Hegel: Negation

Gegen die verbreitete Vorstellung, dass Negativität im Interesse von mehr Selbstverwirklichung, Produktivität und Positivität überwunden oder be-grenzt werden muss, eröffnet dieser Band eine andere Perspektive. Er geht den verschiedenen Formen des Negativen in Kunst, Recht und Politik nach, um zu zeigen, dass es nicht allein eine Negativität gibt, die dem Gelingen im Weg steht oder zu dessen sicher beherrschtem Mittel wird. Die Beiträge des Bandes erweisen Negativität vielmehr als eine Kraft der Befreiung, die ein Gelingen anderer Art ermöglicht.

Misunderstanding occurs between speakers when they disagree about the meaning of words in use. In the case of truth-values, Frege took these to be referents of sentences which consist of classes of accepted (i.e. “true”) or rejected (i.e. “false”) sentences. From this usual depiction of truth and falsity, a general algebraic framework is proposed to systematize the use of truth-values from a dialogical point of view of logic. A special attention will be paid to two radically opposed pseudo-speakers: Heraclites and (...) Nagarjuna, according to whom truth-values respectively refer to everything or nothing. Finally, dialectical (pseudo-Hegelian) negation will be rendered as a very special function: an ontological object-forming operator, similar to the arithmetic successor-forming operator Sn+1(x) on integers and consistent within our generalized theory of truth-values as variable referents. (shrink)

Tout au long de son chemin de pensée, Heidegger a nourri une patiente explication avec Hegel, qu’il considérait comme son plus coriace adversaire. Or il s’avère que le litige qui les oppose concerne au premier chef le statut et l’origine de la négativité – problème qui s’impose, selon l’aveu même de Heidegger, à titre d’« unique pensée d’une pensée qui pose la question de l’être ». Partant du constat d’une affinité indéniable entre les deux penseurs quant au rôle insigne qui (...) doit revenir à la négation en philosophie, cette étude entend percer à jour les motifs de la constante fin de non-recevoir que Heidegger oppose pourtant à la méthode dialectique de son prédécesseur. C’est qu’il dispute à Hegel un concept de négation qu’il juge plus originaire que son contrepoids dialectique, négation qui doit se faire l’écho de l’abyssal néant qui avoisine l’être. Dans son irréductible retrait, l’être se refuserait ainsi à toute résorption synthétique au sein d’un système totalisant, préservant ainsi pour la pensée un éventail de possibilités insoupçonnées. Mais Heidegger parvient-il, en définitive, à se libérer de l’embarras dialectique qui semble coller à sa pensée et qui exige de lui un constant effort de distanciation ? (shrink)

-/- Why is the philosopher Hegel returning as a potent force in contemporary thinking? Why, after a long period when Hegel and his dialectics of history have seemed less compelling than they were for previous generations of philosophers, is study of Hegel again becoming important? Fashionable contemporary theorists like Francis Fukuyama and Slavoj Zizek, as well as radical theologians like Thomas Altizer, have all recently been influenced by Hegel, the philosopher whose philosophy now seems somehow perennial- or, to borrow an (...) idea from Nietzsche-eternally returning. Exploring this revival via the notion of 'negation' in Hegelian thought, and relating such negativity to sophisticated ideas about art and artistic creation, Andrew W. Hass argues that the notion of Hegelian negation moves us into an expansive territory where art, religion and philosophy may all be radically conceived and broken open into new forms of philosophical expression. The implications of such a revived Hegelian philosophy are, the author argues, vast and current. Hegel thereby becomes the philosopher par excellence who can address vital issues in politics, economics, war and violence, leading to a new form of globalised ethics. Hass makes a bold and original contribution to religion, philosophy, art and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Tout au long de sa carrière philosophique, Heidegger s’est livré à une constante explication avec Hegel, qu’il considérait comme son plus vif antagoniste. Dans le cadre de cet article, nous entendons nous rapporter aux origines de leur différend et prendre la mesure des griefs du jeune Heidegger à l’endroit de la dialectique hégélienne. Nous tenterons en un second lieu de démontrer que son opposition frontale camoufle en fait une secrète appropriation, puisque Heidegger aurait préalablement fait sienne l’idée d’un usage productif (...) de la négation en philosophie. (shrink)

Some authors have claimed that Hegel's ‘determinate negation’ should be distinguished from ‘logical’ or ‘formal’ negation, that is, from a view of negation as a contradictory forming operator. In contrast, I argue that dialectical determinate negation involves a view of negation as a contradictory forming operator, and can therefore count as formal negation in every respect. However, as it is clear in contemporary glutty semantics of negation, one may distinguish between different accounts of the relationship between negation, contradiction and content. (...) I suggest that, differently from classical negation, and as glutty negation, dialectical negation has partial content. (shrink)

