History: Persons

In an earlier paper in Theoria, I discussed an argument based on the idea of “soul-switching” that attempted to undermine the immaterialist account of human beings. The present paper deals with a parity argument against that argument in which the idea of “body-switching” plays a pivotal role. I call these two arguments, that have been reported by Razi (d. 1210), respectively “the soul-switching argument” and “the body-switching argument”. After some introductory remarks, section 2 of the paper describes the structure of (...) the latter argument. Section 3 considers some philosophical discussions in the ancient, modern, and contemporary eras in which the idea of body-switching (or some similar conception) plays a major role. In the following section 4, some criticisms of the argument are discussed and a general response that is meant to cover a broad range of objections is considered. This paper shows that the body-switching argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of several contemporary arguments in defence of substance dualism. (shrink)

In classical South Asia, most philosophers thought that the self (if it exists at all) is what the first-person pronoun ‘I’ stands for. It is something that persists through time, undergoes conscious thoughts and experiences, and exercises control over actions. The Buddhists accepted the ‘no self’ thesis: they denied that such a self is substantially real. This gave rise to a puzzle for these Buddhists. If there is nothing substantially real that ‘I’ stands for, what are we talking about when (...) we speak of ourselves? In this paper, I present one Buddhist answer to this question, an answer that emerges from the work of the Abhidharma thinker Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century CE). (shrink)

This essay examines the relation between philosophical questions concerning personal identity and character development in Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s philosophy. Shaftesbury combines a metaphysical account of personal identity with a normative approach to character development. By contrasting Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s views on these issues, I examine whether character development presupposes specific metaphysical views about personal identity, and in particular whether it presupposes the continued existence of a substance, as Shaftesbury assumes. I show that Hume’s philosophy offers at least two alternatives. Moreover, (...) I consider whether and how Hume’s philosophy leaves scope for character development and how he departs from Shaftesbury’s normative project of self-formation. (shrink)

Neither of the seemingly straightforward approaches of retaining the human at the top of the hierarchy of beings and of flattening human personhood solves the question of non-human personhood. But the concept of personhood does have the resources to address this issue, if we take it as a kind of moral agency. The way that humans develop moral agency through their temporality, historicity and community must be mapped onto the personhood of animals, but this is extremely difficult and must await (...) more scientific knowledge and wiser and more empathetic human understanding. It is in our hands, rather than the commandment of a non-human reality. (shrink)

Catholic philosophical anthropologists have defended views of the human person on which we are not reducible to anything non-personal. For example, it is not the case that we are nothing but matter, souls, or parts of society. Nevertheless, most Catholic anthropologies have been reductionistic in other ways. Mark K. Spencer presents a philosophical portrait of human persons on which we are entirely irreducible to anything non-personal, by synthesizing claims from many strands of the Catholic tradition. These include Thomism, Scotism, phenomenology, (...) personalism, nouvelle théologie, analytic philosophy, Greek and Russian thought, and several others. It adjudicates among these traditions' claims by considering whether they are grounded in how we appear in experience and whether they are non-reductionistic. While many metaphysical claims about persons are defended, the picture that ultimately results is one on which persons are best grasped not through abstract concepts but through aesthetic perception, as unique kinds of beauty. This portrait also shows how we have many irreducible parts, principles, and powers. Various chapters explore the irreducibility of our subjectivity, senses, intellect, freedom, and affections, and of our souls, bodies, acts of existence, and activities. Readers will also find explorations of divine simplicity and causality, the nature of matter, organisms, and artifacts, all of which must be understood to fully grasp our own irreducibility. In considering how to synthesize various traditions' claims, the book also offers new solutions to a number of prominent debates in contemporary Catholic philosophy. These include debates over natural law, the natural desire to see God, the separated soul, the nature of gifts, integralism and personalism, idealist and realist phenomenology, and various scholastic accounts of the act of existence. The picture of persons thereby developed helps the reader to perceive persons more perfectly. (shrink)

