Related categories

234 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 234
  1. Is the Existence of God a "Hard" Fact?Marilyn McCord Adams - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (4):492-503.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  2. The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Torin Alter - forthcoming - In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth.Marcus Arvan - 1998 - Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesis
    The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances.".
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Hard Science.A. Aspinall - 1986 - In J. L. Bintliff & C. F. Gaffney (eds.), Archaeology at the Interface: Studies in Archaeology's Relationships with History, Geography, Biology, and Physical Science. B.A.R..
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - manuscript
    In this paper I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is epistemological, and it concerns whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is a problem (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Physicalism, Dualism, and Metaphysical Gridlock.Katalin Balog - manuscript
    In this paper I survey the landscape of anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses to them. The anti-physicalist arguments I discuss start from a premise about a conceptual, epistemic, or explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions and conclude from this – on a priori grounds – that physicalism is false. My primary aim is to develop a master argument to counter these arguments. With this master argument in place, it is apparent that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  8. Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”.Katalin Balog - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.
    Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Review: Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.
    Symposium contribution on Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book he develops this thesis within the two-dimensional framework and also proposes a formal argument for it. I argue that the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Phenomenal Concepts.Kati Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  12. Owen Flanagan, The Science of Mind Reviewed By.William Bechtel - 1985 - Philosophy in Review 5 (6):249-252.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World – By Owen Flanagan.James Behuniak - 2011 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (2):323-327.
  14. A Review Of Jeffrey Gray’s Consciousness: Creeping Up On The Hard Problem. [REVIEW]Stephen Biggs - 2005 - Psyche 11.
    Jeffrey Gray’s Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem will be enjoyed by everyone interested in consciousness. Gray, a neuropsychologist, eloquently summarizes significant experimental results on consciousness and, more importantly, explains both how these results interrelate and how they constrain potential theories of consciousness. He also uses these results to build a novel, fascinating theory of what consciousness does and does not do. Throughout the work Gray’s accessible presentation remains deeply respectful of psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers’ approaches to consciousness. In (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Physics, Machines, and the Hard Problem.D. Bilodeau - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):386-401.
    The ‘hard problem’ of the origin of phenomenal consciousness in a physical universe is aggravated by a simplistic and uncritical concept of the physical realm which still predominates in much discussion of the subject. David Chalmers is correct in claiming that phenomenal experience is logically independent of a physical description of the world, but his proposal for a ‘natural supervenience’ of experience on a physical substrate is misguided. His statements about machine consciousness and the role of information are especially compromised. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Ancestors: The Hard Evidence.A. Bilsborough - 1987 - Journal of Biosocial Science 19 (4):505.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. The Harder Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
    consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  18. The Harder Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  19. Creating Reality.Bruce Bokor - manuscript
    Our commonsense notion of reality is supported by two critical assumptions for which we have little understanding: The conscious experience which underpins the observations integral to the scientific method and language, which is the method by which all theories, scientific or otherwise, are communicated. This book examines both of these matters in detail and arrives at a new theoretical foundation for understanding how nature undertakes the task of building the universe. -/- Creating Reality is a synthesis of Darwin’s The Origin (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. The Downward Causality and the Hard Problem of Consciousness or Why Computer Programs Do Not Work in the Dark.Alexander Boldachev - 2015 - Studia Humana 3 (4):7-10.
    Any low-level processes, the sequence of chemical interactions in a living cell, muscle cellular activity, processor commands or neuron interaction, is possible only if there is a downward causality, only due to uniting and controlling power of the highest level. Therefore, there is no special “hard problem of consciousness”, i.e. the problem of relation of ostensibly purely biological materiality and non-causal mentality - we have only the single philosophical problem of relation between the upward and downward causalities, the problem of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework.Nicholas Boltuc & Piotr Boltuc - 2007 - In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), Ai and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. Aaai Press, Merlo Park, Ca.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2012 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (2):187-207.
    I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. The Problems That Generate the Rationality Debate Are Too Easy, Given What Our Economy Now Demands.Selmer Bringsjord & Yingrui Yang - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):528-530.
