History of Western Philosophy

This is a two page handout, briefly summarizing late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosopher Henry Sidgwick's objections to giving all citizens a right to as much equal freedom as possible. H.L.A. Hart, who uses the material in a notable paper, also figures.

This is a defence of the authenticity of Plato’s Epistula vii against the recent onslaught by Frede and Burnyeat (2015). It focusses on what Ep. vii has to say about writing and the embedded philosophical Digression and evaluates this in the context of other mainly late dialogues. In the Cratylus, Socrates ends with resignation regarding the potential of language study as a source of truth. This is also the case in Ep. vii, where the four means of knowledge (names, definitions, (...) images (diagrams) and knowledge/insight/true opinion) do not offer the essence of reality due to the weakness of language, in this case owing to a diagram with contrary properties. Consequently, name and definition are impermanent and conventional. Contra Burnyeat, definition is not impossible but useful in the acquisition of knowledge. Only after dialectical examination comes a flash of insight into reality. So, reality (truth) must, as in the Cratylus, be studied directly. Significantly for Plato (as opposed to Socrates), the epistemology is illustrated by a mathematical case. Hence it is relevant to look at mathematical procedure in middle and late dialogues. Moreover, the possible role of division is considered. Finally, the critique of writing justified by the Digression is placed in the context of the general aversion to the written word. The epistemology of the Digression is shown to be a fair and competent synopsis of the later Plato’s epistemology. Hence, there seems to be no reason thus far to doubt that Ep. vii is a genuine work of Plato. (shrink)

This is a defence of the authenticity of Plato’s Epistula vii against the recent onslaught by Frede and Burnyeat (2015). It focusses on what Ep. vii has to say about writing and the embedded philosophical Digression and evaluates this in the context of other mainly late dialogues. In the Cratylus, Socrates ends with resignation regarding the potential of language study as a source of truth. This is also the case in Ep. vii, where the four means of knowledge (names, definitions, (...) images (diagrams) and knowledge/insight/true opinion) do not offer the essence of reality due to the weakness of language, in this case owing to a diagram with contrary properties. Consequently, name and definition are impermanent and conventional. Contra Burnyeat, definition is not impossible but useful in the acquisition of knowledge. Only after dialectical examination comes a flash of insight into reality. So, reality (truth) must, as in the Cratylus, be studied directly. Significantly for Plato (as opposed to Socrates), the epistemology is illustrated by a mathematical case. Hence it is relevant to look at mathematical procedure in middle and late dialogues. Moreover, the possible role of division is considered. Finally, the critique of writing justified by the Digression is placed in the context of the general aversion to the written word. The epistemology of the Digression is shown to be a fair and competent synopsis of the later Plato’s epistemology. Hence, there seems to be no reason thus far to doubt that Ep. vii is a genuine work of Plato. (shrink)

G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, despite its importance for the development of post-Kantian idealism, has not been fully translated into English. Now and then, when I have time, I will upload draft translations of parts of the text here, with the goal of, at some point, providing a complete translation. These drafts will be rough and I welcome feedback! -/- This document contains only the Title page, Schulze's indication of the contents of the work, and the preface.

This article offers a novel account of a key concept in Hannah Arendt’s political thought: amor mundi. In political theory’s ethical turn, theorists have increasingly turned to amor mundi as a source of ethical guidance and inspiration for politics. However, in doing so, they have elided Arendt’s distinct understanding of care. This article recovers Arendt’s understanding of amor mundi as care for the world by reconstructing the central concerns of her dissertation, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, and tracing them to the (...) “Crisis” essays of Between Past and Future. It shows that amor mundi emerges in the dissertation as part of a question: if love is our fundamental orientation toward the world, how can we love the world without instrumentalizing it? The two “Crisis” essays provide the following answer: if love is to avoid—and perhaps militate against—the instrumentalization of the world, it must take the form of care. Following this analysis, this article contends that the contribution of amor mundi to the ethical turn is best understood, not as the ethos needed to guide action in the political realm, but as a key pre- or nonpolitical ethos needed to conserve the world where politics takes place—and thus the very possibility of politics. (shrink)

