Hegel: Metaphysics

This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel's Logic”: (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel's account of the concepts “being”, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel's case for beginning a science of logic (...) with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both “immediate” and “mediated” at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel's treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his “dialectical method” should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel's Science of Logic. (shrink)

Review of Vols 1 & 2 of Stephen Houlgate's 'Hegel on Being'.

Este libro alberga tres motivos entrelazados -uno estético, uno práctico y uno teórico-. El motivo estético consistió en llegar a exponer tres niveles de análisis en el interior de una sola gran historia. El motivo práctico gravitó en la reducción lógica del argumento, para poder darle "musculatura" al texto, y mostrar así su concepto de la manera más clara y directa posible. Ambos motivos quedaron relativamente bien resueltos. El problema teórico residió ante todo en poder hacer de la unidad un (...) movimiento de la libertad, cuestión que requirió primero elevar la unidad a su forma suprema. A partir de ese dilema apareció además la necesidad de responder a la pregunta ¿por qué Hegel? Dicho en pocas palabras, porque a partir de su filosofía es posible pensar la unidad como autodeterminación múltiple. De ahí que el objeto de este libro no sea tanto defender la "diferencia" y la "multitud", cuanto más bien se trata de mostrar que la unidad puede ser en sí misma libre y diferente. La realización de esta unidad negativa e infinita debe entonces conjugar con lo otro, razonar lo heredado, asumirse como la totalidad de las diferencias y considerar a aquella diferencia como su verdad. Pero estas formas de unidad desarrolladas -unidades masivas, relativas y plenas; unidades concomitantes, constituyentes y soberanas; unidades singulares, particulares y universales, o unidades silogísticas- tienen lugar únicamente cuando ha sido forjado un bastidor de tejidos programáticos, o un juego metódico de conceptos. En ellos se realiza entonces y al fin la circulación efectiva entre las esferas disyuntivas que despliegan la vitalidad creadora del "espíritu de un pueblo". Este problema, en cambio, aún no está resuelto, y es más bien una tarea por hacer. (shrink)

Hegel opens the first book of his Science of Logic with the statement of a problem: “The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other, so either way of beginning finds its rebuttal.” Despite its significant placement, exactly what Hegel means in his expression of this problem and exactly what his solution to it is, remain unclear. -/- In this book, Robb (...) Dunphy provides a detailed engagement with Hegel’s “problem of beginning”, locating it within Hegel’s account of significant approaches to the topic of beginning in the history of Western philosophy, as well as making an extended case for the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. Dunphy’s discussion of the various putative solutions that Hegel might be thought to put forward contributes to debates concerning Hegel’s views on the methodology of logic, the relation between his Logic and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and differences between his Encyclopaedia presentation of logic and that of his greater Science of Logic. -/- Hegel and the Problem of Beginning also functions as a critical commentary on Hegel’s essay, “With what must the beginning of the science be made?” which should be of interest to both researchers and students working on the opening of Hegel’s Logic. -/- Errata for this text are recorded on my personal webpage. (shrink)

I provide a metaphysically realist interpretation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature—one that allows us to make sense of one of the more puzzling references to nature in his Science of Logic. I do so by affording William Maker’s under-appreciated account of Hegel’s realism more of the attention and scrutiny it deserves—not least because it involves a distinctively simple and elegant account of the famously obscure move from logic to nature in Hegel’s system. Though I point out its limitations, I claim (...) that Maker’s arguments can be revised in order to recover more of the rigour and complexity of Hegel’s metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper deals with Walter Jaeschke’s Hegels Philosophie. It begins with Hegel’s early writings, focusing on the relationship between logic and metaphysics. It goes on to explore central moments of Hegel’s philosophy: the relationship with Kant, the nature of categories, the philosophy of history, and the concept of the State. Jaeschke’s interpretation of Hegel’s thought is that of a paradigmatic thinker, whose fundamental philosophical breakthrough lies in the concept of Geist.

