Global Governance

Regulation by design (RBD) is a growing research field that explores, develops, and criticises the regulative function of design. In this article, we provide a qualitative thematic synthesis of the existing literature. The aim is to explore and analyse RBD’s core features, practices, limitations, and related governance implications. To fulfil this aim, we examine the extant literature on RBD in the context of digital technologies. We start by identifying and structuring the core features of RBD, namely the goals, regulators, regulatees, (...) methods, and technologies. Building on that structure, we distinguish among three types of RBD practices: compliance by design, value creation by design, and optimisation by design. We then explore the challenges and limitations of RBD practices, which stem from risks associated with compliance by design, contextual limitations, or methodological uncertainty. Finally, we examine the governance implications of RBD and outline possible future directions of the research field and its practices. (shrink)

The chapter gives an overview of the binding and non-binding international norms which govern and regulate the activities of states and other actors in outer space. It covers the key agendas and challenges being addressed within international space law in the wake of advancements in technology and greater access to outer space by multiple actors. For a comprehensive view of the subject, the chapter gives an overview of the nature of space laws within national systems, and the interface of space (...) law with other fields of law namely environmental law, human rights law, and intellectual property law. (shrink)

Promising new solutions or risking unprecedented harms, science and its technological affordances are increasingly portrayed as matters of global concern, requiring in-kind responses. In a wide range of recent discourses and global initiatives, from the International Summits on Human Gene Editing to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, experts and policymakers routinely invoke cosmopolitan aims. The common rhetoric of a shared human future or of one humanity, however, does not always correspond to practice. Global inequality and a lack of accountability (...) within most institutional contexts of international governance render these cosmopolitan proclamations of ‘one human community’ incoherent and even harmful. More generally, there exists no shared normative standard for the cosmopolitan governance of science, with which such global initiatives could be evaluated. Taking a broadly philosophical perspective, the present paper aims to better understand this problem situation, identifying three high-level challenges global governance of technoscience: problematic ideals of technology and science, the unjust formation of “global” concerns, and the limitations of cosmopolitan theory. By holistically engaging these jointly empirical and normative sites of inquiry, scholars can better support humanity’s re-imagination of technoscientific practices within and beyond the nation-state. (shrink)

The liberal international legal order faces a legitimacy crisis today that becomes visible with the recent anti-internationalist turn, the rise of populism and the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. Either its authority or legitimacy has been tested many times over the last three decades. The article argues that this anti-internationalist trend may be read as a reaction against the neoliberal form taken by international law, not least over the last three decades. In uncovering the intricacies of international law’s legitimacy crisis, (...) the article uncovers the paradox of global constitutionalism: that its need to adopt a sectoral form of integration may cause a legitimacy gap/deficit because international authorities, resting their legitimacy primarily on instrumental grounds, may face problems in compensating for the legitimacy deficit caused by the erosion of domestic sovereignty and extending their legitimacy to non-instrumental grounds. This paradox has one necessary structural and two contingent content-related implications for domestic democracies: (1) it necessarily narrows down the regulatory space of nation-states; and this may in turn (2) impair democratic stability and solidarity, and (3) provide a fertile ground for populism. Drawing on Raz’s service conception, the article focuses on the interaction between international and domestic authorities and highlights the problematic aspects of the neoliberal constitutionalization of international law. (shrink)

Climate justice demands polluters to take responsibility for both present and future harm caused by past GHG emissions and for future harm caused by future GHG emissions. One problem with this is double climate taxation: people living in historical polluting countries must both shoulder the burden of an effective and inclusive climate transition and repay the climate debt incurred by their predecessors. Although double climate taxation might be defensible on normative grounds, it risks making climate justice politically infeasible. I therefore (...) maintain that global climate justice should focus on future, rather than past, climate harms. The forward-looking polluter pays principle (FL-PPP) can ensure both a cost-effective climate transition and a fair distribution of the climate burden, provided it is applied as follows: i) each country must introduce a carbon price calibrated to the global social cost of carbon; ii) each country must transfer part of carbon revenues collected at the country level to an international fund; iii) global carbon revenues must be redistributed on the basis of the country-level social cost of carbon. The FL-PPP burden can be made more progressive, moreover, if the formula for allocating global carbon revenues is adjusted through two coefficients, one consumption-based and one priority-sensitive. (shrink)

