Henry of Ghent

In this chapter I want to focus on what it might mean to speak of the “Trinitarian friendship circle.” There are at least two ways to consider this friendship circle. One way is to consider the Trinity in itself, which is what theologians call the “immanent Trinity.” If we consider a “Trinitarian friendship circle” with regard to the immanent Trinity, then we would be talking about whether before the creation of the world, the three di- vine persons were in some (...) sense “co-lovers.” Another way is to consider the Trinity in relation to creatures, which is what theologians call the “economic Trinity.” The latter includes discussion of God the Son’s incarnation, and the work of the Holy Spirit among creatures. In what follows, I am interested in exploring what some medieval theologians, whom McCord Adams wrote so much about, had to say about this Trinitarian friendship circle with regard to the immanent Trinity. This is speculative stuff. Some theologians might object that this kind of speculation is unwarranted. They would contend that (e.g.,) the ecumenical councils were mostly focused on the Trinity with regard to creation. At most, we find in Nicaea I (325 CE) the claim that God the Father and God the Son are of the same essence (“homoousia”). This doesn’t signal anything specific regarding whether God the Father and God the Son each have their own act of loving the divine essence (or another divine person) in eternity past. This sort of view is what is today sometimes called Social Trinitarianism, according to which we should count the number of divine acts of knowing and loving according to the number of divine persons. On this Social Model of the Trinity, the Father loves the divine essence, the Son loves the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit loves the divine essence, and none of these acts of loving are numerically the same acts of loving the divine essence. There are three acts of loving, one by each divine person. (I should mention here that I reject this Social Model of the Trinity.) [...] -/- [...]. In what follows, I give a brief history of different interpretations of Augustine’s claim that the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit. This history supports my contention that a majority report among scholastics has it that the Holy Spirit, as a divine person, is not a unique object of an act of love, nor is any other divine person a unique object of an act of love. What the divine person’s love is their shared divine essence. This is what can be called a reductive interpretation of Augustine’s statement. A minority position, held by Henry of Ghent, is that the Holy Spirit (as the Holy Spirit) makes it the case that the divine persons love that they love the divine essence. Henry is distinctive in defending an interpretation according to which the Holy Spirit, as a specific divine person, uniquely contributes something to a certain act of loving that is shared by all divine persons. I believe Henry’s claim that a specific divine person can contribute something unique to an intellectual act or an act of will that can be used in the development of a “Latin” Model of the Trinity that accounts for the divine persons’ de se propositional knowledge. That is, a “Latin Social” Model of the Trinity offers an account of how it could be that, e.g., God the Father can be aware of the proposition that I know that I love God the Son. Nonetheless, Henry himself does not develop a view in which a divine person has de se propositional knowledge. So far as I am aware, no scholastic teaches that a divine person makes use of “I” for self-reference (apart from, e.g., the Incarnation) or de se propositional knowledge. If one wanted to develop McCord Adams’s contention that the divine persons are mutual friends, then if we look at what Henry of Ghent has done then we can develop his insights into what I have labeled a “Latin Social” Model of the Trinity. While there are likely several ways that Henry’s moves can be developed into a Latin Social Model of the Trinity, I will summarize one way it could be done, that is, the way I have done it. (shrink)

The disagreement between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on divine illumination is usually recognized as a high point in the history of medieval epistemology. Still, there is much obscurity surrounding that debate, including the specific nature of the disagreement between those two thinkers. In this paper, I argue that the point at issue is the relationship between sense and intellect. Henry of Ghent, who posits a close tie between sense and intellect, holds that the senses are the only (...) natural source of both content and certainty for the intellect. By contrast, Duns Scotus holds that, in our natural state, the senses are the source of content but not of certainty for the intellect, which can achieve knowledge of the truth of first principles true by virtue of the meaning of their terms independently of the sensory input it receives. (shrink)

Hugh of Novocastro, Landolfo Caracciolo, John Baconthorpe, and some other medieval authors argued that there are real contradictions in nature. The background of this early fourteenth-century theory was the Aristotelian question of how to determine the instant of change between p and ~p. The argument was that these are simultaneously true at the temporal instant of change if it is an instant of changing. The author’s aim is to discuss the background of this view in Henry of Ghent’s theory of (...) instantaneous change from potentiality to actuality at that very instant. (shrink)

Rather unusually, Henry of Ghent includes ‘totality’ in the list of divine attributes discussed in his Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. Availing himself of the different philosophical definitions of totality given by Boethius and Avicenna, Henry concludes that God cannot be considered a totum universale, a totum numerale and a totum virtuale or potestativum, but concedes that He may be considered a totality insofar as His being comprehends the exemplary perfections of all created beings.