Cette thèse porte sur la question du fini et de l’infini dans la philosophie de Hegel. L’objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à retracer l’influence exercée par la philosophie antique (principalement Platon et Aristote) et par la philosophie moderne (pour l’essentiel Kant et certains postkantiens) sur l’élaboration hégélienne des catégories de la finité et de l’infinité. En second lieu, elle étudie le développement systématique de la logique de l’infinité hégélienne à la lumière de cette influence. Il s’agit d’étudier, (...) à travers une approche historique et critique, comment Hegel résout l’opposition traditionnelle du fini et de l’infini par sa théorie des deux infinis. A l’aune des conceptions de l’infinité-finie (la mauvaise infinité) et de l’infinité véritablement infinie (la véritable infinité), Hegel montre que le processus de la détermination du fini est un processus d’idéalisation qui supprime la contradiction du fini et de l’infini. Ainsi, l’enquête sur des concepts de finité et d’infinité permet de découvrir que l’idéalité spéculative est pour Hegel une réponse non seulement au problème traditionnel de leur articulation, mais aussi, plus généralement, aux problèmes soulevés par la caractérisation des idéalismes antiques et modernes. (shrink)

Hegel begins the third main part of the Science of Logic, the “logic of the concept,” with the dialectic of universality. This dialectic, however, proves to be insufficient for the exposition of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, because it is dominated by the perspective of self-identity. For this reason speculative logic develops a dialectic of particularity whose domain is dominated by the perspective of difference. While the dialectic of universality made explicit the meaning of the proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is universal, the (...) dialectic of particularity aspires to make explicit the meaning of the conflicting proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is particular. The present paper attempts a detailed reconstruction of this dialectic and thereby a disclosure of the meaning of the onto-logical claim that being-as-concept is particular. It is first shown how Hegel’s account of the particular relates to the expression of a totality of particulars. Next it is argued that the speculative notion of the particular is extremely complex and that this complexity can be decoded by means of four dimensions. Third, it is explained how abstraction comes to be regarded by Hegel as the essence of the particular. I end the paper by discussing how the collapse of the dialectic of particularity gives rise to the category of the individual and its peculiar dialectic. (shrink)

With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-standing criticism: Scholars from Marx to Popper and Habermas have worried that Hegel’s metaphysics has anti-individualist and authoritarian implications, which are particularly pronounced in his Philosophy of History, since Hegel identifies historical progress with reason imposing itself on individuals. Rather than proposing an alternative non-metaphysical conception of reason, as Pippin or Brandom have done, this article argues that critics are broadly right in their metaphysical reading of Hegel’s central (...) concepts. However, they are mistaken about what Hegel’s approach entails, when one examines the specific types of states discussed by the philosopher in his Philosophy of History. Even on a traditional metaphysical reading, Hegel is not only non-authoritarian; he also makes a powerful argument concerning freedom, whereupon the freest society involves collective oversight and the shaping of social structures so as to ensure that they benefit everybody. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Hegel’s system includes no ontology of nature, either in any traditional sense, or in any specifically Hegelian sense, of “ontology.” What Hegel provides instead is a philosophy of nature in which specifically natural activities generate specifically natural differences and identities out of themselves. I make my case first by considering the meaning of “ontology” Hegel inherited from Wolff and Kant. I show that Hegel rejected this sense of ontology for his own philosophy, in part (...) because of his recognition of the success of the Kantian critical project in making traditional ontology impossible. I then argue that although Hegel sometimes characterizes his own Objective Logic in ontological terms, he also restricts that characterization in a way that makes it inapplicable to his treatment of apparently natural categories in the Logic itself, and to his Philosophy of Nature. Against this anti-ontological background I examine a small portion of Hegel’s concrete treatment of natural phenomena and kinds: his discussion of the nervous system in higher-order animals. Through its self-formation and the contribution of its nervous-system activity to its overall life, the animal does not implement differences, identities, or logical structures borrowed from elsewhere, but itself produces the differences and identities through which it is constituted. The self-determination Hegel articulates in his study of the nervous system gives us a good example of his typically “on-the-ground” approach, which is strikingly different from the “top-down” approach more common in the ontological tradition. (shrink)