Duties to address global injustices face a large motivation gap, particularly amongst those populations most capable of bearing the financial burdens of fulfiling them. This motivation gap is explained, at least in part, by the structure of the state system, which facilitates group identification with fellow citizens to a greater extent than with outsiders. This structural feature of the state system gives states little incentive to further the cause of global justice. Yet, given that states are the most powerful actors (...) on the global stage today, a more just global order is likely predicated upon the development of more just states. In light of these realities, in this paper I make the case for an approach to furthering global justice which i call inward internationalisation. Inward internationalisation calls for the initially modest structural transformation of domestic states, so as to make domestic governments and their constituents increasingly sensitive to their international obligations. Inward internationalisation involves states giving a public, formal, and institutionalised voice within their own domestic deliberations to other states' representatives. This serves informational, expressive, and dynamic functions. After outlining these functions, thereby showing the attraction of inward internationalisation, I argue for the strategic accessibility of inward internationalisation as a path to reform, by outlining the dynamics which might cause inward internationalisation to spread as a norm of governance amongst states. (shrink)

In her important book Promoting Justice Across Borders, Lucia Rafanelli offers a detailed account of ‘reform interventions’, seen as ‘any deliberate attempt to promote justice in a foreign society’. Such interventions, she argues, can and should be subject to ethical evaluation, including standards relating to toleration, legitimacy, and collective self-determination. While I am sympathetic to many of Rafanelli's arguments, in this essay I will argue that, for a large number of cases this complex moral machinery is not needed, because the (...) acts in question either are, or could be, morally indifferent when looked at from the perspective of interaction between members of the international community. In particular, I argue that many market or economic interactions between states fall into this morally indifferent zone, and so need not meet the standards set out by Rafanelli to be acceptable. (shrink)

In an important article published in this journal, Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz (2011) champion the convocation of a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly (DGCA). In this article, I aim to further strengthen the case for a DGCA by addressing: (i) why a DGCA is likely to take a long-term perspective in the global interest and (ii) why it is so vital that a global institution should do so. I start by analyzing the nature of the issues requiring global policy. These issues, (...) I will argue, are typically global cooperation problems. Cooperation problems pose two major challenges. The first is to prevent freeriding – i.e. serving one’s short-term interests at the expense of the long-term global interest. The second is to align on an efficient global policy. In both respects, I will argue, a DGCA is a good candidate to yield desirable results (and is likely to do better than current supranational institutions). (shrink)

It is increasingly recognized that as artificial intelligence becomes more powerful and pervasive in society and creates risks and ethical issues that cross borders, a global approach is needed for the governance of these risks. But why, exactly, do we need this and what does that mean? In this Open Forum paper, author argues for global governance of AI for moral reasons but also outlines the governance challenges that this project raises.

EU co-legislators recently approved the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which establishes a uniform carbon price on both EU and imported products, in ETS covered sectors. This violates the CBDR-RC principle. Yet, CBAM advocates claim that the resulting unfair mitigation can be offset by scaling up climate finance, to the benefit of poorer countries. I argue that the CBAM’s unfairness is compounded by previous climate injustice, as avoidable emissions by developed countries pushed the climate crisis to the point where (...) fair mitigation is no longer viable. This implies that a disadvantage within the distributive sphere of emissions abatement cannot be counterbalanced by additional advantages within the distributive sphere of climate finance. (shrink)

The book takes a hard look at libertarian foreign policy doctrines, especially those of non-intervention, interstate federalism, and non-aggression, and applies new insights to these old doctrines. Classical liberal thinkers such as Vincent Ostrom, James Madison, and F.A. Hayek have all hinted at the idea of world governance from a libertarian standpoint. Yet today, “the libertarian position” on foreign policy is either non-intervention from the US side of the Atlantic or a halfhearted confederation from the European side of the Atlantic. (...) The themes that emerge in this volume (II) are whether or not libertarian alternatives to the status quo are workable and, if so, whatwould they look like. (shrink)

This paper sets out a research agenda for a political theory of climate displacement, by critically examining one prominent proposal—the idea of a normative status for ‘climate refugees’—and by proposing an alternative. Drawing on empirical work on climate displacement, I show that the concept of the climate refugee obscures the complexity and heterogeneity of climate displacement. I argue that, because of this complexity and heterogeneity, approaches to climate displacement that put the concept of the climate refugee at their centre will (...) fail to treat like cases alike and relevantly different cases differently. In response to these failings, I outline an alternative—the pluralist theory of climate displacement—which confronts the specific challenges that climate displacement poses in different practical and institutional contexts, whilst also treating climate displacement as a unified phenomenon at the second-order level of burden-sharing. (shrink)