Although Broad published many books in his lifetime, this volume is unique in presenting some of his most interesting unpublished writings. Divided into five clear sections, the following figures and topics are covered: Autobiography, Hegel and the nature of philosophy, Francis Bacon, Hume's philosophy of the self and belief, F. H. Bradley, The historical development of scientific thought from Pythagoras to Newton, Causation, Change and continuity, Quantitative methods, Poltergeists, Paranormal phenomena. -/- Each section is introduced and placed in context by (...) the editor, Joel Walmsley. The volume also includes an engaging and informative foreword by Simon Blackburn. It will be of great value to those studying and researching the history of twentieth-century philosophy, metaphysics, and the recent history and philosophy of science, as well as anyone interested in Broad's philosophical thought and his place in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The atheistic Hiddenness Argument contains a controversial premise that a perfectly loving God would love every single person. J. L. Schellenberg, the author of the Argument, claims that this premise is necessarily true. However, many ancient theologians would disagree with the truth of this premise. In this paper, I provide evidence of the variety of alternative theological views from antiquity concerning the proper object of perfect divine love. The list of alternatives includes 1) the whole humanity as a collective subject, (...) 2) humanity as a universal, 3) divine image reflected in human beings, 4) the community of the faithful, 5) a chosen people. Based on the disagreement between Schellenberg and the ancient theologians concerning the proper object of perfect divine love, I argue that the aforementioned premise of the hiddenness argument, even if true, is not necessarily true. Therefore, the key premise of the hiddenness argument turns out to be without support, and the Argument turns out to be unsound. (shrink)

This article deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that attempted to undermine the immaterialist position about human nature. After some introductory remarks and explanation of the conceptual background, the article analyses the structure of the argument, with special attention to the idea of soul-switching.’ Some comparisons are made between the argument reported by Razi and a number of arguments from modern and contemporary eras of philosophy. One section is devoted to the critique of the argument and its (...) conceptual basis. This article shows that the argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of a family of contemporary epistemological arguments against substance dualism. It is also shown that discussion of the argument could be useful to highlight a weakness in some, but not all, versions of immaterialism about human nature. (shrink)

In the _Meditations_ and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self’s properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication—the self—is both simple (...) and composite, which is contradictory. In response to this objection, this paper develops a reading of Descartes’s various ways of considering the self. I argue that the best reading of Descartes’s qualified claims about the self, i.e., about the self _qua_ mind or the self qua human being, presupposes an account of the unqualified self, that is, of the self _simpliciter_. I argue that the self _simpliciter_ is not a mind, and that it is not a human being either. This result might suggest the pessimistic conclusion that Descartes’s view of the self is incoherent. To avoid this result, I introduce a new metaphysical account of the Cartesian self. On my view, the self is individuated by a unified mental life. The self is constituted by the beings that jointly produce this mental life, and derives its unity from it. (shrink)

According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show (...) why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection. (shrink)

It is a well-known fact that mathematics plays a crucial role in physics; in fact, it is virtually impossible to imagine contemporary physics without it. But it is questionable whether mathematical concepts could ever play such a role in psychology or philosophy. In this paper, we set out to examine a rather unobvious example of the application of topology, in the form of the theory of persons proposed by Kurt Lewin in his Principles of Topological Psychology. Our aim is to (...) show that this branch of mathematics can furnish a natural conceptual system for Gestalt psychology, in that it provides effective tools for describing global qualitative aspects of the latter’s object of investigation. We distinguish three possible ways in which mathematics can contribute to this: explanation, explication and metaphor. We hold that all three of these can be usefully characterized as throwing light on their subject matter, and argue that in each case this contrasts with the role of explanations in physics. Mathematics itself, we argue, provides something different from such explanations when applied in the field of psychology, and this is nevertheless still cognitively fruitful. (shrink)

This chapter is about personhood in relation to ethics and to conciliar Christian theology, and how concepts of personhood may discriminate against profoundly cognitively disabled human beings. (By ‘conciliar Christian theology’ I mean the Christian theology that is articulated in, or endorsed by, the first seven ecumenical councils.) -/- I believe we can learn several things about personhood by looking at these two topics together. By examining ancient and medieval concepts of personhood and some modern conceptions of personhood we gain (...) a better grasp of the variety of concepts and what substantive work they were intended to do. By becoming familiar with (part of) the history of concepts of personhood we are better situated to appreciate and judge the theoretical work that these concepts were intended to do and what consequences they have in ethical and theological theorizing. -/- In the first section I tell a select history of moral philosophers theorizing about personhood and discuss these in relation to human beings with profound cognitive disability. I focus on John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Mary Anne Warren. In the “When Personhood Is Discriminatory” section I argue that concepts of personhood, especially modern concepts of personhood, are typically used in a manner that discriminates against human beings with profound cognitive disabilities. I give two arguments against discriminatory uses of personhood, the Moral Shift Argument and the Argument against Exclusive Personhood. Although the Moral Shift Argument is deductively valid, it probably has little persuasive power over those who do not share the moral belief that profoundly cognitively disabled human beings are equal members of the moral community. However, the Argument against Exclusive Personhood has more argumentative force because it denies the claims that personhood is “self-evident” and that it is “obvious” to everyone. In the following section I survey a select history of concepts of personhood in order to establish the claims that concepts of personhood are not self-evident and are not obvious to everyone. This history of personhood goes back to ancient and medieval Christian theorizing and debating about personhood. It shows that concepts of personhood are not “self-evident” but rather are theoretical posits that are posited in theory construction in order to explain certain putative theological facts. Given that personhood is a theoretical posit and is not “self-evident,” moral philosophers who aim to determine the extent of the moral community on the basis of a supposedly “self-evident” concept of personhood are not justified in doing so. Moreover, given the Argument against Exclusive Personhood, philosophical theologians who wish to articulate models of the Trinity or Incarnation that are consistent with the seven ecumenical councils will find that they, like moral philosophers, are not justified to assume, or to insist on, modern personhood for their models of the Trinity or Incarnation. My overall conclusion, then, is that modern personhood is bad for ethics and unnecessary for conciliar ecumenical Christian theology. (shrink)