Although personal being plays an important role in G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy he never provided a comprehensive definition of personality. Within the framework of his works it is thus possible to formulate different definitions of person and personality, and several conflicting definitions were presented among Hegelians during the 1830s and 1840s. In this paper I examine the role of personality in Hegel's system and discuss the relationship between personality and metaphysics. The question shall be analyzed in the context of various (...) works by Hegel and contrasted with two important precursors of Hegel, I. Kant (1724–1804) and J.G. Fichte (1762–1814). I shall also put the philosophy of Finnish Hegelian J.V. Snellman (1806–81) under scrutiny. The paper will indicate the importance of logic for Hegelian metaphysics and for Hegelian conception of personality. (shrink)

As an important corollary of this interpretation of absolute knowledge, the dissertation concludes with the suggestion that Hegelian philosophy need not be regarded merely as an interesting curiosity in the history of ideas, but rather that it can serve as a vital and potentially rewarding source of fresh theoretical insights. ;Instead, the concrete completeness of speculative philosophy can only consist in the activity of a dynamical, ceaselessly self-examining and self-regulating intellectual community. In one sense, of course, no finite system can (...) ever be complete, insofar as it will inevitably be guilty of errors and misconceptions. Yet at the same time, the infinite System is perfect and complete, insofar as it contains within itself the means whereby its own unavoidable flaws will be discovered, corrected, and "forgiven"--i.e. aufgehoben into vanishing moments of a universal totality. ;In opposition to most traditional interpretations of Hegel, the position is maintained that Hegel himself deliberately faced this problem, and that a true understanding of his proposed solution requires a radical Aufhebung of the concept of cognition as such. Relying primarily on the penultimate chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the dissertation argues that absolute knowledge can neither be a finalized system of fully explicit content, nor an endless movement toward such an ideal state. ;This dissertation undertakes a critical examination of one central problem in Hegelian philosophy: viz., whether the final realization of "absolute knowledge" is logically consistent with significant epistemic progress in the system's continuing development. Serious consideration of the concept of systematic completeness, as interpreted on Hegel's terms, uncovers the existence of a profound paradox. On the one hand, if the Truth is the Whole, then the truth of any finite part or aspect of that Whole depends upon its place within the system as a totality. In order to grasp the part and comprehend it correctly, one must already have a systematically ordered knowledge of the universe in its entirety. Yet the methodological open-endedness of dialectical thinking precludes the acceptance of any particular theoretical formulation as final or complete in itself. Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as a progression of successive formulations of the Truth, each of which improves on its predecessors by reconciling their internal contradictions, but no one of which is adequate in itself. Hence, no theoretical world view, including Hegel's own, can rest content within its limits, for the inevitable advance of thought must in the end throw it down. (shrink)

This is a book review of Will Dudley, "Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy".

Hegel’s conception of Spirit does not subordinate difference to sameness, in a way that would make it unusable for a genuinely intersubjective idealism directed to a comprehensive account of the contemporary world. A close analysis of the logic of recognition and the dialectic of conscience in the Phenomenology of Spirit demonstrates that the unity of Spirit emerges in and through conflict, and is forged in the process whereby particular encounters between differently situated individuals reveal and establish the emerging character and (...) significance of the stances they uniquely occupy. (shrink)

Criticism of Hegel has been a central preoccupation of “postmodern” philosophy, from critical theory and deconstruction to Lacanianpsychoanalytic theory and Foucauldian “archaeology.” One of the most frequent criticisms is that Hegel’s invocation of “absolute knowledge”installs him in a position of authorial arrogance, of God-like authority, leaving the reader in a position of subservience to the Sage’s perfectwisdom. The argument of this article is that this sort of criticism is profoundly ironic, since Hegel’s construction of the role of the Sage possessing (...) absolute knowledge is in fact an elaborate mask covering over a radical project of disappearance of the author by which itbecomes the reader who is left to author the text. The article explores Hegel’s commitment to his own death as an author in his invention of anew method of demonstration, his epistemology, his philosophy of language, his theory of desire, and even in the seemingly least likelyplace of all, his portrait of “absolute knowledge.”. (shrink)

In 1837 an eighteen-year old maker of verse epigrams wrote of Hegel.