Although the concept of “AI governance” is frequently used in the debate, it is still rather undertheorized. Often it seems to refer to the mechanisms and structures needed to avoid “bad” outcomes and achieve “good” outcomes with regard to the ethical problems artificial intelligence is thought to actualize. In this article we argue that, although this outcome-focused view captures one important aspect of “good governance,” its emphasis on effects runs the risk of overlooking important procedural aspects of good AI governance. (...) One of the most important properties of good AI governance is political legitimacy. Starting out from the assumptions that AI governance should be seen as global in scope and that political legitimacy requires at least a democratic minimum, this article has a twofold aim: to develop a theoretical framework for theorizing the political legitimacy of global AI governance, and to demonstrate how it can be used as a compass for critially assessing the legitimacy of actual instances of global AI governance. Elaborating on a distinction between “governance by AI” and “governance of AI” in relation to different kinds of authority and different kinds of decision-making leads us to the conclusions that much of the existing global AI governance lacks important properties necessary for political legitimacy, and that political legitimacy would be negatively impacted if we handed over certain forms of decision-making to artificial intelligence systems. (shrink)

The failure to effectively confront major challenges facing humanity, most importantly, the global ecological crisis, it is argued, is due to the failure of those analysing the root causes of these challenges to engage with and invoke political philosophy to find a way out, and concomitantly, the failure of ethical and political philosophers to effectively engage with the deep assumptions, power structures and dynamics actually operative in the current world-order. It is claimed that this is due to a tacit acceptance (...) of a cultural dualism manifest in the opposition between the sciences and the humanities, with the humanities having been marginalized by the sciences. To overcome this dualism and marginalization of the humanities, and to defend communitarian ethical and political philosophy in a way that both challenges mainstream thinking and engages with the world as it is, with the potential to inspire and orient people for effective action, it is shown how communitarian ethical and political philosophy can be defended and developed through ecology incorporating the notion of ecopoiesis. It is shown how this can serve to create an effective counter-hegemonic culture, integrated as a dialogic grand narrative, uniting and orienting people to create a multi-polar world-order as an ecological civilization. (shrink)

As the geopolitical superpowers race to regulate the digital realm, their divergent rights-centered, market-driven, and social-control-based approaches require a global compact on digital regulation. If diverse regulatory jurisdictions remain, forms of domination entailed by cultural imposition and hermeneutical injustice related to AI legislation and AI systems will follow. We argue for consensual regulation on shared substantive issues, accompanied by proper standardization and coordination. Failure to attain consensus will fragment global digital regulation, enable regulatory capture by authoritarian powers or bad corporate (...) actors, and deepen the historical geopolitical power asymmetries between the global South and the global North. To prevent an unjust regulatory landscape where the global South’s cultural and hermeneutic resources are absent, two principles for the Global Digital Compact to counter these prospective harms are proposed and discussed: (1) “recognitive consensus on key substantive benefits and harms” and (2) “procedural consensus on global coordination and essential standards.”. (shrink)

Global governance has a major impact on the lives of people around the world. However, traditional theories of legitimacy were usually developed for states and are not suitable for the diversity of global governance institutions that exist today. This book first develops a normative concept of legitimacy that is applicable to all political institutions. According to this concept, to regard an institution as legitimate means ascribing it the right to exercise its function in political practice. Secondly, the book discusses how (...) the use of this concept opens up new perspectives in the debate on legitimacy criteria for global governance institutions. In this context, the book analyses the relationship of legitimacy to the values of justice and democracy and discusses the role of feasibility constraints and the all-affected principle in legitimacy judgements. The concept of legitimacy as the right to function opens up the conceptual space to accommodate the insight that legitimacy criteria are not the same for all global governance institutions, but depend on their function and context. Thirdly, the book applies the developed theoretical framework to a specific global governance institution, the G20. (shrink)

Corruption is a ubiquitous problem. As Gillian Brock notes early on, it exists to one degree or another in all societies, no matter their stage of development, and is regularly identified by the public as one of the top problems in the world (2–3). Despite its importance and frequency, it hasn’t been a central topic for philoso- phers working on normative moral and political theory. This isn’t to say that it has been ignored, but it has mostly been seen as (...) a specialty topic in areas such as business ethics, criminal law theory focusing on white-collar crime, or certain sub- areas in democratic theory. However, as Brock points out, corruption has particular importance for questions of global justice, given that “corruption plays an enor- mous role in sustaining global injustice and hinders efforts aimed at remedying global deprivations” (17). This comes not only from the sort of large-scale corrup- tion by government officials that starves developing countries of funds needed to provide necessary services but also from more day-to-day corruption in the provi- sion of water, leaving many people without access to clean drinking water; in con- struction, where people must make do with substandard and unsafe buildings; in the provision of education and medical services; and so on. Despite the massive size of the global justice literature, Brock’s book is one of the first—perhaps the first— to focus specifically on corruption in relation to global justice. It would be an im- portant work for this reason alone, but it also has many other virtues which should make it the touchstone of the topic going forward. (shrink)