Around the middle of XVI th century, in the Florence of Grand Duke Cosimo I de’ Medici, Bernardo Segni (Firenze, 1504–1558) translated and commented some Aristotelian works in the Florentine vernacular. His works represents a very important innovation in the panorama of Italian Aristotelianism, because they are the product of circles outside the university world and are the first attempt to translate in Italian the works of the great Greek philosopher. In this paper, I’ll examine some aspects of his works, (...) in particular of his translation of Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

In his Commentaries, Proclus describes the ways in which a teacher can awaken the desire for knowledge and philosophy in a given soul, and help this soul to make cognitive and moral progress. He considers such an intervention to be a case of providence, analogous to both the action of divine Pronoia and the care of one’s personal daemon. As the soul being thus educated is still unaware of the merits of rational thought, the teacher needs to use the emotions (...) of his student to stimulate him; he might even want to generate desirable emotions in his soul. I focus here on two emotions: wonder and shock. The first serves to stimulate interest while preserving autonomy. The second allows deeper commitment at the price of reduced autonomy of the pupil. Both are complementary aspects of philosophical perplexity. (shrink)

“The A2 is Light,” Schelling explains to us in the Presentation of My System of Philosophy. Is such a statement meaningful, so that its truth value can be asked? Is it an empirical statement, which can be tested and possibly confirmed through observations? Or is it a synthetic a priori judgment independent of observations? Such questions are not easy to answer, and they are related to the logical status of Schelling’s theory as a whole. That such questions became important stems (...) from the peculiarity of the philosophical systems that were developed in Jena after 1800. They were called “systems of absolute idealism,” but it is not clear what this means. These systems include not only Schelling’s but also Hegel’s and Krause’s. In the following, some commonalities, as well as specific particularities, of these systems will be examined in more detail from the standpoint of methodology. (shrink)

I argue that the idea of the good is best understood in terms of a rather unorthodox thesis concerning actuality, namely that what is actual -as opposed to what just is, either spatio-temporally or abstractly- is properly identified as actual if it embodies a value, the value of maximal determinateness.

Certain contemporary Nietzsche scholars claim to have discovered Nietzsche’s position on metaethics through a careful reading and interpretation of his texts. Whose account is most accurate? Unfortunately, Nietzsche’s texts underdetermine his views on metaethics; we lack the textual evidence to settle these debates decisively. Does this mean that the historical Nietzsche’s metaethical beliefs, ultimately inaccessable, are of little use to contemporary metaethical study? Or instead, must metaethicists interested in Nietzsche fundamentally change how Nietzsche’s works are to be understood? While I (...) present scholars who argue that Nietzsche’s corpus as a whole should be understood in radically different ways, I ultimately argue that we can avoid both of the above questions if scholars working in the history of philosophy tradition pivot their focus from attempting to offer a descriptive account of Nietzsche’s metaethical view and instead embrace appropriation. (shrink)

Modifying the conjecture of Wolfgang Helbig by means of the distinction between Xenophon and his various narrators introduced by Benjamin McCloskey, this paper uses the insights of Hartvig Frisch to show how drawing a distinction between the first-person speaker in pseudo-Xenophon’s Constitution of the Athenians and its author indicates that the former is Alcibiades and the latter is Xenophon himself.

It is often emphasized that the Athenians viewed philosophy as essentially apolitical or anti-political. Placed in this context, Aristotle’s Politics 7.1–7.3 deserves special attention because here Aristotle presents his argument on the best life for ‘each human being and commonly for cities and human beings ’, which culminates in his conclusion that ‘the same life ’ is the best for them. This paper attempts to show that ‘the same life’ does not mean a life consisting of activity of the same (...) content but rather of the same type or kind, and that Aristotle semantically differentiates between ἑκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων and τοῖς ἀνθρώποις and assigns a sphere of philosophy to the former and a sphere of politics to the latter, which helps him mitigate the tension between the philosophical life and the political life. (shrink)

