Government and Democracy

This article explains how we ordinary subjects of a state who are neither political leaders nor functionaries are responsible for outcomes that are properly attributed to that state and that took place during our adult lifetime. Its focus is on the connection we forge to those outcomes via our obedience alone. If our responsibility as subjects is justified, it would apply under all regime types including oppressive and authoritarian ones. The argument is that this responsibility can only be justified within (...) a minimal account of agency and a bare-bones account of responsibility. Thus, while we incur a burden of responsibility for the state via our obedience alone, that burden does not suffice to either blame us or extract remedies from us for state injustices. For us obedient subjects, however, it is important that we be cognizant of this burden as it marks the most minimal agency we exercise in the state. (shrink)

This essay summarizes the research program developed in our new book, Why We Argue : A Guide to Political Disagreement. Humans naturally want to know and to take themselves as having reason on their side. Additionally, many people take democracy to be a uniquely proper mode of political arrangement. There is an old tension between reason and democracy, however, and it was first articulated by Plato. Plato’s concern about democracy was that it detached political decision from reason. Epistemic democrats attempt (...) to show how the two can be re-attached. What is necessary is to couple the core democratic liberties with norms of rational exchange. Thus epistemology and argument provides a basis for democratic politics. Why We Argue makes a case for the connection and develops a toolkit for maintaining it. (shrink)

This article deals with the impact of the free, democratic and peaceful accession to power of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey on the Arab world in general and on the Islamic currents active in Arab societies in particular. A main point is looking into how Arab political formations and especially political Islam are trying to make sense out of such recent developments in Turkey as: (1) the fact that traditionally reviled Turkish secularism, Kemalism and westernism could (...) produce a democratic form of political Islam capable of winning free elections and ruling Turkey without a catastrophe befalling the whole polity; and (2) the fact that an Islamic JDP is the most eager proponent of Turkey’s membership in the secular EU, while the traditional staunch military guardian of Turkish secularism is now the main obstructor of the drive for EU membership. (shrink)

This 2003 report reflects an explorative, comparative study started in the Netherlands in 1998, into the phenomenon of Councils for the Judiciary in Europe. Councils like these are abundant and come in different sorts and sizes. Notwithstanding all of their differences, Councils for the Judiciary (the umbrella term the report uses to refer to them) in the EU do share a lot of common features. Generally they function as independent intermediates between the government and the judiciary in order to ensure (...) and guarantee the independence of the judiciary in some way or in some respect.For purposes of classification a Council for the Judiciary is defined as an institution which: a. is a self-governing judicial organization, b. functions independently from the government and parliament, c. acts as an intermediate institution (a 'buffer') between the legislative-executive branch of government and the judiciary, and d. does not administer justice as such, but typically performs 'meta-judicial' tasks such as disciplinary action, career decisions by judges, the recruitment and professional training of judges, coordination between courts, general policies, courts' service-related activities (budget, housing, automation, finances and accounting, etc.) , etc. as regards judges and courts.On the basis of an empirical study different Councils for the Judiciary in Europe are compared (France, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Croatia. A comparison of features and constitutional position of the Councils involved in the study learns that there are basically two model-types of Councils in Europe: the so-called Northern styled ones (with foremost budget, managerial, policy and logistic responsibilities) and Southern styled ones (with responsibilities for discipline and career decisions as regards judges. The report - published by the ECEJ of the Council of Europe -observes a trend in Europe to establish Councils for the Judiciary in Europe in order to boost the independent functioning of the judiciary vis-a-vis government and parliament. (shrink)

The lively debate over the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been marred by a formalism which obscures its point and value.ed from genuine issues of substance, the rival positions offer inadequate accounts of the legitimacy of judicial review; constitutional theory must regain its connection with questions of political principle and moral value. Although the critics of ultra vires have rightly emphasized the foundational role of the common law, they have misconceived its nature and implications. On the one hand, they (...) have invited the charge of judicial supremacism by marginalizing the role of legislative intent; on the other, their affirmation of absolute parliamentary sovereignty (within the context of this debate) undermines the critique of ultra vires. In substance, therefore, the rival camps occupy essentially the same ground, equally trapped by a formalism that entrenches a stark confrontation between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A conception of shared sovereignty, or interdependent sovereignties, provides a better foundation for judicial review. (shrink)