This article is a summarization of a research paper titled The Philosophy of the UEFA Champions League. Both the summary and the paper puts forward the hypothesis which seeks to prove and establish the real existence of metaphysics in the cosmos. Particularly that Eyjafjallajokul of April 2010 moved owing to call from human beings; an urgent call to the abstract force of planet earth, the spirit, to spring into action. Taking the UEFA Champions League as our laboratory, the conclusion will (...) be reached when the order of Juventus, Liverpool and Bayern Munich emerge as champions ahead of FC Barcelona in the coming years. (shrink)

To some it is a shallow platitude that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component. To others, it is an empirical hypothesis with accumulating support. To yet others it is a false dogma. In this chapter, I defend the claim that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component, confining the claim to adults with ordinary speech and hearing. It is one thing, I emphasize, to assert that inner speech often, or even typically, has an auditory-phonological component—quite another to propose that (...) it always does. When forced to argue for the stronger point, we stand to make a number of interesting discoveries about inner speech itself, and about our means for discriminating it from other psycholinguistic phenomena. Establishing the stronger conclusion also provides new leverage on debates concerning how we should conceive of, diagnose, and explain auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia. (shrink)

Definition, conditions and bearers of being a person - three philosophical aporias. -/- In this article I examine the philosophical question of how to define the concept of the person in a non-arbitrary way, how to find out the determining conditions of being a person and how to enumerate the bearers of being a person. I come to the conclusion that the question of a non-arbitrary definition, of the essential conditions and of the bearers of being a person has not (...) yet been clarified; it is not sufficiently clear what we actually mean or should mean by "person" - beyond conventions, disciplinary boundaries and doctrines. This results in three philosophical aporias of the concept of the person. (shrink)

This dissertation offers an account of the different ways in which putatively idealist and transcendental models of sociality, which grounded the subject’s relation to other human beings in the subject’s own cognition, were rejected and replaced. Scrapping this account led to a variety of models of sociality which departed from the subject as the ground of sociality, positing grounds outside of the subject. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, Franz Rosenzweig, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer represent alternative positions along a spectrum of models of (...) sociality which reject the idealist concept of sociality. The central argument of this dissertation claims that the responses to idealism and transcendental models of sociality ultimately find fault with an inadequate ontology, one which grounds sociality (as well as all of reality) in the cognition of the subject. The ontology of the transcendental model locates the subject as initially unconnected to other subjects such that the first move in relating them together must be epistemological. The social relation is grounded in the subject’s cognitive grasp. Each of the thinkers I examine identifies this as the key problem with idealism; however, their solutions to this problem differ. The differing solutions of Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer can be identified as occupying different representative positions along a continuum, call it the “scale of social grounding.” What I offer here is a topography of responses to the idealist model of sociality. The ontological ground of sociality, instead of being the subject, is posited as situation of dialogue (Gadamer), the face of the other (Levinas), or divine revelation (Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer). In each of these alternative models, we see that the subject is conditioned rather than autonomous, that sociality is enacted through temporality and language, and that sociality is principally a normative relation rather than an epistemological one. The story that emerges from my analysis, then, is a richer topography of responses to idealism than has hitherto been mapped out. The responses, represented by Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer each provide an alternative ontology on which any adequate model of sociality must rest. While my account of the spectrum of ontological responses to idealist sociality does not claim to be exhaustive, it does give a better topography of the field of responses than has hitherto been offered in studies of models of sociality in the 20th century. Finally, this dissertation shows the centrality of providing an alternative ontology to idealism in these projects. Far from rejecting ontology wholesale or merely offering moral revisions to the existing social order, each of the figures I examine in this study radically revise the ground of sociality by articulating a fresh ontological vision which can support social life. (shrink)