El que para Nietzsche sea nuestro cuerpo el que interpreta, sobre el sustento pulsional de las fuerzas inconscientes, tiene la consecuencia de desdibujar la seguridad del privilegio constituyente y unificador de la conciencia. La fragmentación implícita en la fisiología hermenéutica es la que permite la afirmación de la vida en todas sus dimensiones. Entender las pulsiones como proyecciones interpretativas de la voluntad de poder supone la ratificación de la excelencia, pero, al mismo tiempo, el abismo de la parte maldita. Este (...) agón trágico, tan reconocidamente nietzscheano, parece no haber tenido más remedio que expresar su contradicción en el carácter expiatorio de algunas muestras del arte corporal actual. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s conception of eros and its role in the development of philosophers is similar to the conception of those same topics espoused by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. Nietzsche and Diotima agree that eros is an insatiable desire to possess the beautiful, that eros aims at immortality through reproduction, and that philosophy requires an ascent beyond sexual desire to “higher” forms of eros, which nevertheless are still modeled on heterosexual reproduction. Understanding these facets of Nietzsche’s view leads to an apparent contradiction (...) in that Nietzsche thinks of philosophy on the model of reproduction and ascribes to the philosopher both the female and the male roles in heterosexual reproduction. I argue that this ambivalence reflects Nietzsche’s view that practicing philosophy requires balancing two conflicting philosophical tendencies: on the one hand, pursuit of truth, which involves dissatisfaction with oneself; on the other hand, creation, which involves acknowledgment of one’s own capacity and value. (shrink)

Hume believes it is common and natural for people to have preferences for character traits similar to their own, but he remains silent on how to separate the innocent preferences from the blameworthy ones. This paper looks to Hume's morality to answer this question, ultimately arguing for two jointly sufficient criteria: 1) a preference is innocent so long as it doesn’t prevent one from adopting the general point of view and 2) a preference is innocent so long as it is (...) not met with disapproval from a spectator viewing it from the general point of view. I argue that these criteria leave most preferences unscathed, and this result highlights a distinctive pluralism in Hume. I consider the ramifications for this pluralism and argue that it gives Hume’s morality an appeal over more rigid moral theories. I conclude by considering the challenge of factionalism that arises from my interpretation. (shrink)

Ibn Bajja both lavishly praises Plato, and quietly alters his teaching. He develops a novel version of the Platonic city, taken partly from Alfarabi, which completely excludes non-philosophers from it, arguing that the gap between purely intellectual philosophy and mostly corporeal politics is simply too great. This allows Ibn Bajja to escape many of the problems associated with the exposition and implementation of the city of the Republic and Political Regime, but raises a new difficulty, namely, the relationship of the (...) small, weak city of the philosophers to the stronger, larger cities of human beings more generally, in the midst of which it must somehow flourish. Ibn Bajja’s solution, ironically, points to the frenetic political engagement for which his biography is known, and which he himself may eventually have come to regret. (shrink)

In Aristotelian understanding, political autarky does not imply individual isolation, but the order of all human relationships within the community. The final aim is not ‘not-needing-anybody-else-anymore’, the independent identity, but the collective-cooperative shaping and ordering of life in the immediate forms of community. This includes in a special way basic social-anthropological elements, economic activities, civic organization, social-ethical reflection and friendship. These core elements of Aristotle’s specific political autarky make it clear that man is not only a zōon politikon but also (...) a zōon koinonikon and that he can only realize this ‘political autarky’ in community. (shrink)

Resenha de Bellucci, Francesco. Charles S. Peirce. Selected Writings on Semiotics, 1894–1912, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110607390.

Many traditional martial artists assert that MMA is not a martial art, denying that the ‘martial skill’ of MMA constitutes a ‘martial art’, and citing the sportive and entertainment aspects of MMA competitions as antithetical to the spirit of martial arts, lacking the integrity, discipline, and tradition found in martial arts. Today, these criticisms are even more relevant in light of the fact that the typical MMA fighter no longer practices a single discipline but is versed in a variety of (...) techniques and utilizes a variety of strength and conditioning modalities. In addition, with the development of social media and mainstream media’s acceptance of MMA as a legitimate sport, MMA is now more than ever about entertainment. We argue that MMA is a martial art, but it is not always practiced as one. By drawing upon Socrates’ distinction in Plato’s Gorgias, between ‘knacks’ and ‘crafts’ we clarify the difference between ‘martial skills’ and ‘martial arts’. Using this distinction, we examine whether the sportive and entertainment aspects of MMA are, in fact, antithetical to the spirit of martial arts. We argue that the latter is, but the former is not. (shrink)

