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  1. Can Science Explain consciousness? Toward a solution to the 'hard problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
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  2. Why the hard problem of consciousness will never be solved.Philip Davies - manuscript
    The purpose of this paper is to argue that (1) that the hard problem of consciousness is concerned with subjective experience; (2) subjective experience arises from the measure of absolute quantities directly by our senses; (3) objective experience, on the other hand, arises from the measure of relative quantities which are invariant to perception; (4) only relative quantities can be shared with others; (5) consequently the hard problem is forever locked inside the head of each individual and can never be (...)
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  3. The meta-problem and the transfer of knowledge between theories of consciousness: a software engineer’s take.Marcel Kvassay - manuscript
    This contribution examines two radically different explanations of our phenomenal intuitions, one reductive and one strongly non-reductive, and identifies two germane ideas that could benefit many other theories of consciousness. Firstly, the ability of sophisticated agent architectures with a purely physical implementation to support certain functional forms of qualia or proto-qualia appears to entail the possibility of machine consciousness with qualia, not only for reductive theories but also for the nonreductive ones that regard consciousness as ubiquitous in Nature. Secondly, analysis (...)
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  4. Solving the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Richard McDaniel - manuscript
    The hard problem of consciousness is a symptom of a fact of all scientific explanations. This article demonstrates through analogy with uncontroversial explanations that the hard problem of consciousness either shouldn't be considered a problem or that all scientific explanations are also lacking in the same way as an explanation of consciousness.
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  5. A Parsimonious Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Complexity and Narrative.Maxson J. McDowell - manuscript
    Three decades after Chalmers named it, the ‘hard problem’ remains. I suggest a parsimonious solution. Biological dynamic systems interact according to simple rules (while the environment provides simple constraints) and thus self-organize to become a new, more complex dynamic system at the next level. This spiral repeats several times generating a hierarchy of levels. A leap to the next level is frequently creative and surprising. From ants, themselves self-organized according to physical/chemical laws, may emerge an ant colony self-organized according to (...)
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  6. Towards a scientific account of experience.Dennis Nicholson - manuscript
    I outline and develop a particular physicalist perspective on qualia, and suggest that it may be the basis of a correct account of the relationship of mental states to the physical world. Assume that a quale is a perspective on a physical state in the organism – the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such – but that the perspective, though it entails irreducible experiential knowledge, has no physical substance over that encompassed in the physical state itself. (...)
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  7. On the Solvability of the Mind-Body Problem.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is epistemically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically (...)
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  8. No Form Action Theory.Hongbo Sun - manuscript
    The thinking demonstrated by the "no form action" theory is completely new, and no one has ever used this kind of thinking to consider problems. Using no form and form as the two dimensions to describe this world is like using the x-axis and y-axis as the two dimensions of a Cartesian coordinate system in mathematics. The no form here means having no form at all. The theory established by these two dimensions is called two-dimensional theory, which avoids the shortcomings (...)
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  9. The genuine problem of consciousness.Anthony Jack, Philip Robbins & and Andreas Roepstorff - manuscript
    Those who are optimistic about the prospects of a science of consciousness, and those who believe that it lies beyond the reach of standard scientific methods, have something in common: both groups view consciousness as posing a special challenge for science. In this paper, we take a close look at the nature of this challenge. We show that popular conceptions of the problem of consciousness, epitomized by David Chalmers’ formulation of the ‘hard problem’, can be best explained as a cognitive (...)
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  10. The hard problem of consciousness.Torin Alter - forthcoming - In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness.
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  11. The Rise and Fall of the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - forthcoming - In Corine Besson, Anandi Hattiangadi & Romina Padro (eds.), Meaning, Modality and Mind: Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I examine the relationship between physicalism and property dualism in the light of the dialectic between anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses. Upon rehearsing the moves of each side, it is hard not to notice that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks on physicalism and physicalist replies. Each position can be developed in a way to defend itself from attacks from the other position, and it seems that there are neither a priori nor a posteriori grounds (...)