It is now widely expected that climate change will be serious enough that a very large number of people will be displaced from their homes because of events relating to or resulting from climate change. Such events may include rising sea levels (and resulting increased salination of ground water), stronger hurricanes and tropical storms, drought, floods, increased and more intense wildfires, and other extreme or (previously) unusual weather events. Although estimates vary widely, it seems very likely that many millions of (...) people—perhaps hundreds of millions if sufficient precautions are not taken—will be forced from their homes by these events related to climate change. In the public imagination, much of the attention has been on ‘climate refugees’, where this is taken to mean people who have crossed borders. However, there is good reason to believe that a very large percentage—probably a significant majority—of displacement resulting from climate change will be, or could be, internal. In this chapter I argue that there are likely to be a large number of cases where internal displacement related to climate change is of international concern, and where, therefore, states have significant moral reasons to provide assistance, either directly to those displaced, or else to the state in which the displacement has taken place. My claim is that internal displacement arising from climate change is of international concern and so grounds a duty of aid by states able to provide it, when this displacement threatens the basic human rights of those displaced, and when the local or domestic government cannot or will not take the necessary steps to meet the needs and protect the rights of those who are displaced. (The uploaded version of this paper is an uncorrected proof. Please cite and refer to the published version.). (shrink)

As the normative literature on immigration has matured over the last twenty plus years, it’s become increasingly hard to make interesting, plausible, and original claims. Most issues have been discussed, and most plausible positions staked out. Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi’s book is, then, a pleasant surprise. In a brisk 173 pages they make important tech- nical contributions and argue for an insightful approach to thinking about some problems relating to migration. I will suggest worries about both their conclusions and (...) the approach, but anyone interested in normative migration theory should read the book. (shrink)

Regulation is nothing without enforcement. This particularly holds for the dynamic field of emerging technologies. Hence, this article has two ambitions. First, it explains how the EU´s new Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) will be implemented and enforced by various institutional bodies, thus clarifying the governance framework of the AIA. Second, it proposes a normative model of governance, providing recommendations to ensure uniform and coordinated execution of the AIA and the fulfilment of the legislation. Taken together, the article explores how the (...) AIA may be implemented by national and EU institutional bodies, encompassing longstanding bodies, such as the European Commission, and those newly established under the AIA, such as the AI Office. It investigates their roles across supranational and national levels, emphasizing how EU regulations influence institutional structures and operations. These regulations may not only directly dictate the structural design of institutions but also indirectly request administrative capacities needed to enforce the AIA. (shrink)

China’s rise to global power status is set to be amongst the primary shapers of politics and life more broadly in the 21st century. Yet despite its immense significance, political philosophers have been surprisingly quiet on the normative implications of China’s rise. This, I will argue, is a mistake. Not only does China’s rise generate interesting normative questions in its own right; it also upends some basic assumptions that many of us have hitherto adopted in our thinking about international distributive (...) justice. In the philosophical literature, the international order is often characterised by two sorts of states – developed and developing – with the former owing demanding duties and the latter having expansive permissions to further their own development. China’s status as both a genuine superpower and a middle-income country facing significant development challenges calls into question the continued functionality of such simplifying assumptions. Against the backdrop of China’s rise – and, to a lesser extent, that of other large emerging economies – this paper develops a more fine-grained account of how to conceive of states’ differential levels of advantage, distinguishing between states that are incapable, precariously capable, and robustly capable of realizing a minimally decent standard of domestic justice. This account reaffirms the assignment of the most onerous international duties to developed states, but also assigns duties and claims to developing states in a scalar fashion, with the upshot that better-off developing states in particular bear positive duties of international justice, owed to least-developed countries (LDCs). (shrink)

Energy politics lie at the heart of human activity. In a time of ecological and energy crises, it is fundamental to realise that our reality systems are always open to change and that, in order to respond to the challenges of a changing energy landscape, we must explore the full possibilities of technology in a radical way. This analysis aims to consider the ethical implications of energy and technology, presenting an urgent case for cosmotechnical pluralism, that is the diversification of (...) world-views, knowledges, technologies in the realm of global politics. To reconstruct the world and its politics around the existence of several ways of navigating and conceiving it, literally leads to a change in reality. The notion of cosmotechnics will present a way of conceiving of the cosmic, epistemic and technic order as interconnected: in this spirit, this exploration will travel through the prisms of cosmology, epistemology, morality, to subsequently enter into the room where energy policies are created. By employing this tripartite framework, policy directions will be suggested on the path towards energy justice in the hope of shining some light on what moral practices of policy-making in the field of energy politics could look like. (shrink)

The prospect of human genetic enhancement requires an institutional response, and probably the creation of new institutions. The governance of genetic enhancement technologies, moreover, needs to be global in scope. In this article, I analyze the debate on the global governance of human genetic enhancement. I begin by offering a philosophical justification for the need to adopt a global framework for governance of technologies that would facilitate the improvement of non-pathological genetic traits. I then summarize the main concrete proposals that (...) have recently emerged to govern genome editing at the global level. Finally, I develop some impediments that limit the impetus for global governance of genetic enhancement. (shrink)