In this paper I offer a new approach to Henry of Ghent's argument for divine illumination. Normally, Henry is criticized for adhering to a theory of divine illumination and failing to accept rediscovered Aristotelian approaches to cognition and epistemology. I argue that these critiques are mistaken. On my view, Henry was a proponent of Aristotelianism. But Henry discovered a tension between Aristotle's views on teleology and the nature of knowledge, on the one hand, and various components of the Christian worldview, (...) on the other. I argue that Henry's adherence to a theory of divine illumination was an attempt to preserve various components of the Aristotelian system, not an attempt to reject Aristotelianism. (shrink)

This article investigates three major contexts in which Henry of Ghent’s Summa quaestionum ordinariarum was received from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. The study takes into account the material features of a group of relevant manuscripts of the Summa: Paris, where the Summa was copied and annotated by Godfrey of Fontaines and his socii; the Dominican convent in Bologna at the beginning of the fourteenth century, to which Aimericus de Placentia gave a copy of the Summa corrected against the (...) very manuscript of Godfrey of Fontaines; the Roman Papal Court, where the Summa attracted the special attention of the humanist Pope Nicholas V, who employed the manuscript from the Bolognese convent for producing new copies of the work. In this study, I endeavour to present a late-medieval history of the Summa as a book, and to contribute to the debate about the mutual relationships among some of the most important witnesses of the text. I pay particular attention to the marginal annotations in t... (shrink)

This book examines the central ideas that defined the debate about divine production in the Trinity in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, namely those of Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. Their discussions are significant for the history of trinitarian theology and the history of philosophy.

The medieval doctrine of God as first known presents a privileged moment in a tradition of classical metaphysics that runs from Plato to Levinas. The presentcontribution analyzes two versions of this doctrine formulated by Bonaventure († 1274) and Henry of Ghent († 1293). In reaction to the preceding discussion inParis, they advance a doctrine of God as first known that distinguishes the relative priority of God within the first known transcendental concepts from the absolutepriority of God over these. Although their (...) two-staged doctrines of God as first known structurally agree, they vary in their strategical embedding. Underlying this variation is a transformation of the concept of reality that abstracts actuality as a standard and criterion to the determination of the first known. As such, thisconcept of reality gives rise to the very idea of neutral existence against which Levinas objects. (shrink)

There has been a renewed interest of late in the thought of Henry of Ghent.1 Scholars have recognized that Henry was an influential figure at the University of Paris in the late-thirteenth century and that his influence extended well past his own generation. It is also widely acknowledged that Henry's thought developed significantly over the span of his career.2 The critical edition of Henry's works has proven to be crucial in assessing this development.3 Nonetheless there is little consensus on the (...) nature of the development, particularly with respect to his theory of cognition. One reason for the diversity of opinions is that no single trend can be identified in his doctrine as a whole; rather, distinct .. (shrink)

This paper aims to explain Henry of Ghent's views on what kind of language is appropriate in theology, and why. It concentrates on a number of questions of the Summa quaestionum ordinariarum , which are devoted to his take on how theologians should explain their discipline to students, and to the meaningfulness in general of theological language. The paper delves into the technical terms sensus and insinuare , and compares Henry's account with H.P. Grice's views on (speaker-)meaning and his notion (...) of `conversational implicatures', thus showing that Henry emphasises the performative features of linguistic use. (shrink)

The volume addresses the historical context of Henry, e.g. his writings and his participation in the events of 1277; examines Henry’s theology, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics; and studies Henry’s influence on John Duns Scotus and Pico della Mirandola.

