History of Western Philosophy

While Kant’s position concerning human freedom and divine foreknowledge is perhaps the least Molinist element of his multifaceted take on free will, Kant’s Molinism (minimally defined) is undeniable when it comes to the threat ensuing from the idea of creation. In line with incompatibilism and with careful qualifications in place, he ultimately suggests regarding free agents as uncreated. Given the limitations of our rational insight, this assumption is indispensable for granting that finite free agents can acquire their intelligible characters by (...) themselves. Nonetheless, Kant concedes that creation may, as a matter of fact, be compatible with what for Molina is the pre-volitionality of the counterfactuals of freedom. (shrink)

Philosophy strives to give us a firmer hold on our concepts. But what about their hold on us? Why place ourselves under the sway of a concept and grant it the authority to shape our thought and conduct? Another conceptualization would carry different implications. What makes one way of thinking better than another? This book develops a framework for concept appraisal. Its guiding idea is that questioning the authority of concepts asks for reasons of a special kind: reasons for concept (...) use, which tell us which concepts to adopt, adhere to, or abandon, thereby shoring up—or undercutting—the reasons for action and belief that guide our deliberations. Traditionally, reasons for concept use have been sought either in timeless rational foundations or in concepts’ inherent virtues, such as precision and consistency. Against this, the book advances two main claims: that we find reasons for concept use in the conceptual needs we discover when we critically distance ourselves from a concept by viewing it from the autoethnographic stance; and that sometimes, concepts that conflict, or exhibit other vices such as vagueness or superficiality, are just what we need. By considering not what concepts are absolutely best, but what concepts we now need, we can reconcile ourselves to the contingency of our concepts, determine the proper place of efforts to tidy up thought, and adjudicate between competing ways of understanding contested notions like liberty or free will. A needs-based approach separates helpful clarification from hobbling tidy-mindedness, and authoritative definition from conceptual gerrymandering. (shrink)

The ingenious thought of Anton Günther (1783–1863) is rarely mentioned in the annals of nineteenth-century philosophy. However, in the eyes of his contemporaries, Günther belonged to the key thinkers of his age on par with Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Günther was an original writer yet he left many of his insights undeveloped or ambiguously formulated. As a flamboyant and popular debater, he attacked the most influential philosophers of his time. His attacks were aimed especially at what he termed the (...) unavoidable pantheism of these thinkers, a pantheism Günther often identified with monism. Monism, semi-monism, pantheism, and semi-pantheism are recurring charges of Günther against many influential thinkers, including even Descartes, whose thought Günther considered otherwise epoch-making. Based on a reformed Cartesianism, Günther elaborated his antidote he termed dualism. Yet Güntherian dualism turns out to be a synthesis properly termed organicism. On such a basis, Günther carried out a heroic attempt to transcend the horizon of traditional views and open the vista of an I-centered philosophy built on the universal notion of revelation. By re-reading this Bohemia-born thinker, one can have a better understanding of the scope and influence of what we term Austrian Philosophy. (shrink)

Heresies are intrinsically intertwined with the evolution and inner growth of the very religions that denounce them. They serve as theological junctures, challenging and thus refining the orthodoxy of religious beliefs. The Pelagian heresy touches on one of the central tenets of Christian theology: the question of salvation. Pelagianism posits that human beings retain freedom of the will and, more specifically, the capacity to earn salvation through their own merits rather than relying solely on the grace of God in Christ. (...) This stands in contrast to the predominant Christian view that Original Sin fundamentally impaired man’s will and intellect. A central tenet of Christianity is that through His suffering and death on the Cross, Christ atoned for humanity’s Original Sin and paved the way for our redemption. But what exactly made this redemption possible through the suffering and death on the Cross? Unlike many of the answers offered, Abelard’s explanation, also referred to as exemplarism, resonates with modern sensibilities: Christ set an example to imitate, and through this imitation, man learns humility and love. However, this stance faced criticism and was condemned by Bernard of Clairvaux as having Pelagian tendencies because it suggests that Christ’s redemptive work might not inherently require Christ’s divine nature. This study will attempt to defend the exemplaristic approach while ensuring Christ’s essential role and addressing criticisms against the Pelagian heresy. This discussion is further enriched by an examination of the Eucharist, illuminating the theological tension between symbolic and realistic interpretations of religious rites. (shrink)