Seyla Benhabib has presented us with the first English translation of a work of Marcuse which was published originally in 1932 as Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, and was reissued in 1968 by Klostermann in an unrevised edition under the abbreviated title, Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit. Benhabib’s fluent and readable translation begins with a thoughtful and informative introduction and ends with a glossary which explains not only key terms, but also the relations between (...) them upon which Marcuse draws. For example, sich verhalten receives the following explanation on p. 342. (shrink)

Le livre de Jean-Luc Gouin se présente comme une introduction à la philosophie de Hegel. Il cherche à retrouver ce qu'il y a de vivant dans cette pensée, à retrouver les débats et les nécessités qui l'animent. L'ambition de l'ouvrage est de mettre en perspective ce qui, en deçà des différentes propositions ou domaines, constitue la pensée hégélienne, ce qui en est le véritable moteur, de «déceler une certaine structure mouvante dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre du penseur». Dès lors, il s'écarte (...) à la fois d'une recherche sur un domaine particulier, comme la conception hégélienne de l'État ou du Droit, et d'une présentation générale de l'œuvre. Il vise plutôt à s'installer dans le mouvement même de la pensée hégélienne, dans cet élément «vivant» qui structure et traverse l'ensemble des domaines. L'auteur revient à plusieurs reprises sur sa volonté de «présenter dialectiquement la dialectique. Mieux: hégéliennement l'hégélianisme». La dialectique a souvent été posée, à juste titre, comme cet élément du mouvement hégélien, comme ce qui traverse et donne sens à l'ensemble de l'œuvre. Mais il faut alors ajouter, pour J.-L. Gouin, que c'est à partir d'un ensemble de concepts que la dialectique peut jouer ce rôle et c'est donc plutôt à une «constellation», à une «structure» qu'il faut se référer. «Cette structure se cristallise autour de quatre notions fondamentales. Il s'agit des notions de Sujet, de Négativité, de Résultat et de Réconciliation». (shrink)

The goal of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is to achieve absolute knowing. Minimally, knowing can be absolute only if it is unconditioned or unlimited; that is, only if it is not essentially contrasted with some other possible knowing—say, God's—or is not restricted such that it necessarily does not pertain to certain items—say, freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, or God. Knowing can be absolute only if these items, appropriately interpreted, are within its scope. However, if it can (...) be shown that human knowing is not limited or restricted in either of these two ways, it would then follow that we cannot contrast our conceptual scheme—human knowing as such—with the world, and, hence, we cannot even notionally contrast human knowledge of appearances with things in themselves. Initially, it is in this quite narrow sense that Hegel's project in the Phenomenology is to transform Kant's subjective or limited idealism into objective or absolute idealism by showing that items Kant took to be necessarily extrinsic to human knowing are intrinsic and constitutive of it. Thus, if we were to translate Hegel's dictum that the ground of science in general is "pure self-recognition in absolute otherness" back into Kant's lexicon, it would state that we achieve full apperceptive self-awareness, full categorial selfawareness of ourselves as knowers, only in the thing in itself. Within Hegel's own system, achieving the standpoint of absolute knowing is a necessary condition for doing logical science, and, by implication, the first part of the system as a whole, because only by demonstrating that the necessary conditions of human knowing cannot, even notionally, be contrasted with the world in itself is it possible to then work out a system of logical categories that are simultaneously categories of thought and categories of being. (shrink)

Benjamin provides new and important readings of key canonical texts in the history of philosophy in his sustained philosophical reworking of ontology. Amongst texts included are Hegel's _Difference Essay_ and the _Shorter Logic_ and Heidegger's _Time and Being_ and _The Question of Being_. The effective presence of ontology, defined as `an original difference', will be familiar to readers of his earlier writings. This book represents his most thorough and original contribution to contemporary philosophy to date.

This classic introduction to one of the most influential modern thinkers, G.W.F. Hegel has been made even more comprehensive through the addition of four new chapters. New edition of a classic introduction to Hegel. Enables students to engage with many aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. Covers the whole range of Hegel’s mature thought. Relates Hegel’s ideas to other thinkers, such as Luther, Descartes and Kant. Offers a distinctive and challenging interpretation of Hegel’s work.

I propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of the Science of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts (...) of facts about finite reality can be given. (shrink)

In this interest of time, I’ll just say something directly: this is an incredible book. Reading it, thinking it through, is extremely rewarding. I haven’t read a work of philosophy that had as much impact on me since being in school myself. The book presents you with new ideas and connections and it forces you to see philosophy and its history in new ways, even if you (like me) had been quite attached to your old ways. The book got into (...) my head. Now I find myself, in idle moments, arguing with Paul up there in my head; as if there is a little copy of him in there now, making the case for his versions of inferentialism and cognitive contextualism. Fortunately, Paul is in my experience unfailingly nice, generous and sympathetic even in argument—otherwise it might not be as nice to have a copy of him in your head. Still, the copy pales in comparison to the original, so it is great to be here. I can’t do justice to the book. But I will try to proceed as follows. I will try to sketch the general line of thought I find so powerful. Then, I will try to take up my assigned role as critic. The most stimulating thing I can think of to do is to argue as follows: Paul’s arguments concerning Kant and Hegel are largely successful, but end up pushing us in directions that are not consistent with the general approach to philosophy, and the general approach to Kant and Hegel, from which Paul himself begins. So we should abandon that general approach. That is what I will try, at least, to argue. (shrink)

The concept of essence is thought by many political theorists to be a residue of the patriarchal onto-theological tradition of metaphysics that needs to be (or has been) overcome by more progressive aims. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of essentialism in light of the treatment of the concept of essence in Hegel’s Science of Logic, and within the context of recent issues in critical race theory and feminism. I will argue that the role of an (...) essence underlying appearance is a valuable one within a Hegelian framework, and that it is politically important to reassess it. There are reasons that we should want to uphold the distinction between essence and an inessential appearance. We should want to uphold the irreducibility of essence to the Hegelian self-determining concept, and I argue in this paper that there is a basis for doing so in Hegel’s own text. Despite the well established impossibility of claiming that there is a property or set of properties that all women share, to dissolve essence as an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance is both to misunderstand essence, and to relinquish a tool needed in the struggle for justice. Essence cannot be dismissed by claiming that it is an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance because essence and the inessential do not exhibit the characteristic of reciprocity. (shrink)

In this paper I consider Hegel’s idea of logic in different passages of his work (in the Introduction to the Science of Logic, in the Vorbegriff of the Encyclopaedia Logic, in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy), and I compare it with some contemporary conceptions of logic. In my view, such a comparison is relevant in at least two senses. First, it makes possible to address the controversial question: «what kind of logic is Hegel’s logic?». Second, it allows to (...) locate Hegel’s view within contemporary debates, assessing its actuality. In this perspective, Hegel’s reflections reveal to be crucial in order to deal with some questions at the very core of contemporary debates in the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

The classic analytic tradition associated the philosophy of George Berkeley with idealism. Yet in terms of the German Idealismus, Berkeley was no idealist. Rather, he described himself as an “immaterialist”. In the classic analytic tradition we find a misunderstanding of the German Idealismus. This paper will suggest, through reference to the work of Paul Redding, that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents Idealismus as that which reconciles objectivity and subjectivity in the experience of consciousness. Hegel’s Phenomenology develops this idea in the (...) elaboration of a remarkably novel theory of consciousness. For Hegel, the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience are a dialectical movement between consciousness and the object, or immediacy and mediacy. In the whole movement of consciousness we have the logic of contradiction working at the back of phenomenological experience that Hegel will make explicit in the Science of Logic, a logic that involves the thinker becoming consciously aware of their own thought processes. Yet Hegel’s Logic is different from the common meaning of ‘logic’. His Logic is not a formal approach to valid inference but captures the method and the moments and movement of logic. For Hegel, the great problem of classical logic is the immobility of the categories. This paper proposes that Hegel’s ‘holism’ entails the description wherein Logic, Nature, and Spirit are articulated as a whole in dialectical movement. (shrink)

In this rich and impressive new book, Henry Somers- Hall gives a nuanced analysis of the philosophical relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze. He convincingly shows that a serious study of Hegel provides an improved insight into Deleuze’s conception of pure difference as the transcendental condition of identity. Somers- Hall develops his argument in three steps. First, both Hegel and Deleuze formulate a critique of representation. Second, Hegel’s proposed alternative is as logically consistent as Deleuze’s. Third, Deleuze (...) can account for evolution, whereas Hegel cannot. (shrink)