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  1. Insults, Free Speech and Offensiveness.David Archard - 2014 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2):127-141.
    This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing (...)
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  2. Individual Responsibility for Carbon Emissions: Is There Anything Wrong with Overdetermining Harm?Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland - forthcoming - In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...)
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  3. Harm, Change, and Time.C. Belshaw - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):425-444.
    What is harm? I offer an account that involves the victim’s either suffering some adverse intrinsic change or being prevented from enjoying some beneficial intrinsic change. No one is harmed, I claim, in virtue of relational changes alone. Thus (excepting for contrived cases), there are neither posthumous harms nor, in life, harms of the undiscovered betrayal, slander, reputation-damaging variety. Further, two widespread moves in the philosophy of death are rejected. First, death and posthumous are not to be assimilated—death does bring (...)
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  4. Human Rights, Harm, and Climate Change Mitigation.Brian Berkey - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2-3):416-435.
    A number of philosophers have resisted impersonal explanations of our obligation to mitigate climate change, and have developed accounts according to which these obligations are explained by human rights or harm-based considerations. In this paper I argue that several of these attempts to explain our mitigation obligations without appealing to impersonal factors fail, since they either cannot account for a plausibly robust obligation to mitigate, or have implausible implications in other cases. I conclude that despite the appeal of the motivations (...)
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  5. Drugs and the Problem of Law Abuse.D. G. Brown - 1972 - University of British Columbia Law Review 7 (1):1-16.
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  6. Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination. [REVIEW]Jan Christoph Bublitz & Reinhard Merkel - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):51-77.
    The neurosciences not only challenge assumptions about the mind’s place in the natural world but also urge us to reconsider its role in the normative world. Based on mind-brain dualism, the law affords only one-sided protection: it systematically protects bodies and brains, but only fragmentarily minds and mental states. The fundamental question, in what ways people may legitimately change mental states of others, is largely unexplored in legal thinking. With novel technologies to both intervene into minds and detect mental activity, (...)
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  7. Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7.J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
    Overview -/- Most philosophical explorations of responsibility discuss the topic solely in terms of metaphysics and the "free will" problem. By contrast, these essays by leading philosophers view responsibility from a variety of perspectives—metaphysics, ethics, action theory, and the philosophy of law. After a broad, framing introduction by the volume's editors, the contributors consider such subjects as responsibility as it relates to the "free will" problem; the relation between responsibility and knowledge or ignorance; the relation between causal and moral responsibility; (...)
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  8. The Concept of Well-Being.Stephen M. Campbell - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge.
  9. An Analysis of Prudential Value.Stephen M. Campbell - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (03):334-54.
    This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of the related concepts of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of (...)
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  10. Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “A Broader Understanding of Moral Distress”.Stephen M. Campbell, Connie M. Ulrich & Christine Grady - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics 16 (12):1-3.
  11. What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection.Marc Champagne - 2011 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11 (2):233–236.
    Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".
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  12. Don’T Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting.Yishai Cohen - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):245-261.
    Suppose you can save only one of two groups of people from harm, with one person in one group, and five persons in the other group. Are you obligated to save the greater number? While common sense seems to say ‘yes’, the numbers skeptic says ‘no’. Numbers Skepticism has been partly motivated by the anti-consequentialist thought that the goods, harms and well-being of individual people do not aggregate in any morally significant way. However, even many non-consequentialists think that Numbers Skepticism (...)
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  13. Eight Arguments Against Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie.
    I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
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  14. Über die Würde der Kinder als Patienten.Ulrich Diehl - 2003 - In C. Wiesemann, A. Dörries, G. Wolfslast & A. Simon (eds.), Das Kind als Patient. Campus.
    In der Medizin gehören Kinder neben Ausländern, Behinderten und psychiatrisch Erkrankten zu den besonders vulnerablen Patientengruppen. Im Folgenden soll die Frage nach der Würde der Kinder in medizinethischer Hinsicht behandelt werden. Dazu werden drei Thesen erläutert und begründet: (1.) das Prinzip der Menschenwürde kann nicht ganz außer Acht gelassen werden, wenn Kinder als Patienten in medizinethischer Hinsicht thematisiert werden; (2.) das Prinzip der Menschenwürde wird in der Medizinethik nicht schon vollständig durch die medizinethischen Prinzipien der Patientenautonomie und der Fürsorge für (...)
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  15. The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle.Donald A. Dripps - 1998 - Criminal Justice Ethics 17 (2):3-18.
  16. The Paradox of Meaning Well While Causing Harm: A Discussion About the Limits of Tolerance Within Democratic Societies.Silvia Edling - 2012 - Journal of Moral Education 41 (4):457-471.
    Curriculum guidelines in many democratic countries argue for the need to practice tolerance as a means to creating peaceful relations. Through moral education, young people are believed to be able to develop a way of being that respects plurality and decreases interpersonal violence in society. But where do students? personal involvements or the issue of unpredictability accompanying inter-personal relations fit into the discussion? This article draws on four young people?s narratives as starting points to discuss the gap between progressive educational (...)
