History of Chemistry

This chapter examines the work in chemistry that led to the discovery of boron and explores the implications of this episode for the scientific realism debate. This episode begins with Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity and his prediction that boracic acid contains oxygen and a hypothetical, combustible substance that he called the boracic radical. And it culminates in the work of Davy, Gay-Lussac, and Thénard, who used potassium to extract oxygen from boracic acid and thereby discovered boron. This episode constitutes (...) a novel predictive success of Lavoisier’s theory of acidity, which was not even approximately true. Selective realists attempt to accommodate such false-but-successful theories by showing that their success is due to the fact that they have approximately true parts. This episode poses a strong challenge to selective realism because the parts of Lavoisier’s theory that are responsible for its success are not even approximately true. (shrink)

This book examines the way in which Robert Boyle seeks to accommodate his complex chemical philosophy within the framework of a mechanistic theory of matter. More specifically, the book proposes that Boyle regards chemical qualities as properties that emerged from the mechanistic structure of chymical atoms. Within Boyle’s chemical ontology, chymical atoms are structured concretions of particles that Boyle regards as chemically elementary entities, that is, as chemical wholes that resist experimental analysis. Although this interpretation of Boyle’s chemical philosophy has (...) already been suggested by other Boyle scholars, the present book provides a sustained philosophical argument to demonstrate that, for Boyle, chemical properties are dispositional, relational, emergent, and supervenient properties. This argument is strengthened by a detailed mereological analysis of Boylean chymical atoms that establishes the kind of theory of wholes and parts that is most consistent with an emergentist conception of chemical properties. The emergentist position that is being attributed to Boyle supports his view that chemical reactions resist direct explanation in terms of the mechanistic properties of fundamental particles, as well as his position regarding the scientific autonomy of chymistry from mechanics and physics. (shrink)

This paper explores the experiments of the English mathematician Thomas Harriot on specific gravity in the years 1600-1605, as recorded in a series of manuscript notes in British Library Add. MS 6788. It examines the programme of reading undertaken by Harriot before these experiments, and describes a series of experiments conducted by him which compared the weight of a wide variety of substances in air and water. Harriot’s work is compared to that of his contemporary Marino Ghetaldi in Promotus Archimedis, (...) and the work of both mathematicians can be positioned in the context of sixteenth-century mathematical responses to the famous problem posed by Hiero, King of Syracuse to Archimedes. Harriot’s use of proportional mathematics in his experimental work and his application of this technique to problems in the alloying of metal and chymical analysis is examined in detail. (shrink)

This paper explores how a set of observations on the weight of lead were interpreted and assessed between the 1540s and the 1630s across three different interconnecting disciplines: medicine, mineralogy and chemistry. The epistemic import of these discussions will be demonstrated by showing: 1) the changing role and articulation of experience and quantification in the investigation of metals; and 2) the notions associated with weight in different disciplinary frameworks. In medicine and mineralogy, weight was not considered as a specific subject (...) of inquiry in itself, but as a “sign” indicating other relevant properties of metals. In contrast, the chemistry tradition was increasingly concerned with the specific investigation of weight as a property of matter, as seen in the debates that took place in the “chemical revolution.” In addition, this study will reveal the versatility, polysemy, and parallel purposes of the recourse to experiential knowledge in different contexts, where the same “facts” operate within different disciplines. (shrink)

In late Renaissance medicine, the example of digestion was frequently invoked to prove the elemental composition of the human body. Food was considered as being decomposed in its first elements by the stomach, and digested into a thick juice, which was assimilated by the liver and the body parts. Such a process points to the structure of the human body into four elements that are transformed into different types of humors during several stages of “concoction”. This chapter examines the Galenic (...) interpretation of digestion expounded by the French physician Jean Fernel (1497–1558) in his Physiologia (1567). In this treatise, Fernel states the body composition into elemental portions, while stressing the role of the “innate heat” as the physiological counterpart of the body’s essence or “substantial form”. He applies this view in his account of digestion, where he states that the conversion of food follows the rule of “mixture”. This chapter aims to explore how Fernel applies his interpretation of elements and innate heat to the process of digestion, as well as his sources in Galen’s De facultatibus naturalibus, Avicenna’s Canon and Aristotle’s Meteorologica. It first examines the role of the natural soul and its “nourishing” faculties in nutrition as a physiological function. It then considers the role of elements, humors and innate heat during the “concoction” of food in the stomach, liver and veins. (shrink)