Having revealed an illusion of man’s cognitive efforts, Kant sealed the progress of enlightenment inscribed into a historical process, with a deep conviction that an ancient Greek prescription to “know thyself” was finally fulfilled. A man became aware of being equipped with a mind, and accordingly, with freedom as well as the ability to act morally, still remaining a finite natural being with limited cognitive skills. This critical self-knowledge of an enlightened man relieved him of his nonage to open his (...) eyes for a new vision of both the world and a man himself regarded as a self-conscious subject and active creator of his fate. The character and ontological status of religious beliefs, the enlightened man confesses, are in fact defined by the famous Kantian formula: as if. Driven by moral reasons, they are distinguished with a rationality for which a fundamental value is the Highest Good, purely rationalistic construction, a kind of God thought to be an essential being and a ration for existence of the phenomenal world. (shrink)

The inflammatory and elitist language Nietzsche uses in Beyond Good and Evil to describe the relationship between the ruling class and the underclass is often read as hyperbolic, and attempts are often made in the secondary literature to spare him the appearance of advocating gratuitous exploitation. This thesis challenges the assumption that Nietzsche is speaking hyperbolically in the passages in question. It argues in fact that the descriptive project Nietzsche undertakes in Beyond Good and Evil requires the prima facie radical (...) exploitation it puts forward. The central aim of the thesis is to situate his description of human exploitation within the broader framework of a perfectionistic account the conditions of human advancement. (shrink)

Engaging Aristotle’s broader corpus, this paper offers an exegesis of his counterfactual statement in the Politics regarding self-weaving shuttles and self-playing lyres. It argues that Aristotle imagines and offers his own theory of automation – if by automation we understand the conditions, limits, and consequences of substituting human work with artificial tools capable of acting themselves to complete the relevant task. Because such automated tools are impossible in Aristotle’s time, his political thought is never positively released from its foundational dependence (...) on living tools and the extremity of natural slavery. By analysing what it means for these workers to be considered tools, the perceptual requirements of the work they are to perform – as understood through the disjunctive conditions under which automated tools could replace them – and the consequences to masters and master-craftsmen of employing such tools, Aristotle’s disparagement of slave and craft subordinate work is thus also re-emphasized. (shrink)

Tacitus is an unlikely source for our study of Brutus, Cassius, and Cato, as they stand outside the chronological framework of Tacitus’ writings; nonetheless, they do appear a number of times throughout his works, and Tacitus portrays them with nuance and significance. As Brutus, Cassius, and Cato are rarely the precise focus for Tacitus, they are often referred to obliquely or in dialogue or speeches typically regarding treason and liberty. This paper will explore Tacitus’ depiction of Brutus, Cassius, and Cato (...) in his major and minor works, including the oblique references to Cato, Brutus as an orator and writer, Brutus and Cassius as commanders in civil war, and lastly their memory as it pertains to liberty and treason. Tacitus’ contribution to our understanding of Brutus, Cassius, and Cato comes from both his own use of them as markers of political memory and liberty and his examination of how others used Brutus, Cassius, and Cato to make arguments for political liberty or for the basis of accusations of treason. (shrink)

I attempt to present a more holistic and more detailed account of Schopenhauer's pessimistic philosophical premises and their implications. The discussion begins with Schopenhauer's claim that the world is representation and with the discovering of the Will. It continues by examining the implications of the Will, which leads to the argument against existence itself.

Nietzsche is a popular source of inspiration for transhumanist writers. Some, such as Sorgner and More, argue that Nietzsche ought to be considered a precursor of the movement. Transhumanism is a philosophy committed to the desirability of using technology to transform human beings, through significant alteration of their brains and bodies, into a new posthuman species. One of the defining characteristics of transhumanism is the desire for personal immortality. I argue that this feature of transhumanism is wholly incompatible with Nietzsche’s (...) philosophy, and a close examination of this disagreement brings out the degree to which transhumanists and Nietzsche differ in their values and philosophical commitments. Nietzsche does not think that personal immortality is desirable or metaphysically possible. I show that his views have more in common with philosophers like Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit than they do with transhumanism. (shrink)

The Republic’s political discussion begins with the construction of two contrasting cities: a ‘healthy’ city and a ‘city with a fever’; one defined by environmentally sustainable subsistence practices and the other by ‘luxurious’ over consumption that exceeds the carrying capacity of its land. Plato’s characters proceed to cure the inflamed city of its fever, resulting in the delineation of the ideal political constitution, the Kallipolis, which recovers the virtues of the original, healthy city in an altered form. This paper develops (...) an ecological reading of the Republic, highlighting Plato’s optimism regarding humans’ ability to limit their material consumption in accordance with the limits of the natural world. The conventional interpretation of the Republic’s first city, known as ‘the city of pigs’, is reconsidered in light of new socio-ecological research on traditional resource management systems. (shrink)

