Hegel: Metaphysics

Cette thèse porte sur la question du fini et de l’infini dans la philosophie de Hegel. L’objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à retracer l’influence exercée par la philosophie antique (principalement Platon et Aristote) et par la philosophie moderne (pour l’essentiel Kant et certains postkantiens) sur l’élaboration hégélienne des catégories de la finité et de l’infinité. En second lieu, elle étudie le développement systématique de la logique de l’infinité hégélienne à la lumière de cette influence. Il s’agit d’étudier, (...) à travers une approche historique et critique, comment Hegel résout l’opposition traditionnelle du fini et de l’infini par sa théorie des deux infinis. A l’aune des conceptions de l’infinité-finie (la mauvaise infinité) et de l’infinité véritablement infinie (la véritable infinité), Hegel montre que le processus de la détermination du fini est un processus d’idéalisation qui supprime la contradiction du fini et de l’infini. Ainsi, l’enquête sur des concepts de finité et d’infinité permet de découvrir que l’idéalité spéculative est pour Hegel une réponse non seulement au problème traditionnel de leur articulation, mais aussi, plus généralement, aux problèmes soulevés par la caractérisation des idéalismes antiques et modernes. (shrink)

Hegel begins the third main part of the Science of Logic, the “logic of the concept,” with the dialectic of universality. This dialectic, however, proves to be insufficient for the exposition of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, because it is dominated by the perspective of self-identity. For this reason speculative logic develops a dialectic of particularity whose domain is dominated by the perspective of difference. While the dialectic of universality made explicit the meaning of the proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is universal, the (...) dialectic of particularity aspires to make explicit the meaning of the conflicting proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is particular. The present paper attempts a detailed reconstruction of this dialectic and thereby a disclosure of the meaning of the onto-logical claim that being-as-concept is particular. It is first shown how Hegel’s account of the particular relates to the expression of a totality of particulars. Next it is argued that the speculative notion of the particular is extremely complex and that this complexity can be decoded by means of four dimensions. Third, it is explained how abstraction comes to be regarded by Hegel as the essence of the particular. I end the paper by discussing how the collapse of the dialectic of particularity gives rise to the category of the individual and its peculiar dialectic. (shrink)

With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-standing criticism: Scholars from Marx to Popper and Habermas have worried that Hegel’s metaphysics has anti-individualist and authoritarian implications, which are particularly pronounced in his Philosophy of History, since Hegel identifies historical progress with reason imposing itself on individuals. Rather than proposing an alternative non-metaphysical conception of reason, as Pippin or Brandom have done, this article argues that critics are broadly right in their metaphysical reading of Hegel’s central (...) concepts. However, they are mistaken about what Hegel’s approach entails, when one examines the specific types of states discussed by the philosopher in his Philosophy of History. Even on a traditional metaphysical reading, Hegel is not only non-authoritarian; he also makes a powerful argument concerning freedom, whereupon the freest society involves collective oversight and the shaping of social structures so as to ensure that they benefit everybody. (shrink)

Although personal being plays an important role in G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy he never provided a comprehensive definition of personality. Within the framework of his works it is thus possible to formulate different definitions of person and personality, and several conflicting definitions were presented among Hegelians during the 1830s and 1840s. In this paper I examine the role of personality in Hegel's system and discuss the relationship between personality and metaphysics. The question shall be analyzed in the context of various (...) works by Hegel and contrasted with two important precursors of Hegel, I. Kant (1724–1804) and J.G. Fichte (1762–1814). I shall also put the philosophy of Finnish Hegelian J.V. Snellman (1806–81) under scrutiny. The paper will indicate the importance of logic for Hegelian metaphysics and for Hegelian conception of personality. (shrink)

