Henry of Ghent

In this paper I offer a new approach to Henry of Ghent's argument for divine illumination. Normally, Henry is criticized for adhering to a theory of divine illumination and failing to accept rediscovered Aristotelian approaches to cognition and epistemology. I argue that these critiques are mistaken. On my view, Henry was a proponent of Aristotelianism. But Henry discovered a tension between Aristotle's views on teleology and the nature of knowledge, on the one hand, and various components of the Christian worldview, (...) on the other. I argue that Henry's adherence to a theory of divine illumination was an attempt to preserve various components of the Aristotelian system, not an attempt to reject Aristotelianism. (shrink)

This modest contribution has been occasioned by the publication of the Proceedings of an international colloquium held at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre of the Institute of Philosophy in commemoration of the seven-hundredth anniversary of the death of Henry of Ghent. This colloquium had a twofold purpose: «first to establish a status quaestionis of the different fields of research concerning Henry’s doctrines and the critical edition of his work and, second, to provide a forum for specialists to exchange ideas and insights (...) on specific problems. The publication of the Proceedings offers an assessment of our present knowledge and opens up possibilities for further research». It is only natural, then, that the present contribution takes over this twofold end. On the one hand it will attempt to give a survey of what has been achieved thus far in studying Henry’s thought. On the other hand it hopes to derive from this survey a picture of what has been left undone until now, in order to set out a few lines for future research. More in particular it will push forward one issue that has been stepmotherly dealt with: relation. (shrink)

This essay examines Henry of Ghent's reaction to the Thomistic criticism of the Au-gustinian theory of divine illumination. By grounding epistemology in the psychology of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas made divine illumination appear to be an unwieldy theory incorrect in its basic assumptions. Even though Henry reworked the Augustinian theory, he did not completely reject the Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology. Unlike so many of his predecessors, Henry did not attempt to avoid difficult questions raised by the fallibility of sense experience in developing his (...) epistemology. Rather, he attempted to synthesize the intellectualist tendencies of the Augustinian theory with some of the empirical concerns of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of human knowledge. Henry moved away from the strict metaphor of illumination, while at the same time exploring the relationship between the divine art and the human agent intellect. He was thus able to retain much of the Aristotelian terminology and still defend what he understood to be Augustine's intention for the doctrine of illumination. (shrink)

The medieval doctrine of God as first known presents a privileged moment in a tradition of classical metaphysics that runs from Plato to Levinas. The presentcontribution analyzes two versions of this doctrine formulated by Bonaventure († 1274) and Henry of Ghent († 1293). In reaction to the preceding discussion inParis, they advance a doctrine of God as first known that distinguishes the relative priority of God within the first known transcendental concepts from the absolutepriority of God over these. Although their (...) two-staged doctrines of God as first known structurally agree, they vary in their strategical embedding. Underlying this variation is a transformation of the concept of reality that abstracts actuality as a standard and criterion to the determination of the first known. As such, thisconcept of reality gives rise to the very idea of neutral existence against which Levinas objects. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that Henry of Gent had a major and lasting influence on the developments at the University of Paris after the condemnation of the errores philosophorum in 1277, the Gandavistae - pupils of Henry of Gent - are hardly known by their proper names in the history of philosophy. As a member of the theological and philosophical faculty, Henry broke with the predominant Averroistic approach to Aristotle's conception of science and concentrated, instead, on the Aristotelian tradition. (...) He defended a revised version of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories along the lines of the pseudo-Boethian Liber de sex principiis and ascribed fundamental eminence to relatio, a category which was considered ontologically “debilissimus“ among the Aristotelians. John de Polliaco was a pupil of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Gent and Godfrey of Fontaines during the seventies of the 13th century. In his Quodlibet I, q. 7, dating from 1307, he gave a controversial account of the notion of relation that was favoured by Henry's adherents: “Does the relation, expressed as a respect, differ from the respects expressed by the six principles?“ In this discussion he attacks the intentional and modal interpretation given by the Gandavistae and calls them non-reales. Is this accusation already an indication of the rise of 14th century nominalism? (shrink)

In spite of the fact that Henry of Gent had a major and lasting influence on the developments at the University of Paris after the condemnation of the errores philosophorum in 1277, the Gandavistae - pupils of Henry of Gent - are hardly known by their proper names in the history of philosophy. As a member of the theological and philosophical faculty, Henry broke with the predominant Averroistic approach to Aristotle's conception of science and concentrated, instead, on the Aristotelian tradition. (...) He defended a revised version of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories along the lines of the pseudo-Boethian Liber de sex principiis and ascribed fundamental eminence to relatio, a category which was considered ontologically “debilissimus“ among the Aristotelians. John de Polliaco was a pupil of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Gent and Godfrey of Fontaines during the seventies of the 13th century. In his Quodlibet I, q. 7, dating from 1307, he gave a controversial account of the notion of relation that was favoured by Henry's adherents: “Does the relation, expressed as a respect, differ from the respects expressed by the six principles?“ In this discussion he attacks the intentional and modal interpretation given by the Gandavistae and calls them non-reales. Is this accusation already an indication of the rise of 14th century nominalism? (shrink)

