The growing block view of time can be seen as the combination of two theses. First of all, the growing block view is committed to a dynamic account of time, on which there is an objective, changing present. The growing block conception of time shares this commitment with a number of other A-theoretic accounts of time, including presentism and the moving spotlight theory. The second commitment is ontological; past and present times exist, while future times do not exist. On the growing block view, there is a block of objectively past time-slices and one present slice. As the present changes, new present slices are added to the block. The combination of these dynamic and ontological commitments means that the growing block view of time is often portrayed as a middle ground between presentism and eternalism.
|Key works||For an early defense of the growing block view of time see Broad 1923. Tooley 1997 is a contemporary book length defense of the position. More recent advocates of the growing block view of time include Forrest 2004, Forrest 2006, and Button 2006. The growing block view of time faces a serious skeptical challenge in accounting for our knowledge that we are present. Versions of this objection are raised or discussed in Bourne 2002, Braddon-Mitchell 2004, and Heathwood 2005.|
|Introductions||Good introductions include Markosian 2010 and Miller 2013|
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De De Clercq
Ezio Di Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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