Arthur Clark and Michael Kube–McDowell (“The Triger”, 2000) suggested the sci-fi idea about the direct transformation from a chemical substance to another by the action of a newly physical, “Trigger” field. Karl Brohier, a Nobel Prize winner, who is a dramatic persona in the novel, elaborates a new theory, re-reading and re-writing Pauling’s “The Nature of the Chemical Bond”; according to Brohier: “Information organizes and differentiates energy. It regularizes and stabilizes matter. Information propagates through matter-energy and mediates the interactions of (...) matter-energy.” Dr Horton, his collaborator in the novel replies: “If the universe consists of energy and information, then the Trigger somehow alters the information envelope of certain substances –“. “Alters it, scrambles it, overwhelms it, destabilizes it” Brohier adds. There is a scientific debate whether or how far chemistry is fundamentally reducible to quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the fact that many essential chemical properties and reactions are at least partly representable in terms of quantum mechanics is doubtless. For the quantum mechanics itself has been reformulated as a theory of a special kind of information, quantum information, chemistry might be in turn interpreted in the same terms. Wave function, the fundamental concept of quantum mechanics, can be equivalently defined as a series of qubits, eventually infinite. A qubit, being defined as the normed superposition of the two orthogonal subspaces of the complex Hilbert space, can be interpreted as a generalization of the standard bit of information as to infinite sets or series. All “forces” in the Standard model, which are furthermore essential for chemical transformations, are groups [U(1),SU(2),SU(3)] of the transformations of the complex Hilbert space and thus, of series of qubits. One can suggest that any chemical substances and changes are fundamentally representable as quantum information and its transformations. If entanglement is interpreted as a physical field, though any group above seems to be unattachable to it, it might be identified as the “Triger field”. It might cause a direct transformation of any chemical substance by from a remote distance. Is this possible in principle? (shrink)

In his account of scientific revolutions, Thomas Kuhn suggests that after a revolutionary change of theory, it is as if scientists are working in a different world. In this paper, we aim to show that the notion of world change is insightful. We contrast the reporting of the discovery of neon in 1898 with the discovery of hafnium in 1923. The one discovery was made when elements were identified by their atomic weight; the other discovery was made after scientists came (...) to classify elements by their atomic number. By considering two instances of the reporting of the discovery of a new chemical element 25 years apart, we argue that it becomes clear how chemists can be said to have been responding to different worlds as a result of the change in the concept of a chemical element. They saw, did, and reported different things as they conducted their research on the new chemical elements. (shrink)

One of several important issues that inform contemporary philosophy of chemistry is the issue of structural explanation, precisely because modern chemistry is primarily concerned with microstructure. This paper argues that concern over microstructure, albeit understood differently than it is today, also informs the chemical philosophy of Robert Boyle. According to Boyle, the specific microstructure of ‘chymical atoms’, understood in geometric terms, accounts for the unique essential properties of different chemical substances. Because he considers the microstructure of ‘chymical atoms’ as semi-permanent, (...) Boyle considers these stable entities as operationally irreducible, even if they are not ontologically fundamental. While it is generally believed that our contemporary concern over structural explanation is a function of modern chemistry’s emphasis on microstructure, this discussion of structural explanation in Boyle will serve as a case study to illustrate the manner in which many of our contemporary concerns have deeply historical origins and the manner in which the history of chemistry can substantively inform issues in contemporary philosophy of chemistry. (shrink)

Greatly detailed history of design changes of the eudiometer; unfortunately the annotation on many diagrams is illegible.

