History: Pleasure

In this article I contend that John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism has been widely misunderstood, and hence the importance of his philosophical project has been diminished. This misunderstanding arises primarily from misconceptions regarding Mill's definition of pleasure. However, these misconceptions may be successfully resolved by reflecting on Mill's educational roots and his commitment to Greco-Roman philosophy. In particular, I hold that a deeper understanding of Mill's philosophical progenitors (i.e., Aristotle and Epicurus) would lead us to conclude that for Mill the 'pleasures' (...) of the Utilitarian project are in the final analysis nothing other than the 'pleasures' of the mind and conscience. Thus, by following Mill's line of reasoning and adhering to some of the salient points of his work, specifically in Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism, we may reach a richer and more nuanced understanding of his impressive philosophical project. (shrink)

This paper considers how Plato can account for the fact that pain features prominently in the intellectual pleasures of philosophers, given that in his view pleasures mixed with pain are ontologically deficient and inferior to ‘pure,’ painless pleasures. After ruling out the view that Plato does not believe intellectual pleasures are actually painful, I argue that he provides a coherent and overlooked account of pleasure in the Phaedrus, where purity does not factor into the philosopher’s judgment of pleasures at all; (...) what matters instead is the extent to which a given pleasure fosters the philosophical life. I show that to argue, as James Warren has recently done, that Plato thinks intellectual pleasures are not per se painful is less successful than the Phaedrus account at explaining philosophers’ lived experiences of pleasure, which often involve pain. (shrink)

The Eudemian Ethics is a major treatise on moral philosophy whose central concern is what makes life worth living. This is the first time it has been published in its entirety in any modern language. Anthony Kenny's fine translation is accompanied by a lucid introduction and explanatory notes.

Aristotle identifies the goal of life as happiness and discusses its attainment through the contemplation of philosophic truth.

This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which (...) pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation. (shrink)

[This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of a satisfied experiential-desire (...) account. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a description of the general character of Hume's ethics, which are Epicurean in that he assumes that pleasure is good, and every good thing is pleasing. All virtues, for him, are ‘agreeable or useful’ to their possessor or to others, and the useful is defined as what can be expected to yield future pleasure. The discussion then covers Hume's views on sympathy and the principles governing our approbations; trust and its enlargement by social ‘artifices’; natural virtues, (...) natural duties, and what they include and exclude; responsibility; the role of reason; rights; and his influence on subsequent moral philosophers. (shrink)

This article deals with the following question. Does Freud's description of pleasureas the result of a (significant) reduction of tension (pleasure principle), imply that all pleasure is to be understood in terms of tension, and moreover, in terms of a transition between two states of tension, and again in terms of a reduction of tension? Although Freud certainly provides grounds for such an interpretation, a closer reading of his work (in particular his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 1905) (...) reveals how he distinguishes at least three sources of pleasure that we can connect with three majorphilosophical traditions. First of all, there is the pleasure generated by a reduction of tension which follows the satisfaction of a need. This so-called end-pleasure ("Endlust"), fully consonant with the pleasure principle, constitutes a neurophysiologicalquantitative reading of a platonic line of thought: pleasure as a filling up of a deficiency (Philebus). Freud discerns another kind of pleasure in the experience of movement or action itself. With this second kind of pleasure, pleasure-in-movement ("Lustcharakter der Bewegungsempfindungen"), he follows a truly anstotelic way of thought, according to which pleasure consists in the (unimpeded) execution of an (immanent) activity (Ethica Nicomachea). There is yet a third form of pleasure, not in the decrease, but precisely in the increase of tension, that Freud thematises as fore-pleasure ("Vorlust"), pleasure-in-excitement. In the expectation of satisfaction (as relief of tension), increasing tension, although a source of displeasure according to the pleasure principle, may not only be endured but also enjoyed for itself through the intervention of (conscious orinconscious) representations. Of this fore-pleasure, that opens out into the realm of mental pleasure and joy, we find an antecedent in the joy in Hope ("gaudium ex spe") of Thomas Aquinas. But due to the loss of transcendental superstructure, Freud's fore-pleasure represents a strongly sharpened concept, just as the corresponding experience has become greatly intensified in the contemporary cultural climate. (shrink)