It can be tempting to read Iris Murdoch as subscribing to the same position as standard contemporary moral realists. Her language is often similar to theirs and they share some key commitments, most importantly the rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, it is a mistake to assume that her realism amounts to the same thing theirs does. In this paper I offer a sketch of her alternative conception of realism, which centres on the idea that truth and reality are fundamentally (...) ethical concepts. For Murdoch, I suggest, realism is a matter of doing justice to the objects one is confronted with—something that cannot be understood except in ethical terms. (shrink)

Cette étude s’attache à comprendre l’argument d’Anselme dans le contexte de l’oeuvre de son auteur. Après un exposé de la ligne argumentative, il s’agit de réexaminer le projet d’Anselme, d’abord dans le Proslogion, puis par rapport à la démarche discursive du Monologion. Ce qui émerge est une tentative de la créature raisonnable de s’élever vers Dieu en pensant rationnellement la modalité d’existence de son créateur. Sur ce chemin, elle expérimente et identifie les limites de son intelligence.

"The Third Being" presents texts by A.V. Bronnikov, written from 2011–2019 and is devoted to issues regarding the philosophy of art, creativity and language. If the first being is the being of the eternal and divine and the second being is that of the temporary and human, then the new, third, being appears as the intersection and continuation of the first two. The third being is seen and anticipated in art—in the timeless and indestructible reality created by man, in the (...) reality of a poetic word that raises the world and its things to the level of form, image and idea. The book compares approaches to the philosophy of art and the theory of language by H.-G. Gadamer, M. Heidegger, G. Frege, R. Ingarden, R. Bart, L. Wittgenstein and J. Derrida. An important place is given to Russian religious philosophy, presented by P. A. Florensky, S. N. Bulgakov, N. A. Berdyaev and others. The publication contains essays on the life and work of poets R. M. Rilke, E. Pound and T. S. Eliot, as well as the first Russian translation of J. Derrida's “Advances,” known as the postmodern commentary on Plato's “Timaeus.” -/- Contents: Russia in Rilke / Plato's ideality of text / Word and world / Art as reality / Sacrality of art / Cosmists / Florensky space / Serial music of "Four Quartets" / Philosophy of "The Cantos" / Ezra Pound and his "Cantos" / Poetry: a breakthrough to reality / At the origin of the world / J. Derrida's "Advances". (shrink)

L’article présente un regard synthétique sur les enjeux de la philosophie de la nature de l’idéalisme allemand. Il montre pourquoi la philosophie hégélienne de la nature doit être lue non pas seulement comme la chute de l’idée dans une extériorité sans esprit, mais aussi comme la chance de l’esprit qui veut penser le réel tel qu’il est. Il compare cela à l’opposition de la gravité et de la lumière dans la philosophie de la nature de Schelling, et fait finalement une (...) hypothèse sur l’utilité de la Naturphilosophie aujourd’hui. (shrink)

L’article se propose de réintégrer Spinoza dans l’histoire des preuves de l’existence de Dieu et d’interroger, dans ce but, le cartésianisme de Spinoza.

L’argument ontologique de l’existence de Dieu n'est pas seulement un argument de l’existence de Dieu. C’est la réflexion de la pensée sur ses propres conditions, fondements et limites. Cet essai examine cette auto-réflexion de la pensée, en particulier en ce qui concerne la version kantienne de la preuve ontologique. Il affirme que l’argument ontologique consiste en la dépotentialisation de la pensée par elle-même.

Concept à significations multiples, le sens commun désigne chez Bergson tantôt un contenu de croyances naïves et répandues, tantôt l’effort par lequel on fait un tri parmi les croyances. En serrant de près ces deux acceptions principales, nous chercherons ici à éclairer l’apport philosophique que Bergson attribue par moments au sens commun. Il s’agira donc de faire ressortir combien Bergson développe une conception positive du sens commun lorsqu’il l’associe au bon sens et l’envisage comme la disposition à faire volte-face, c’est-à-dire (...) à se régler sur les particularités du réel. (shrink)

Cet article se demande pourquoi Kant évoque une preuve ontologique de l’existence de Dieu dans l’ Opus postumum après l’avoir abandonnée dans la Critique de la raison pure. Il met d’abord en lumière l’importance des critiques des Schwärmer pour qui la religion n’est pas une affaire de la raison. Puis il montre comment Kant y répond en posant un lien analytique entre Dieu et la loi morale dans la Critique de la raison pratique et en érigeant la théologie en « (...) principe suprême » de la philosophie transcendantale dans l’ Opus postumum. Il conclut que Dieu existe dans la reconnaissance du sujet dans le monde. (shrink)

Bobzien’s reply to a defamatory blogpost on her essay ‘Frege plagiarized the Stoics’. (This is a minor contribution to the discussion of 'Frege plagiarized the Stoics', simply setting the record straight. It contains no important philosophical content.).