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  12. Facing up to the Hard Problem as an Integrated Information Theorist.Robert Chis-Ciure & Francesco Ellia - forthcoming - Foundations of Science.
    In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, Integrated Information Theory. After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and propose our own Layered View of the Hard Problem, showing how two separate issues can be distinguished. More specifically, we argue that it’s possible to disentangle a Core (...)
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  13. Going Out of My Head: An Evolutionary Proposal Concerning the “Why” of Sentience.Stan Klein, Bill N. Nguyen & Blossom M. Zhang - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.
    The explanatory challenge of sentience is known as the “hard problem of consciousness”: How does subjective experience arise from physical objects and their relations? Despite some optimistic claims, the perennial struggle with this question shows little evidence of imminent resolution. In this article I focus on the “why” rather than on the “how” of sentience. Specifically, why did sentience evolve in organic lifeforms? From an evolutionary perspective this question can be framed: “What adaptive problem(s) did organisms face in their evolutionary (...)
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  14. Non-eliminative reductionism: the basis of a science of conscious experience?Dennis Nicholson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either to reduce (...)
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  15. The Hard Problem of Content is Neither.William Max Ramsey - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    For the past 40 years, philosophers have generally assumed that a key to understanding mental representation is to develop a naturalistic theory of representational content. This has led to an outlook where the importance of content has been heavily inflated, while the significance of the representational vehicles has been somewhat downplayed. However, the success of this enterprise has been thwarted by a number of mysterious and allegedly non-naturalizable, irreducible dimensions of representational content. The challenge of addressing these difficulties has come (...)
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  16. A scientific perspective on the hard problem of consciousness.Alexei V. Samsonovich, Giorgio A. Ascoli, Harold Morowitz & M. Layne Kalbfleisch - forthcoming - In Benjamin Goertzel & Pei Wang (eds.), Advances in Artificial General Intelligence: Concepts, Architectures and Algorithms. Proceedings of the AGI Workshop 2008. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press: Amsterdam.
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  17. Controversies in science and the humanities: Exploring consciousness—the “hard problem.”.J. Shear - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  18. Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps.Işık Sarıhan - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):1-13.
    Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates the problem of qualities to physical objects in the environment, given that such qualities (...)
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  19. Why Philosophy Makes No Progress.Eric Dietrich - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (2):1-14.
    This paper offers an explanation for why some parts of philosophy have made no progress. Philosophy has made no progress because it cannot make progress. And it cannot because of the nature of the phenomena philosophy is tasked with explaining—all of it involves consciousness. Here, it will not be argued directly that consciousness is intractable. Rather, it will be shown that a specific version of the problem of consciousness is unsolvable. This version is the Problem of the Subjective and Objective. (...)
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  20. But Aren’t We Conscious? A Buddhist Reflection on the Hard Problem.Georges Dreyfus - 2023 - In Christian Coseru (ed.), Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality: Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits. Springer. pp. 19-34.
    One of the persistent debates that has animated thinkers concerns the nature of consciousness. Is it merely an epiphenomenon that can be reduced to matter or does it belong to a different ontological domain? In recent times, this question has been reformulated as the hard problem of how material brain states can give rise to the mental states that we seem to experience. One of the answers to the hard problem has been to deflate the question and simply deny that (...)
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  21. Certainty and Our Sense of Acquaintance with Experiences.François Kammerer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):3015-3036.
    Why do we tend to think that phenomenal consciousness poses a hard problem? The answer seems to lie in part in the fact that we have the impression that phenomenal experiences are presented to us in a particularly immediate and revelatory way: we have a sense of acquaintance with our experiences. Recent views have offered resources to explain such persisting impression, by hypothesizing that the very design of our cognitive systems inevitably leads us to hold beliefs about our own experiences (...)