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  17. Harm to Others—a Rejoinder.Joel Feinberg - 1986 - Criminal Justice Ethics 5 (1):16-29.
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  18. Stoic “Harm” as Degradation.William Ferraiolo - 2011 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):119-120.
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  19. The Metaphysics of Death.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 1993 - Stanford University Press.
    This collection of seventeen essays deals with the metaphysical, as opposed to the moral, issues pertaining to death. For example, the authors investigate (among other things) the issue of what makes death a bad thing for an individual, if indeed death is a bad thing. This issue is more basic and abstract than such moral questions as the particular conditions under which euthanasia is justified, if it is ever justified. Though there are important connections between the more abstract questions addressed (...)
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  20. Ducking Harm and Sacrificing Others.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1994 - Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (3):135-145.
  21. Defensive Killing: An Essay on War and Self-Defence.Helen Frowe - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Most people believe that it is sometimes morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. In Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe offers a detailed exploration of when and why the use of such force is permissible. She begins by considering the use of force between individuals, investigating both the circumstances under which an attacker forfeits her right not to be harmed, and the distinct question of when it is all-things-considered permissible to use force against (...)
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  22. Killing John to Save Mary: A Defence of the Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die.Helen Frowe - 2013 - In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Introduction This paper defends the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die. In the first part of the paper, I consider and reject Michael Tooley’s argument that initiating a causal process is morally equivalent to refraining from interfering in that process. The second part disputes Tooley’s suggestion it is merely external factors that make killing appear to be worse than letting die, when in reality the distinction is morally neutral. Tooley is mistaken to claim that we are (...)
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  23. A Practical Account of Self-Defence.Helen Frowe - 2010 - Law and Philosophy 29 (3):245-272.
    I argue that any successful account of permissible self- defence must be action-guiding, or practical . It must be able to inform people’s deliberation about what they are permitted to do when faced with an apparent threat to their lives. I argue that this forces us to accept that a person can be permitted to use self-defence against Apparent Threats: characters whom a person reasonably, but mistakenly, believes threaten her life. I defend a hybrid account of self-defence that prioritises an (...)
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  24. The Justified Infliction of Unjust Harm.Helen Frowe - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (3):345 - 351.
  25. Threats, Bystanders and Obstructors.Helen Frowe - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):365-372.
    In this paper I argue that the widespread view that obstructors are a special sort of bystander is mistaken. Obstructors make Victim worse off by their presence, and thus are more properly described as innocent threats. Only those characters who do not make Victim worse off by their presence can be classified as bystanders.
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  26. Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders.Helen Frowe - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):277-290.
    abstract Michael Otsuka claims that it is impermissible to kill innocent threats because doing so is morally equivalent to killing bystanders. I show that Otsuka's argument conflates killing as a means with treating a person herself as a means. The killing of a person can be a means only if that person is instrumental in the threat to Victim's life. A permission to kill a person as a means will not permit killing bystanders. I also defend a permission to kill (...)
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  27. How We Fight: Ethics in War.Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    How We Fight: Ethics in War contains ten groundbreaking essays by some of the leading philosophers of war. The essays offer new perspectives on key debates including pacifism, punitive justifications for war, the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the structure of 'just war theory', and bases of individual liability in war.
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  28. Well-Being and the Non-Identity Problem.Molly Gardner - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 429-438.
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  29. A Harm-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem.Molly Gardner - 2015 - Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    Many of us agree that we ought not to wrong future people, but there remains disagreement about which of our actions can wrong them. Can we wrong individuals whose lives are worth living by taking actions that result in their very existence? The problem of justifying an answer to this question has come to be known as the non-identity problem.[1] While the literature contains an array of strategies for solving the problem,[2] in this paper I will take what I call (...)
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  30. On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming.Molly Gardner - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):73-87.
    _ Source: _Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 73 - 87 According to action-relative accounts of harming, an action harms someone only if it makes her worse off in some respect than she would have been, had the action not been performed. Action-relative accounts can be contrasted with effect-relative accounts, which hold that an action may harm an individual in virtue of its effects on that individual, regardless of whether the individual would have been better off in the absence of the (...)
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  31. Persons, Lives, and Posthumous Harms.Walter Glannon - 2001 - Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (2):127–142.
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  32. The Indeterminacy of Loss.Mark Greene - 2008 - Ethics 118 (4):633-658.
    Abstract: This paper argues that continua of both genetic and environmental manipulation give rise to cases in which it is indeterminate whether the non-identity problem arises. In clear non-identity cases, impersonal principles can underwrite intuitions of wrongdoing. In clear cases of ordinary personal harm, ordinary ethical thinking about personal compensation augments or supersedes impersonal considerations. Indeterminate cases raise a special problem because it is indeterminate whether personal ethical considerations apply. Might indeterminacy of identity preclude a determinate and ethically justified resolution (...)
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  33. Smoke and Mirrors: When Professional Discipline May Cause Harm.L. R. Haller - 2005 - Legal Ethics 8 (1):70-86.
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  34. Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm.Matthew Hanser - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):459-469.