Since the early nineteenth century a membrane or wall has been central to the cell’s identity as the elementary unit of life. Yet the literally and metaphorically marginal status of the cell membrane made it the site of clashes over the definition of life and the proper way to study it. In this article I show how the modern cell membrane was conceived of by analogy to the first “artificial cell,” invented in 1864 by the chemist Moritz Traube (1826–1894), and (...) reimagined by the plant physiologist Wilhelm Pfeffer (1845–1920) as a precision osmometer. Pfeffer’s artificial cell osmometer became the conceptual and empirical basis for the law of dilute solutions in physical chemistry, but his use of an artificial analogue to theorize the existence of the plasma membrane as distinct from the cell wall prompted debate over whether biology ought to be more closely unified with the physical sciences, or whether it must remain independent as the science of life. By examining how the histories of plant physiology and physical chemistry intertwined through the artificial cell, I argue that modern biology relocated vitality from protoplasmic living matter to nonliving chemical substances—or, in broader cultural terms, that the disenchantment of life was accompanied by the (re)enchantment of ordinary matter. (shrink)

Roughly, instrumentalism is the view that science is primarily, and should primarily be, an instrument for furthering our practical ends. It has fallen out of favour because historically influential variants of the view, such as logical positivism, suffered from serious defects. -/- In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated and resilient than its predecessors. This position—‘cognitive instrumentalism’—involves three core theses. First, science makes theoretical progress primarily when it furnishes us with (...) more predictive power or understanding concerning observable things. Second, scientific discourse concerning unobservable things should only be taken literally in so far as it involves observable properties or analogies with observable things. Third, scientific claims about unobservable things are probably neither approximately true nor liable to change in such a way as to increase in truthlikeness. -/- There are examples from science throughout the book, and Rowbottom demonstrates at length how cognitive instrumentalism fits with the development of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century chemistry and physics, and especially atomic theory. Drawing upon this history, Rowbottom also argues that there is a kind of understanding, empirical understanding, which we can achieve without having true, or even approximately true, representations of unobservable things. In closing the book, he sets forth his view on how the distinction between the observable and unobservable may be drawn, and compares cognitive instrumentalism with key contemporary alternatives such as structural realism, constructive empiricism, and semirealism. -/- Overall, this book offers a strong defence of instrumentalism that will be of interest to scholars and students working on the debate about realism in philosophy of science. (shrink)

I critically examine Stewart’s suggestion that we should weigh the various predictions Mendeleev made differently. I argue that in his effort to justify discounting the weight of some of Mendeleev’s failures, Stewart invokes a principle that will, in turn, reduce the weight of some of the successful predictions Mendeleev made. So Stewart’s strategy will not necessarily lead to a net gain in Mendeleev’s favor.

I critically examine Stewart’s suggestion that we should weigh the various predictions Mendeleev made differently. I argue that in his effort to justify discounting the weight of some of Mendeleev’s failures, Stewart invokes a principle that will, in turn, reduce the weight of some of the successful predictions Mendeleev made. So Stewart’s strategy will not necessarily lead to a net gain in Mendeleev’s favor.

I draw attention to one of the most important sources of Kuhn’s ideas in Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Contrary to the popular trend of focusing on external factors in explaining Kuhn’s views, factors related to his social milieu or personal experiences, I focus on the influence of the books and articles he was reading and thinking about in the history of science, specifically, sources in the history of chemistry. I argue that there is good reason to think that the history (...) of chemistry had a profound influence on Kuhn’s thinking, and what is remarkable is that this has eluded our attention for so long. I also argue that his interest in the history of chemistry was due to the influence of James B. Conant and Leonard Nash. (shrink)

In seventeenth-century England agriculturalists, projectors and natural philosophers devoted special attention to the chemical investigation of plants, of soil composition and of fertilizers. Hugh Plat’s and Francis Bacon’s works became particularly influential in the mid-seventeenth century, and inspired much of the Hartlib Circle’s schemes and research for improving agriculture. The Hartlibians turned to chemistry in order to provide techniques for improving soil and to investigate plant generation and growth. They drew upon the Paracelsian chemistry of salts, as well as upon (...) the works of van Helmont and Glauber. Benjamin Worsley, Boyle’s scientific companion in the 1640s and 1650s, played a leading role in the Hartlib Circle’s research on saltpetre and on fertilizers. The Hartlib Circle’s research in agricultural chemistry shaped much of the research carried out by the Royal Society in the 1660s and in the 1670s. Daniel Coxe, who adopted Boyle’s chemical theories and pursued original experimental research on the composition of plants, played a central part in the early Royal Society’s agricultural projects and notably in the investigations of plants. (shrink)