The object of this work is the traditional image of the philosopher Socrates, created by Plato and Xenophon. The author changes the research context, proceeding from the idea that philosophy in the Ancient Greece during the time of Socrates have not yet separated from the religion. Special place within the Greek religion holds the mantic – the ritual art of interpreting symbols, sent by the supernatural forces. An expert in the field of mantic were called mantis or prophet; they featured (...) the prophet abilities, inspired trance, magic skills, and non-literate character of teaching. Expanding the context alongside examining the image of Socrates in terms of the ideas and practices of the traditional Greek religion, allow interpreting the key aspects of the image of Socrates (daemon of Socrates, falling into trance, predicting the future, etc.) from a new angle. The research shows that the Socrates’ contemporaries could perceive him as a religious expert, inspired prophet, mantis, who understands and realizes a specific religious mission. Such interpretation of the image of Socrates contributes into the solution of the problem of Plato and have access to the platform of Plato’s knowledge, as well as allows expanding the grounds of Plato’s comparison of the philosopher and the Sophists. -/- Объектом исследования является традиционный образ философа Сократа, созданный Платоном и Ксенофонтом. Автор меняет контекст исследования, отталкиваясь от идеи о том, что философия в Древней Греции во времена Сократа еще не отделилась от религии. Особое место в греческой религии занимает мантика - ритуальное искусство толкования знаков, которые посылаются сверхъестественными силами. Эксперт в области мантики называется мантисом или профетом. Для этих экспертов были характерны пророческие способности, вдохновленный транс, магические способности, бесписьменный характер учения. Расширение контекста, рассмотрение образа Сократа в контексте идей и практик традиционной греческой религии, позволяет по-новому интерпретировать основные черты образа Сократа (даймон Сократа, впадание в транс, предсказание будущего и др.). Исследование показывает, что современники Сократа могли воспринимать его как религиозного эксперта, вдохновенного пророка, мантиса, который осознает и осуществляет свою особую религиозную миссию. Такая трактовка образа Сократа вносит вклад в решение проблемы Платона и имеет выход на теорию познания Платона, а также позволяет расширить основания платоновского противопоставления философа и софистов. (shrink)

Can we reify the form of a substance? Is it possible to identify DNA as the principle of our personal and numerical identity? These questions will be studied through Berti’s reading of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Indeed, Enrico Berti proposes the identification of the DNA to the Aristotelian notion of form, thesis which raises many questions from an exegetical point of view and a metaphysical perspective. We will present the sources of Berti’s reading and one of the main objections made by Aristotle. (...) Thus, different versions of the Berti’s thesis will be examined and then, a thought experiment that makes them false. Finally, it will be proposed an aristotelian solution, coming from a contemporary Aristotelian (E. J. Lowe), that seems to prevent Berti’s mistakes and gives us a robust metaphysics of the identity. (shrink)

Возникший глубокий кризис украинской государственности и идущая там, по сути, гражданская война вынуждают обратиться к причинам постоянных неудач формирования украинского государства. Многие на первый взгляд труднообъяснимые и откро-венно негативные особенности внешней и внутренней политики современной Украины в значительной степени связаны с геополитическими и историческими особенностями формирования государства, менталитета и традициями социально-политической психологии. Очевидно также, что многие отрицательно воздействующие на стабильность государства геополитические и геокультурные факторы прошлого не утратили своего значения до сих пор. Анализу этих факторов и их роли в разные (...) периоды украинской истории и посвящена данная статья. В статье также сделана попытка систематического сравнения истории Украины с историей ее ближайших соседей (России, Белоруссии, Польши), что позволяет лучше понять причины различий исторических судеб в сходных условиях и определить степень влияния соседей на политические модели Украины и ее отдельных областей. (shrink)

The essays in this volume focus on the notion of the first-person pro-noun ‘I’, the notion of the self or person,1 and the notion of the first-person perspective. Let us call these the three notions. Ever since Descartes set the initial tone in his Meditations, modern philosophical controversies concerning the three notions have continued unabated. Part of the reason for ongoing debates has to do with the sorts of questions that the three notions give rise to.

