History: Pleasure

of (from Studies in the History of Ethics).

Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that all pleasure is negative, and this view seems to play key roles throughout his work. Nonetheless, many scholars have argued that Schopenhauer actually acknowledges certain positive pleasures. Two major arguments have been offered for this reading, one focused on the link between Schopenhauer's view of pleasure and Plato's, and one focused on Schopenhauer's distinction between two components of aesthetic pleasure. I argue that neither way of motivating the positive pleasure reading succeeds. Both overlook a key aspect (...) of Schopenhauer's account: namely, his suggestion that there are two distinct kinds of negative pleasure, pleasures of satisfaction and pleasures of distraction. When Schopenhauer claims that all pleasure is negative, he means it. (shrink)

Nietzsche seems to hold that ‘higher types’, or examples of great power, are the only things good as an end. I consider and reject three reconstructions of Nietzsche’s argument for this: that it follows from understanding evolution, or from the will to power understood as a descriptive thesis, or from our admiration for such types. I suggest that Nietzsche’s strategy is to take for granted our shared admiration for higher types and then attack our admiration for other goods such as (...) virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. I argue that his arguments against pleasure fail. (shrink)

Optimism and pessimism are two diametrically opposed views about the value of existence. Optimists maintain that existence is better than non-existence, while pessimists hold that it is worse. Arthur Schopenhauer put forward a variety of arguments against optimism and for pessimism. I will offer a synoptic reading of these arguments, which aims to show that while Schopenhauer’s case against optimism primarily focuses on the value or disvalue of life’s contents, his case for pessimism focuses on the ways in which life (...) as a whole is structurally defective. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Plato considers pleasure to be part of the good life. Always despises pleasure, Plato, however, no longer insists on extreme rationalism, instead, he reconciles reason and pleasure with the fundamental principle of ‘measure’ In the Philebus, Plato considers ‘measure (μέτρον)’ to be of the highest value. He not only argues for the concrete application of ‘measure’ in the sensual world, but also confirms the metaphysical ground of ‘measure’. Many scholars have discussed the application of ‘measure’ from different (...) perspectives, but the deep logical principle of ‘measure’ has not been clarified clearly yet. Actually, the thought of ‘measure’ involves the relationship between ideas and sensual things. On the basis of the redefinition of this relationship, Plato proposes that a life that mixes reason and pleasure is a good one. On the one hand, ‘measure’ gives a certain rationalistic color to pleasure, and on the other hand, ‘measure’ protects pleasure from being replaced by reason. In this way, Plato turns to moderate rationalism, pioneers the principle of ‘measure’ in dealing with ethical issues, and draws a line between the gods and man. (shrink)

Traditionally, pleasure has been understood in three different ways: as a simple feeling or phenomenological quality, as a behavioral disposition, and as an evaluation. While versions of these accounts – and combinations of two of them – have been attributed to Kant, I argue that Kant successfully combines all three. Pleasure, on this view, is an evaluation of an object’s agreement with a particular subject’s ability or intention to act. Because it refers to a particular subject, it has a subjective (...) felt character, and because it is about agreement with an ability or intention to act, it disposes one to action. In addition to being philosophically compelling, this reading incorporates Kant’s disparate characterizations of pleasure. (shrink)

Zelle offers a concise analysis of Schiller’s essay On the Cause of the Pleasure We Derive from Tragic Objects (1792). Zelle emphasises that the essay takes up an aesthetic trend in the second half of the eighteenth century. Schiller answers the question of the reason for tragic pleasure with the help of the late Enlightenment theory of mixed sensations, which is reformulated in the articulation medium of Kant's freshly received Critique of Judgment (1790), namely the Analysis of the Sublime contained (...) therein. In doing so, Schiller relates the aesthetic emotional ambivalence that pleasure is aroused by displeasure to the anthropology of the human being’s dual nature, which is a mixture of sensuality and morality. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:This paper argues that in the Eudemian Ethics (EE), Aristotle aims to prove the Pleasure Thesis (PT). According to the Pleasure Thesis, happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. Through a reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT, this paper shows that happiness is most pleasant for three reasons: (1) it is pleasant by definition; (2) it is constituted by the most pleasant activities (virtuous actions and contemplation); (3) it is pleasant by nature. A reconstruction of the argument (...) in favor of PT is philosophically interesting not only in order to better understand the argument in the EE—and in particular the debated status and role of NE VII/EE VI.11–14—but also insofar as it sheds light on the relation between the pleasant and the good. (shrink)

After three decades of concentrated effort, commentators still seem to disagree about Kant's understanding of the nature of emotions. I argue that the appearance is misleading because the disagreement depends on different assumptions that are independent of Kant. I then propose a way out of this deadlock by pointing to the fact that, although the Kantian phenomena commonly understood as emotions originate in two different faculties, they all involve pleasure. This account provides the necessary yet insufficient conditions on a Kantian (...) phenomenon's being an emotion, but it allows us to mitigate the conflicting needs of historical accuracy and contemporary interest. (shrink)