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  22. Author’s Response: The Experiential World.Bin Liu - 2023 - Constructivist Foundations 18 (3):411-415.
    I explain the world of screen creatures by virtue of our familiar environment and the notion of the experiential world. My explanation is meant to strengthen the argument for the view that the constructivist world model does not need the perceptual relation. I also demonstrate that the experiential world is complete, meaning that every type of phenomenon can be explained within this realm.
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  23. The World of Screen Creatures.Bin Liu - 2023 - Constructivist Foundations 18 (3):387-396.
    Context: Some scholars have put forward constructivist world models in which the purported external world is constructed from experience (i.e., there is a constructive relation between them. However, scholars disagree about whether experience is generated by the brain and results from the perception of the purported external world (i.e., whether there are generative relations and perceptual relations. Problem: Do we need to maintain perceptual relations or generative relations in a constructivist world model? Method: I propose a world model where our (...)
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  24. Fenomenología y filosofía del lenguaje ordinario. El hard problem de la conciencia y el hard problem de la inteligencia artificial.Manuel Liz - 2023 - In David Pérez Chico (ed.), Cuestiones de la filosofía del lenguaje ordinario. Zaragoza, España: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza.
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  25. Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2023 - Routledge. Edited by Josh Weisberg.
    Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness argues that despite the worries of explanatory pessimists, consciousness can be fully explained in “easy” scientific terms. The widespread intuition that consciousness poses a hard problem is plausibly based on how consciousness appears to us in first-person access. The book offers a debunking argument to undercut the justificatory link between the first-person appearances and our hard problem intuitions. -/- The key step in the debunking argument involves the development and defense of an (...)
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  26. Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers.Sophie R. Allen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.
    Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks (...)
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  27. The hard problem of intertheoretic comparisons.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1401-1427.
    Metanormativists hold that moral uncertainty can affect how we ought, in some morally authoritative sense, to act. Many metanormativists aim to generalize expected utility theory for normative uncertainty. Such accounts face the “easy problem of intertheoretic comparisons”: the worry that distinct theories’ assessments of choiceworthiness are incomparable. The easy problem may well be resolvable, but another problem looms: while some moral theories assign cardinal degrees of choiceworthiness, other theories’ choiceworthiness assignments are merely ordinal. Expected choiceworthiness over such theories is undefined. (...)
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  28. The evolution and development of consciousness: the subject-object emergence hypothesis.John E. Stewart - 2022 - Biosystems 217.
    A strategy for investigating consciousness that has proven very productive has focused on comparing brain processes that are accompanied by consciousness with processes that are not. But comparatively little attention has been given to a related strategy that promises to be even more fertile. This strategy exploits the fact that as individuals develop, new classes of brain processes can transition from operating ‘in the dark’ to becoming conscious. It has been suggested that these transitions occur when a new class of (...)
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  29. The Hard Problem of Semantic Communication.Aaron Green - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1117-1130.
    This paper describes semantic communication as an arbitrary loss function. I reject the logical approach to semantic information theory described by Carnap, Bar-Hillel and Floridi, which assumes that semantic information is a logical function of Shannon information mixed with categorical objects. Instead, I follow Hirotugu Akaike’s maximum entropy approach to model semantic communication as a choice of loss. The semantic relationship between a thing and a message about the thing is modelled as the loss of information that results in the (...)
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  30. Can Quantum Mechanics Solve the Hard Problem of Consciousness?Basil J. Hiley & Paavo Pylkkänen - 2022 - In Shan Gao (ed.), Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford, UK:
    The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why physical processes give rise to consciousness (Chalmers 1995). Regardless of many attempts to solve the problem, there is still no commonly agreed solution. It is thus very likely that some radically new ideas are required if we are to make any progress. In this paper we turn to quantum theory to find out whether it has anything to offer in our attempts to understand the place of mind (...)