Between 1276 and 1288, Henry of Ghent composes four quodlibetal questions concerning the ‘economic’ practice commonly known as ‘rent contracts’ or emptio-venditio reddituum. In contrast to other authors of his day, Henry holds that these rent contracts are not legitimate, arguing that the practice is just a form of usury. In particular the Flemish doctor, following Aristotle, denounces the emptio-venditio reddituum as a kind of usurious loan being contra naturam. In this article I want to show that behind his condemnation (...) of this ‘economic’ practice lie two aims: 1) to demonstrate the central role of the master of theology in society, that is, not only in the religious, but also in the civil society of his time; 2) to attack, as a secular master, the religious orders. Henry argues that because the validity of a norm depends on whether or not it conforms to the natural/divine law, rather than to the positive law, the legitimacy of a norm must be established by the theologian. The reason for this is that the theologian knows the natural and religious law better than anyone else. Accordingly, the secular theologian becomes the unique authority in ‘economic’ matters in particular and in ethics more generally. By contrast, the religious orders seem to endorse the emptio-venditio reddituum. Henry argues that this betrays their ignorance concerning the natural law. As a consequence, they should not be given authority in ‘economic’ or moral matters. (shrink)

This article investigates three major contexts in which Henry of Ghent’s Summa quaestionum ordinariarum was received from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. The study takes into account the material features of a group of relevant manuscripts of the Summa: Paris, where the Summa was copied and annotated by Godfrey of Fontaines and his socii; the Dominican convent in Bologna at the beginning of the fourteenth century, to which Aimericus de Placentia gave a copy of the Summa corrected against the (...) very manuscript of Godfrey of Fontaines; the Roman Papal Court, where the Summa attracted the special attention of the humanist Pope Nicholas V, who employed the manuscript from the Bolognese convent for producing new copies of the work. In this study, I endeavour to present a late-medieval history of the Summa as a book, and to contribute to the debate about the mutual relationships among some of the most important witnesses of the text. I pay particular attention to the marginal annotations in t... (shrink)

This book examines the central ideas that defined the debate about divine production in the Trinity in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, namely those of Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. Their discussions are significant for the history of trinitarian theology and the history of philosophy.

The third volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access in English, to major texts that form the debate over mind and knowledge at the center of medieval philosophy. Beginning with thirteenth-century attempts to classify the soul's powers and to explain the mind's place within the soul, the volume proceeds systematically to consider the scope of human knowledge and the role of divine illumination, intentionality and mental representation, and attempts to identify the object (...) of human knowledge in terms of concepts and propositions. The authors included are Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, William Alnwick, Peter Aureol, William Ockham, William Crathorn, Robert Holcot, Adam Wodeham as well as two anonymous Parisian masters of arts. This volume will be an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, theology and literature. (shrink)

Rather unusually, Henry of Ghent includes ‘totality’ in the list of divine attributes discussed in his Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. Availing himself of the different philosophical definitions of totality given by Boethius and Avicenna, Henry concludes that God cannot be considered a totum universale, a totum numerale and a totum virtuale or potestativum, but concedes that He may be considered a totality insofar as His being comprehends the exemplary perfections of all created beings.

There has been a renewed interest of late in the thought of Henry of Ghent.1 Scholars have recognized that Henry was an influential figure at the University of Paris in the late-thirteenth century and that his influence extended well past his own generation. It is also widely acknowledged that Henry's thought developed significantly over the span of his career.2 The critical edition of Henry's works has proven to be crucial in assessing this development.3 Nonetheless there is little consensus on the (...) nature of the development, particularly with respect to his theory of cognition. One reason for the diversity of opinions is that no single trend can be identified in his doctrine as a whole; rather, distinct .. (shrink)

This paper aims to explain Henry of Ghent's views on what kind of language is appropriate in theology, and why. It concentrates on a number of questions of the Summa quaestionum ordinariarum , which are devoted to his take on how theologians should explain their discipline to students, and to the meaningfulness in general of theological language. The paper delves into the technical terms sensus and insinuare , and compares Henry's account with H.P. Grice's views on (speaker-)meaning and his notion (...) of `conversational implicatures', thus showing that Henry emphasises the performative features of linguistic use. (shrink)

The paper explores three areas in which Avicenna had an important influence on the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent: first, in developing an argument for the existence of God in metaphysics rather than in physics; secondly, in his intentional distinction between essence and existence; and thirdly, in his arguments not merely that there is only one God, but that it is impossible for there to be many gods, his arguments which Henry clearly took from books one and eight of Avicenna’s (...) ’Metaphysics’. (shrink)