[DRAFT] Paper presented at Congress for Doctoral Researchers in Philosophy, Tampere University, 25.–27.10. 2021. The Paper strives to flesh out Gilbert Simondon's notion of information as a multifaced process (transduction-modulation-organization) from the viewpoint of living (/biological) beings.

Digital technologies are changing our understanding of ethical emulation. In this article, Matthew Dennis proposes that some social media technologies have given rise to a strikingly new set of ethical ideals, often concerned with the ideal of self-cultivation. While there is relatively little philosophical discussion of these kinds of ideals, Dennis suggests that scrutiny of Friedrich Nietzsche's ethical philosophy offers a guiding account of why the ideal of self-directed character change is important. He concludes by speculating on how the digital (...) affordances of social media technologies will change the way in which ethical exemplars influence future generations. (shrink)

The reason for the lexical transformation of classical Latin auctor and auctoritas into Neo-Latin author and authoritas has remained obscure outside of specialist literature. This note offers a consolidated account of the matter in English. Based on a minor misreading of Priscian’s Institutiones grammaticae by glossators active at the turn of the thirteenth century, a back-formation of Latin author by analogy with Greek αὐθέντης and αὐθεντία was proposed by humanist scholars in the sixteenth century. Once introduced, the Neo-Latin fricative th (...) dropped out or was never fully adopted into any of the European vernaculars except English, where it nonetheless survives in ‘author’ and its derivatives today. (shrink)

Nietzsche employs the concept of pregnancy metaphorically at various points in his writings; discussing the pregnancy of philosophers (GM III 8, BGE 292), spiritual pregnancy (EH, Clever 3; GS 72) and being pregnant with thoughts or deeds (D 552). I explore how Nietzsche uses the notion of pregnancy in Dawn, arguing that it connects to the theme of self-cultivation. I employ the various associations that Nietzsche makes with pregnancy, including the unknown, selfishness, strangeness, and solitude, to elucidate Nietzsche’s understanding of (...) self-cultivation. I show how the metaphor of pregnancy, in which we do not control what we give birth to, both expresses and helps us explore the problem of what, if the self is made up of and directed by many competing drives, shapes and directs self-cultivation. I argue that Nietzsche’s deliberate references to the context of Plato’s discussion of pregnancy involve a self-conscious challenge to Plato’s concept of the philosopher, and of philosophy, and a reimagining of what they will give birth to. The appropriation of Plato’s famous metaphor thus underscores how Nietzsche’s concept and method of self-cultivation contrasts to Plato’s care for the soul and is rooted in attentiveness to the body and its drives. (shrink)

In this article, we re-examine Pascal’s Mugging, and argue that it is a deeper problem than the St. Petersburg paradox. We offer a way out that is consistent with classical decision theory. Specifically, we propose a “many muggers” response analogous to the “many gods” objection to Pascal’s Wager. When a very tiny probability of a great reward becomes a salient outcome of a choice, such as in the offer of the mugger, it can be discounted on the condition that there (...) are many other symmetric, non-salient rewards that one may receive if one chooses otherwise. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of Giordano Bruno’s philosophy is the marriage of universal animation with atomism. This unusual combination produced an extraordinary image of the universe, which was governed by the World-Soul and its universal intellect along with an infinite number of living atoms or corpuscles, animated by their internal spiritual principle. After examining Bruno’s principal arguments on the World-Soul, universal animation and living atoms or corpuscles, this article explores two possible sources among the works of his near-contemporaries. (...) The first author, Agostino Steuco, tried to reconcile the doctrine of the World-Soul with Christianity, integrating the idea of Anaxagoras on the cosmic mind as the demiurgic agent of the universe. The second figure, Jacob Schegk, further elaborated his unusual atomistic or corpuscular reinterpretation of this Presocratic philosopher’s ideas. (shrink)

