History: Autonomy

This article is concerned with the shape of the story of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century moral philosophy as told by J. B. Schneewind in The Invention of Autonomy. After discussion of alternative possible shapes for such a story, the focus falls on the question to what extent, in Schneewind's account, strands of empiricist voluntarism and rationalist intellectualism are interwoven in Kant. This in turn leads to consideration of different types of voluntarism and their roles in early modern ethical theory. Correspondence:c1 robert.adams@mansfield.oxford.ac.uk.

Castoriadis’s encounter with autopoiesis was a decisive factor for his philosophical trajectory. Its influence can be seen on four interconnected levels of his thought: his reconsideration of Greek sources for his later interpretation of trans-regional being as self-creating; his rethinking of objective knowledge; his ventures into philosophical cosmology; and his re-evaluation of the living being, especially in light of his dialogue with Varela. In brief, Castoriadis’s engagement with autopoiesis was significant for his shift towards an ontology of radical physis. His (...) shift to radical physis does not point so much to a rejection of the project of autonomy, however, as, paradoxically, its simultaneous radicalization and relativization. (shrink)

This article critically considers Castoriadis’ central concept of creation ex nihilo. It does so in two ways. It first draws on recent research to suggest that the historical inauguration of the project of autonomy in ancient Greece - in both its political and philosophical aspects - was more complex and contextually anchored than Castoriadis acknowledges: it did not surge forth out of nothing. Second, it considers the idea of creation from a theoretical perspective. Here the idea of creation as contextual (...) rather than absolute is offered. Within this suggested qualification, two lines of discussion - drawn from the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions - are broached. (shrink)

It is argued to be essential to Kant's philosophy that natural forces bring about the emergence of reason without either ceasing to have causal efficacy or destroying the possibility of a priori knowledge or moral autonomy. Autonomy is the topic mainly explored here. In Chapter I, to introduce the issues, Kant's essays on history are shown to describe man "becoming a noumenon" by a natural development. The remaining chapters explore the implications of this naturalism for Kant's account of the self. (...) ;In Chapter II objections to this approach are discussed. It is suggested that Kant's theory of synthesis requires, rather than ruling out, that the rational self should be a product of nature. Kant's argument is shown to lead to the conclusion that synthesis is a reconstruction of a nature whose effect the synthesizing self is. A confusion among commentators between two quite different senses of thing-in-itself, which has made the reconstruction view seem unacceptable, is examined critically. Kant's Copernican analogy is then discussed in the light of the idea of the reconstruction of experience. ;In Chapter III Kant's accounts of the relation between logic and psychology and between empirical and transcendental deductions are discussed and shown to require an empirical psychology distinct but inseparable from transcendental logic. Kant's misgivings about empirical psychology are also examined. ;The problem of action is taken up in Chapter IV where Kant is show to argue that the will is a natural cause. In Chapter V Kant's working out of this view for moral psychology is examined in detail. The key issue is the role of the feeling of respect for moral law. Kant's use of the term Triebfeder is discussed to show that empirical causes operate in a similar way after as before the emergence of reason. An interpretation of the function of the concept of noumenon, which links it with personal identity, is suggested. The chapter ends with a return to one of Kant's essays on history, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" to show that it fits into the naturalist account of human development explored in the previous chapters. (shrink)

To discover affects within Husserl’s texts designates a difficult investigation; it points to a theme of which these texts were forced to speak, even as they were explicitly speaking of regional ontologies and the foundations of sciences. For we may at first wonder: where can affection find a positive role in the rigor of a pure philosophy that seeks to account for its phenomena from within the immanence of consciousness? Does this not mean that the very passivity and foreignness of (...) affect will be overlooked; will it not be continually linked to a Vorstellung that issues as a ray of the pure ego? That is, will the phenomenological account of affect be reduced to the cognition of an object, as Emmanuel Levinas suggests? Yet there are affects in Husserl’s texts that maintain their autonomy and resist subsumption to an objectivating intentionality.We may see this in the Lectures On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time: in the longitudinal intentionality of retention, through which consciousness becomes aware of its elapsed phases without making them into objects—a passive synthesis that gives the flow of time-constituting consciousness the form of a continually deferred auto-affection.1We find it again as early as the fifth Logical Investigation, 2 providing us with the impetus to radicalize Husserlian phenomenology. (shrink)

