by arguing that it is fruitful to view reification as closely linked to modern legal practices because it grounds the concept in a way that avoids theoretical problems found in Lukács, as Honneth wishes, while connecting it to normative issues in law and democracy in a way that he does not. (shrink)

The tragic death in Tolstoy's writings has helped both Max Weber and György Lukács in characterizing the modern pathos as a tragic contemplation of the emptiness of life. Through Tolstoy's readings, Weber and Lukács found an interesting source of denying arts and modern sciences autonomy, considering, from the aesthetics sphere, the meaningless of this new immanent reality. Both has assumed Tolstoy main theme from the same perspective, contrasting ancient and modern worldviews. Max Weber presented this theme in his disenchantment of (...) world theory and Lukács, in a very similar way, following the paradox of religious needing as a mainline. -/- O tema da morte trágica, presente nos escritos de Liev Tolstói, auxiliou tanto a Max Weber como a György Lukács a caracterizarem o pathos moderno de pressentimento da morte como uma contemplação do vazio. Weber e Lukács encontraram, através das leituras de Tolstói, uma interessante maneira de questionar a autonomia da arte e da ciência moderna, considerando pela esfera estética, como se mostra sem sentido a recente realidade imanente. Ambos assumiram o tema central das obras de Tolstói segundo uma mesma imagem, derivada do contraste entre o mundo antigo e o moderno. Max Weber adequou esse tema a sua teoria do desencantamento do mundo e Lukács, de modo muito semelhante, seguindo seu conceito do paradoxo da necessidade religiosa. (shrink)

As Kevin Mulligan, more than anyone else, has demonstrated, there is a distinction within the philosophy of the German-speaking world between two principal currents: of idealism / transcendentalism, characteristic of Northern Germany; and of realism / objectivism, characteristic of Austria and the South. We explore some of the implications of this distinction with reference to the influence of Austrian (and German) philosophy on philosophical developments in Hungary, focusing on the work of Ákos von Pauler, and especially on Pauler’s reading of (...) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. (shrink)

Georg (György) Lukács (1885–1971) was a literary theorist and philosopher who is widely viewed as one of the founders of “Western Marxism”. Lukács is best known for his pre-World War II writings in literary theory, aesthetic theory and Marxist philosophy. Today, his most widely read works are the Theory of the Novel of 1916 and History and Class Consciousness of 1923. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács laid out a wide-ranging critique of the phenomenon of “reification” in capitalism and formulated (...) a vision of Marxism as a self-conscious transformation of society. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Lukács’ claim that the overcoming of reification amounts to the realization of the identity philosophies of Fichte and Hegel. I suggest that Lukács does indeed contrast reification with a Hegelian conception of social freedom that remains plausible today. Reification occurs when the preconditions of freedom and social participation are eroded through practices such as commodification and juridification. I conclude with the claim that reification diminishes freedom, and that criticism of reification is itself a form of (...) freedom. (shrink)

The studying of Marx, said Gyorgy Lukäcs at the beginning of the 1920s, does not mean the uncriticised recognition of the results of his researches, nor the set in well-defined theses, the interpretation of a book. One has to become absorbed in the ceuvre of Marx, so that then, as a second step, one can commence the systematic elaboration of the problems of our age. It is unjust that in western philosophies, especially in the Anglo-Saxon concerning literature the (...) name of the old-age Lukäcs does not appear, or is present as that of some Stalinist inquisitor, the indisputable pillar of Marxism and the Bolshevik movement. Yet his late piece of labour, his vast ontology experiment convincingly shows how one can penetrate the original texts of Marx and at the same time preserve one's conceptual souvereignity, sense of reality, and one's capacity, at least in a latent way, to judge or surpass the thoughts of one's master. This study aims to interpret the problem of Lukäcs's relation to Marx through the analysis of the labour concept of Lukäcs, and would like to prove that the rereading of Lukäcs (and Marx) can serve with surprises, new meanings and morals even today. (shrink)

According to our opinion, Lukäcs's way does not lead to Marx but to himself and his independent philosophy and in spite of its inconsistency and mistakes it is still one of the most significant achievements of the XXt h century.

The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between revolution and violence in Marxism and in a series of texts drawing on Marxian theory. Part 1 outlines the basic normative frameworks which determine the outer limits of permissible violence in Marxism. Part 2 presents a critical analysis of a series of later discussions - by Sorel, Fanon and Žižek - which transformed the terms in which violence was discussed by developing one particular aspect of Marxist thought. By teasing (...) out the implications of revolutionary theory for the commission and permission of violence, it is possible to specify those points at which it tends towards excess. This in turn points towards limits that an adequate normative theory of revolutionary violence should establish. (shrink)

Feminist standpoint epistemology suggests that women are cognitively privileged, since gender-specific forms of oppression produce insights systematically denied to men. Yet if many forms of oppression exist, what happens when they overlap? Some reject such theories as irredeemably essentialist, triumphalist, and relativist, but I argue that their original versions in Hegel and Lukács as supplemented by Sabina Lovibond generate both the strongest arguments for standpoint theories and a way through their deepest difficulties.

TARTALOM Előszó 5 Módszer és problémái "A tiszta ész kritikájá"-ban 12 Kari Jaspers Nyugat és Kelet között 28 A szent, avagy a fény csendes hangjai 51 "A lélek és a formák"-tól az Ontológiáig 67 Georg Simmel és a titok szociológiája 89 Beavatás, hallgatás, álarc 117 A titok és kategoriális szerkezete 134 Titok és tilalom 154 Az összeesküvés 167 A "volt titkok" 196 Elzártság, elfedettség és rejtőzködés Heideggernél 223 Utószó 307 Jegyzetek 313.