Observations, experiments and inquiries into the world of plants figure prominently in Francis Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum. My purpose in this article is to offer a survey of this very rich and relatively under-investigated natural historical material, with the purpose of showing two things. First, I show that these inquiries unveil a sophisticated instrumental approach. Bacon treats plants as chemical laboratories in which one can investigate the fundamental processes of nature and the continuous ‘pneumatisation’ of matter. A detailed examination of this (...) instrumental approach can shed important light upon Bacon’s reductionist strategies of explanation. Second, I show that some of the experiments with plants recorded in the Sylva Sylvarum uncover several layers of theoretical vocabulary. In this experimental context, key concepts of Bacon’s natural philosophy are further refined and acquire new meanings. (shrink)

Today, the lipid bilayer structure is nearly ubiquitous, taken for granted in even the most rudimentary introductions to cell biology. Yet the image of the lipid bilayer, built out of lipids with heads and tails, went from having obscure origins deep in colloid chemical theory in 1924 to being “obvious to any competent physical chemist” by 1935. This chapter examines how this schematic, strictly heuristic explanation of the idea of molecular orientation was developed within colloid physical chemistry, and how the (...) image was transformed into a reflection of the reality and agency of lipid molecules in the biological microworld. Whereas in physical and colloid chemistry these images considered secondary to instrumental measurement and mathematical modeling of surface phenomena, in biology the manipulable image of the lipid on paper became an essential tool for the molecularization of the cell. (shrink)

Kant conceives of chemical dissolutions as involving the infinite division and subsequent blending of solvent and solute. In the resulting continuous solution, every subvolume contains a uniform proportion of each reactant. Erich Adickes argues that this account stands in tension with other aspects of Kant’s Critical philosophy and his views on infinity. I argue that although careful analysis of Kant’s conception of dissolution addresses Adickes’ objections, the infinite division inherent to the process is beyond our human cognition, for Kant. Nevertheless, (...) such infinite division may be considered as an idea of reason to make comprehensible chemical reactions, revealing reason to play a pivotal role in the foundations of chemistry. (shrink)

Kant’s preoccupation with architectonics is a characteristic and noteworthy aspect of his thought. Various features of Kant’s argumentation and philosophical system are founded on the precise definitions of the various subdomains of human knowledge and the derivative borders among them. One science conspicuously absent from Kant’s routine discussions of the organization of knowledge is chemistry. Whereas sciences such as physics, psychology, and anthropology are all explicitly located in the architectonic, chemistry finds no such place. In this paper, I examine neglected (...) passages from Kant’s corpus as well as texts regarding chemistry that Kant himself read in order to unveil his views on the definition of chemistry and its relations with the other sciences. These considerations reveal chemistry to be the science that studies the changes of matter into new kinds. Yet Kant idiosyncratically believes that such a change requires an infinite division of matter, effected by chemical forces. Although this understanding of chemical change dovetails with Kant’s dynamical, continualist theory of matter, it implies that chemistry cannot be reduced to physics. Thus, although chemistry stands alongside empirical physics as an applied natural science in Kant’s architectonic, it remains a distinct, independent science. (shrink)

Several recent studies of early modern natural philosophy have claimed that corpuscularism and experimental philosophy were sharply distinct or even conflicting views. This chapter provides a different perspective on the relation between corpuscularism and experimental philosophy by examining Domenico Guglielmini’s ‘Philosophical Reflections’ on salts (1688). This treatise on crystallography develops a corpuscularist theory and defends it in a way that is in line with the methodological prescriptions, epistemological strictures, and preferred argumentative styles of experimental philosophers. The examination of the ‘Reflections’ (...) shows that early modern philosophers could consistently endorse, at the same time, corpuscularism and experimental philosophy. (shrink)

This essay proposes to discuss the manner in which Jan Baptista van Helmont helped to transform the Neoplatonic notions of vital spirit and of ferment by giving these notions an unambiguously chemical interpretation, thereby influencing the eventual naturalization of these ideas in the work of late seventeenth century chymists. This chemical interpretation of vital spirit and ferment forms part of Helmont’s hybrid ontology, which fuses a corpuscular conception of minima naturalia with a non-corporeal conception of semina rerum. For Helmont, chemical (...) alterations involve the minima as physical units but also depend upon ferments that are contained in the semina, which function as formative spiritual agents. Helmont’s nuanced ontology ultimately contributes to the development of modern corpuscularian theory by explaining many chemical reactions in fundamentally corpuscular terms, as the addition and subtraction of particles. (shrink)