Social theory between progress and apocalypse -- Autonomy and domination: Weber's cage -- Barbarism and modernity: Eisenstadt's regret -- Integration and justice: Parsons' utopia -- Despising others: Simmel's stranger -- Meaning evil -- De-civilizing the civil sphere -- Psychotherapy as central institution -- The frictions of modernity and their possible repair.

Hannah Arendt e Hans Jonas highlight one specific aspect of Duns Scotus's thought: the wide autonomy that the Franciscan theologian allows to human will. In particular, Scotus admits that the very aim of human behaviour can be freely chosen by man, rather than being a natural and cogent propensity towards good. In Arendt's opinion Scotus opens the way to modernity, an age in which man is both the producer and the defender of all values, creator of history and responsible for (...) it. Arendt's interpretation is acceptable, however it is necessary to highlight with great care the limits of human freedom, in particular if an evil goal can be found among the freely chosen aims. Scotus strongly denies that evil can be desired for itself: creation is intrinsically positive because being and good can be converted into each other; thus Scotus holds a conception of evil actions that appears surprisingly modern. When Scotus maintains that for man the worse fault is to choose evil for his own freedom, the Franciscan theologian takes leave from the ethical conceptions of his age which blamed sins on the weakness of human will, prone to the external temptations of an errant reason or to the urge of physical passions: in Scotus’s conception, human will has in itself the reasons of sin, traceable in a sort of indetermination due to the constitutive finity of man, which has the power of leading man astray in spite of his autonomy naturally directed towards good. However, with this operation Scotus denies any grandiosity of the evil behaviour. Evil does not prove itself at the highest degree in rationally evil projects; instead, as our experience nowadays shows, evil reflects the senseless emptiness of a human being ready to commit evil actions for the vain achievement of himself as free. (shrink)

Henry E. Allison presents a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals . Allison pays special attention to the structure of the work and its historical and intellectual context. He argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy.

The purpose of this article is to set out an Aristotelian account of individual autonomy. Individual autonomy is the capacity of the individual to make and act upon judgments for which he is held morally accountable. This sense of autonomy may be contrasted to a number of other senses. Of these, the most important are political or legal autonomy and Kantian principled autonomy. Political or legal autonomy concerns the environment in which an individual operates. It exists where individuals are able (...) to operate reasonably freely.1 For the most part we will not consider this sense except insofar as it is necessary to explain the importance placed on respecting individual autonomy. Kantian principled autonomy has been described recently by Onora O‟Neill in a series of writings.2 On this account, autonomy is seen as a characteristic of the principle behind action rather than of action per se and is not a characteristic of agents at all. (shrink)

this article, I discuss the Protestant contribution to the modern concept of autonomy on the basis of an analysis of John Calvin's moral theology. I show that Calvin affirms our incapacity to know and want what is morally good, as expressed by natural law. Such incapacity is compensated for by the biblical mandates that, according to Calvin, should be incorporated into the positive legislation of Christian republics. In view of all this, I conclude that Calvin is far from the Kantian (...) idea of autonomy which defines our Modernity. (shrink)