Life and the living (on Aristotelian biohorror) -- Supernatural horror as the paradigm for life -- Aristotle's De anima and the problem of life -- The ontology of life -- The entelechy of the weird -- Superlative life -- Life with or without limits -- Life as time in Plotinus -- On the superlative -- Superlative life I: Pseudo-Dionysius -- Negative vs. affirmative theology -- Superlative negation -- Negation and preexistent life -- Excess, evil, and non-being -- Superlative life II: (...) Eriugena -- Negation in the periphyseon -- The quaestio de nihilo: on nothing -- The quaestio de nihilo: superlative nothing -- Dark intelligible abyss -- Apophasis -- The apophatic logic -- Negation in Frege and Ayer -- Negation vs. subtraction in Badiou -- Negation and contradiction in Priest -- The dialetheic vitalism of negative theology -- Ellipses: Suhraward and the luminous void -- Univocal creatures -- On spiritual creatures -- Life as form in Aristotle -- The concept of the creature -- Univocity I: Duns Scotus vs. Aquinas -- Univocity in Aquinas' Summa theologica -- Univocity in Duns Scotus' Opus oxoniense -- The common nature of the creature -- Univocity II: Duns Scotus vs. Henry of Ghent -- Univocity in Henry of Ghent -- Negative vs. privative indetermination -- Absolute indetermination -- Univocity III: Deleuze's scholasticism three variations -- Spinoza et le problème de l'expression -- Différence et répétition -- Cours de Vincennes -- Univocal creatures -- Ellipses: Dgen and uncreated univocity -- Dark pantheism -- Everything and nothing -- Life as spirit in Aquinas -- The concept of the divine nature -- Immanence I: Eriugena's periphyseon -- Natura and the unthought -- Universal life -- Four statements on pantheism -- Immanence II: Duns Scotus' reportatio Ia -- Univocal immanence -- Actual infinity -- The pathology of the triple primacy -- Immanence III: Nicholas of Cusa's De docta ignorantia -- The coincidence of opposites -- The folds of life -- Absolute vs. contracted pantheism -- Speculative pantheism (Deleuze's interlocutors) -- Pantheism and pure immanence -- The insubordination of immanence in Deleuze -- Scholia I: the isomorphism of univocity and immanence -- Scholia II: the vitalist logic of common notions -- Scholia III: the life of substance -- Dark pantheism -- Ellipses: Wang Yangming and idealist naturalism -- Logic and life (on Kantian teratology) -- The wandering line from Aristotle to Kant -- Critique of life -- Spectral life and speculative realism -- Ontotheology in Kant, atheology in Bataille -- The night land. (shrink)

There are two general routes that Augustine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, for a psychological account of the Father's intellectual generation of the Word. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, in their own ways, follow the first route; John Duns Scotus follows the second. Aquinas, Henry, and Scotus's psychological accounts entail different theological opinions. For example, Aquinas (but neither Henry nor Scotus) thinks that the Father needs the Word to know the divine essence. If we compare the theological (...) views entailed by their psychologies we find a trajectory from Aquinas, through Henry, and ending with Scotus. This theological trajectory falsifies a judgment that every Augustinian psychology of the divine persons amounts to a pre-Nicene functional Trinitarianism. This study makes clear how one's awareness of the theological views entailed by these psychologies enables one to assess more thoroughly psychological accounts of the identity and distinction of the divine persons. (shrink)

Between 1276 and 1288, Henry of Ghent composes four quodlibetal questions concerning the ‘economic’ practice commonly known as ‘rent contracts’ or emptio-venditio reddituum. In contrast to other authors of his day, Henry holds that these rent contracts are not legitimate, arguing that the practice is just a form of usury. In particular the Flemish doctor, following Aristotle, denounces the emptio-venditio reddituum as a kind of usurious loan being contra naturam. In this article I want to show that behind his condemnation (...) of this ‘economic’ practice lie two aims: 1) to demonstrate the central role of the master of theology in society, that is, not only in the religious, but also in the civil society of his time; 2) to attack, as a secular master, the religious orders. Henry argues that because the validity of a norm depends on whether or not it conforms to the natural/divine law, rather than to the positive law, the legitimacy of a norm must be established by the theologian. The reason for this is that the theologian knows the natural and religious law better than anyone else. Accordingly, the secular theologian becomes the unique authority in ‘economic’ matters in particular and in ethics more generally. By contrast, the religious orders seem to endorse the emptio-venditio reddituum. Henry argues that this betrays their ignorance concerning the natural law. As a consequence, they should not be given authority in ‘economic’ or moral matters. (shrink)

This volume offers a new and comprehensive study of a central aspect of Henry of Ghent's (+ 1293) philosophical thought: his understanding of metaphysics.