A correct understanding of what Freud means by “pleasure” and what he thinks of the possible ways to obtain pleasure requires an examination of his conceptions of the drive and of the libidinal body. Both theories are built on a variety of traditional philosophical views, the examination of which can help to overcome some of their obscurities. The reference to Leibniz and his Aristotelian understanding of the relation between pleasure and the force (vis activa) which animates the substance and maintains (...) it in constant movement allows an account of what in the drive preserves it from total exhaustion and a consequent reversal of pleasure into displeasure. Similarly, an examination of Schopenhauer's conception of the human body clarifies what Freud says about the “pleasure of the organ”. The necessity for the drive to invest a body is given thereby a metaphysical foundation. Furthermore Schopenhauer's phenomenological description of the manner in which this driven body is experienced differently in the affect of pleasure or displeasure, and in an objective representation sheds new light on the relation between the libidinal body and the objective body. (shrink)

Le propos est précédé par une illustration, la seule de l’ouvrage, extraite d’une Histoire de l’industrie du coton en Grande-Bretagne parue en 1835. Il s’agit de la reproduction d’un dessin représentant le processus d’impression de motifs sur du calicot. On y voit deux hommes travailler, de façon semble-t-il minutieuse, sur deux grandes machines installées dans un atelier spacieux. L’illustration est égayée par les motifs imprimés sur les pans de tissu, qui occupent une grande partie de l’esp..

A fresh look at the often-censured but imperfectly understood traditions of Utilitarianism and political economy in relation to Victorian literature and culture. Setting the writings of Bentham, Smith, Malthus, Mill, Dickens, Carlyle, Trollope, Eliot, Gaskell, and Tagore in historical context, Blake widens awareness of commonalities across the age.

This essay is intended to support a certain picture of the relationship between metaphysics and ethics in Plato's thought. According to that picture, Plato's moral theory remained the same with respect to its central tenets throughout the dialogues, while his metaphysical theory grew more complex, partly as a result of his attempt to provide a strong theoretical foundation for his moral theory. The particular moral views that I use as an example to illustrate this thesis are related to Plato's treatment (...) of pleasure. ;I begin by describing the relationship between Plato's treatment of pleasure, and the doctrine that no one does wrong willingly, which I take to be a fundamental tenet of his moral theory. I go on to discuss the role that moderation and measure play in Plato's treatment of pleasure, and suggest the broader significance that the concept of measure might have for Plato's metaphysical and moral theories. Next, I demonstrate that the Republic is not fully equal to the task of providing a theoretical foundation for Plato's treatment of pleasure. I then argue that some of the features by means of which the metaphysics of the Philebus differs from that of the Republic are features that make it possible to give a theoretical foundation to Plato's treatment of pleasure. Finally, I show that the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus does rely on those changes in Plato's metaphysics. (shrink)

of (from Studies in the History of Ethics).

A reprint of the article "La théorie du plaisir d'après Épicure" (The Theory of Pleasure According to Epicurus), by Victor Brochard, and translated and edited by Eve Grace, which appeared in the 1904 issue of the "Journal des Savants" is presented. The article focuses on philosopher Epicurus' theory of pleasure. It notes that most historians believe that pleasure, in the view of Epicurus, is reducible to the absence of pain. The philosopher states that the pleasure of the belly is the (...) only one pleasure. (shrink)

In Book IX of the Republic, Plato presents an argument purporting to show that the philosophical life is most pleasant because pleasures other than those of the intelligent person are "not altogether true or pure". The first part considers one type of experience, the relief from pain , and argues that though it may appear pleasant, it is not pleasant. The second part argues that intellectual processes of replenishment provide a "truer" fulfillment which, in turn, causes a true pleasure, but (...) the bodily replenishments provide a "less true" fulfillment which, in turn, causes a "less true" pleasure. ;Very often, the primary principle used to evaluate both parts of Plato's argument is the notion that pleasure is a purely subjective experience and that as such it cannot be false. Some, like N. R. Murphy, suggest quite plausibly that Plato is not repudiating the pure subjectivity of pleasure but is only attacking predictions and generalizations about pleasure. Others, like G. Grote, think that Plato does violate the pure subjectivity of pleasure and that therefore Plato's argument is unsound. Both interpretations, however, share the view that the pure subjectivity of pleasure is a principle that ought not be violated. ;I, on the other hand, unlike Murphy, think that Plato does in fact deny the pure subjectivity of pleasure but unlike Grote, also think Plato quite right to deny it. Plato denies it by showing that some experiences generally thought to be pleasant are not pleasant at all and that some genuinely pleasant experiences are not as pleasant as they appear to be. ;In this thesis, I give an exposition of Plato's argument and then, using passages from elsewhere in the Republic and the Phaedo, explain why Plato thinks that one can be mistaken about one's own inner states of pleasure. In addition, I provide a brief exposition of Plato's arguments in the Philebus, the final discussion of pleasure in the Platonic corpus. (shrink)