This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first explain the view of corruption as a disease of the political body. Following this view, we have to consider the type of actions that debase a political entity of its constitutive principal in order to assess corruption. Accordingly, we need to consider what the constitutive principle of democracy is. This is the task I undertake in the second section where I explicate democratic legitimacy. I present democracy (...) as a procedure of social inquiry about what ought to be done that includes epistemic and practical considerations. In the third section, I argue that the problem of corruption for a procedural conception of democracy is that the epistemic value of the procedure is diminished by corrupted agents’ lack of concern for truth. Corruption, according to this view, consists in two deformities of truth: lying and bullshit. These deformities corrupt since they conceal private interests under the guise of a concern for truth. In the fourth section, I discuss the difficulties a procedural account may face in formulating solutions to the problem of corruption. (shrink)

I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so (...) as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point. (shrink)

In this article, I locate the Critical Theoretic and Republican themes of misrecognition and domination in transnational democracy, viewed as an emancipatory project. Contrary to John Dryzek, I argue that transnational democracy requires an appropriate account of mutual recognition and personal integrity in order to ground the emancipatory dimension of this project, especially given Dryzek's analysis of transnational contests in forming personal identifications. Beyond this, I argue that the same themes are needed to supplement James Bohman's account of the normative (...) powers of dominated persons to initiate deliberation in circumstances of injustice. Primarily, my claim has been that the idea of personal integrity remains essential not only to motivating the project of transnational democracy, but also modifying the appeal to normative powers in the interest of enabling dominated persons to enter into communicative relationships and engage in public processes of critical self-examination. (shrink)

The Dutch government has a double moral message for Dutch parents. On the one hand, they expect mothers to work more hours outside the home; on the other hand, they expect parents to perform better in their parental tasks. New research shows again that in spite of all stimulation measures, Dutch women with children prefer their part-time jobs, and parents prefer not to leave their children to the responsibility of day care all week. To what extent is the government allowed (...) to oblige mothers to work more hours a week if the consequence is that the responsibility for upbringing shifts from parents to day care centres? (shrink)

Empirical research on public opinion has tended to misjudge the normative rationales for modern democracy. Although it is often presumed that citizens' policy preferences are the opinions of interest to democratic theorists, and that democracy requires a highly informed citizenry, neither of these premises represents a dominant position in mainstream democratic theory. Besides incorrect assumptions about major tenets of democratic theory, empirical research on civic engagement is running into dead ends that will require normative analysis to overcome. Bringing political philosophy (...) back in to the study of public opinion can not only remedy shortcomings in the empirical literature, but can also underscore how relevant that literature is for a wide range of problems in democratic practice. (shrink)

Two short paragraphs, 42 and 43, in the White Paper, Excellence in Schools , published in July 1997, announced the UK government's intention to educate for citizenship: Schools can help to ensure that young people feel that they have a stake in our society and the community in which they live by teaching them the nature of democracy and the duties, responsibilities and rights of citizens.

In the dissertation I will attempt to put forth and demonstrate the following: The incompatibility of the Islamic state and community with revisionist democracy. In essence, revisionist democracy is nothing more than reassertion of classical liberal democracy and which is defined as a method of choosing between competing elites. Mayo's four principles elaborating on the revisionist brand of democracy are: popular control of policy makers; political equality ; effectiveness of popular control ; and, the majority principle. The second theme will (...) address the compatibility of the Islamic State and community with the tenets of participatory democracy . This will be the core of my thesis. Again here, complementary to the first point, I will discuss two case studies--Algeria and Saudi Arabia--in an attempt to further clarify and support my thesis. In addressing these two case studies my purpose will not be to pass judgment on whether the two systems can be considered democratic but rather to evaluate the recent developments in both countries in relation to the main themes discussed in the dissertation. The recent event I am referring to in the case of Algeria concerns the collapse of the process of elections. In the case of Saudi Arabia, I will address the newly created consultation councils, in addition to the regular open meetings between the King and the general public. (shrink)

Abstract Does media coverage of politics undermine democratic deliberation? By covering the ?horse race? instead of the issues, the media encourage people to believe that politicians place self?interest above the public interest. The media also affect which issues people consider important, and negative advertisements discourage political participation. People learn from the media only because they know so little about politics. Were democracy deliberative, these media effects would undermine it. But democracy is not a deliberation but a contest that relies on (...) the ability of the media to shape public opinion. The evidence for media effects is strong, but the media cannot be undermining a form of democracy that does not and cannot exist, and they do sustain the form that does. (shrink)