The term ‘artificial intelligence’ has arguably come to function in political discourse as, what Laclau called, an ‘empty signifier’. This article traces the shifting political discourse on AI within three key institutions of global governance–OHCHR, WHO, and UNESCO–and, in so doing, highlights the role of ‘crisis’ moments in justifying a series of pivotal re-articulations. Most important has been the attachment of AI to the narrative around digital automation in human healthcare. Greatly enabled by the societal context of the pandemic, all (...) three institutions have moved from being critical of the unequal power relations in the economy of AI to, today, reframing themselves primarily as facilitators tasked with helping to ensure the application of AI technologies. The analysis identifies a shift in which human health and healthcare is framed as in a ‘crisis’ to which AI technology is presented as the remedy. The article argues the need to trace these discursive shifts as a means by which to understand, monitor, and where necessary also hold to account these changes in the governance of AI in society. (shrink)

As neurotechnologies continue to develop and diffuse, this fast-paced field must be guided by robust governance frameworks in order to promote responsible innovation. The article by Bublitz (2024)...

Статтю присвячено проблемі розвитку національних спільнот у Європі в контексті впливу явищ IV промислової революції (Industry 4.0) та глобалізації, які взаємно обумовлюють одне одного. Вплив цих явищ на національні спільноти об’єднаної Європи має неоднорідні наслідки. У контексті глобалізації, тісно пов’язаної з Industry 4.0, а також феноменів антиглобалізму та євроскептицизму як реакції на неї виокремлено тенденції розвитку національних спільнот у державах сучасної Європи. У країнах Західної Європи переважно спостерігається процес фрагментації національних спільнот. У країнах Центрально-Східної Європи, що перебували у сфері впливу (...) СРСР і стали членами ЄС і НАТО на межі ХХ та ХХІ ст., реакцією на глобалізацію та євроінтеграційні процеси стало зростання впливу євроскептичного та антиглобалістичного націоналізму. В Україні, яка зазнає агресії з боку РФ, розглядає країни ЄС і НАТО як союзників, недостатньо інтегрована в процеси глобалізації та IV промислової революції, тенденції до національного відродження мають переважно єврооптимістичний характер, не породжують скептичного ставлення до глобалізації. Доведено, що IV промислова революція та глобалізація, що взаємно обумовлюють одна одну, формують передумови до послаблення ролі національних держав як на міжнародній арені, так і у сфері внутрішньополітичного розвитку. Суспільні зміни, спричинені цими процесами, викликали явище антиглобалізму та євроскептицизму в країнах ЄС і є чинником коригування глобалізаційних процесів. Поруч із регіональним сепаратизмом політичні спільноти в Західній Європі, які прагнуть відокремлення, все ж залишаються в глобальних і наднаціональних структурах. Україна також виявляє прагнення до національного відродження, спрямованого на дистанціювання від минулого та долучення до передових країн IV промислової революції, зберігаючи відкритий, інклюзивний характер і підтримуючи європейську та євроатлантичну інтеграцію. (shrink)

In contemporary democracies, global capitalism exerts a significant influence over how state power is exercised, raising questions about where political power resides in global politics. This question is important, since our specific considerations about justifiability of political power, i.e. political legitimacy, depend on how we characterize political power at the global level. As a partial answer to this question, I argue that our notion of global political legitimacy should be reoriented to include the structural power of the Transnational Capitalist Class (...) as its subject matter. Structural power is a social relation in which the institutional context makes some agents comply with others’ preferences regardless of actors’ intentional efforts to bring about such outcomes. Even when global business elites do not intentionally exercise power to obtain political control of global governance, their structural power has recognizable effects that partly enforce the world order. To advance my claim, I utilize the radical realists’ argument that the notion of legitimacy is applicable to a broader range of social practices that are beyond dyadic power relations, i.e. rulers intentionally exercising power over subjects. (shrink)

Rather than making another attempt at proposing a single and unifying theory of global health justice, this timely collection brings together, instead, scholars from a range of traditions to frame the issue more broadly, highlighting not only different perspectives but also key topics and debates. -/- The volume features chapters that offer both new theoretical approaches to global health justice, as well as fresh takes on existing frameworks. Others adopt a bottom-up approach to tackle specific problems, including the sexual rights (...) of children and adolescents, artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine, framing of neglected tropical diseases, securitization of health, and trademarks in global health. Brought together within one volume, the breadth of these chapters provides a unique and enlightening contribution to the wider Global Health field. -/- This important volume will be a fascinating read for students and researchers across Global Health, Bioethics, Political Philosophy, and Global Development. (shrink)