The paper explores three areas in which Avicenna had an important influence on the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent: first, in developing an argument for the existence of God in metaphysics rather than in physics; secondly, in his intentional distinction between essence and existence; and thirdly, in his arguments not merely that there is only one God, but that it is impossible for there to be many gods, his arguments which Henry clearly took from books one and eight of Avicenna’s (...) ’Metaphysics’. (shrink)

This volume offers a translation with introduction and notes of Henry of Ghent's questions on the being and essence of God from his Summa of Ordinary Questions (Summa quaestionum ordinarium). These questions form the heart of Henry's philosophy of God, especially his "new way" of proving the existence of God and his claim that God is the first object known by the human intellect.

This book treats the thirteenth-century debate concerning the natural love of God over self with an eye to how the thinkers of this period saw the connection between one's own good and the aims of virtuous action. It shows that the main difference in this debate reflects a fundamental contrast between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus over the importance of natural inclination in Ethics and the priority of the common good. It indicates how medieval thinkers attempted to reconcile eudaimonism (...) with the claim that everyone must love the common good more than themselves. It considers perhaps the most crucial issue in the thirteenth-century reception of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It also indicates how later theories that separate morality from self-interest have their origins in concepts that were created in earlier debates, such as this one. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that Henry of Gent had a major and lasting influence on the developments at the University of Paris after the condemnation of the errores philosophorum in 1277, the Gandavistae – pupils of Henry of Gent – are hardly known by their proper names in the history of philosophy. As a member of the theological and philosophical faculty, Henry broke with the predominant Averroistic approach to Aristotle’s conception of science and concentrated, instead, on the Aristotelian tradition. (...) He defended a revised version of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories along the lines of the pseudo-Boethian Liber de sex principiis and ascribed fundamental eminence to relatio, a category which was considered ontologically “debilissimus” among the Aristotelians. John de Polliaco was a pupil of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Gent and Godfrey of Fontaines during the seventies of the 13th century. In his Quodlibet I, q. 7, dating from 1307, he gave a controversial account of the notion of relation that was favoured by Henry’s adherents: “Does the relation, expressed as a respect, differ from the respects expressed by the six principles?” In this discussion he attacks the intentional and modal interpretation given by the Gandavistae and calls them non-reales. Is this accusation already an indication of the rise of 14th century nominalism? (shrink)

In spite of the fact that Henry of Gent had a major and lasting influence on the developments at the University of Paris after the condemnation of the errores philosophorum in 1277, the Gandavistae – pupils of Henry of Gent – are hardly known by their proper names in the history of philosophy. As a member of the theological and philosophical faculty, Henry broke with the predominant Averroistic approach to Aristotle’s conception of science and concentrated, instead, on the Aristotelian tradition. (...) He defended a revised version of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories along the lines of the pseudo-Boethian Liber de sex principiis and ascribed fundamental eminence to relatio, a category which was considered ontologically “debilissimus” among the Aristotelians. John de Polliaco was a pupil of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Gent and Godfrey of Fontaines during the seventies of the 13th century. In his Quodlibet I, q. 7, dating from 1307, he gave a controversial account of the notion of relation that was favoured by Henry’s adherents: “Does the relation, expressed as a respect, differ from the respects expressed by the six principles?” In this discussion he attacks the intentional and modal interpretation given by the Gandavistae and calls them non-reales. Is this accusation already an indication of the rise of 14th century nominalism? (shrink)

The third volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access in English, to major texts that form the debate over mind and knowledge at the center of medieval philosophy. Beginning with thirteenth-century attempts to classify the soul's powers and to explain the mind's place within the soul, the volume proceeds systematically to consider the scope of human knowledge and the role of divine illumination, intentionality and mental representation, and attempts to identify the object (...) of human knowledge in terms of concepts and propositions. The authors included are Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, William Alnwick, Peter Aureol, William Ockham, William Crathorn, Robert Holcot, Adam Wodeham as well as two anonymous Parisian masters of arts. This volume will be an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, theology and literature. (shrink)