The conception of subjectivity that dominates the Western philosophical tradition, particularly during the Enlightenment, sets up a simple dichotomy: either the subject is ultimately autonomous or it is merely a causally determined thing. Fichte and Freud challenge this model by formulating theories of subjectivity thattranscend this opposition. Fichte conceives of the subject as based in absolute activity, but that activity is qualified by a check for which it is not ultimately responsible. Freud explains the behavior of the self in terms (...) of biological drives and social pressures, yet both forces are actively interpreted by the subject itself. The tensions that arise from these very different approaches show that both Fichte and Freud are trying to overcome this deeply imbedded dichotomy between freedom and determinism. Although some would respond to these tensions by trying to forge a Hegelian synthesis, such a resolution covers over the paradoxical nature of finite subjectivity. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Fichte's critical idealism in an effort to formulate a compelling model of how we can be said to be free, despite our subjection to both rational and nonrational constraints. ;Fichte grounds idealism in a "drive to freedom" that involves two disparate strands of thought: the standpoint of idealism is said to be both the result of an absolutely free adoption of the principle of self-determination and conditioned by reason, to which the finite I is necessarily subject. However, (...) if there is no reason prior to the choice of a first principle, the choice of idealism over dogmatism cannot be motivated, and so is not attributable to a responsible subject. And if there is a prior basis for the election of idealism, the constraints of reason already necessitate the I's attempt to consider itself to be independent and are, therefore, not self-legislated. Fichte's argument strategy thus yields the following question: How can there be an absolute election of the philosophical principle of one's life, when the adoption of such a standpoint is already a manifestation of who one is? Fichte confronts this issue by conceiving of the I as necessarily subject to an original limit and by radically subjectivizing the world in terms of the I's ethical and conceptual demands. ;By locating the tension between these positions, this dissertation reveals how philosophers indebted to Fichte as well as interpreters of the Wissenschaftslehre have mischaracterized Fichte's treatment of rational self-constraint. Fichte's synthesis of freedom and necessity constitutes a model of subjectivity according to which the normatively constrained structure of experience is impossible without my relating that experience to my practical activity, and the ways in which I am able to characterize that experience are answerable to what is practically required of me by that experience. Fichte shows the interdetermination of the givenness of the given and the autonomy of the I by qualifying each in terms of the other. As a description of this interdetermination, Fichte's striving doctrine establishes the tension involved in this mutually constitutive relation as a positive conception of human freedom. (shrink)

In this essay, John Ambrosio examines the role of ascetic writing practices in Michel Foucault’s conception of ethical self‐formation. Ambrosio argues for an interpretation of Foucault’s later writings as representative of both an extension, and a dramatic break, from his previous writings — from demolishing the subject to embracing the notion of an autonomous and reflexive subject. Ambrosio further contends that Foucault’s notion of ethical self‐formation cannot be divorced from his genealogical method, and that his primary preoccupation near the end (...) of his life was to counterbalance his strong notion of a disciplinary society with the recognition of a subject able to make ethical choices and thus to transform itself. Finally, Ambrosio examines the implications of this for educators and argues that Foucault’s conception of ethical self‐formation through ascetic writing practices provides a powerful tool for teachers who seek to improve and transform their pedagogy. (shrink)

Karl Ameriks here collects his most important essays to provide a uniquely detailed and up-to-date analysis of Kant's main arguments in all three major areas of his work: theoretical philosophy (Critique of Pure Reason), practical philosophy (Critique of Practical Reason), and aesthetics (Critique of Judgment). Guiding the volume is Ameriks's belief that one cannot properly understand any one of these Critiques except in the context of the other two. The essays can be read individually, but read together they offer a (...) comprehensive guide to the main themes of the most influential of all modern philosophical systems. (shrink)

It has been argued that Kant's all-consuming efforts to place autonomy at the center of philosophy have had, in the long-run, the unintended effect of leading to the widespread discrediting of philosophy and of undermining the notion of autonomy itself. The result of this 'Copernican revolution' has seemed to many commentators the de-centring, if not the self-destruction, of the autonomous self. In this major reinterpretation of Kant and the post-Kantian response to his critical philosophy, Karl Ameriks argues that such a (...) view of Kant rests on a series of misconceptions. By providing the first systematic study of the underlying structure of the reaction to Kant's critical philosophy in the writings of Reinhold, Fichte and Hegel, Karl Ameriks challenges the presumptions that dominate popular approaches to the concept of freedom, and to the interpretation of the relation between the Enlightenment, Kant and post-Kantian thought. (shrink)

The relations between the neurosciences and phenomenology enable us today— thanks to the works of M. Merleau-Ponty, G. Simondon, F. Varela, A.R. Damasio and V.S. Ramachandran—to define the brain as a biosubjective organ: its constitution, its functioning, and its interactions prove that a description of individuation can fit in a cognitive neurophenomenology. In this framework, the mental state acquires a subjective autonomy even if it is an illusion in regard to the determining conditions of brain functioning.

