Gorgias

Gorgias’ On Not-Being survives only in two divergent summaries. Diels–Kranz's classic edition prints the better-preserved version that appears in Sextus’ Aduersus Mathematicos. Yet, in recent years there has been rising interest in a second summary that survives as part of the anonymous De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. The text of MXG is more difficult; it contains substantial lacunae that often make it much harder to make grammatical let alone philosophical sense of. As Alexander Mourelatos reports, one manuscript has a scribal note (...) that reads: ‘The original contains many errors; no one should blame me; I just copy what I see.’2 The treatise's state of preservation has aptly prompted Michael Gagarin to liken it to a black hole: ‘something we cannot see directly but know must exist because of certain effects it has on other objects.’3. (shrink)

The proof of first thesis of Gorgias is an indirect deductive argument constructed by the multiple use of the _modus tollens_ pattern. Those of its premises which are assumed without proofs are misleadingly similar to some logical or analytical truths. If they actually were such truths, some contradictions would have to appear in the proof. In the times of Gorgias the proof could be regarded as correct; the possibility of showing and clearly describing its defects emerged only after formal logic (...) had been invented. Gorgias could announce his thesis seriously – as a thesis of extreme metaphysical nihilism – without being embarrassed. If the proof is a sophistry, then it is a masterpiece among sophistries, the most outstanding achievement of the sophists in this domain. (shrink)

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of (...) speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the variety of sophistic argumentations that the Paduan philosopher and writer Sperone Speroni (1500-1588) applies in the so-called paradoxical work Dialogo della Discordia (1542), in which style as well as content factor into the author’s interest in ancient sophistic rhetoric. In analyzing the subject, the paper focuses on the influence of Erasmus’ Praise of Folly (1511) in Speroni’s dialogue. In so doing, the paper also intends to contribute to a deeper understanding of the impact of (...) Erasmus’ work in the Venetian area - in particular, the rebirth of ancient sophistic literature in the Italian Renaissance. (shrink)

These are the excerpts from the book "Sztuka a prawda. Problem sztuki w dyskusji między Gorgiaszem a Platonem" concerning Gorgias' theory of apate (deception).

Rhetorik der Platonischen Verteidigung des Sokrates Die Platonische Verteidigung des Sokrates nimmt einen besonderen Platz im Werk Platons ein. Zweifellos schafft sie viele Fragen, das Datum und Umstände ihrer Entste- hung betreffend, oder hinsichtlich der darin enthaltenen originellen ldeen und ihrer Treue gegenüber der Verteidigungsrede von Sokrates selbst. Die Verteidigungsrede (eigentlich sind es drei Verteidigungsreden) ist jedoch auch aus dem Grund sehr interessant, daß sie (als Verteidigungsrede) zu einer gewissen Tradition gehört, die für immer mit der Sophi- stik verbunden ist. (...) Diese Tatsache erlangt besonders deswegen große Bedeutung, weil Platon mit diesen Reden ein Gebiet betritt, das eine Domäne der philosophischen Haupt- feinde sowohl von Sokrates als auch von Platon selbst ist. Aus der Perspektive der späte- ren Texte Platons und der darin geäußerten Ablehnung gegenüber Anwendung der Rhe- torik ist es interessant, die Apologie des Sokrates in ihrem Aufbau zu analysieren. Die Be- stimmung des intertextuellen Hintergrunds der Platonischen Verteidigung des Sokrates, ihr Bezug auf rhetorische Traditionen jener Zeit und der Hinweis auf strukturelle, inhal- tliche und philosophische Anknüpfungen können bei der Rekonstruktion der Platonischen Auffassung von Rhetorik und des Verhältnisses Platons zu der Sophistik hilfreich sein. (shrink)

The paper examines Gorgias' treatise "On non-being" in the paraphrasis of Sextus Empiricus (Adversus mathematicos, VII, 65-87).

This is the translation and interpretation of the Gorgias' speech from Plato's dialogue Gorgias (456A1-457C3). In the commentary it is argued that the Gorgias' speech in the dialogue is based on the philosophical and rhetorical motives which can be found both in Gorgias' epideictic speeches ("Helen" and "Palamedes") and doxographical accounts.

This is the introduction and the translation with a vast commentary in the footnotes of Gorgias' "Palamedes".

This is the introduction and the translation of Gorgias' "Helen". The speech is considered to be one of the most interesting pieces of early Greek rhetoric not only because of its rhetorical, but also because of its philosophical value. There is no doubt that it sets out the outlines of the sophistic conception of logos and (along with another Gorgias' speech Palamedes) represents the starting point for the Plato's critique of Gorgias' rhetoric in the dialogue "Gorgias'.

In this paper I offer a reconstruction of the account of meaning and language the Cyrenaics appear to have defended on the basis of a famous passage of Sextus, as well as showing the philosophical parentage of that account.