As an important corollary of this interpretation of absolute knowledge, the dissertation concludes with the suggestion that Hegelian philosophy need not be regarded merely as an interesting curiosity in the history of ideas, but rather that it can serve as a vital and potentially rewarding source of fresh theoretical insights. ;Instead, the concrete completeness of speculative philosophy can only consist in the activity of a dynamical, ceaselessly self-examining and self-regulating intellectual community. In one sense, of course, no finite system can (...) ever be complete, insofar as it will inevitably be guilty of errors and misconceptions. Yet at the same time, the infinite System is perfect and complete, insofar as it contains within itself the means whereby its own unavoidable flaws will be discovered, corrected, and "forgiven"--i.e. aufgehoben into vanishing moments of a universal totality. ;In opposition to most traditional interpretations of Hegel, the position is maintained that Hegel himself deliberately faced this problem, and that a true understanding of his proposed solution requires a radical Aufhebung of the concept of cognition as such. Relying primarily on the penultimate chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the dissertation argues that absolute knowledge can neither be a finalized system of fully explicit content, nor an endless movement toward such an ideal state. ;This dissertation undertakes a critical examination of one central problem in Hegelian philosophy: viz., whether the final realization of "absolute knowledge" is logically consistent with significant epistemic progress in the system's continuing development. Serious consideration of the concept of systematic completeness, as interpreted on Hegel's terms, uncovers the existence of a profound paradox. On the one hand, if the Truth is the Whole , then the truth of any finite part or aspect of that Whole depends upon its place within the system as a totality. In order to grasp the part and comprehend it correctly, one must already have a systematically ordered knowledge of the universe in its entirety. Yet the methodological open-endedness of dialectical thinking precludes the acceptance of any particular theoretical formulation as final or complete in itself. Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as a progression of successive formulations of the Truth, each of which improves on its predecessors by reconciling their internal contradictions, but no one of which is adequate in itself. Hence, no theoretical world view, including Hegel's own, can rest content within its limits, for the inevitable advance of thought must in the end throw it down. (shrink)

This is a book review of Will Dudley, "Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy".

Hegel’s conception of Spirit does not subordinate difference to sameness, in a way that would make it unusable for a genuinely intersubjective idealism directed to a comprehensive account of the contemporary world. A close analysis of the logic of recognition and the dialectic of conscience in the Phenomenology of Spirit demonstrates that the unity of Spirit emerges in and through conflict, and is forged in the process whereby particular encounters between differently situated individuals reveal and establish the emerging character and (...) significance of the stances they uniquely occupy. (shrink)

Criticism of Hegel has been a central preoccupation of “postmodern” philosophy, from critical theory and deconstruction to Lacanianpsychoanalytic theory and Foucauldian “archaeology.” One of the most frequent criticisms is that Hegel’s invocation of “absolute knowledge”installs him in a position of authorial arrogance, of God-like authority, leaving the reader in a position of subservience to the Sage’s perfectwisdom. The argument of this article is that this sort of criticism is profoundly ironic, since Hegel’s construction of the role of the Sage possessing (...) absolute knowledge is in fact an elaborate mask covering over a radical project of disappearance of the author by which itbecomes the reader who is left to author the text. The article explores Hegel’s commitment to his own death as an author in his invention of anew method of demonstration, his epistemology, his philosophy of language, his theory of desire, and even in the seemingly least likelyplace of all, his portrait of “absolute knowledge.”. (shrink)

In 1837 an eighteen-year old maker of verse epigrams wrote of Hegel.

Seyla Benhabib has presented us with the first English translation of a work of Marcuse which was published originally in 1932 as Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, and was reissued in 1968 by Klostermann in an unrevised edition under the abbreviated title, Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit. Benhabib’s fluent and readable translation begins with a thoughtful and informative introduction and ends with a glossary which explains not only key terms, but also the relations between (...) them upon which Marcuse draws. For example, sich verhalten receives the following explanation on p. 342. (shrink)