There are two bodies of literature, one offering theories of the legitimacy of domestic institutions like states, another offering theories of the legitimacy of international institutions like the IMF. Accounts of domestic legitimacy stress the importance of democratic procedure, while few to no theorists make democracy a necessary condition for the legitimacy of international institutions. In this paper, I ask whether this asymmetry can be defended. Is there a unified higher-order theory which can explain why legitimacy requires democracy in the (...) domestic context, but not in the international context? I argue that no proceduralist higher-order theory succeeds, and that we need to look for other solutions. (shrink)

The recent Covid-19 global health crisis not only brings into sharp relief the current problems afflicting the international intellectual property regime (IIPR) but also calls into question its legitimacy as an international authority. Against this backdrop, the article aims to launch an investigation into the legitimacy of the IIPR, as an international co-ordinative authority, designed to protect IP rights without prejudice to international trade norms. Drawing on Raz’s service conception of authority, it explores whether the IIPR lives up to its (...) promises by enabling co-ordination between states over IP rights without undermining the initial balance on which it is founded, struck between developing and developed countries, as well as between international protection of IP- cum-trade rights and domestic regulatory autonomy. It does so by classifying the historical evolution of the IIPR under three different phases: (i) its foundation, (ii) before, and (iii) after the TRIPS-plus. Upon showing the legitimacy challenges inherent in its undemocratic foundation, the article points to the success of the regime in finding a balance between conflicting interests before the TRIPS-plus era. Later, it underlines the many challenges that come with linking the IIPR to the investment regime and argues that the FTAs and frequent regime-shifting activities put further pressure on the authority and legitimacy of the regime. Stressing the importance of democratic participation for the legitimacy of any co-ordinative authority, the article casts doubt on the IIPR’s legitimacy and concludes by raising some points to overcome the ongoing legitimacy challenges. -/- . (shrink)

Whether as a rule, principle, ideal, or procedure, self-determination – however complicated – is here to stay. For it to remain politically viable, however, we need reexamine its ontology and teleology: its existence and function. As we leave the modern age in which it was molded, self-determination is confronted by challenges unique to our time. How we, in the 21st century, manage to keep alive and accommodate the concept will determine how the next stage in our global history unfolds. The (...) aim of this paper is threefold: (i) to explore the theoretical foundations of self-determination, (ii) to examine the practical implications and challenges that follow, and (iii) to chart a course for its future directions in global terms. Taking self-determination seriously – if, indeed, we believe that is still worth doing – requires us to think critically about its use (and abuse) as a key doctrine of international law; no longer can we take for granted what we did, in its establishment. To that end, we begin first with an exploration of self-determination as a concept, descriptively and normatively, in Section 2. Through legal theory and political theory, then the philosophy, and on to the psychology, of self-determination, we construct its theoretical foundations; strong and diverse as we find them to be. We then move on, in Section 3, to examine the practice of self-determination. From its historical origins through to its judicial development, we come to see how self-determination actually happens – finding the modern processes to be elusive, giving rise to a central practical problem: what to do with secession. In Section 4, in moving from theory to practice, we attempt to develop a theoretically-informed praxis. We consider first the relevant theoretical challenges self-determination proposes and consider next what the practical responses to those may be. And finally, in Section 5, policy recommendations are made to that effect. (shrink)

Global public goods and the contrast to global public bads require a dramatic change in the international monetary system, enforcement capacity, democratic legitimation, the return to regionalism and multilateralism. Pending the emergence of a more equitable global reserve and payments system, an increased use of the Special Drawing Rights, channeled through Multilateral Development Banks, may help managing the transition towards the provision of such global public goods. This would also provide a guidance for the reduction of Central Banks’ balance sheets, (...) the financialization of the economy and an increase of real investment, thus anchoring the whole international economy to a less vulnerable and volatile monetary structure. (shrink)

International studies investigate the governance authority of state versus non-state actors in terms of their public or private authority. However, the public–private distinction does not sufficiently capture the variety of governance actors, or the forms of their authority, beyond that distinction. Focussing on businesses, this paper argues that certain governance actors assume public and private roles, as well as a third category of roles it calls ‘societal’ that transcend notions of public and private. To understand these roles and how they (...) affect governance authority, this paper treats the public–private relationship as mediated and extends it with the ‘societal’ category, then translates it into the concept of business authority, which constitutes a particular form of governance authority alongside public and private authority. It does so by operationalising governance authority as a triadic concept composed of power, legitimacy and a connection to public interests. In all three components, business authority escapes the binary distinction between public and private without simply merging the two. (shrink)