In this essay I seek to show that a philosophy of modesty informs core aspects of both Nietzsche’s critique of morality and what he intends to replace morality with, namely, an ethics of self-cultivation. To demonstrate this I focus on Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, a largely neglected text in his corpus where Nietzsche carries out a quite wide-ranging critique of morality, including Mitleid. It is one of Nietzsche’s most experimental works and is best read, I claim, as (...) an Epicurean-inspired critique of the present and an exercise in moral therapy. In the opening sections I draw attention to the wider social dimension of the text and its concern with a morality of compassion, which is rarely done in the literature. I then turn to highlighting Nietzsche’s Epicurean moment, followed by two sections on Nietzsche on the self in which I aim to bring to light his ethics of self-cultivation and show in what ways his revaluation makes central to ethics a modest egoism and care of self. In the conclusion to the essay I provide a contrast between Nietzsche and Kant and deal with reservations readers might have about his ethics. Overall, the essay seeks to make a contribution to an appreciation of Dawn as a work of moral therapy. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;This thesis examines the contentious question of Nietzsche's politics by situating Nietzsche's political thought in the context of his chief theoretical concerns. Attention is focused on the role the concepts of nihilism and the will play in Nietzsche's moral and political thought. With this theme of "nihilism and the will" as a way of comprehending the meaning and significance of Nietzsche's moral and political thought, the thesis shows how Nietzsche's work can (...) be interpreted in terms of a political education that aims to educate the will to nothingness about its disfigured and misrecognised will to power through tracing the formation and deformation of the will to power in terms of its social and historical evolution. It is shown that Nietzsche develops an historical understanding of nihilism that presupposes in his work a philosophy of history. It is shown that with the notion of will to power Nietzsche does not simply posit a universal, ahistorical will to domination, but rather that the notion represents an attempt to formulate a philosophy of praxis in which questions of freedom and action bequeathed by Kant can be fruitfully posed in terms of a history of culture and discipline. This theme is explored in his two most systematic pieces of writing. On the Genealogy of Morals and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Finally, on the basis of the inquiry into his understanding of nihilism and the will to power, the thesis addresses the question of Nietzsche's politics. His overt aristocratic politics are presented and critically examined in the context of recent appraisals of his political philosophy and in the context of the antinomies of modern political theory. It is argued that Nietzsche's political thought can only be fully appreciated when situated in this latter context. It is shown that Nietzsche's moral and political thought develops two different responses to the antinomy of discipline and autonomy that lies at the centre of modern political philosophy. On the one hand his work succeeds in giving a meaning and identity to the experience of dissolution and meaninglessness, and does not impose a new metaphysics; on the other hand his work fails to reconcile the concern with discipline with a recognition of autonomy based on a principle of subjective freedom, and thus conceives of the imposition of values through philosophical legislation and political domination. The main conclusion reached is that Nietzsche's overt aristocratic politics does not adequately address the central problem of political alienation that he has located as an essential experience of nihilism in his historical and genealogical account of morals. (shrink)

Among others, four significant criticisms have been leveled against Kant’s morality. These criticisms are that Kant’s morality lacks a motivational component, thatit ignores the spiritual dimensions of morality espoused by a virtue-based ethics, that it overemphasizes the principle of autonomy in neglecting the communal context of morality, and that it lacks a theological foundation in being detached from God. In this paper I attempt to show that, when understood in the broader context of his religious doctrines and the overall philosophical (...) project of the architectonic of reason, Kant’s morality has a strong motivational component, supports the forming of a virtuous character as an essential element in a complete moral life, must be grounded in a community so as to realize peace and happiness for rational individuals, and is linked, ultimately, to a theological foundation. (shrink)