Le livre de Jean-Luc Gouin se présente comme une introduction à la philosophie de Hegel. Il cherche à retrouver ce qu'il y a de vivant dans cette pensée, à retrouver les débats et les nécessités qui l'animent. L'ambition de l'ouvrage est de mettre en perspective ce qui, en deçà des différentes propositions ou domaines, constitue la pensée hégélienne, ce qui en est le véritable moteur, de «déceler une certaine structure mouvante dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre du penseur». Dès lors, il s'écarte (...) à la fois d'une recherche sur un domaine particulier, comme la conception hégélienne de l'État ou du Droit, et d'une présentation générale de l'œuvre. Il vise plutôt à s'installer dans le mouvement même de la pensée hégélienne, dans cet élément «vivant» qui structure et traverse l'ensemble des domaines. L'auteur revient à plusieurs reprises sur sa volonté de «présenter dialectiquement la dialectique. Mieux: hégéliennement l'hégélianisme». La dialectique a souvent été posée, à juste titre, comme cet élément du mouvement hégélien, comme ce qui traverse et donne sens à l'ensemble de l'œuvre. Mais il faut alors ajouter, pour J.-L. Gouin, que c'est à partir d'un ensemble de concepts que la dialectique peut jouer ce rôle et c'est donc plutôt à une «constellation», à une «structure» qu'il faut se référer. «Cette structure se cristallise autour de quatre notions fondamentales. Il s'agit des notions de Sujet, de Négativité, de Résultat et de Réconciliation». (shrink)

The goal of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is to achieve absolute knowing. Minimally, knowing can be absolute only if it is unconditioned or unlimited; that is, only if it is not essentially contrasted with some other possible knowing—say, God's—or is not restricted such that it necessarily does not pertain to certain items—say, freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, or God. Knowing can be absolute only if these items, appropriately interpreted, are within its scope. However, if it can (...) be shown that human knowing is not limited or restricted in either of these two ways, it would then follow that we cannot contrast our conceptual scheme—human knowing as such—with the world, and, hence, we cannot even notionally contrast human knowledge of appearances with things in themselves. Initially, it is in this quite narrow sense that Hegel's project in the Phenomenology is to transform Kant's subjective or limited idealism into objective or absolute idealism by showing that items Kant took to be necessarily extrinsic to human knowing are intrinsic and constitutive of it. Thus, if we were to translate Hegel's dictum that the ground of science in general is "pure self-recognition in absolute otherness" back into Kant's lexicon, it would state that we achieve full apperceptive self-awareness, full categorial selfawareness of ourselves as knowers, only in the thing in itself. Within Hegel's own system, achieving the standpoint of absolute knowing is a necessary condition for doing logical science, and, by implication, the first part of the system as a whole, because only by demonstrating that the necessary conditions of human knowing cannot, even notionally, be contrasted with the world in itself is it possible to then work out a system of logical categories that are simultaneously categories of thought and categories of being. (shrink)

Benjamin provides new and important readings of key canonical texts in the history of philosophy in his sustained philosophical reworking of ontology. Amongst texts included are Hegel's _Difference Essay_ and the _Shorter Logic_ and Heidegger's _Time and Being_ and _The Question of Being_. The effective presence of ontology, defined as `an original difference', will be familiar to readers of his earlier writings. This book represents his most thorough and original contribution to contemporary philosophy to date.

This classic introduction to one of the most influential modern thinkers, G.W.F. Hegel has been made even more comprehensive through the addition of four new chapters. New edition of a classic introduction to Hegel. Enables students to engage with many aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. Covers the whole range of Hegel’s mature thought. Relates Hegel’s ideas to other thinkers, such as Luther, Descartes and Kant. Offers a distinctive and challenging interpretation of Hegel’s work.

I propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of the Science of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts (...) of facts about finite reality can be given. (shrink)

In this interest of time, I’ll just say something directly: this is an incredible book. Reading it, thinking it through, is extremely rewarding. I haven’t read a work of philosophy that had as much impact on me since being in school myself. The book presents you with new ideas and connections and it forces you to see philosophy and its history in new ways, even if you (like me) had been quite attached to your old ways. The book got into (...) my head. Now I find myself, in idle moments, arguing with Paul up there in my head; as if there is a little copy of him in there now, making the case for his versions of inferentialism and cognitive contextualism. Fortunately, Paul is in my experience unfailingly nice, generous and sympathetic even in argument—otherwise it might not be as nice to have a copy of him in your head. Still, the copy pales in comparison to the original, so it is great to be here. I can’t do justice to the book. But I will try to proceed as follows. I will try to sketch the general line of thought I find so powerful. Then, I will try to take up my assigned role as critic. The most stimulating thing I can think of to do is to argue as follows: Paul’s arguments concerning Kant and Hegel are largely successful, but end up pushing us in directions that are not consistent with the general approach to philosophy, and the general approach to Kant and Hegel, from which Paul himself begins. So we should abandon that general approach. That is what I will try, at least, to argue. (shrink)

The concept of essence is thought by many political theorists to be a residue of the patriarchal onto-theological tradition of metaphysics that needs to be (or has been) overcome by more progressive aims. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of essentialism in light of the treatment of the concept of essence in Hegel’s Science of Logic, and within the context of recent issues in critical race theory and feminism. I will argue that the role of an (...) essence underlying appearance is a valuable one within a Hegelian framework, and that it is politically important to reassess it. There are reasons that we should want to uphold the distinction between essence and an inessential appearance. We should want to uphold the irreducibility of essence to the Hegelian self-determining concept, and I argue in this paper that there is a basis for doing so in Hegel’s own text. Despite the well established impossibility of claiming that there is a property or set of properties that all women share, to dissolve essence as an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance is both to misunderstand essence, and to relinquish a tool needed in the struggle for justice. Essence cannot be dismissed by claiming that it is an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance because essence and the inessential do not exhibit the characteristic of reciprocity. (shrink)

In this paper I consider Hegel’s idea of logic in different passages of his work (in the Introduction to the Science of Logic, in the Vorbegriff of the Encyclopaedia Logic, in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy), and I compare it with some contemporary conceptions of logic. In my view, such a comparison is relevant in at least two senses. First, it makes possible to address the controversial question: «what kind of logic is Hegel’s logic?». Second, it allows to (...) locate Hegel’s view within contemporary debates, assessing its actuality. In this perspective, Hegel’s reflections reveal to be crucial in order to deal with some questions at the very core of contemporary debates in the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

The classic analytic tradition associated the philosophy of George Berkeley with idealism. Yet in terms of the German Idealismus, Berkeley was no idealist. Rather, he described himself as an “immaterialist”. In the classic analytic tradition we find a misunderstanding of the German Idealismus. This paper will suggest, through reference to the work of Paul Redding, that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents Idealismus as that which reconciles objectivity and subjectivity in the experience of consciousness. Hegel’s Phenomenology develops this idea in the (...) elaboration of a remarkably novel theory of consciousness. For Hegel, the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience are a dialectical movement between consciousness and the object, or immediacy and mediacy. In the whole movement of consciousness we have the logic of contradiction working at the back of phenomenological experience that Hegel will make explicit in the Science of Logic, a logic that involves the thinker becoming consciously aware of their own thought processes. Yet Hegel’s Logic is different from the common meaning of ‘logic’. His Logic is not a formal approach to valid inference but captures the method and the moments and movement of logic. For Hegel, the great problem of classical logic is the immobility of the categories. This paper proposes that Hegel’s ‘holism’ entails the description wherein Logic, Nature, and Spirit are articulated as a whole in dialectical movement. (shrink)

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully (...) see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well-defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post-Kantian conception of substantial form. (shrink)

In this rich and impressive new book, Henry Somers- Hall gives a nuanced analysis of the philosophical relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze. He convincingly shows that a serious study of Hegel provides an improved insight into Deleuze’s conception of pure difference as the transcendental condition of identity. Somers- Hall develops his argument in three steps. First, both Hegel and Deleuze formulate a critique of representation. Second, Hegel’s proposed alternative is as logically consistent as Deleuze’s. Third, Deleuze (...) can account for evolution, whereas Hegel cannot. (shrink)