Global governance has become a topic of interest to many contemporary political theorists. Issues arising from the nature of global markets and multinational corporations can no longer be locally contained. These developments signal the decline of the nation state and therewith the end of the liberal moral and political theory that justified national institutions. The alternative possible orders appear bleak, including anarchy, hegemonic power or the most horrific of all specters, the liberty crushing “world state.” Kant’s cosmopolitan theory of justice (...) can provide a third way between nationalism and its bleak alternatives, providing a measureof global governance upheld by nations without recourse to a world state. My thesis is that a juridical society of states is necessarily founded upon cosmopolitan right having universal jurisdiction and that the implementation of the norms of hospitality underlying cosmopolitan right requires global institutions based upon democratic representation and accountability. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Kant's concept of cosmopolitan right is the philosophical basis for contemporary international human rights. The law of world citizenship or cosmopolitan right is necessary in order to secure hospitable interactions between individuals and states. Such interactions in turn create an international civil culture or "cosmopolitan condition" which 1 is the source of the further specification and eventual codification of human rights. Human rights, I conclude, are universal because of their international significance and scope and (...) are inherently linked to cosmopolitan values. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 5, Page 685, August 2012.

Are there any coherent and defensible alternatives to liberal democracy? The author examines the possibility that a reformed democratic centralism-the principle around which China's current polity is officially organized-might be legitimate, according to both an inside and an outside perspective. The inside perspective builds on contemporary Chinese political theory; the outside perspective critically deploys Rawls's notion ofa "decent society " as its standard. Along the way, the author pays particular attention to the kinds and degree of pluralism a decent society (...) can countenance, and to the specific institutions in China that might enable the realization of a genuine and/or decent democratic centralism. The author argues that by considering both inside and outside perspectives, and the degrees to which they inter-penetrate and critically inform one another, we can engage in a global philosophy that neither pre-judges alternative political traditions nor falls prey to false conceptual barriers. (shrink)

Barack Obama is often lauded as a 'pragmatist,' yet when most people employ the term, they mean it in the vaguest sense: that he's practical and willing to compromise to get things done. However, the public philosophy of pragmatism, which has been the subject of a rich revival in the past couple of decades, is far more than this. First developed in the late nineteenth century, pragmatism is primarily a way of thinking--an anti-dualist philosophy that attempts to overcome the dichotomies (...) between self and object, nature and culture, mind and body, theory and practice, and fact and value. When applied to governance, pragmatists advocate the use of tactics like third party mediation and problem-solving to achieve anti-dualist principles: cosmopolitan localism, analytical holism, progressive conservatism, and processual structuralism. -/- In Pragmatist Governance, Chris Ansell begins with a theory of the concept and then explains why the approach is ideal for addressing today's governance problems. For instance, while many think that bureaucracy's unchecked growth is the fundamental problem facing democracy today, pragmatism suggests the opposite: that public agencies can effectively manage the relationship between governance and democracy if they focus on building consent for public problem-solving. Ansell argues that wishing away bureaucracy will not do given what we know about the indispensible role of institutions in contemporary governance. Utilizing pragmatist concepts, Ansell rethinks the design of institutions, arguing that they are neither the simple products of rational design that can be endlessly tinkered with nor 'congealed taste'--where institutions represent the timeless customs and values of a people. Along with overcoming this dualism, Ansell also challenges us to rethink our approach to governance. Instead of moving from one extreme to the other--from bureaucracy to 'post-bureaucracy' or 'public entrepreneurialism'--pragmatism would not merely seek to replace one (hierarchical bureaucracy) with the other (a 'flat,' entrepreneurial organization), but rather to hitch the two approaches together in an innovative amalgam where organizational leaders constantly interact with and learn from street-level bureaucrats. -/- Pragmatist Governance concludes that if government is to regain public trust, the technical knowledge of experts must be brought together with sensitivity to local problems, situations, and knowledge. The answer lies not, however, in a diminished bureaucracy. That may only deepen distrust. Rather, the emphasis should be on taking the best of both sides to find innovative and effective ways to solve enduring public problems. (shrink)