Having refuted the phlogiston theory, Lavoisier uses this second portion of his essay to expound his new theory of combustion, based on the oxygen principle. He gives a mechanistic account of thermodynamic phenomena in terms of a subtle fluid and its ability to penetrate porous bodies. He uses this hypothetical fluid to explain volume changes, heat capacity and latent heat. Beyond the three types of combustion that he distinguishes and defines, Lavoisier also explains other chemical sources of heat, such as (...) the heat of solution. (shrink)

Lavoisier and his allies should be regarded as philosophers of chemistry, for they took it upon themselves to carry out a scientific revolution. Inspired by enlightenment philosophy, they introduced new assumptions, apparatus and methods of experimentation. They provided a linguistic framework that would ensure These reforms, as much as any theoretical changes, are what make this period revolutionary. Moreover, by reading these scientists as philosophers of chemistry, we see that the Chemical Revolution was in many ways more revolutionary than Thomas (...) Kuhn and other philosophers of science portray it. (shrink)

In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (MAN), Kant claims that chemistry is an improper, though rational science. The chemistry to which Kant confers this status is the phlogistic chemistry of, for instance, Georg Stahl. In his Opus Postumum (OP), however, Kant espouses a broadly Lavoiserian conception of chemistry. In particular, Kant endorses Antoine Lavoisier's elements, oxygen theory of combustion, and role for the caloric. As Lavoisier's lasting contribution to chemistry, according to some histories of the science, was his emphasis on (...) quantitative methods, Kant's assimilation of the chemical revolution raises the question: did Kant continue to think of chemistry as an improper, though rational, science in OP? In this paper, I answer this question affirmatively. I explain that a proper science requires a priori laws for the mathematical construction of its objects: the mere use of quantitative measurements is insufficient for the satisfaction this requirement. Further, I argue, contra Burkhard Tuschling, that in OP Kant retains a central role for mathematical construction in the foundations of proper natural science. Finally, I contend that the prominent a priori components of chemistry discussed in OP—the aether and the enumeration of the elements—do not make chemistry into a proper science. (shrink)

Invited review of the anthology of new papers _Philosophy of Chemistry: Growth of a New Discipline_.

This seminal paper, which marks a turning point of the chemical revolution, is presented for the first time in a complete English translation. In this first half Lavoisier undermines phlogiston chemistry by arguing that his French contemporaries had replaced Stahl’s original theory with radically different systems that conceptualised the phlogiston principle in completely incompatible ways. He refutes their claims by showing that these later models were riddled with inconsistencies as to phlogiston’s weight, its ability to penetrate glass and its role (...) as a source of colour and odour in chemical compounds. (shrink)

Quine, taking the molecular constitution of matter as a paradigmatic example, offers an account of the relation between theory confirmation and ontology. Elsewhere, he deploys a similar ontological methodology to argue for the existence of mathematical objects. Penelope Maddy considers the atomic/molecular theory in more historical detail. She argues that the actual ontological practices of science display a positivistic demand for “direct observation,” and that fulfillment of this demand allows us to distinguish molecules and other physical objects from mathematical abstracta. (...) However, the confirmation of the atomic/molecular theory and the development of scientists’ ontological attitudes towards atoms was more complicated and subtle than even Maddy supposes. The present paper argues that the history of the theory in fact supports neither Quine’s and Maddy’s accounts of scientific ontology. There was no general demand from scientists to “see” atoms before they were reckoned to be real; but neither did the indispensable appearance of atoms in the best theory of chemical combination suffice to convince scientists of their reality. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem’s (1861-1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter traditionally has been attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, the traditional view has been challenged by the new claim that Duhem’s opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories at the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper, I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem’s opposition to atomism, and provide (...) a new framework in which to understand Duhem's rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem’s philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem’s resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics. (shrink)