In this paper I will discuss the doctrine of substance which emerges from Leibniz’s unpublished early memoir De affectibus of 1679. The memoir marks a new stage in Leibniz’s views of the mind. The motivation for this change can be found in Leibniz’s rejection of the Cartesian theory of passion and action in the 1670s. His early Aristotelianism and some features of Cartesianism persisted to which Leibniz added influences from Hobbes and Spinoza. His nascent dynamical concept of substance is seemingly (...) a combination of old and fresh influences, representing a characteristically eclectic approach, but I will argue that the influence of Hobbes is especially important in the memoir. To do that, I will examine Leibniz’s development in the 1670s up to the De affectibus and consider the nature of affects in the memoir, especially the first affect which starts the thought sequence. This first affect of pleasure or pain is the key to Leibniz’s theory of active substances and in this way to the whole of Leibniz’s moral psychology and ethical metaphysics. (shrink)

Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...) entry explores some of the arguments for and objections to this controversial account of our nature and persistence. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation of John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity that gives full credit to Locke’s claim that “person” is a forensic term, sheds new light on the relation between Locke’s characterizations of a person in sections 9 and 26, and explains how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. I show that Locke’s claim that sameness of consciousness is necessary for personal identity (...) depends on two components: first, his particular moral and legal conception of a person and, second, his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability for past actions. Had Locke given a different account of personhood, or thought differently about the conditions of just accountability, he might have given a nonpsychological account of personal identity. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse the notion of critique, its subject and scope of validity in the context of critical metaphysics of Otto Liebmann. The main argument is preceded by introductory remarks in which historical context and intellectual background of this notion are discussed. The main focus of the paper is on the standpoint of Otto Liebmann, author of curricular for neo-Kantianism "Kant und die Epigonen", and who — however usually conceived to be forerunner of neo-Kantianism — quite paradoxically takes (...) somehow different position on metaphysics. It is different from so-called late neo-Kantianism which declared itself as opposite to metaphysics. Contrary to this, Liebmann accepted the possibility of metaphysics as a kind of crowning achievement and climax of scientific theories. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to introduce, interpret, and develop two incompatible process -ontological theories of personal identity that have received little attention in analytic metaphysics. The first theory derives from the notion of personal identity proposed in Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy, but I interpret this notion differently from previous commentators. The Whiteheadian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but has nothing to do with diachronic objectual (...) identity : the binary equivalence relation that every entity bears to itself, and only to itself, even after undergoing intrinsic change. The Whiteheadian theory may also find favor with those who, like Whitehead, reject the possibility of pure processes and hold that in every becoming, something—which need not be an object, thing, or individual substance—becomes. The second theory derives from the notion of recurrent dynamics presented in Johanna Seibt’s General Process Theory. The Seibtian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves not only an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but also the relation of diachronic objectual identity. The Seibtian theory may also find favor with those who, like Broad and Sellars, find reason to postulate pure processes. (shrink)

John Locke offered a very rich and influential account of persons and personal identity in “Of Identity and Diversity,” which is chapter 27 of Book 2 of his An Essay concerning Human Understanding. He added it to the second edition in 1694 upon the recommendation of his friend William Molyneux. Locke’s theory was soon after its publication discussed by his contemporaries and has influenced many present-day discussions of personal identity. Distinctive about Locke’s theory is that he argues that the notion (...) of a person is to be distinguished from that of a human organism, or “man” to use Locke’s term, and that of a substance. By distinguishing the notion of a person from the more traditional notions of a human organism and a substance, Locke is able to address moral questions of accountability without having to take a stance on the question of whether the underlying ontological constitution of a person is material or immaterial. The chapter can be divided into two parts: in the first he outlines his general account of identity, and in the second he applies his general account of identity to persons and personal identity. The discussion of Locke’s general account of identity in the secondary literature has focused on whether Locke’s account of identity can be regarded as a version of the thesis that identity is relative and on how Locke understands modes and substances in chapter 27. The secondary literature on Locke’s account of persons and personal identity often focuses on how Locke’s claim that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness is to be understood. However, some interpreters also draw attention to the importance of the moral and legal dimension which Locke makes explicit in his claim that “person” is a forensic term (II.xxvii.26). Moreover, some scholars have argued that Locke’s theory is to be understood in its religious context. The objections which have repeatedly been raised against Locke include the problem of circularity and the problem of transitivity; Locke’s reference to “fatal error” in II.xxvii.13 has also been regarded as a serious problem for his view. In the 20th century, psychological accounts of personal identity were often called neo-Lockean theories. It is controversial whether neo-Lockean theories differ from Locke’s own theory, and it can be asked whether the moral and religious dimension of Locke’s theory constitutes an important difference. (shrink)