L'A. esamina in primo luogo l'origine del problema metafisico in Enrico. Il tema del subiectum metaphysice è inquadrato nel contesto della problematica del soggetto scientifico e ciò che interessa l'A. è soprattutto il procedimento argomentativo di Enrico ed il significato delle conseguenze di tale procedere. Lo studio si chiude con uno sguardo sul commentario alla Metafisica di Pietro di Auvergne, evidenziando la relazione fra soggetto della metafisica e dottrina del primum cognitum nell'intelletto umano. Riferimenti alle posizioni di Avicenna, Averroè e (...) Tommaso. (shrink)

This essay examines Henry of Ghent's reaction to the Thomistic criticism of the Au-gustinian theory of divine illumination. By grounding epistemology in the psychology of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas made divine illumination appear to be an unwieldy theory incorrect in its basic assumptions. Even though Henry reworked the Augustinian theory, he did not completely reject the Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology. Unlike so many of his predecessors, Henry did not attempt to avoid difficult questions raised by the fallibility of sense experience in developing his (...) epistemology. Rather, he attempted to synthesize the intellectualist tendencies of the Augustinian theory with some of the empirical concerns of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of human knowledge. Henry moved away from the strict metaphor of illumination, while at the same time exploring the relationship between the divine art and the human agent intellect. He was thus able to retain much of the Aristotelian terminology and still defend what he understood to be Augustine's intention for the doctrine of illumination. (shrink)

This modest contribution has been occasioned by the publication of the Proceedings of an international colloquium held at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre of the Institute of Philosophy in commemoration of the seven-hundredth anniversary of the death of Henry of Ghent. This colloquium had a twofold purpose: «first to establish a status quaestionis of the different fields of research concerning Henry’s doctrines and the critical edition of his work and, second, to provide a forum for specialists to exchange ideas and insights (...) on specific problems. The publication of the Proceedings offers an assessment of our present knowledge and opens up possibilities for further research». It is only natural, then, that the present contribution takes over this twofold end. On the one hand it will attempt to give a survey of what has been achieved thus far in studying Henry’s thought. On the other hand it hopes to derive from this survey a picture of what has been left undone until now, in order to set out a few lines for future research. More in particular it will push forward one issue that has been stepmotherly dealt with: relation. (shrink)

The first doctrine Peckham mentions as being under attack is of undoubtedly the TDI, according to which human beings are illuminated by "the unchangeable light" so as to attain the "eternal rules." This language of light and illumination is of course most closely associated with Augustine, but it permeates the entire Christian medieval tradition. Until Aquinas's time the TDI had played a prominent role in all the most influential medieval theories of knowledge, including those of Anselm, Albert the Great, Roger (...) Bacon, and, especially, Bonaventure. However, by the beginning of the fourteenth century the theory had fallen out of fashion. Indeed, the three best philosophers of the scholastic period--Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham--would all reject the theory in its standard form. Even by 1285 supporters of the TDI such as Peckham were evidently feeling rather defensive. It seems entirely plausible to attribute this attitude, in large part, to the influence of Aquinas's views on human knowledge. (shrink)

According to one recent account, in the “preliberal epoch” before the seventeenth century people did not think of individuals “as possessing inalienable rights to anything — much less life, liberty, property, or even the pursuit of happiness.” The statement is not true, but it is excusable. Compared with the flood of writing on the classical rights theories of the early modern period, there has been only a thin trickle of work on medieval ideas concerning individual natural rights, or human rights (...) as we say nowadays, rights inhering in the human person as such. Some modern authors see the seventeenth-century rights theories as a radical departure from ancient and medieval ways of thought; they are content to explain the ideas of Hobbes and Locke and Pufendorf by reference to some aspect of the intellectual, political, or economic life of the seventeenth century itself. C. B. MacPherson, for instance, emphasizing economic factors, inaugurated a minor academic industry when he interpreted Locke's teaching that everyone had a property right in his own person as a reflection of the possessive individualism of early-modern capitalism. (shrink)