In “Violence and Metaphysics” Jacques Derrida suggests that “the only effective position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel would seem to be…to consider false-infinity…irreducible.” Inversely, refuting the charge of logocentrism associated with Hegelian true infinity ( wahrhafte Unendlichkeit ) would involve showing that Hegel’s speculative logic does not establish the infinity of being exempt from the negativity of the finite. This paper takes up Derrida’s challenge, and argues that true infinity is crucial to Hegel’s understanding of (...) ideality as a question of normative authority, which does not fall prey to logocentrism. Through an exposition of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite in Hegel’s Science of Logic , I argue that true infinity is not an ontological category that eliminates division, but rather refers to the metalogical standpoint involved in a philosophical account of determinacy. Although fully achieved at the end of the Logic , the metalogical standpoint that Hegel elaborates in the Seinslogik under the banner of the true infinite already clarifies that determinacy is a product of normative authority that is itself precarious. (shrink)

In this rich and impressive new book, Henry Somers- Hall gives a nuanced analysis of the philosophical relationship between G. W. F. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze. He convincingly shows that a serious study of Hegel provides an improved insight into Deleuze’s conception of pure difference as the transcendental condition of identity. Somers- Hall develops his argument in three steps. First, both Hegel and Deleuze formulate a critique of representation. Second, Hegel’s proposed alternative is as logically consistent as Deleuze’s. Third, Deleuze (...) can account for evolution, whereas Hegel cannot. (shrink)

Here I attempt to clarify the general sense of the question that forms the background of Hegel's section on contradiction: What is the essence of contradiction? To what extent does this question pose a philosophical problem for Hegel? By considering this problem can we come to understand contradiction as a relation pertaining to "objective logic"? Translated by Erin Flynn & Kenneth R. Westphal. Originally published as "Über Hegels Lehre vom Widerspruch," in: Dieter Henrich, ed., Probleme der Hegelschen Logik (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, (...) 1986), 107-28. (shrink)

Part One establishes that self-relation, or truth, is the leading feature of thought and that logic is the science of self-relation. Any science concerns the truth of its subject matter, but logic must analyze truth itself. For that reason, logic is the "architectonic science," and its outcome is the "immanent deduction of the Concept." Thus, logic represents not only the science of self-relation, but the self-relation of science. ;In Part Two, by way of a contrast with Kant, we show that (...) Hegel conceives logic not as a science of pure form, but of the identity of form and content. For this reason, concepts may be established as true or false in themselves, apart from any application to sensuous experience. It is only because concepts possess an immanent source of content, and therefore an immanent criterion of truth, that logic may become a science. This immanent criterion is the self-relation, or self-application, of each logical concept. We analyze the concepts Being and Nothing as examples of this method, which reveals not merely their self-relation, but the identity within them of a self-relation and a self-negation. This identity is the chief problem of logic as well as the strategy for its solution. ;In Part Three, we show that negation, too, has its "truth," or self-relation. The truth of negation is self-negation. This is illustrated by analyzing the concepts Becoming and Determinate Being. A discussion of logical method reveals that, in self-negation, negation as an independent element disappears from logic to emerge as a moment in the self-relation of the Concept. We show that, for Hegel, "dialectic is a function of totality." In this way, the self-resolving identity of self-relation and self-negation also dominates the structure of the science that is the science of this structure. ;Part Four is an exposition of the first part of the Doctrine of Essence. In Essence, the identity of self-relation and self-negation undergoes a "self-sublation": It is rendered a result of itself. The autonomy of the Concept is thereby established, and the identity of self-relation and self-negation is revealed as the basic idea of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. (shrink)

Le tome 68 de l’Édition intégrale des œuvres de Martin Heidegger, qui met en scène un important épisode de son explication avec Hegel, a relativement peu été commenté jusqu’à ce jour. Cet article se veut une analyse approfondie de la première moitié du texte, intitulée « La négativité ». Heidegger y traque l’origine de la négativité hégélienne et en vient à proposer lui-même un concept de « néant » qu’il juge plus originaire que celui de son prédécesseur.

_This first English translation illuminates Hegelianism's most obscure dialectical synthesis: the relation between the phenomenology and the logic. This book is essential for understanding the development of French thought in this century._.