The paper offers a new reading of the argument against poetry in Republic 10. I argue that Socrates’ corruption charges rely on the tripartite theory of the soul, and that metaphysical doctrines play a role only in the first charge, which demonstrates that the poets are not qualified to teach by reducing tragic poetry to mimetic skill. This accusation clears the way for two corruption charges: the strengthening of appetite, and the softening of spirit (i.e., ‘the greatest charge’). The former (...) focuses on the dangerous association between the poets and the largest appetitive class in the city (hoi polloi), while the latter focuses on the corruption of the educated elite (hoi epieikeis). (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse conceptions of induction and certainty in Wolff and Crusius, highlighting their competing conceptions of physics. We discuss (i) the perspective of Wolff, who assigned induction an important role in physics, but argued that physics should be an axiomatic science containing certain statements, and (ii) the perspective of Crusius, who adopted parts of the ideal of axiomatic physics but criticized the scope of Wolff’s ideal of certain science. Against interpretations that take Wolff’s proofs in physics to (...) be based on empirical statements that are probable, we show how inductively established statements, coupled with assumptions concerning the uniformity of nature, can be certain according to Wolff. We further study Crusius’ little known work on physics and show that he attacked Wolff, arguing that many statements of physics are probable. We provide discussion of the reception of methodological rules similar to Newton’s Regulae Philosophandi, discussing different interpretations of such rules. We conclude by briefly hinting at how the debate between Wolff and Crusius provides historical context for understanding Kant’s philosophy of natural science. (shrink)

The encounter of the medieval Muslims with Greek philosophy undeniably shaped the course of their philosophical and theological thought. This encounter led to the complex and contentious issue of ‘philosophy versus theology’. Medieval Muslim thinkers needed to develop a response to the issue of philosophy versus theology. The present article will first highlight the response of the Islamic theologians to their encounter with Greek philosophy in the form of three major trends in medieval Islamic theology: (1) strong opposition to the (...) application of reason and rationalist approach to Islamic doctrines, and strict adherence to the actual text of the Qur’an and the Hadith, (2) the adoption of Greek philosophy, and the application of reason and rationalist approach to explain and defend Islamic religion and (3) acknowledging the significance of reason in exploring the matters related to the natural world but, at the same time, stressing the subordination of reason to revelation. This article will discuss Atharism, Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism as the representatives of the first, second and third trends, respectively. The response of the medieval Islamic theologians to the issue of philosophy versus theology serves as a context in which medieval Muslim philosophers carried out their philosophy–theology debate. The article will proceed to show that some medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Abu Bakr Al-Razi, subordinated religion or revelation to philosophy or reason. Other medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Al-Ghazali, subordinated philosophy to theology. The third group of medieval Islamic philosophers represented by Alfarabi argued for the reconciliation and harmonious co-existence of philosophy and religion. Contribution: This article highlights the response of medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers to the issue of philosophy versus theology that was caused by their encounter with Greek philosophy. (shrink)

In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir diagnoses “woman” as the “lost sex,” torn between her individual autonomy and her “feminine destiny.” Becoming a “real woman” in patriarchal societies demands that women lose their authentic, autonomous selves to become the “inessential Other” for Man. To better understand this diagnosis and how women might refind themselves, I rehabilitate the influence of Søren Kierkegaard and his concept of repetition as what must be lost to be found again in Beauvoir’s account of freedom (...) and, specifically, the liberation of women. Beauvoir offers a dual account of repetition, that of mundane repetition and sacrificial repetition, bringing them to bear both on her diagnosis of women’s oppression and her theorization of our liberation. Sacrificial repetition becomes a temporality for freedom—one must be able to repeat or retake their autonomy continuously toward an open future. For this to happen concretely, Beauvoir insists that we must sacrifice the (racist, classist) patriarchal ideals of the “real woman” and “real man” as we retake our autonomy and reconfigure the meaning of sex difference anew. (shrink)