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  31. A “Hard Problem” of Lenin’s Theory of Reflection: Discussions of the 1930s and 1950s.Svetlana М Klimova - 2022 - Антиномии 22 (1):44-64.
    This article discusses the versions of Leninist reflection theory in the Russian philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century. The very nature of the discussions made the problem of understanding the features of the theory of cognition a “hard” problem. This was facilitated by the ideological and political impurities characteristic of philosophical inquiry at the time. The “diamat” reflection theory is compared with M.A. Lifshits’s “ontognoseology”. The task is to show the process of dogmatization of Lenin’s reflection theory (...)
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  32. Teleosemantics and the Hard Problem of Content.Stephen Francis Mann & Ross Pain - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):22-46.
    Hutto and Myin claim that teleosemantics cannot account for mental content. In their view, teleosemantics accounts for a poorer kind of relation between cognitive states and the world but lacks the theoretical tools to account for a richer kind. We show that their objection imposes two criteria on theories of content: a truth-evaluable criterion and an intensionality criterion. For the objection to go through, teleosemantics must be subject to both these criteria and must fail to satisfy them. We argue that (...)
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  33. Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.Janko Nešić - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):243-259.
    Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the (...)
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  34. Is the Brain Analogous to a Quantum Measuring Apparatus?Paavo Pylkkänen - 2022 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Anthony C. Grayling (eds.), Metaphors and Analogies in Sciences and Humanities: Words and Worlds. Cham: Springer Synthese Library. pp. 215-235.
    Researchers have suggested since the early days of quantum theory that there are strong analogies between quantum phenomena and mental phenomena and these have developed into a vibrant new field of quantum cognition during recent decades. After revisiting some early analogies by Niels Bohr and David Bohm, this paper focuses upon Bohm and Hiley’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory which suggests further analogies between quantum phenomena and biological and psychological phenomena, including the proposal that the human brain operates in some (...)
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  35. The given and the hard problem of content.Pietro Salis - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content as an (...)
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  36. The hard problem of AI rights.Adam J. Andreotta - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (1):19-32.
    In the past few years, the subject of AI rights—the thesis that AIs, robots, and other artefacts (hereafter, simply ‘AIs’) ought to be included in the sphere of moral concern—has started to receive serious attention from scholars. In this paper, I argue that the AI rights research program is beset by an epistemic problem that threatens to impede its progress—namely, a lack of a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness: the problem of explaining why certain brain states give rise (...)
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  37. Can Consciousness Be Explained? Buddhist Idealism and the "Hard Problem" in Philosophy of Mind.Dan Arnold - 2021 - In Steven M. Emmanuel (ed.), Philosophy's big questions: comparing Buddhist and Western approaches. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 97-128.
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  38. Finding Space in a Nonspatial World.David J. Chalmers - 2021 - In Christian Wüthrich, Baptiste Le Bihan & Nick Huggett (eds.), Philosophy Beyond Spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  39. Understanding responsibility in Responsible AI. Dianoetic virtues and the hard problem of context.Mihaela Constantinescu, Cristina Voinea, Radu Uszkai & Constantin Vică - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):803-814.
    During the last decade there has been burgeoning research concerning the ways in which we should think of and apply the concept of responsibility for Artificial Intelligence. Despite this conceptual richness, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what Responsible AI entails on both conceptual and practical levels. The aim of this paper is to connect the ethical dimension of responsibility in Responsible AI with Aristotelian virtue ethics, where notions of context and dianoetic virtues play a grounding role for (...)
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  40. Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Biosemiotics.Donald Favareau - 2021 - Biosemiotics 14 (3):603-615.
    Forty-five years ago, while still an undergraduate student at Western Washington University’s Fairhaven College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Terrence Deacon produced as his honours thesis a programmatic manifesto for re-situating the semiotic logic of Charles Sanders Peirce “out of the realm of philosophy and [revealing instead] its necessary association with the information sciences and its close parallels with current systems theories”. Deacon’s project, then and now, has been to show how, within the context of naturally occurring physical processes, Peirce’s essential insight (...)