In his Science of Logic Hegel purports to give an account of a dialectical logic that generates the totality of being’s fundamental structures. This totality does not exhaust the richness of being, but it exhausts the basis of this richness. Any phenomenon, whether cognitive, scientific, social or political, is based upon some or all of those structures. The paper presents and examines the logic of a structure which pervades each and every phenomenon: the border(die Grenze). It is analyzed as an (...) advanced manifestation of “determinateness,” an even more primitive structure of being, which makes explicit its intrinsic connection with not-being. What is distinctive about Hegel’s analysis is that it establishes a logical character concerning the concept of “border” that precedes empirical observation and a connection with space. The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Hegel’s dialectic of the border in such a way as to make this logical character apparent and convincing to contemporary audience, who begin from the assumption that all discourse about border has an empirical basis and presupposes reference to space. It will be argued that, contrary to received opinion, the very phenomenon of “border” has certain universal and necessary features which explain its very possibility, are completely a priori and are established prior to any reference to space. A discussion about “borders” that excludes any a priori investigation into this phenomenon from its domain simply fails to illuminate its most important dimension: its logical core or, if you will, its universal and necessary attributes. (shrink)

Hegel is most famous for his view that conflicts between contrary positions are necessarily resolved. Whereas this optimism, inherent in modernity as such, has been challenged from Kierkegaard onward, many critics have misconstrued Hegel's own intentions. Focusing on the Science of Logic, this transformative reading of Hegel on the one hand exposes the immense force of Hegel's conception of tragedy, logic, nature, history, time, language, spirit, politics, and philosophy itself. Drawing out the implications of Hegel's insight into tragic conflicts, on (...) the other hand, De Boer brings into play a form of negativity that allows us to understand why the entanglement of complementary positions always tends to turn into their conflict, but not necessarily into its resolution. (shrink)

Despite accusations of irresponsibility and negativity, Jacques Derrida's deconstruction has had an immense influence on contemporary social, political and cultural critique. 'Evolving negativity' offers a preliminary explanation of this influence by tracing the philosophical 'family tree' that links deconstruction to German Critical Theory via the Frankfurt School. The paper explores the origins of a certain dynamic and productive notion of negativity in Hegel's dialectic and describes its 'evolution' in the works of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno as a process of (...) de-determination that finds its culmination in Derrida's notion of 'différance'. Set free of its totalizing, teleological force, Derrida's negativity as 'différance' is compared with Hegel's more general and generative notion of Negativität. The paper concludes that for this branch of 'critical' thinking, to flourish in the shadow of Hegel means also to be continually reinventing his respect for difference and negativity, and transforming it to respond to the questions of the present. Key Words: Adorno • Critical Theory • deconstruction • Derrida • dialectic • différance • difference • Hegel • Horkheimer • negativity. (shrink)

: Studies of Chinese dialectical materialism have long neglected the important philosophical dimension of Hegelian thought and its influence on Chinese Marxism. This essay examines the work of Zhang Shiying of Beijing University, whose studies of Hegel's works on dialectical logic in the 1950s sought to clarify the nature of Hegel's speculative dialectic and its relation to dialectical materialism. Like Lenin before him, Zhang believed that Hegel's works on logic offered a more profound reflection on materialism than had previously been (...) recognized by Marxist critics of German idealism. Zhang's sensitive reading of both Hegel's Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia Logic highlights the problem of the speculative dialectic and negativity. Examined here is Zhang's analysis of the Hegelian dialectic in light of contemporary accounts of the role of Hegelian negativity in poststructuralist thought. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to make sense of Hegel's notion of aufheben. The double meaning of aufheben and its alleged ?rise above the mere ?either?or?; of understanding? have been taken, by some, to constitute a criticism of the logic of either?or. It is argued, on the contrary, that Hegel's notion of aufheben, explicated in its primary and philosophical context, turns out to be a substantiation of that logic. The intelligibility of the formula of either?or depends, for example, on the (...) categories of Being and Not?Being. But if these categories are regarded as particular finite determinations themselves subject to the formula of either?or, then the formula, far from being intelligible, ?falls apart?. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that if we are to substantiate the logic of either?or, we must, at the same time, ?rise above? that logic. The role of aufheben is then considered in the special sciences. Here it is argued that we must distinguish between empirical transitions, governed by the finite determinations of things, and logical or dialectical transitions, governed by considerations of the intelligibility of the notions involved. Applying the notion of aufheben to the former transitions suggests wrongly that empirical transitions have an objective or philosophic necessity. Finally, the place of ?immanent transformation? in the context of aufheben is examined. It is concluded that if there is to be a transformation, then a distinction must be drawn between thought and its content, but then the transformation cannot be regarded as immanent. (shrink)