In the United States the relationship between Hegel and Schelling divides into two camps: The first sees Hegel’s critical remarks in the Phenomenology not directed against Schelling himself but against Schelling’s adherents. I provide here detailed arguments for the minority view: Although Hegel did collaborate with Schelling in the early Jena years even opposing Reinhold, he nonetheless worked with Reinhold’s arguments on the origins and systematicity of philosophy differently than did Schelling: The rift between the two giants really goes back (...) to the very early Jena period. (shrink)

In this article, I draw upon the ‘post-Kantian’ reading of Hegel to examine the consequences Hegel’s idea of God has on his metaphysics. In particular, I apply Hegel’s ‘recognition-theoretic’ approach to his theology. Within the context of this analysis, I focus especially on the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ. First, I argue that Hegel’s philosophy of religion employs a distinctive notion of sacrifice (kenotic sacrifice). Here, sacrifice is conceived as a giving up something of oneself to ‘make room’ for the (...) other. Second, I argue that the idea of kenotic sacrifice plays a fundamental role in Hegel’s account of Christ. Third, I conclude by sketching some of the consequences of Hegel’s idea of a God who renounces his own divinity for an idealistically conceived metaphysics. My main thesis is that the notion of incarnation is conceived by Hegel as the expression of a spirit that advances only insofar as it is willing to withdraw and make room for the other. A kenotic reading of the Hegelian notion of the incarnation is also useful in terms of a clarification of the dispute between ‘left Hegelians’ and ‘right Hegelians’ concerning the status of the idea of God in Hegel’s philosophy. (shrink)

The role of history in Hegel’s system is puzzling. On one hand, Hegel argues that truth is necessarily the outcome of development, and to that extent historical. On the other hand, however, this development is said to be a mere “play” of the Idea with itself. Moreover, Hegel’s claim in Enc. §14 that the historical development of spirit follows its systematic development not only implies that the systematic structure of the Idea precedes its historical unfolding but also makes history deterministic. (...) This article argues that if we want to preserve the primacy of the system over its history while at the same time avoiding determinism, we need to amend Hegel’s position in light of the Aristotelian distinction, ignored by Hegel, between hypothetical and absolute necessity. (shrink)

As his ambitious title suggests, Houlgate intends his study to compare and contrast the respective critical methodologies of Hegel and Nietzsche. Toward this end, Houlgate endeavors to establish two central points. First, despite their obvious differences, Hegel and Nietzsche share as a common objective the development of a systematic critique of metaphysical speculation. They both agree that Western metaphysics largely impoverishes life by privileging the formal, lifeless abstractions of a spectral realm. Second, although Nietzsche is perhaps the more famous critic (...) of Western metaphysics, Hegel is the more thorough and radical critic. According to Houlgate, Nietzsche criticizes metaphysical abstractions as necessarily inimical to the nature of life itself, which lies beyond the grasp of human cognition. As Houlgate points out, however, any such critique of metaphysics must presuppose a fundamental metaphysical distinction between language and life: "Nietzsche seems to be employing a distinction between being-for-another and being-in-itself which in his own terms can only be called metaphysical.... This contradiction... invalidates any claim that Nietzsche might make to have produced a truly non-metaphysical philosophy". Houlgate thus presents Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics as representative of a retrograde current in German philosophy: "Nietzsche remains a metaphysical thinker because he employs a metaphysical distinction in order to reject metaphysical categories". Unlike Nietzsche, however, Hegel was able successfully to circumvent the traditional appeal to metaphysical foundations. Hegel's phenomenological method thus underwrites an immanent, rather than a transcendent, critique of modes of consciousness: "This method involves no reference to a presupposed standard of judgement.... We can thus examine how internally consistent each mode of consciousness is, that is whether each mode of consciousness is determined as it believes itself to be". Hegel's development of an immanent critique of consciousness thus distinguishes him from Nietzsche and privileges his criticism of metaphysics vis-à-vis the latter's. (shrink)