  35. The Metaphysics of Harm.Matthew Hanser - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):421-450.
  36. Where's the Harm in Dying?Matthew Hanser - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (1):4-10.
  37. The Identity and (Legal) Rights of Future Generations.Ori J. Herstein - 2009 - The George Washington Law Review 77:1173.
    Exploring the peculiar nature of future generations and concluding that types of future people is the most promising object on which to project our concern for future generations the article poses two main questions: “Can future people have rights?” and, if so, “Do they in fact have any rights?” The article first explains why the non-existence of future people raises doubts whether future generations can have rights. Within the philosophical literature, the leading approach explaining how future people can, nevertheless, have (...)
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  38. "Did the Bills Harm Tom Brady?" - Overview of Temporal Comparative Account of Harm.Ryan Holt - 2015 - Http://Www.Freshphilosophy.Com/Journal.
    Harm is a concept in philosophy that has been able to elude definition. Many attempts have been made to formulate a definition of harm, however they have all been futile. This has led many to question if it is even possible to define harm, or if we really even need a definition of harm? My answer to both of these questions is yes, harm is something that is worth caring about and has many practical implications in society today. The theories (...)
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  39. Correspondence.Robert Howell, Edward Langerak, Adam Morton & Michael Tooley - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (4):407-432.
    I discuss Tooley's use of the concept of a person with respect to other moral issues such as justifiable suicide.
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  40. Liberal Pornographic Rights.Pilhong Hwang - 2003 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):225-240.
    The conservative antipornographic premise (“defined and connected”) should be faulted for its groundlessness. Thus, conservative state censorship should be challenged by liberal individual rights to pornography and further by the value of moral harm. Along with the spirit of J. S. Mill’s harm principle, the right to free speech, including of course pornographic right, must prevail. And a number of feminist challenges to free pornographic rights are replied to in a variety of ways by some liberal thinkers who believe in (...)
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  41. The Concept of Harm and the Significance of Normality.Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu - 2012 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):318.
    Many believe that severe intellectual impairment, blindness or dying young amount to serious harm and disadvantage. It is also increasingly denied that it matters, from a moral point of view, whether something is biologically normal to humans. We show that these two claims are in serious tension. It is hard explain how, if we do not ascribe some deep moral significance to human nature or biological normality, we could distinguish severe intellectual impairment or blindness from the vast list of seemingly (...)
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  42. Harms of Excluding Pregnant Women From Clinical Research: The Case of HIV-Infected Pregnant Women.Nancy E. Kass, Holly A. Taylor & Patricia A. King - 1996 - Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 24 (1):36-46.
  43. Criminally Harming Others.John Kleinig - 1986 - Criminal Justice Ethics 5 (1):3-10.
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  44. Using the Cables Model to Assess and Minimize Risk in Research: Control Group Hazards.Gerald P. Koocher - 2002 - Ethics and Behavior 12 (1):75 – 86.
    CABLES is both an acronym and metaphor for conceptualizing research participation risk by considering 6 distinct domains in which risks of harm to research participants may exist: cognitive, affective, biological, legal, economic, and social/cultural. These domains are described and illustrated, along with suggestions for minimizing or eliminating the potential hazards to human participants in biomedical and behavioral science research. Adoption of a thoughtful ethical analysis addressing all 6 CABLES strands in designing research provides a strong protective step toward safeguarding and (...)
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  45. Truth and Confidentiality Without Harm.Shiriki Kumanyika - 1995 - Ethics and Behavior 5 (2):199 – 202.
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  46. Self-Determination, Wellbeing, and Threats of Harm.Antony Lamb - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):145–158.
    David Rodin argues that the right of national-defence as conceived in international law cannot be grounded in the end of defending the lives of individuals. Firstly, having this end is not necessary because there is a right of defence against an invasion that threatens no lives. However, in this context we are to understand that 'defending lives' includes defending against certain non-lethal threats. I will argue that threats to national-self determination and self-government are significant non-lethal threats to the wellbeing of (...)
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  47. Sparing Civilians.Seth Lazar - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. If any moral principle commands near universal assent, this one does. Few moral principles have been more widely and more viscerally affirmed. And yet, in recent years it has faced a rising tide of dissent. Political and military leaders seeking to slip the constraints of the laws of war have cavilled and qualified. Their complaints have been unwittingly aided by philosophers who, rebuilding just war theory from its foundations, have concluded that this principle (...)
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  48. The Nature and Disvalue of Injury.Seth Lazar - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (3):289-304.
    This paper explicates a conception of injury as right-violation, which allows us to distinguish between setbacks to interests that should, and should not, be the concern of theories of justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It (...)
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  49. Corrective Justice and the Possibility of Rectification.Seth R. M. Lazar - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):355-368.
    In this paper, I ask how - and whether - the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately. First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because (...)
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  50. On the Concept of a Morally Relevant Harm.David Lefkowitz - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):409-423.
    The author argues that only when the two harms are morally relevant to one another may an agent take into account the number of people he can save. He defends an orbital conception of morally relevant harm, according to which harms that fall within the of a given harm are relevant to it, while all other harms are not. The possibility of preventing a harm provides both a first-order reason to prevent that harm, and a second-order reason not to consider (...)
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