This paper puts forward a new interpretation of the argument at Philebus 36c–40d that pleasures can be false. Protarchus raises an objection at 37e–38a, and in response Socrates presents the elaborate painter-scribe analogy. Most previous interpretations do not explain how the analogy answers Protarchus’ objection. On my account, Protarchus’ objection relies on the plausible intuition that pleasure is simply not in the business of assessing the world, and so it cannot be charged with doing so incorrectly. Socrates responds by demonstrating (...) that pleasure can be mistaken about the world, despite not making an independent assessment of it. The painter-scribe analogy demonstrates how pleasure comes to be mistaken about the world by reproducing the mistake of a judgment. Socrates persuades Protarchus that pleasure can be mistaken in part by preserving his intuition that pleasure itself is not the source of the mistake. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s ambiguous and much-discussed claim that pleasure perfects activity. This interpretation provides an alternative to the two main competing readings of this claim in the scholarship: the addition-view, which envisages the perfection conferred by pleasure as an extra perfection beyond the perfection of activity itself; and the identity-view, according to which pleasure just is the perfect activity itself. The proposed interpretation departs from both these views in rejecting their assumption that pleasure cannot perfect (...) the activity itself, and argues that pleasure makes activity perfect by optimising the exercise of one’s capacities for that activity. Those who build or play music with pleasure do so better than those who do not delight in these activities. The basis of this interpretation is Aristotle’s little-read remarks from the following chapter, i. e. NE x.5, about how pleasure “increases” the activity. (shrink)

A long-lived and lively tradition of materialist philosophers flourished in classical India and in classical Greece. Due to the condition of their texts, however, they do not often receive close study. This essay compares the views of the classical Indian materialists, the Cārvākas, and the classical Greek materialists, the Epicureans. The first section introduces their philosophies. The second outlines their doctrines of empiricism and materialism. The third and fourth turn to two comparative topics in Cārvāka and Epicurean ethics: their views (...) on eliminating irrational fears caused by superstition and their understanding of pleasure as the goal of human action and life. (shrink)

In book IX of the Republic, Socrates offers a strange mathematical calculation, which claims to prove that the tyrant lives exactly 729 times less pleasantly than the king. For the first time, a complete and detailed reconstruction of this difficult text and its underlying structure is offered in the present article. It thereby proves that the distinction between ‘pleasure’ and the ‘image of pleasure’ is one among the keys to understanding the passage. It is furthermore shown how the whole calculation (...) is based on Plato’s ontology of dimensions and therefore proves that this theorem can be taken into account at least already for the time of the Republic. (shrink)

Aristotle argued that you need some wealth to live well. The Stoics argued that you could live well with or without wealth. But the Cynics argued that wealth is a hinderance. For the Cynics, a good life consists in self-sufficiency, or being able to rule and help yourself. You accomplish this by living simply and naturally, and by subjecting yourself to rigorous philosophical exercises. Cynics confronted people to get them to abandon extraneous possessions and positions of power to live better. (...) And while the Cynics were experts in living in this way, their ascetic lifestyles made their message curious to some audiences. This paper reflects on Cynic ascetic practices and the ways others perceived them. (shrink)

According to Schopenhauer’s compensation argument for pessimism, the non-existence of the world is preferable to its existence because no goods can ever compensate for the mere existence of evil. Standard interpretations take this argument to be based on Schopenhauer’s thesis that all goods are merely the negation of evils, from which they assume it follows that the apparent goods in life are in fact empty and without value. This article develops a non-standard variant of the standard interpretation, which accepts the (...) relevance of the negativity thesis but rejects that the argument assumes that life’s goods are all empty and valueless. Instead, it argues that whatever value negative goods might possess, they do not have the kind of value to compensate for positive evils. This involves additional development of the negativity thesis and a defence of it against objections from Byron Simmons (2021). (shrink)

From the time human beings are born, they are forever confronted with the phenomena of pleasure and happiness. These two concepts are very close but there are major differences and that is that pleasure is also used in momentary cases, and happiness is used only for lasting or relatively lasting pleasures. Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra completely separated these two concepts and provided separate definitions for them. There is a deep relationship between pleasure and happiness. Psychology has a direct effect (...) on pleasure and happiness. According to the perceptual powers of the soul, it considers different levels for pleasure and happiness, among which it considers intellectual pleasure and intellectual or spiritual happiness in terms of evidence, proof, and quantity and quality of superior than other pleasures and happiness. And among the powers of the soul, it is the only intellectual power that has not been destroyed by death, and in the world of the hereafter, ultimate happiness and pleasure will be determined by it. The method used in this article is descriptive and analytical and the method of collecting materials is library. (shrink)