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Currently in Japan, it is extremely difficult to realize the basic wish of protecting personal dignity at the end of life. A patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has not been substantially warranted, and advance directives have not been legally enforceable. Unfortunately, it is not until the patient is moribund that all concerned parties start to deliberate on whether or not death with dignity should be pursued. Medical intervention is often perceived as a worthwhile goal to not only preserve life, (...) but also provide psychological benefit to the family, regardless of its effect on the patient. To feel they are doing something, family members tend to act against the imperative “Do not inflict on others what you would not wish done to you,” and permit extraordinary measures they would not want themselves. Another complication in Japanese culture is the necessity of unanimous decisions for end-of-life care. If there is conflict between a patient and his/her family on accepting medical intervention, the view of the latter is more likely to prevail due to different perceptions of human dignity. As a result, incapacitated patients in Japanese clinical settings often suffer through extraneous medical procedures, particularly during end-of-life care. Patient dignity is in danger from a national refusal to accept major bioethical principles such as having respect for patient autonomy, serving the best interests of the patient, doing no harm, and ensuring fairness at the end of life. We argue that more education about human dignity and legislation for death with dignity are necessary. Peace of mind for patients during end-of-life care will never be achieved in this society unless drastic changes take place in medical ethics and law. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Recent scholarship, though undermining the critical/pre-critical distinction in various parts of Kant's philosophy, presupposes an anachronistic division of his system into epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. What needs to be treated independently as a distinct topic is the general question of Kant's conception of philosophy as such. ;This thesis aims to fill the gap: to write the history, not of some part of Kant's system, but of the idea of (...) the whole. The study examines the origins and development of his view of the nature of philosophy as a "theory of autonomy". It covers the formative period , the first draft of a theory of autonomy as an account of morality , the second draft as a conception of reason , and the third draft involving the duality of theoretical and moral reason . ;The thesis re-maps stretches along Kant's route to transcendental idealism by plotting several junctures which have hitherto not received the attention they deserve. The foundations of ethics play as important a role in the rise of German Idealism as later the foundations of mathematics do for analytic philosophy. Chapter I marks Kant's distinction between willing and knowing, his break with Wolff's perfectionism, and the invention of the modern self freed from hierarchy and teleology. Chapter II reveals Kant's debt to Hutcheson for the question: how is a Categorical Imperative possible? Chapter III shows how Kant appropriates Rousseau's contract model to justify morality. Chapter IV covers the generalization of this breakthrough to cognition and the formation of an autonomous transcendental subject as the ground of both the Categories and the Categorical Imperative. Chapter V presents Kant's attempt to unify theoretical and moral autonomy within his account of reason. Chapter VI concludes with transcendental idealism as a dualistic view of reason. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage rassemble les textes des interventions prononcées lors du colloque Cornelius Castoriadis. Réinventer l'autonomie qui s'est déroulé aux universités de Paris-VIII et de Cergy-Pontoise en mars 2007.

The paper argues for distinguishing two aspects in Kant’s idea of self-legislation of the moral law: the immediate character (i.e., the practical necessity) of the law itself and the lawgiving function attributed to the rational will. I argue that the novelty of Kant’s thesis chie y consists in the combination of the two aspects, and that this solves the alleged paradoxical character of the idea of self-legislation. As it grounds on the connection of a fundamental law with a lawgiving, Kant’s (...) view can be regarded as a novel variant of the mixed model first proposed by Suárez, with two crucial di erences concerning the subject playing the role of the lawgiver and the notion of law involved. Finally, I argue that the inner structure of the idea of self-legislation shows that Kant’s view combines a realism of the moral law with a constructivism of moral obligation. (shrink)