The paper is about the Soviet philosopher Valentin Ferdinandovich Asmus (1894–1975) and his criticism of the fascist and Nazi appropriation of Hegel’s philosophy. The status of the Hegelian legacy was very controversial in Marxism-Leninism throughout the Stalinist era. Unlike the majority of Soviet academics of this time, Asmus did not recognize any valid intellectual legacy at the base of German fascism. Asmus heavily criticized attempts to portray Hegel as a pro-fascist thinker. When many Soviet philosophers defended only the method, dialectics, (...) Asmus defended Hegel’s social and political views as humanistic and liberal. The first part of the article describes the “official” Soviet philosophy within the context of which Asmus had to act. The second part offers a comprehensive analysis of the criticism of Hegel’s fascist interpretation in Asmus’ Fascist Falsification of Classical German Philosophy (1942). (shrink)

The article demonstrates unity in Plato’s thought to a degree not heretofore realized and suggests analytical links to developments in logic, metaphysics and epistemology millennia later, substantiating Whitehead's famous comment that ‘the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.’.

Early in his career, Valentin Asmus gave a polemical lecture on Descartes’s dialectics, and during the “Thaw” he published a book on René Descartes’s life and scientific work. Asmus was the guardian of classical philosophical culture in the worst of times, when it was attacked by ideologically biased and semi-literate “Red professors.” They proclaimed Descartes founder of “modern idealism” and of a “mechanical worldview” hostile to dialectics. Asmus responded by arguing that Descartes had contributed much to the development of the (...) dialectic and materialist view of the world—this was the only possible way to rehabilitate Descartes’s philosophical legacy from ideological accusations. In his 1956 book, Asmus gave an overview of Descartes’s philosophy as a whole. He was fluent in the philosophical techniques of Marxist histmat (short for “historical materialism”); at the same time, the portrait he draws of Descartes clearly shows the Kantian way of thinking, which Asmus learned from the schoolroom in the pre-revolutionary period. (shrink)

이 글은 칸트 특유의 ‘실천이성’ 개념을 중심으로 칸트의 행위이론을 다룬다. 먼저, 칸트의 고유한 이성 개념, 즉 ‘실천이성’의 의미를 분명히 한 뒤, 도덕 외적인 차원까지 포괄하여 칸트의 행위 개념을 고찰한 다음, 칸트 철학에서 도덕적 행위이론을 위한 전제들을 탐구한다(Ⅱ). 다음으로, 자연인과성에서 귀결되는 행위 일반과는 다른 종류의 인과성 및 다른 행위의 가능성을 탐구한 뒤, 『도덕형이상학 정초』의 실천이성과 의지의 동일시 논변을 중심으로 자유로운 행위의 성립 조건과 실천적 필연성 혹은 이성의 강요(필연화)를 살펴본다(Ⅲ). 이를 통해 이 글은 도덕적 행위에 대한 칸트의 설명이 훨씬 더 복잡한 중층 (...) 구조를 지닌다는 점을 부각하고자 했다. (shrink)

This paper aims to examine Kant's views on evolution of organized beings and to show that Kant's antievolutionary conclusions stem from his study of natural history and variability of organisms. Accordingly, I discuss Kant's study of natural history and consider whether his conclusion about impossibility of knowledge about such history expands on the research of history of organized beings. Moving forward, I examine the notion of variability in Kant's philosophy, and show that his theory of organized beings relies on the (...) preformationist conception of variability that provides limited insight into the history of organisms. I explain that Kant's endorsement of preformationism is conditioned by a lack of knowledge about the mechanism that successfully explains adaptation and transmutation of organisms leading towards the creation of new species. Finally, I sumarize the following reasons for Kant's rejection of the hypothesis of evolution: lack of cognitive ability to discover all changes of natural phenomena in different periods of time and adoption of preformationist conception of variability of organized beings. I finish off with a discussion about mechanical inexplicability of organisms and find a third reason Kant believes that the idea of evolution is only "a daring adventure on the part of reason". (shrink)

The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof (...) to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je défends l’idée selon laquelle l’affirmation d’une compatibilité entre le perspectivisme de Nietzsche et le réalisme constitue une option philologique et philosophique théoriquement plus satisfaisante que la mobilisation de Nietzsche sous la bannière de l’antiréalisme – aux côté de penseurs tels que Quine, Rorty ou Derrida). Il devient en effet alors possible de voir comment Nietzsche met place une critique stratégique des valeurs, une écriture gouvernée par ce que je propose de nommer le « trope du redoublement (...) », et une conception originale du rapport entre sens, intérêts et états de choses. (shrink)