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  41. Zombie intuitions.Eugen Fischer & Justin Sytsma - 2021 - Cognition 215 (C):104807.
    In philosophical thought experiments, as in ordinary discourse, our understanding of verbal case descriptions is enriched by automatic comprehension inferences. Such inferences have us routinely infer what else is also true of the cases described. We consider how such routine inferences from polysemous words can generate zombie intuitions: intuitions that are ‘killed’ (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the psycholinguistic phenomenon of linguistic salience bias. Extending ‘evidentiary’ experimental philosophy, this paper examines whether the ‘zombie argument’ against materialism (...)
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  42. Reductive Model of the Conscious Mind.Wieslaw Galus & Janusz Starzyk (eds.) - 2021 - Hershey, PA: IGI Global.
    Research on natural and artificial brains is proceeding at a rapid pace. However, the understanding of the essence of consciousness has changed slightly over the millennia, and only the last decade has brought some progress to the area. Scientific ideas emerged that the soul could be a product of the material body and that calculating machines could imitate brain processes. However, the authors of this book reject the previously common dualism—the view that the material and spiritual-psychic processes are separate and (...)
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  43. Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity: Functionalism and the Hard Problem.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (2):371–393.
    Spacetime functionalism is the view that spacetime is a functional structure implemented by a more fundamental ontology. Lam and Wüthrich have recently argued that spacetime functionalism helps to solve the epistemological problem of empirical coherence in quantum gravity and suggested that it also (dis)solves the hard problem of spacetime, namely the problem of offering a picture consistent with the emergence of spacetime from a non-spatio-temporal structure. First, I will deny that spacetime functionalism solves the hard problem by showing that it (...)
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  44. Is the universe conscious? Reflexive monism and the ground of being.Max Velmans - 2021 - In Edward F. Kelly & Paul Marshall (eds.), Consciousness Unbound: Liberating Mind from the Tyranny of Materialism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophical model of a reflexive, self-observing universe that can accommodate both ordinary and extraordinary experiences in a natural, non-reductive way that avoids both the problems of reductive materialism and the (inverse) pitfalls of reductive idealism. To contextualize the ancient roots of the model, the chapter touches briefly on classical models of consciousness, mind and soul and how these differ in a fundamental way from how mind and consciousness are viewed (...)
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  45. Phenomenality, conscious states, and consciousness inessentialism.Mikio Akagi - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):803-819.
    I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also possible to fail (...)
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  46. Disillusioned.Katalin Balog - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):38-53.
    In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers draws a new framework in which to consider the mind-body problem. In addition to trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness – the problem of why and how brain processes give rise to conscious experience –, he thinks that philosophy, psychology, neuro-science and the other cognitive sciences should also pursue a solution to what he calls the “meta-problem” of consciousness – i.e., the problem of why we think there is a problem with (...)
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  47. The Integrated Information Theory facing the Hard problem of consciousness.Wael Basille - 2020 - Dissertation, Sorbonne Université
    The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) formulated for the first time in 2004 by the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi, is a theoretical framework aiming to scientifically explain phenomenal consciousness. The IIT is presented in the first part of this work. Broadly speaking, integrated information is an abstract quantitative measure of the causal power a system has on itself. The main claim of IIT is the identity between informational structures and experience. The nature of this identity will be the subject of the second (...)
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  48. How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):201-226.
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  49. Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.
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  50. Review of Philosophers of Our Times. [REVIEW]Subhasis Chattopadhyay - 2020 - Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 125 (03):380-382.
    Ted Honderich's edited volume, with introductions to his chosen philosophers shows his contempt/ignorance of the non-white world's thinkers. Further, this review points out the iterative nature of Western philosophy today. The book under review is banal and shows the pathetic state of philosophising in the West now in 2020.
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