Hume understands identity as “invariableness and uninterruptedness” through a supposed change in time, something true only of objects he calls steadfast. And Hume discerns nothing steadfast about the mind or self—nothing like a substance or soul underlying the changing and interrupted succession of perceptions we experience in ourselves. I nevertheless think of myself as the same person over time. A central concern of the Treatise discussion of personal identity is to give a psychological explanation of how we arrive at this (...) belief in personal identity. The answer, very broadly, is that it is a fiction of the imagination produced by certain associative principles. Hume notoriously goes on to disavow this .. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy in the 20 th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death , and Galen Strawson’s Selves . I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic worldview with a conception of the self as a subject of experience , a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unifi ed and continuous experience. I argue here (...) that this conception of the self is unthreatened by the otherwise valuable considerations advanced by Johnston and Strawson. Both are inclined to identify selves-at-times with momentary episodes of experience (or centres or ‘arenas’ of consciousness). Both go on to argue, albeit in diff erent ways, that individual selves cannot extend beyond the confi nes of these brief episodes. However, in so doing they give insuffi cient weight to an important phenomenological datum: the continuity of our ordinary experience. When the latter is recognized, and appropriately understood, it provides us with a secure basis upon which a more recognizable conception of the self can be constructed. (shrink)

In destructing traditional metaphysics, Heidegger accuses German Idealism of eliminating the finite in favour of the infinite. Particularly Hegel is criticized for ignoring the true finitude of Dasein and thereby misinterpreting being as infinite absolute. The paper explores this criticism in three steps. First, the main features of Heidegger’s early metaphysics of finite Dasein as developed in Being and Time will be traced, followed, second, by an examination of Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s absolute has a temporal-finite origin. Taking a closer (...) look at Heidegger’s alternative, true finitude, leads finally to a reflection on some difficulties in Heidegger’s critique of Hegel. (shrink)

In the essay 'Donner la mort' (1992) Jacques Derrida develops a new concept for the philosophical category of the subjectivity. In particular, he crucially connects the genesis of the subject with the experience of the absolute responsibility that, for Derrida, also represents the beginning of the religion itself: the religion comes to light fundamentally as history of the responsibility. The symbol of the absolute responsibility is the biblical figure of Abraham in the shocking pericope of Genesis 22, where God demands (...) the sacrifice of Isaac. This paper aims to analyze the structure of the absolute responsibility as genesis of the subject in Derrida’s reconstruction of the biblical text. The responsibility itself turns out to be the common foundation of those religions that share the figure of Abraham and provides also a base for a philosophy of monotheism. (shrink)

Considering various arguments in Hume’s Treatise, I reconstruct a Humean argument against personal identity or unity. According to this argument, each distinct perception is separable from the bundle of perceptions to which it belongs and is thus transferable either to the external, material reality or to another psychical reality, another bundle of perceptions. Nevertheless, such transference (Hume’s word!) is entirely illegitimate, otherwise Hume’s argument against causal inference would have failed; furthermore, it violates private, psychical accessibility. I suggest a Humean thought (...) experiment clearly demonstrating that, to the extent that anything within a psychical reality is concerned, no distinction leads to separation or transference and that private, psychical accessibility has to be allowed in the Humean argument for personal identity or unity. Private accessibility and psychical untransferability secure personal identity and unity. Referring to the phenomenon of multiple personality along the lines of the Humean argument for personal identity or unity, I illustrate both private accessibility and a possible notion of one and the same person distinct from his/her alters or psychical parts. Finally, I show why Parfit’s Humean argument against personal identity must fail. (shrink)

Convinced that anthropology constitutes the nucleus of K. Wojtyla's thought, the author attempts to discover what kind of anthropology is at the basis of Wojtyla's philosophical writings and the implications of that anthropology. The analysis of the basic structures of Wojtyla's anthropology (the experience of that which occurs and that of action, the structure of the person-act, the transcendence of the person in truth, gift, etc.) leads the author to hold that Wojtyla's philosophy can be considered a coherent metaphysics of (...) the person since the person who acts is not just the method (the conscience of the action), but also the object of study and, above all, the end, that is, to know and to make known to the person his special dignity. Regarding the contribution of Wojytla's anthropology, the author identifies two central themes: the relationship between person and act, and relationality. Regarding the former, Wojtyla effects a synthesis of metaphysics of being and phenomenology: the person is not relative to his acts, because he is a suppositum; nonetheless, the person is in close relationship to his acts. If it were not for these acts the person could not even know himself as subject and could not perfect himself as a person. Regarding the latter, Wojtyla sustains that the person is not person in the singular but in the plural, since each person is in relation with all the others, and this is shown from the phenomena of participation, solidarity, and, above all, donation. The author concludes by sustaining that the multiplicity and the original relationality of the person is one of the aspects of Wojtyla's anthropology that would be worthy of further study. (shrink)

The central positoin of St. Thomas Aquinas in the pantheon of Catholic thinkers along with St. Augustine of Hippo more than justifies ongoing attnetion to his thought and contributions to philosophy, theology, and medieval culture. This volume is an anthology of the passages of his _Summa Theologia _on human nature or the "human constitution.".