This essay explores the gendered lifestyle of early twentieth-century physics and chemistry and shows how that way of life was produced through linking science and home. In 1905, the Swedish physical chemist Svante Arrhenius married Maja Johansson and established a scientific household at the Nobel Institute for Physical Chemistry in Stockholm. He created a productive context for research in which ideas about marriage and family were pivotal. He also socialized in similar scientific sites abroad. This essay displays how scholars in (...) the international community circulated the gendered lifestyle through frequent travel and by reproducing gendered behavior. Everywhere, husbands and wives were expected to perform distinct duties. Shared performances created loyalties across national divides. The essay thus situates the physical sciences at the turn of the twentieth century in a bourgeois gender ideology. Moreover, it argues that the gendered lifestyle was not external to knowledge making but, rather, foundational to laboratory life. A legitimate and culturally intelligible lifestyle produced the trust and support needed for collaboration. In addition, it enabled access to prestigious facilities for Svante Arrhenius, ultimately securing his position in international physical chemistry. (shrink)

Besides the presentation and conclusions, the chapter is divided into two equally important sections. The first one describes the modern development of atomic and molecular structure, emphasising some of the philosophical problems that have been taken, and those that have to be faced in its understanding. The second discusses the alternative conceptions and difficulties of students of different educational levels and also the different approaches to its historical or philosophical teaching. Finally, we recognise the necessity for science teachers to assume (...) a specific historical-philosophical position. (shrink)

To those of us who are sold on history, it may seem non-controversial to suggest that the learning and teaching of chemistry should give cognisance to the historical development of the subject. However, this suggestion is proving controversial amongst some in the chemistry profession. For example, in the October 2010 edition of Chemistry in Australia, Rami Ibo takes issue with the emphasis on the history of science in the HSC chemistry curriculum (Year 12) in New South Wales. He studied chemistry, (...) physics and biology for his HSC in NSW and concluded that, because the primary focus of these three sciences was History of Science, ‘There was hardly any content that challenged our minds, and calculations barely involved plugging in numbers into an equation…. We were required to recall Antoine Lavoisier’s experiments that led to the theories of acids and bases… while my friends in Lebanon were studying ideal gas laws, chemical kinetics, acids and bases, organic chemistry, soaps and detergents, medicinal chemistry and new materials’ (Ibo, Chemistry in Australia 77(9): 5, 2010). What does the literature have to say in response to such arguments? Does the presence of the history of chemistry in a curriculum necessarily reduce important content and problem-solving skills? -/- A study of the literature suggests at least three reasons for persisting with aspects of the history of chemistry in the learning and teaching of chemistry. -/- The fact that student conceptions sometimes recapitulate early ideas found in the history of chemistry is seen as offering teachers a means of a deeper understanding of student ideas with the potential for more positive learning outcomes. -/- Conceptual clarity is more easily achieved within an historical context. Often conceptual usefulness is pursued at the expense of conceptual depth (de Berg, Conceptual Depth and Conceptual Usefulness in Chemistry: Issues and Challenges for Chemistry Educators. In I. V. Eriksson (Ed.), Science Education in the 21st Century (pp. 165–182). New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008a). -/- The history of chemistry directly gives us some idea of the epistemological status of chemistry within science and knowledge in general and therefore gives a student access to aspects of the Nature of Science. -/- This review chapter also examines different ways the history of chemistry has been incorporated into chemistry curricula and looks at the purported advantages, disadvantages and limitations of such attempts. Some directions for future research in this area are included in the chapter. (shrink)