Non-technical summary: -/- When developing and deploying negative emissions technologies (NETs), little attention has been paid to where. On the one hand, one might develop NETs where they are likely to contribute most to global mitigation targets, contributing to a global climate solution. On the other hand, one might develop NETs where they can help support development on a regional basis, justified by regional demands. I defend these arguments and suggest that they reflect the values of efficiency and responding to (...) need, respectively. To the extent that these values conflict, they introduce what I call the Need-Efficiency Trade-off Effect (‘NET Effect’). -/- Technical summary: -/- Unlike other geoengineering methods, the effectiveness of negative emissions technologies (NETs) tends to be sensitive to regional siting. This paper argues that this point raises morally and legally important implications by identifying a trade-off between ‘efficiency’ and ‘need’. First, it introduces two arguments justifying NETs: one focused on contributions to global mitigation and the other focused on contributions to regional development. Second, reflecting the two arguments, the paper discusses the moral values of efficiency and need, respectively. For instance, if the strategy is to try to use NETs to maximize expected mitigation contributions to reflect efficiency, then deployment should occur in regions with the best prospects for success (e.g. Western countries). However, if the strategy is to try to use NETs to improve the chances of simultaneous development and mitigation to respond to need, then deployment should occur in regions with limited development and expected growth of demand for NETs (e.g. Asian countries). When these values conflict, I call that a Need-Efficiency Trade-off Effect (‘NET Effect’). The paper concludes by considering the NET Effect in the context of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage as well as direct air carbon capture and storage. [Open access]. (shrink)

Introduction: There is currently no binding, internationally accepted and successful approach to ensure global equitable access to healthcare during a pandemic. The aim of this ethical analysis is to bring into the discussion a legally regulated vaccine allocation as a possible strategy for equitable global access to vaccines. We focus our analysis on COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) and an existing EU regulation that, after adjustment, could promote global vaccine allocation. -/- Methods: The main documents discussing the two strategies are (...) examined with a qualitative content analysis. The ethical values reasonableness, openness and transparency, inclusiveness, responsiveness and accountability serve as categories for our ethical analysis. -/- Results: We observed that the decision-making processes in a legal solution to expand access to vaccines would be more transparent than in COVAX initiative, would be more inclusive, especially of nation states, and the values responsiveness and accountability could be easily incorporated in the development of a new regulation. -/- Discussion: A legal strategy that offers incentives to the pharmaceutical industry in return for global distribution of vaccines according to the Fair Priority Model is an innovative way to achieve global and equitable access to vaccines. However, in the long term, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will require from all nations to work in solidarity to find durable solutions for global vaccine research and development. Interim solutions, such as our proposed legal strategy for equitable access to vaccines, and efforts to find long-term solutions must be advanced in parallel. (shrink)

Since the disintegration of the USSR Eurasia has gained a new geopolitical and strategic significance. Fifteen Countries emerged as a result of disintegration, among which only the Russian Federation was the successor state. The post-soviet era especially the era of the 1990s was a political and economic trauma for the Russian Federation and the post-soviet space. But Eurasianists were well aware of the American unilateralism and American ‘Grand Chessboard strategy” that was solely aimed at encircling Russian geography. With these concerns, (...) the Eurasianists advised the Russian political and military elites to initiate the Eurasian Union Project. This paper briefly sketches the Russian historical Eurasian dream, which deeply rooted in Russian imperial history, and discusses the importance of Eurasian philosophy for the political and economic stability of Russia-Eurasia. The paper also illustrates the challenges and opportunities for Eurasian integration and for the establishment of multipolar world order. Moreover, the paper also briefly outlines the geopolitical rationale behind the Eurasian project as a key objective of contemporary Russian foreign policy and geopolitics. (shrink)

The idea of a responsible cosmopolitan state (RCS) represents a recent attempt to reconcile the utopianism of cosmopolitan political theory and the practical constraints arising from the current realities of politics among territorial and largely self-interested states. I show in the chapter that the neorealist and/or geopolitical challenge rests on a misconception about what cosmopolitanism is meant to provide, because immediate practical advice is only a part of what normative political theory may bring to the table. Besides the notion of (...) self-interest which can be interpreted in different ways, it is mainly the action-modifying role of norms (especially international/supranational law) which may gradually change the game. Since the sustenance of state capacities is often preconditioned by events which take place beyond state borders, shared rules of conduct allow for more effective coordination in cases where collective action is required. Although the idea of a RCS primarily targets foreign policy priorities of smaller/weaker states (not-great-powers), it may turn out that collective action problems arising from empirical realities of the 21st century increasingly put great powers under pressure to accept such self-imposed constraints and comply with them. In the final part of the paper, however, I explain why this ‘cosmopolitan optimism’ needs to be aware of its own limitations, singling out the problems of internal motivation of actors in world politics and the deeper meaning of sovereignty which precludes an easy switch to the language of dispersed, pooled, or relational sovereignty. I conclude by arguing that if we are to take cosmopolitan ideals seriously, the RCS most likely represents a transitional stage on the route towards a centralised global political authority. (shrink)