An appreciation of Hume’s psychology of object identity allows us to recognize certain tensions in his discussion of the origin of our belief in personal identity---tensions which have gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature. This will serve to provide a new solution to the problem of explaining why Hume finds that discussion of personal identity so problematic when he famously disavows it in the Appendix to the Treatise. It turns out that the two psychological mechanisms which respectively generate the (...) ideas of object and of personal identity are mutually incompatible. It is this sort of conflict within Hume’s introspective or subjectivist psychology which is the source of his worry. (shrink)

My hypothesis is that human personhood has ancient biological roots which make it possible for social reinforcers to contribute to the gradual construction of real persons who are always deeper than the stories about them. Multiple persons do sometimes emerge from one human organism. Rather than try to prove they are real, I explore the consequences of assuming them to be genuine emergentsthat become social environment to one another. I suggest that the multiple-persons phenomenon has profoundly influenced the development of (...) human ethics and the attainment of personhood through the pursuit of ideals. (shrink)

This book is a exploration of the notion of personal identity. Here it is shown how the various attempts to give an account of personal identity are all based on false assumptions and so inevitably run aground. One of the first Western thinkers to realize this was David Hume, the 18th century empiricist philosopher who argued that self was a fiction. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive point (...) of view of personal identity, and by approaching the problem in terms of phenomenology, Buddhist critiques of the notion of the self, and the idea of a constructed self-image. No Self to Be Found explores the problem of personal identity from the most basic level by raising the question of the existence of personal identity itself. (shrink)

This ambitious book examines the conceptions of the human subject held by numerous Western thinkers from various disciplines. The study begins with Descartes and ends with Derrida. For the forty-six principal authors covered, Morris gives a brief biography, an overview of the author's thought in its historical context, an analysis of the author's theory of the human individual as presented in a major work, and a critique of that theory. Writers in addition to these forty-six are also discussed, but in (...) less detail. As is not surprising in a work that spans the fields of philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and sociobiology, the expositions and critiques rely considerably on secondary sources. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions Robert S. Henderson Scholarly reflection on Hume's "doctrine" ofselfand personal identity continues to focus on the sections "Of Personal Identity" and the "Appendix" toA Treatise ofHuman Nature. To answer the question of why we have so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successiveperceptions which make up experience, Hume says that we must distinguish betwixtpersonal identity, as it (...) regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. He considers only the former in these sections. Towards the end of the personal identity section he writes that our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for ourpast or future pains or pleasures (T 261). In the advertisement to the Treatise Hume says that the subjects of the understanding and passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves (T xii). In light of the importance Hume attaches to the distinction, and since there are many indications that the Treatise should be read as an integral whole, it is surprising that so little attention is given to what he says of personal identity in the other books. As the title suggests, this paper concentrates on the second part of the distinction and especially on the discussion ofthe indirectpassions in Book II of the Treatise. This is not to suggest that self does not play an important role elsewhere in Hume's science ofman; for example, it is selfwhich experiences the impression ofwill and the direct passions. However, the indirect passions have a particularly important part to play in ascriptions of personal identity and this justifies the present investigation. II We can safely predict that personal identity as it regards our passions will not be the idea??some philosophers whose views of self as having the philosophical (strict) relation ofidentity Hume has rejected in "Of Personal Identity." The relationship between thought and passion to which he draws attention suggests that the idea of selfin this context has a relation to the positive suggestions in that earlier section of why Volume XVI Number 1 33 ROBERT S. HENDERSON we do speak meaningfully of the identity of the self. We are able so to speak because ofarelationship which is felt to exist between a person's distinct and changing perceptions. The relationship has to do with the discovery by memory of the connection of a person's perceptions through the association ofideas by resemblance and causation (T 261). Examination of the idea of self to which Hume makes frequent reference in Book II requires some review ofthe method ofthe Treatise. Perceptions make up human experience. Perceptions are either impressions or ideas which derive from impressions. Hume describes the indirect passions as secondary or reflective impressions and these stem from original impressions or from their ideas. He distinguishes between direct andindirect passions. Directpassionsarise immediately fromgood or evil, frompain orpleasure (T 276). Examples are joy, hope and fear. Indirect passionsproceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction ofother qualities (T 276). That is, the indirect passions not onlyhave a cause (an impression which excites them), but also an object (to which the passion directs our view when excited). We shall see that a significant quality of the indirect passions is the relation of these impressions to their objects, which are either one's own or another's self. In Book II of the Treatise Hume examines the indirect passions: love, hate, pride and humility. These passions are evaluations of persons; of selfin the case of pride and humility, and of another in the case of love and hatred. Evaluation of persons is a central feature of Hume's moral philosophy: To have the sense ofvirtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration (T 471). We shall see that the indirect passions in particular make an important contribution to the answer ofHume's original question ofthe source?? owe propension to ascribe an identity. Ill... (shrink)