In this chapter, we review recent trends in the philosophy of chemistry and its applications in chemical education. Chemistry has maintained quite a peripheral existence in the philosophy of science for a long time, thus evading focused attention and critical analysis. However, since the 1990s an increasing number of books, journals, conferences and associations focused on philosophy of chemistry highlighting the contributions of chemistry to philosophy of science (Bhushan and Rosenfeld, Of minds and molecules: new philosophical perspectives on chemistry. Oxford (...) University Press, Oxford, 2000; Hendry, The metaphysics of chemistry. Oxford University Press, 2012; McIntyre and Scerri, Synthese 111(3):211–212, 1997; Scerri and McIntyre, Synthese 111(3):213–232, 1997; Schummer, The philosophy of chemistry: From infancy toward maturity. In: Baird D, Scerri E, McIntyre L (eds) Philosophy of chemistry: synthesis of a new discipline. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 19–39, 2006; Van Brakel, Ambix 57(2):233–234, 2010; Van Brakel, Synthese 111(3):253–282, 1997; Woody, Philosophy of Science 67 (Proceedings):S612–S627, 2000). The uptake of this new domain in the context of chemical education research and practice has been minimal despite some earlier acknowledgment of the potential significance for chemical education (Erduran, Science & Education 10:581–593, 2001; Gilbert et al. Research and development for the future of chemical education. In: Gilbert et al. (eds) Chemical education: towards research-based practice. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 391–408, 2003). The special edition of the Science & Education journal on ‘Philosophy, Chemistry and Education: An Introduction’ (Erduran, Science & Education, 2013) is the first collection where the work on the applications of philosophy of chemistry in chemical education has been collated. This chapter will begin with an overview of some of the key and example debates in philosophy of chemistry. These examples will include themes such as reductionism (e.g. Scerri, Journal of Chemical Education 68(2):122–126, 1991) and supervenience (e.g. Papineau, Arguments for supervenience and physical realization. In: Savellos EE, Yalcin U (eds) supervenience: new essays. Cambridge University Press, 1995) as well as aspects of chemical knowledge such as laws (e.g. Christie and Christie, “Laws” and “theories” in chemistry do not obey the rules. In: Bhushan N, Rosenfeld S (eds) Of minds and molecules. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 34–50, 2000), models (e.g. Woody, Science & Education, 2013) and explanations (e.g. Hendry, The chemical bond: structure, energy and explanation. In: Dorato M, Redei M, Suarez M (eds) EPSA: Philosophical issues in the sciences: launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer, Berlin, pp 117–127, 2010.). Second, the implications of these themes for chemical education research and practice will be explored. The central argument is that understanding of how chemistry is conceptualised and how chemistry is learned, chemical education research has to be informed by the debates about the epistemology and ontology of chemistry. The discussion will be contextualised in the area of nature of science (NOS) that has been one of the highly studied areas of research in science education (Chang et al. Journal of Science Education and Technology, 2010). Contributions of how philosophy of chemistry can contribute to the characterisation of NOS by nuanced perspectives on the nature of chemistry will be discussed. Theoretical perspectives and empirical studies on NOS have tended to focus on domain-general aspects of scientific knowledge with limited understanding of domain-specific ways of thinking. NOS literature can be further developed both theoretically and empirically, thereby contributing more to HPS studies in science education. Third, some applications of philosophy of chemistry in chemical education will be reviewed in more detail. For example, proposed work for secondary chemical education, including the context of the teaching of periodic law through argumentation, will be visited (e.g. Erduran, Foundations of Chemistry 9(3):247–263, 2007). Fourth, the chapter will argue that there is developing potential for reciprocal interplay between philosophy of chemistry and chemical education. While philosophy of chemistry has the potential to influence chemistry education, chemistry education in turn can influences philosophy of chemistry, particularly in relation to empirical foundations of chemical reasoning. The paper will conclude with some recommendations on the future directions of research in chemical education that is informed by philosophy of chemistry. (shrink)

E. J. Holmyard was a distinguished scholar and schoolmaster in England in the first half of the twentieth century. After graduating from Cambridge in both natural science and history, he quickly established a reputation for his research into the early history of chemistry, especially Islamic alchemy, and for his advocacy of a historical approach to the teaching of science. Both these interests found expression in his large number of school chemistry textbooks, many of which were highly successful and innovative publications, (...) placing chemistry in its wider historical and cultural contexts and offering insights into what today would be called ‘the nature of science’. This essay explores the historical method of science teaching with particular reference to Holmyard’s ideas and his authorship of textbooks and comments upon why the history of science has featured so prominently in the history of school science education. (shrink)

I reply in this short note to some criticisms that Alan Rocke has recently made in this journal.

A recent paper by Hoyningen-Huene argues that the Chemical Revolution is an excellent example of the success of Kuhn’s theory. This paper gives a succinct account of some counter-arguments and briefly refers to some further existing counter-arguments. While Kuhn’s theory does have a small number of more or less successful elements, it has been widely recognised that in general Kuhn’s theory is a “preformed and relatively inflexible framework” (1962, p. 24) which does not fit particular historical examples well; this paper (...) clarifies that those examples include the Chemical Revolution. (shrink)

Contribution to a symposium on Kostas Gavroglu and Ana Simões, Neither Physics nor Chemistry, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.