The article argues that one of the maim moments of Lukacs' rupture with the preceding ontologies is his original distinction between essence and phenomenon from the peculiar relation of each one with the category of continuity. Doing so, Lukacs could recover the radical historicity of the human realm.O artigo argumenta que um dos principais momentos de ruptura de Lukács com as ontologias anteriores reside na sua inovadora distinção entre essência e fenômeno, a partir da peculiar relação de cada um com (...) a categoria da continuidade. Assim procedendo, Lukács pôde resgatar a radical historicidade do mundo dos homens. (shrink)

Between 1910 und 1915 the Hungarian philosopher Béla Zalai (1882-1915) developed his “comparative metaphysics of systems”, which had a significant influence on both the young Georg Lukács and also on Karl Mannheim. Through an analysis of Zalai’s approach to metaphysics, we show how he served to mediate between the realist Austrian philosophy of Meinong and of the early Husserl on the one side, and the German (idealistic, Kantian) philosophy then dominant in Hungary.

This text was Lukacs' response to the Soviets' crushing of the Dubeck reform movement in August 1968. As Norman Lavine notes, it was written in great haste between September and December 1968, and Lukacs was not satisfied with the result. It seemed "too much of a summary to be a true scientific work and too scientific for a good summary". Lukacs intended to revise the text as part of a projected work on ethics. I would suggest that The Process of (...) Democratization's literary form is "manifesto." Like its famous predecessor, the book brings a lifetime devoted to a dialectical reading of social experience to bear on a specific revolutionary situation. Unlike the text of Marx and Engels, however, the task of this dialectical inquiry is to explain the emergence of alienating repression within a praxis supposedly guided by Marxist-Leninist principles, and to point toward an overcoming of the alienation that remains within Marxism. (shrink)

Georg Lukacs's The Process of Democratization provides indispensable reading for an understanding of the revolution that swept Russia and Eastern Europe during 1989-1990. Lukacs, a spokesman for anti-Bolshevik communism, was the advance guard of anti-Stalinist reform. Written in the aftermath of the Prague Spring, his book was a precursor to many of the Gorbachev reforms. Lukacs was the leading communist intellectual in the world until his death. During his last 15 years, he embarked upon a massive effort to revive Marxism (...) as philosophy, as aesthetics, and as politics. The Process of Democratization was part of this attempt at a Marxist renaissance. He would probably be surprised to find that the Second Russian Revolution of 1989-1990 moved far beyond his reformism, overthrowing even the anti-Stalinist communism that he fought to retain. (shrink)

Georg Lukacs's The Process of Democratization provides indispensable reading for an understanding of the revolution that swept Russia and Eastern Europe during 1989-1990. Lukacs, a spokesman for anti-Bolshevik communism, was the advance guard of anti-Stalinist reform. Written in the aftermath of the Prague Spring, his book was a precursor to many of the Gorbachev reforms. Lukacs was the leading communist intellectual in the world until his death. During his last 15 years, he embarked upon a massive effort to revive Marxism (...) as philosophy, as aesthetics, and as politics. The Process of Democratization was part of this attempt at a Marxist renaissance. He would probably be surprised to find that the Second Russian Revolution of 1989-1990 moved far beyond his reformism, overthrowing even the anti-Stalinist communism that he fought to retain. (shrink)

Between 1910 und 1915 the Hungarian philosopher Béla Zalai (1882-1915) developed his “comparative metaphysics of systems”, which had a significant influence on both the young Georg Lukács and also on Karl Mannheim. Through an analysis of Zalai’s approach to metaphysics, we show how he served to mediate between the realist Austrian philosophy of Meinong and of the early Husserl on the one side, and the German (idealistic, Kantian) philosophy then dominant in Hungary.

Lukács' last work, The Ontology of Social Being (written between 1963 and 1968, rewritten since and left incomplete) is a monumental and tragic document of an era that seems long past, that of the rebirth of Marxism. De-Stalinization provided Lukács with a fresh dynanism. During those years, he returned to his Heidelberg Aesthetics, a large, systematic effort started during his youth. The first of the three volumes projected on Marxist aesthetics, The Specificity of the Aesthetic, was completed around 1960 and (...) published in 1963. A project on ethics followed immediately. But in a letter May 10, 1960, to Ernst Fischer, Lukács wrote of a difficult transition to the new work: “I now find myself in the transition phase that follows giving birth. (shrink)

In The Destruction of Reason, Lukács considered the Weimar Republic an accomplice in the victory of fascism. Lukács has no monopoly on this thesis. The restorative ideological interests of the fifties portrayed Nazi Germany as an outbreak of irrationality, after which society returned to its rational routine lost at the end of the 1920s. Lukács view of the irrational as the ideological tool of fascist propaganda, of course, differs from this version. Yet, this difference is obscured by his method of (...) simplification that led him to reject all irrationality. In addition Lukács described the development of the philosophy of irrationalism, in which bad conscience, doubt and uneasiness with this movement gradually decreased. (shrink)

Anthologies are often inherently problematical entities. They commonly suffer from two debilitating deficiencies: unevenness in the quality of the contributions and the lack of a common theoretical framework. As far as the latter difficulty is concerned, rarely will perspectival diversity sufficiently compenstate for the concomitant dearth of any conceptual harmony. The result is often — sadly — a discrete congeries of individual essays, some meaningful, others less so, without a unifying raison d'etre. All of which usually justifies the habitual practice (...) of skipping about, randomly choosing this or that more or less interesting piece, ignoring the bulk. In an era in which “information” mindlessly proliferates. (shrink)