    Stanovich & West (S&W), following all relevant others, define the rationality debate in terms of human performance on certain well-known problems. Unfortunately, these problems are very easy. For that reason, if System 2 cognition is identified with the capacity to solve them, such cognition will not enable humans to meet the cognitive demands of our technological society. Other profound issues arise as well.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable Inexplicability.David Brooks - 2000 - Psyche 6 (4):5-20.
    Qualitative states are no threat to physicalism. They have a causal effect upon the world in virtue of their qualitative nature. This effect is exploited in biological mechanisms for representing the world. Representation requires differential responsiveness to different perceived properties of things. Qualia are taken to be tagged properties of internal representation models. These properties are properties for-the-organism. Such for-the-organism properties are to be expected in beings which perceive the world and interact with it intelligently. Consciousness presents a problem for (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Can Science Explain Consciousness? Toward a Solution to the 'Hard Problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Consciousness is Easy but Learning is Hard.Joanna J. Bryson - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 28:70-72.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):67-79.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. The Problem of Consciousness.Paul Carus - 1902 - The Monist 13 (1):69-79.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. The Hard Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
  30. The Problems of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1998 - In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. pp. 29-59.
    This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]].
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):3-46.
    This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Second, I respond to nonreductive critiques, including those that argue that the problems of consciousness are harder than I have suggested, or that my framework for addressing them is flawed. Third, I address positive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  32. The Puzzle of Conscious Experience.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Scientific American 273 (6):80-86.
    Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  33. Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   151 citations  
  34. The Hornswoggle Problem.Patricia S. Churchland - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8.
    Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have propsed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem’. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine’ arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  35. Function and Phenomenology: Closing the Explanatory Gap.Thomas W. Clark - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):241-54.
    This paper critiques the view that consciousness is likely something extra which accompanies or is produced by neural states, something beyond the functional cognitive processes realized in the brain. Such a view creates the `explanatory gap'between function and nomenology which many suppose cannot be filled by functionalist theories of mind. Given methodological considerations of simplicity, ontological parsimony, and theoretical conservatism, an alternative hypothesis is recommended, that subjective qualitative experience is identical to certain information-bearing, behaviour-controlling functions, not something which emerges from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. A Hard Saying.Joseph Clayton - 1922 - New Blackfriars 3 (29):273-276.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. The Other Hard Problem: How to Bridge the Gap Between Subsymbolic and Symbolic Cognition.Axel Cleeremans - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):22-23.
    The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut about fixed-features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connectionism, and show how their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learning, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Conscious Unity, Emotion, Dreaming, and the Solution of the Hard Problem.Rodney M. J. Cotterill - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  39. REVIEW: The Nature of Consciousness, Edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere.Tim Crane - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.
  41. Why Neuroscience May Be Able to Explain Consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1995 - Scientific American 273 (6):84-85.
  42. Explaining Consciousness: A (Very) Different Approach to the “Hard Problem”.Paul F. Cunningham - 2013 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 34 (1):41-62.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. A Good Man Is Hard to Find.Edwin Curley - 1991 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (3):29 - 45.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. On an Argument From Analogy for the Possibility of Human Cognitive Closure.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):227-241.
    In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Chalmers's Fading and Dancing Qualia: Consciousness and the "Hard Problem".L. Dempsey - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Explaining the "Magic" of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2003 - Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1 (1):7-19.
    Is the view supported that consciousness is a mysterious phenomenon and cannot succumb, even with much effort, to the standard methods of cognitive science? The lecture, using the analogy of the magician’s praxis, attempts to highlight a strong but little supported intuition that is one of the strongest supporters of this view. The analogy can be highly illuminating, as the following account by LEE SIEGEL on the reception of her work on magic can illustrate it: “I’m writing a book on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  48. Commentary on Chalmers "Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness".Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Philosophical Explorations.
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Eric Dietrich - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Four Conceptions of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Jonathan Eric Dorsey - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):129-44.
    Though widely discussed, the hard problem of consciousness (‘the hard problem’ hereafter) is surprisingly difficult to pin down. In fact, one may see that not just a couple of plausible conceptions of the problem exist but rather four do. After providing some background for the hard problem, I present and clarify these four conceptions of it. I close by providing some key considerations for and against each of the four conceptions without passing final judgment on any of them. Ultimately, though, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 234