This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

6 found
  1. What Should the Idealist Critique of Naturalism Be? Hegel, Smithson, and Liberal Naturalism.Brandon Beasley - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Robert Smithson argues that considerations stemming from Kantian and post-Kantian idealism undermine naturalistic arguments that seek to debunk elements of the ‘manifest image’ in favour of the ‘scientific image’. The idealist tradition, on this view, holds that philosophy’s task is to uncover and clarify the principles and norms which underlie different forms of inquiry, and is thus well placed to dispel the apparent ‘placement’ problems that stem from the collision of our ordinary worldview with contemporary philosophical naturalism. Smithson also argues (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Export citation  
  2. Describing The Rationality of Human Experience: The Anthropological Task of Hegel’s Logic.Joseph Carew - 2016 - Idealistic Studies 46 (1):79-96.
    I argue that Hegel’s logic is an anthropology. Appealing to the fact that we, as the kind of beings we are, search for meaning in our sensory encounter with things and in our actions, it articulates the rationality that guides this search and explains the fundamental shape of human experience. This has three implications for his logic. First, since this rationality is first and foremost an instinctive activity, it is an elaboration of our unconscious knowledge of the rules of thinking. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel.Paul Giladi - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):248-270.
    My aim in this paper is to defend the claim that the absolute idealism of Hegel is a liberal naturalist position against Sebastian Gardner’s claim that it is not genuinely naturalistic, and also to defend the position of ‘liberal naturalism’ from Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for it to occupy. By ‘liberal naturalism’, I mean a doctrine which is a non-reductive form of philosophical naturalism. Like Fred Beiser, I take the thesis of liberal naturalism to find (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  4. The Freedom of Life: Hegelian Perspectives.Thomas Khurana (ed.) - 2013 - Berlin, Germany: August Verlag.
    For post-Kantian philosophy, “life” is a transitory concept that relates the realm of nature to the realm of freedom. From this vantage point, the living seems to have the double character of being both already and not yet free: Compared with the external necessity of dead nature, the living already seems to exhibit a basic type of spontaneity and normativity that on the other hand still has to be superseded on the path to the freedom and normativity of spirit. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  5. The Trembling of the Concept: The Material Genesis of Living Being in Hegel's Realphilosophie.Joseph Carew - 2012 - Pli 23.
    Although Hegel's absolute idealism is often presented as a solipsistically self-grounding, the Realphilosophie offers us an another image of Hegel which not only challenges standard interpretations, but more importantly gives us valuable resources to rethink living being. The zero-level determinacy of nature as “the idea in its otherness” has two consequences. Firstly, the starting point of any philosophy of nature must be a realism, insofar as nature's material constitution shows itself as unthought-like. Secondly, if idealism is to be viable, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Export citation  
  6. Michael Wolff, Das Körper-Seele-Problem: Kommentar Zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie , §389 , Pp. 211. ISBN 3-465-02509-1. [REVIEW]Willem A. deVries - 1998 - Hegel Bulletin 19 (1-2):109-112.