The rediscovery of Kant’s Doctrine of Right resulted in many attempts to apply Kant’s position to current affairs. This research often faces the problem of defining clear borders of what in Kant’s texts needs to be considered as rational core of his theory and what is merely a theoretically less significant consequence of particular political situation of 18th century. My claim is that in order to be able to adequately apply Kant’s ideas and concepts to the 21st century problems, the (...) process of application of his rational principles to the world of experience must be reconstructed. This will not only bring about the core structure of right but may also determine which elements of Kant’s legal theory are contingent to changing empirical data. I recognise two levels of Kant’s application of the rational principles to human condition, which consecutively determine the rational core of right and secondary structural divisions that emerge from contingent data about political history of mankind. The aim of the article is to investigate the fundamental steps of Kant’s application on the first level, in order to reconstruct the rational core of his legal theory. In the first step I analyse the universal principle of right in order to clarify Kant’s concept of a right. Further, I investigate the axiom of external freedom, which, in conjunction with human condition generates the necessity of using external objects of choice and therefore grounds the emergence of acquired rights. Nevertheless, these rights, as particular legal titles that limit the freedom of others, cannot be reconciled with universal freedom in the state of nature. Therefore, from the establishment of innate and acquired right, there arises the necessity of public right and entering the civil condition. (shrink)

Both Spinoza and Buddhism raise objection to the existence of the self as independent. This work presents Spinoza’s and early Buddhism’s account of the non-self respectively, namely, that the self does not have independent existence. Starting from the non-self, I look into the metaphysical pictures outlined by Spinoza and Buddhism and argue that despite their agreement on the non-self, they differ in regard to their metaphysical views in general. In comparing and contrasting the two, I shall conclude that both fall (...) short in some regards, and the two should be combined and complement each other. This will lead us to a denial of any independent existent thing. Thus, a comparative study of Spinoza and early Buddhism will end up with a view held by later Buddhism, emptiness, such that all things lack independent existence. (shrink)

One of the greatest philosophers of the self is Friedrich Nietzsche. Though he has been widely influential, Nietzsche’s unique writing style and particular legacy pose a challenge about how to interpret his ideas. In this thesis I present novel ways of understanding two of Nietzsche’s most well-known and seemingly opposed concepts, those of the overman and eternal recurrence of the same. In order to do so I ground each idea in new metaphysical arguments that are found elsewhere in Nietzsche’s work. (...) I believe these interpretations allow us to reconcile the contradictions between these two tenets of Nietzsche’s thought, and in doing so offer new ways to think about human existence. (shrink)

This article explores the various ways in which Charles Peirce adapted some of John Duns Scotus’s ideas for his own philosophical purposes. Extending beyond the much-explored territory defined by Peirce’s and Scotus’s common embrace of scholastic realism, the purpose here is to identify and explore a variety of ways in which Peirce’s thought may have been shaped by Scotus’s conclusions. Peirce’s Scotism can be discerned in the careful examination of a diversity of topics: the pragmatic consequences of a commitment to (...) realism, semiosis conceived as an essentially ordered process, abduction as form of abstraction, and the essentially practical nature of theological inquiry are the particular topics emphasized here. In each instance, there is clear evidence that Scotus’s original conceptions have been creatively transformed within the context of Peirce’s philosophy. (shrink)