Classrooms and schools represent a "culture of power" to the extent that they mirror unjust social relations that exist in the larger society. Progressive educators committed to social justice seek to disrupt those social relations in the classroom that function to silence marginalised students, but neutralising those who attempt to reassert power is problematic. This paper investigates the questions: is it ever justified to use power to interrupt power? Does all silencing subjugate? Arguments for and against the censorship of teachers (...) who believe that portraying homosexual lifestyles in a positive light undermines their integrity are outlined. I highlight and explain two crucial considerations absent in the aforementioned debate. Finally, the implications of the debate for social justice educators are explicated. (shrink)

For over thirty years, scholars, courts, defense attorneys and prosecutors have been deeply troubled by the guilty plea procedure, concerned about the sacrifice of rights and due process for cheap efficiency. Although many legal players seem to dislike the plea, few have taken on its reform. With the Supreme Court's recent iteration of the jury's constitutional rights and powers in criminal adjudication, however, a way to meaningfully reform the guilty plea has finally arisen. I propose incorporating the community into the (...) guilty plea process through the use of a plea jury. With a plea jury, a lay panel of citizens would listen to the defendant's allocution and determine the acceptability of the plea and sentence, reinvigorating the community's right to determine punishment for offenders. My goal in this piece is to restore the community jury right to its proper place by envisioning its integration into the guilty plea, theoretically as well as procedurally. In doing so, I will illustrate not only how a standard jury would be incorporated, but also why the critical norms embedded into jury participation will help improve the existing guilty plea procedure. (shrink)

Si es cierto que Tocqueville apreció grandes virtudes en el sistema democrático, tampoco dejó de señalar sus peligros. Con arreglo al diagnóstico de Tocqueville, sobre sus contemporáneos –y por ende sobre todos nosotros– actuarían incesantemente dos pasiones opuestas: la necesidad de ser conducidos y el deseo de ser libres. No sabiendo acabar con ninguna de tales inclinaciones contradictorias, nos esforzaríamos por satisfacer ambas a la vez., concibiendo un poder único, tutelar, todopoderoso, pero elegido por los ciudadanos. La dialéctica entre igualdad (...) y libertad representa el núcleo de sus inquietudes. Los trabajos reunidos aquí fueron debatidos en el Ateneo madrileño al cumplirse 150 años del fallecimiento de Tocqueville. Todos ellos nos invitan a revisitar las múltiples facetas de un autor imprescindible, si queremos revisar los avatares de la democracia y proceder a repensar cómo deberíamos actualizar sus reglas de juego. (Este volumen se inscribe dentro del Programa sobre “Cultura de la Legalidad” TRUST-CM liderado por José María Sauca). Diálogos con clásicos europeos La Colección Clásicos europeos (que dirige Roberto R. Aramayo) pretende rescatar del olvido algunos textos fundamentales para comprender mejor nuestro presente, al poner en valor la impronta que han legado a Europa y al mundo determinados pensadores europeos. Como complemento a esa colección de textos, este volumen sobre Tocqueville prosigue la serie de Diálogos con clásicos europeos, que quisiera cumplir en castellano un papel similar al jugado por los Companions filosóficos de Cambridge. Conviene seguir dialogando con ciertos autores que forman parte del entramado de nuestro acervo cultural, pues no en vano el diálogo es condición sine qua non del filosofar. (shrink)

Constitutional politics has returned in our time in a truly dramatic way. In the last 25 years, not only in the new or restored democracies of South and East Europe, Latin America and Africa, but also in the established liberal or not so liberal democracies of Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, Canada and Great Britain, issues of constitution-making, constitutional revision and institutional design or redesign have been put on the political agenda. Even in the United States, given the new (...) or renewed problems of our versions of presidentialism, federalism and electoral regime, Article V has come to be experienced as a veritable prison house, and judicial constitution-making (think of Buckley v Valejo) is often seen as much as a threat to, as the protection of, democratic mechanisms. And, most recently, in countries currently experiencing externally imposed revolutions, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, constitution-making has turned out to be a central stake in the ongoing political process. We are living in an epoch in which the nations seem to be slouching, or being prodded, toward Philadelphia and Americans, as the heirs of Madison and MacArthur, are sorely tempted to try teaching others the secrets of its success as a supposedly continuous 200-year-old constitutional democracy. But to be an effective teacher, it is not enough to be in a position of political-military superiority. One must first relearn to learn and even to re-learn. (shrink)