L’avènement de la biomédecine moderne est souvent considéré comme une avancée majeure. Cependant, l’ humanisme médical remet en question l’idée que la biomédecine actuelle et son système de santé soient (encore) suffisamment tournés vers des valeurs humanistes telles que la dignité, l’autonomie, l’individualité, l’empathie ou l’humilité. À côté de la biomédecine, il existe cependant de nombreuses approches relevant de la médecine non conventionnelle qui affirment fréquemment être davantage holistiques ou empathiques que la biomédecine. Cette contribution souhaite donc examiner si la (...) médecine dite complémentaire, alternative et intégrative (MCAI) pourrait mieux correspondre aux valeurs attribuées à l’humanisme médical que la biomédecine. (shrink)

Plusieurs aspects du modèle biopsychosocial promeuvent une approche humaniste en médecine. Cependant, Engel a explicitement rejeté un humanisme médical qui s’opposerait à la science. En adoptant une approche fondée sur la science des systèmes pour étudier les êtres humains, la santé et la maladie, Engel défend une approche scientifique pour améliorer la qualité des soins cliniques, ou autrement dit, une approche qui se prête à un examen scientifique de cette question.

Une médecine plus humaniste serait une médecine où les professionnels de santé feraient preuve de plus d’empathie envers leurs patients. Or s’il est difficile d’attester un déclin de l’empathie en médecine en l’attribuant au modèle biomédical, l’empathie n’est pas sans défaut. Cela ne signifie pas la mort de l’humanisme médical. Il est possible de le faire reposer sur un concept minimal de compassion et de lui intégrer une approche basée sur les systèmes de santé. L’humanisme ainsi défendu n’est plus empathique, (...) mais il est aussi plus convaincant. (shrink)

Abordant les situations de soin prodigué à la personne malade et/ou en perte d’autonomie, cet article explore de manière privilégiée les ressources offertes par la pensée du care, afin de répondre à la critique d’un défaut d’humanité adressée aux institutions médicale ou médicalisées ou aux pourvoyeurs de soin à domicile. L’article analyse en quoi consiste l’attention à autrui selon cette pensée et s’intéresse aux implications de la politisation du care.

En el presente artículo se abordarán los aportes de Nietzsche, Freud y Marx, como fundadores de discurso, desde la perspectiva foucaultiana. Para ello, se trabajará con la ponencia "Nietzsche, Freud y Marx" realizada por Foucault en 1964. Foucault condensa en esta ponencia una obra que resulta muy rica, debido a que sintetiza de manera clara los aportes realizados por los "maestros de la sospecha". La riqueza de la obra radica en que expone un giro en las técnicas de la interpretación (...) que permite comprender a la hermenéutica, lejos del descifrado oculto de signos, como una estrategia de producción de nuevos símbolos, en la creación de nuevos imaginarios que construyen diversos y variados sentidos (Grüner, 1995: 11). De esta manera, en el presente escrito se planteará un acercamiento al empleo de las técnicas interpretativas que han llevado a cabo Nietzsche, Freud y Marx, como una forma de acceder a la hermenéutica de la sospecha propuesta por este trío. Para el desarrollo de esta propuesta partiremos de la caracterización general de los tres fundadores de discurso, para puntualizar en la impronta propia de la hermenéutica de cada uno. (shrink)

“Ethics” is one of the three branches of practical philosophy which Islamic philosophy has borrowed from Greek philosophy. Following the issues such as divine justice, divine promise, determination and alike, Islamic theologians have been somehow involved with the issue of moral philosophy. This issue, even, can be considered as the distinguishing aspect of the two theological schools of Mo’tazeli and Ash’ari. Being as a Hanafi-Ash’ari Sunni, Mowlana Jalaleddin Mohammad Balkhi (Rumi) must follow the Ash’ari theological view in this issue. The (...) aim of this essay is to measure Rumi’s views on ethics by citing some words from Masnavi in which he spoke about moral action. It will be concluded that Rumi, as a Suffi and by using a kind of poetic language, has developed the Ash’ari moral philosophy through a mystical approach in Masnavi. Rumi’s views on ethics are not so dissimilar to the Nineteenth century Danish philosopher’s mystical thoughts, i.e. Soren Kierkegaard. Holding the three spheres for human life, i.e. aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres, he justifies some apparent human irrational actions. This means that for him “faith” has preference over “reason”. Comparing his views with Mowlana’s thoughts is the main concern of the present essay. (shrink)