The article examines some well-known attempts to consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in the context of transcendental idealism. The main purpose of these attempts is to protect Wittgenstein’s later philosophy from the relativistic interpretation of such concepts a “language games” and “forms of life.” Thus, Bernard Williams, noting the ambiguity of the pronoun “we” in Philosophical Investigations, believes that such a “we” has a transcendental rather than empirical character. This approach allows Williams to argue that there is no meaningful alternative (...) to the general perspective on the world that is embodied in this “we.” However, the main disadvantage of this approach is that Williams views such a “we” in much the same way as a conceptual schema. However, as many authors point out, this idea does not find its confirmation in the later works of Wittgenstein. Jonathan Lear, in turn, suggests that we should consider such a non-empirical “we” as a special kind of “mindedness.” Such a mindedness could be considered as analogous to a Kant’s analytical principle of apperception. Lear believes that it is this principle that gives meaningful unity to human behaviour and makes possible any communication with other people. Following Williams and trying to correct the shortcomings of his position, Lear proposes to consider the ambiguous status of “we” in Philosophical Investigations as an argument in favour of the “disappearance” of the transcendental “we,” and with it the disappearance of the threat of relativism. John McDowell, however, agreeing with the need to get rid Wittgenstein's philosophy of relativistic interpretations, critically assesses the idea of using transcendental idealism for this purpose. Instead, McDowell proposes to return to Hegel’s thesis about the unboundedness of the conceptual, which makes it unnecessary to appeal to the transcendental justification of harmony between reason and the world. The article, therefore, also examines McDowell’s arguments against attributing to Wittgenstein any versions of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Appropriately specified, the question, 'why be moral?', addresses important and legitimate topics of a broadly meta-ethical nature. The aim of the paper is to use this question as a dialectical tool, in order to identify the core theoretical commitments of Kant'sethics. Becausewell-foundedworrieshavebeenraised about the question itself, I consider these first. The purpose of this preliminary discussion is to determine the sort of question we are dealing with and to introduce the main topics for discussion.

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates presents an image of human beings in a cave to portray the political situation. I contend a close reading of Aristotle’s extant Corpus Aristotelicum reveals a possible path to liberation from his version of the cave. For Aristotle, human beings are slaves if they are unable to follow the rule of the soul. Within the soul, the intellect is the ruling part. Following Simpson, I think it is plausible that all four surviving ethical works were written (...) by Aristotle with the possibility that each had a particular audience. An exegesis of these works as well as his treatise on politics brings to light the liberal education that he intends for some of his students. This education appears to begin with habituation toward the virtues culminating in the attainment of the virtue of prudence such that the student will be liberated both from excessive pursuit of external goods and the passions of the body. Once free, this student will be able to solely pursue the intellectual virtue of wisdom and find happiness in the contemplative life. For Aristotle, the peak of human life is found in the attainment of nobility-and-goodness as described in the Eudemian Ethics. The noble-and-good human being has all the necessary and measured amounts of both the external goods and the goods of the body. This human being also has complete virtue and pursues the goods of the soul to excess culminating in a life devoted to contemplating the god, which I take to be a reference to the motionless first mover. The Great Ethics appears to be addressed to a politically ambitious student and it seems that Aristotle specifically attempts to persuade this student toward a serious pursuit of virtue, justice, and prudence with a view to both citizenship and friendship. The audience of this treatise is repeatedly told that it is just and prudent to give up wealth and rule to those of greater virtue. Otherwise, such goods would be harmful to those without the proper virtues. Although serious is a neutral term itself, when it is combined with the verb to rule, the term can take on a negative connotation. This combined word means to scheme, to intrigue, or to be eager for office, and is found in the Politics. For Aristotle, democracies undergo revolution and turmoil when those eager for office act as demagogues. Regarding the other works, I assert the Eudemian Ethics is likely addressed to someone who has experience with or at least knows of the theoretical or natural sciences. The Nicomachean Ethics appears to be addressed to those especially from the standpoint of the judge, ruler, and lawgiver. On Virtues and Vices seems to be directed to a younger audience and almost anyone in the polis or political community concerned with virtue and vice. Overall, education in youth is directed toward the free, the noble, and the true. Aristotle gives the impression that this education is an early preparation for the contemplative life. Later education has an openness to this life and generally comes into being through a combination of following the law, habituation, and being persuaded by speech or teaching. Overall, Aristotle seems to direct certain students or audiences to specific ends. Some could be led to pursue wisdom, some might pursue prudence in light of possibly serving as judges, rulers, or lawgivers, while others may pursue prudence with a view to both citizenship and friendship. Lastly, Aristotelian freedom differs from liberty in liberal democracy in a few important ways. First, liberal democracy overemphasizes external freedom within the regime. Second, in liberal democracy there is an excessive pursuit of property and a later push towards absolute equality that is unjust by Aristotle’s standards. Third, in liberal democracy and early modern political philosophy, education is an entirely separate topic and there is no longer a direct connection between education and the regime as found in Aristotelian political philosophy. (shrink)