It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon (...) considerations of bodily continuity. Alternatively it has been suggested that Locke's theory could be modified by allowing that for the purposes of personal identity ‘remember’ should be regarded as a transitive relation. So if A remembers the experiences of B but not those of C, and B remembers the experiences of C, then A, B and C can be regarded as belonging to the same unit of consciousness. (shrink)

Modern selfhood presents itself as autonomous, overcoming emotion by following cognitive, moral and linguistic norms on the basis of clear, rational principles. It is difficult to imagine how such normative creatures could have evolved from their purely biological, non-normative, primate ancestors. I offer a just-so story to make it easier to imagine this transition. Early hominins learned to cooperate by developing group identities based on tribal norms. Group identity constituted proto-selves as normative creatures. Such group identity was not based on (...) autonomous selfhood – such an explanation would be anachronistic -- but on emotional patterning. By imitation, music, dance, ritual and other emotional practices, proto-selves learned how to bind themselves to the norms of their culture. Such conformity was a transitional evolutionary stage between primates and selves. Emotion and rationality are not incompatible: even contemporary selfhood remains rooted in emotional identity. (shrink)

The problem of personal identity has vexed philosophers since its initial formulation by John Locke. He argued that "person" is a distinct ontological entity' y from "man." In so doing, he initiated a separation of the physical and psychological which nearly all later philosophers follow. Some, unsatisfied by Locke's preference for the psychological, argue that physicality is the essential feature of personhood. Others, more inclined to support Locke, argue that psychology is the essential feature. A large portion of the discussion (...) concerning the problem of personal identity is the dispute between these two opposing branches. Yet, despite their differences, both branches share a common goal: the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity, the search for a suitable "criterion." Derek Parfit, however, questions the primary motivation behind this quest. His arguments attempt to demonstrate not only that no such necessary and sufficient conditions exist, but that this conclusion is untroubling because identity is not even what matters in survival. This last suggestion-that identity is not what matters-is Parfit's novel contribution, and it is the suggestion with which this thesis is mostly concerned. My first task is a description of Parfit's arguments that lead to his radical conclusion. This includes an explication of his Spectra and Fission Arguments, each of which are then assessed. The second task is a description and evaluation of Parfit's replacement for identity, relation R. I examine the critical notion of "quasi" psychology and attack it on two grounds. First, I argue that it is not entirely clear that Parfit's description eliminates the necessity of personal identity: quasi-memory itself presupposes identity. Second, I argue that even if quasi-memory avoids circularity, it cannot matter in the way in which Parfit hopes it can. This is so, I suggest, because memories matter only because of their essential uniqueness. When this element is erased-as it is in quasi-memory memory" ceases to matter altogether. By way of concluding, I offer a hypothesis that illuminates not only Parfit's possible motivations, but his reasons for going awry. (shrink)

Many people seem to understand the term 'dignity' as applying to all human persons regardless of their race, creed, sex, or religious beliefs. As to what the concept 'dignity' means is a difficult and complex problem. Is the concept 'dignity' an empty concept, void of meaning? What does it mean when we say that this or that person has dignity? Most of the current philosophical literature has very little to say as to what dignity is. I will argue that what (...) we need to find is a concept of dignity that accounts for both the infinite and the irreplaceable value of the human person. Following Kant and Linda Zagzebski, we can say that to be irreplaceable is to be above all comparison and to be of infinite value is to be above all price. This paper will explore how to understand the two aspects of dignity; infinite and irreplaceable value as being necessary components in understanding our intuitions that we have about human persons having 'dignity'. To show how both aspects of dignity are necessary, this paper will explore intuitions of the irreplaceability and infinite value of human persons by looking at the concrete experiences that we have of friendship and love. We will look at Gabriel Marcel's definition of the human person and methodology to see if we can better understand the irreplaceable aspect of the human person. In the last few pages of this thesis we will see how to metaphysically tie the knot between these two aspects. (shrink)