Autonomy is one of the central concepts of contemporary moral thought, and Kant is often credited with being the inventor of individual moral autonomy. But how and why did Kant develop this notion? The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy is the first essay collection exclusively devoted to this topic. It traces the emergence of autonomy from Kant's earliest writings to the changes that he made to the concept in his mature works. The essays offer a close historical and (...) philosophical analysis of what prompted Kant to develop his conception of autonomy, charting the historical background which prompted his search, and thoroughly analysing different stages of his writings in order to see which element of autonomy was introduced at which point. The resulting volume will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kantian moral philosophy, as well as to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau maintained that he was a consistent thinker, even if he presented his ideas in an unsystematic fashion. My work is a demonstration of the coherence of Rousseau's writing that highlights how his views on the nature and form of human imagination connect various aspects of his political philosophy. Moreover, by exploring his concept of imagination, it becomes clear that one of Rousseau's main philosophical preoccupations was the problem of social cooperation. In particular, Rousseau sought ways of controlling and (...) directing human imagination in order to foster and nurture the emotions he thought central to harmonious social and political life. In the course of establishing my interpretation, I describe the relationship between imagination and emotional development as well as the role imagination plays in preserving social order. In the process I defend Rousseau from criticisms that see his position as favouring a narrow and restricted vision of human life and human community. Part of this effort includes a discussion of imagination as central to his model of political decision making and his ideal of citizenship. I conclude with a consideration of how an understanding of these issues provides a new perspective on Rousseau's views on the general will and personal autonomy. (shrink)

would suspect him of murdering them and would not spare him. So he too killed himself. Gods were very much disturbed by this sad incident and realized the ...

Individualists like to think of themselves as atoms, their trajectories causally dependent on collisions with other similar entities but their essence resolutely independent and autonomous. They are whole and entire in themselves: they are not elements or adjuncts of some greater whole. Collectivists take an opposite view. Their oddities and accidents may be individual and independent, their movements and machinations largely self-determined, but in their essence they are necessarily bound to others – for all are adjuncts and elements of a (...) larger whole. In this essay I discuss one version of the collectivist philosophy, a version which has been as popular and as widely supported as any philosophy of human nature. In Section I, the constituent ideas are expounded, largely by way of citation from Alexander Pope. In Section II, the anthropological aspect of Pope's philosophy is subjected to scrutiny; and in Section III, the axiological side of the theory is examined. (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation is to erect a theoretical framework for liberal individualism upon the foundational notions of 'self-ownership' and 'friendship'. It proceeds by attempting sympathetically to explore the meaning of these notions in the thought of three specific thinkers--Etienne de La Boetie , Richard Overton , and Max Stirner --in their respective contexts--mid-sixteenth century France, mid-seventeenth century England, and mid-nineteenth century Prussia. It is argued that self-ownership and friendship were used consistently in reflection upon a variety of emerging, (...) epochally modern, socio-political phenomena: including the Renaissance, urbanization, the discovery of the New World, the rise of the absolutist state, the advent of printing, the growth of popular literacy, the Reformation, the English Revolution, the establishment of democratic institutions, the growth of the market economy, the French Revolution, the industrial revolution, the 'murder of God', and the birth of ideology. It is further contended that these notions were deployed in resistance to specific contemporary arguments. Hence, the arguments of La Boetie, Overton, and Stirner are contrasted against those of Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Edwards, and Karl Marx , respectively. La Boetie, Overton and Stirner used 'self-ownership' to describe and defend the ethically inviolable reality of the autonomous individual person, and 'friendship' to name the ethically appropriate dynamics of individualist human relations. The conclusion culls from the separate studies of La Boetie, Overton, and Stirner, a consistent set of substantive qualities for the notions of 'self-ownership' and 'friendship'. (shrink)

Abstract Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, (...) Stern contends that Kant was a moral realist of sorts, holding certain substantive views that are best characterized as realist commitments about value. In this paper, I raise two central objections to Stern's reading of Kant. The first objection concerns what Stern identifies as Kant's solution to the problem of moral obligation. Whereas Stern sees the distinction between the infinite will and the finite will as resolving the problem of moral obligation, I argue that this distinction merely explains why moral obligations necessarily take the form of imperatives for us imperfect human beings, but does not solve the deeper problem concerning the obligatory nature of morality: why we should take moral norms to be supremely authoritative laws that override all other norms based on our non-moral interests. The second objection addresses Stern's claim that Kantian autonomy is compatible with value realism. Although this is an idea with which many contemporary readers will be sympathetic, I suggest that the textual evidence actually weighs in favor of constructivism. (shrink)