The coronavirus pandemic has given an old question new traction: what exactly is the meaning of appeals to expert authority in politics? Though basing political decisions on the best available scientific and technical knowledge may be a plain task on the surface, and calls for ‘listening to science’ regularly maintain this perception, the relationship between expertise and politics is complicated. Given the particular centrality of expertise to global governance practices and institutions, what would an international political theory of expertise look (...) like? Two recent volumes on the subject offer highly original answers to this question. Read alongside each other, Lucile Maertens and Marieke Louis’ Why International Organizations Hate Politics and Jens Steffek’s International Organization as Technocratic Utopia bring to the fore the technocratic legacies and depoliticising tendencies of global governance. In this review essay, I first discuss the historical emergence of technocratically-inspired international organisations as portrayed by Jens Steffek, and then turn to Lucile Maertens’ and Marieke Louis’ practitioner-centred account of how depoliticisation works and is best understood analytically. I then offer a comparative discussion and propose that, with the help of both books, we can picture global governance as driven by a search for utopia. (shrink)

The creation of increasingly complex artificial intelligence (AI) systems raises urgent questions about their ethical and social impact on society. Since this impact ultimately depends on political decisions about normative issues, political philosophers can make valuable contributions by addressing such questions. Currently, AI development and application are to a large extent regulated through non-binding ethics guidelines penned by transnational entities. Assuming that the global governance of AI should be at least minimally democratic and fair, this paper sets out three desiderata (...) that an account should satisfy when theorizing about what this means. We argue, first, that an analysis of democratic values, political entities and decision-making should be done in a holistic way; second, that fairness is not only about how AI systems treat individuals, but also about how the benefits and burdens of transformative AI are distributed; and finally, that justice requires that governance mechanisms are not limited to AI technology, but are incorporated into a range of basic institutions. Thus, rather than offering a substantive theory of democratic and fair AI governance, our contribution is metatheoretical: we propose a theoretical framework that sets up certain normative boundary conditions for a satisfactory account. (shrink)

Orson Scott Card and his Ender Series have had a profound impact on the genre of contemporary science fiction, meriting an academic analysis of some of his more theoretical ideas. I have chosen to analyze his concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations found in Xenocide and Children of the Mind through the lens of international relations, sociological, and political theory, in order to bring nuance to an underdeveloped theory that many non-academics may be familiar with. Ultimately, we must conclude that (...) Card’s concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations is too stagnant and does not account for social and hegemonic change, which influences the justifications of why these “nations” may be considered “Center” in the first place. (shrink)

Societies of the East are often contrasted with those of the West in their stances toward technology. This paper explores these perceived differences in the context of international ethics guidance for artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. Japan serves as an example of the East, while Europe and North America serve as examples of the West. The paper’s principal aim is to demonstrate that Western values predominate in international ethics guidance and that Japanese values serve as a much-needed corrective. We recommend (...) a hybrid approach that is more inclusive and truly ‘international’. Following an introduction, the paper examines distinct stances toward robots that emerged in the West and Japan, respectively, during the aftermath of the Second World War, reflecting history and popular culture, socio-economic conditions, and religious worldviews. It shows how international ethics guidelines reflect these disparate stances, drawing on a 2019 scoping review that examined 84 international AI ethics documents. These documents are heavily skewed toward precautionary values associated with the West and cite the optimistic values associated with Japan less frequently. Drawing insights from Japan’s so-called ‘moonshot goals’, the paper fleshes out Japanese values in greater detail and shows how to incorporate them more effectively in international ethics guidelines for AI and robotics. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag macht auf die Krise in den globalen Wertschöpfungsketten, die durch die Covid-19 Pandemie verursacht wurde, aufmerksam und gibt dazu einige Denkanstöße aus normativer Perspektive. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Pandemie ein grelles Schlaglicht auf die strukturellen Probleme der Globalisierung wirft. Zu diesen gehört die Gestaltung der globalen Marktwirtschaft über nationale, supranationale und internationale Institutionen, die in der Regel zur Benachteiligung einiger Länder und zum Vorteil für andere führt. Dies wird zunächst am Beispiel der Textilindustrie von Bangladesch erläutert. Danach (...) wird das Problem der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit aus der Perspektive der strukturellen Ungerechtigkeit betrachtet. Der Beitrag befasst sich in diesem Zusammenhang mit den systematischen Problemen entlang der globalen Lieferketten. (shrink)