While Schopenhauer is well-known for his pessimistic outlook on life, I argue that not all aspects of his philosophical project support this outlook. Specifically, I argue that Schopenhauer’s aesthetic genius must necessarily affirm life through artistic creation. To show that this is the case, I contend that the aesthetic genius’ engagement with the world of representation precludes him from engaging in the denial of the will-to-live, and that his desire to communicate his knowledge of the world entails an affirmation of (...) the will-to-live. I furthermore outline and explore significant parallels between artistic creation and procreation, which I believe strengthen my reading of the aesthetic genius as one who affirms life. These claims lead me to conclude that the aesthetic genius affirms the will-to-live by seeking to create something that immortalizes his knowledge of the nature of things—that is, by giving birth to what Schopenhauer calls “immortal children.”. (shrink)

Aristotelian ethics has the resources to address a range of first as well as second order ethical questions precisely in those areas in which Kantian ethics is traditionally supposed to be weak. My aim in this chapter is to examine some of these questions, narrowing my remit to those concerning the nature of the good and the authority of norms. In particular, I want to motivate and sketch a non-naturalist Kantian response to the neo-Aristotelian challenge that targets specifically its meta-ethical (...) and meta-normative naturalistic assumptions. (shrink)

Prior to the third essay of his Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche affixes a fragment from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The purpose of the fragment seems explicit in the Genealogy’s preface where Nietzsche tells us that the essay is a commentary on an aphorism. However, the relationship of the fragment to the third essay is unclear. In response, several commentators have offered a solution: namely, to disregard the fragment from Zarathustra and to read the first section of the third essay as the (...) object of Nietzsche’s commentary. Since this reading, the puzzle concerning Nietzsche’s aphorism has been considered solved. In this thesis, I make a case for why we should revive this debate, why we should restore the most natural reading of the preface, which makes the fragment from Zarathustra the aphorism Nietzsche refers to there, and how we can make sense of its connection to the third essay. (shrink)

I examine the place of the sublime within the Kantian architectonic, I examine why the topic matters for Kant and what its accommodation within the architectonic tells us about his conception of system. I present my argument in the form of answers to the following questions: “What is the sublime?” “What is the sublime about?” “Why does the sublime matter?”.

Arthur Schopenhauer defends the view that aesthetic experience is disinterested and objective. Traditionally, this view is taken to mean that aesthetic experience involves the suspension of all affective states and a passive attitude toward the object of contemplation. However, A. E. Denham argues that Schopenhauer’s view is more complex than traditionally thought. In particular, she claims that he sees aesthetic experience as involving passionate and active engagement with the object of contemplation. In this paper, I argue that a close reading (...) of Schopenhauer’s texts reveals that the traditional view is better supported than Denham’s. In addition, I consider some objections to Schopenhauerian disinterestedness and objectivity that highlight the extremity of his view in a way that Denham’s interpretation fails to appreciate. (shrink)

This thesis examines Hegel’s critique of abstract labor in the Philosophy of Right and the sections on objective spirit in the Encyclopaedia. Against both Frederick Neuhouser’s and Marxist interpretations, I argue that abstract labor, for Hegel, characterizes the specific kind of mechanical labor undertaken in the nineteenth-century factory. Such repetitive labor, Hegel claims, leads to the deadening of the worker through the deforming of her ethical subjectivity, a social pathology he hopes will be resolved by machine automation. By developing two (...) key aspects of Hegel’s social theory—that labor produces ethical subjectivity or education and that this education is the central locus of civil society’s ethicality—I argue that we ought to understand Hegel’s hope for machine automation as a critique of those forms of labor which prevent the worker’s rational participation in the totality of the labor process and thus fail to actualize her social freedom. (shrink)

Aristotle believes that certain pursuits are objectively choice worthy regardless of our attitudes towards them. Moreover, in order to have the correct beliefs about which actions are choice worthy, they must have acquired the right dispositions during their upbringing. Bernard Williams argues that Aristotle’s theory of moral education undermines belief in objective values. In response to Williams, Julia Annas argues that Aristotle does not ground ethics in the external point of view, but rather in the desires and commitments that people (...) already have. In this thesis, I argue that Aristotle held the view to which Williams objects and that Williams’ objection fails. Aristotle’s appeals to nature shows that he does not ground values in individual desires and commitments. Moreover, moral education does not alone undermine our confidence in the truth of our commitments. (shrink)