From Book IV of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura, we most often retain the severe criticism of the amorous feeling and the “traps of Venus.” However, two original aspects of the Lucretian denunciation of love, which I propose to study, are overlooked: on the one hand, the eulogy of the vagrant Venus, the volgivaga vagus Venere of verse 1071, an image of sexual infidelity that has become a philosophical virtue; on the other hand, the study of feminine pleasure—Lucretius acknowledges and values (...) feminine jouissance in his description of the physiology of heterosexual coitus. Bearing in mind that Epicurean ethics identifies voluptas with telos or Sovereign Good, it is particularly interesting to note that these two elements actually propose the outline of a specific sexual ethos, characterized by two structuring elements: diversity and reciprocity. I will thus propose a global perspective on this question of sexuality within Epicurean thought, highlighting the particularities resulting from the Epicureans’ consideration of the feminine dimension and its ambivalence. (shrink)

In this paper, I take Philip Rossi’s robust interpretation of critique as an interpretive guide for thinking generally about how to interpret Kant’s texts. I reflect first upon what might appear to be a minor technical issue: how best to translate the term Fähigheit when Kant utilizes it in reference to the human experience of pleasure and displeasure. Reflection upon this technical issue will, however, end up being a case study in how important it is when we are interpreting Kant’s (...) texts to have Rossi’s focus on human finitude in the background. The terrain for these reflections on human finitude will be the realm of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. And the result will be that, counter to recent interpreters, like Elizondo, who have suggested that Kant could welcome a thoroughly active conception of rational feeling, we must instead, as guided by Kant’s commitment to human finitude, remember that every feeling for Kant—even the most rational of feelings, like the moral feeling of respect, or the pleasure he notes that we take in the proper functioning of one’s virtuous rational self—must be understood within the purview and constraints of the finite and sensibly-affected human being. I hope, then, that this brief reflection can be taken as one small piece of that larger story Rossi so aptly describes in his book, the story which answers the question of “What is critique?” in a way that insists upon but also simultaneously celebrates the centrality of finitude in human existence. (shrink)

New Blackfriars, Volume 102, Issue 1100, Page 459-471, July 2021.

Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading (...) helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power. (shrink)

The Philebus describes the “good” that enables human eudaimonia as a “mixture” in which cognitive states have to be combined with certain types of pleasure. This essay investigates how the various senses of falsehood that Plato distinguishes are applied to the question of the hedonic “ingredients” of the good. It argues that his theory allows for the inclusion of certain virtuous pleasures that are deficient with respect to truth: either qua “mixed pleasures” lacking in truth on account of the compresence (...) of their opposite, pain, or because they are based on mistaken anticipations arising in the pursuit of virtuous and reasonable goals. (shrink)

At Philebus 53c4–55a12, Plato’s Socrates identifies pleasure as an ontologically inferior “becoming” (γένεσις) rather than a “being” (οὐσία) and then uses this information to infer that pleasure, somehow, lacks value. This paper argues that Plato’s γένεσις argument is not about the goodness of individual, particular episodes of pleasure but instead targets the identification of pleasure as the good around which we ought to organize our lives. It also shows that the argument is made up of two subarguments—the argument from finality (...) and the argument from a life not worth living—both of which conclude that, as a γένεσις, pleasure cannot be the good our life as a whole is aimed at reaching. Read in this way, the much maligned γένεσις argument turns out to be more cogent and more interesting than is usually thought. (shrink)

In this paper, we address the question of the ways in which pleasure, as associated specifically with eating food, can help us understand the philosophical complexities of pleasure and how it can be neither purely physical nor purely intellectual. Philosophers have argued for centuries that intellectual pleasure is superior to physical pleasure, but here we make it clear that they are inextricably linked and interdependent on one another. We appeal to Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine, but rely heavily on the ideals (...) of Epicurus for an understanding of the relationship between moderation and pleasure. In the end, we argue for a balanced approach to eating that can serve as a model for both physical, sexual, and intellectual pleasures. (shrink)

I analyze and defend Kant’s claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that pleasure in the good is interested.

In this vast and ambitious tome, Michael Nylan aims to "trace the evolution of pleasure theories in early China over the course of a millennium and a half", roughly from 400 BCE to 1100 CE. This involves dissecting the discourse surrounding a single graph, le 樂, which Nylan translates as pleasure, and actively distinguishes from other states such as happiness and joy. Nylan understands such pleasure as "deeper satisfactions" realized in long-term commitments and often relational in nature. In texts, pleasure (...) is often associated with "objects of consequence" such as intimate friends, Heaven, graceful and charismatic acts and family profession or heritage (p.... (shrink)

This article discusses the nature of “pleasure” in Aristotle. It is an attempt to reconcile and integrate the two different definitions that Aristotle gives in 1153a12–15 and 1174b31–33 of his Nichomachean Ethics. It exams the analysis and proposals of three contemporary philosophers: G.E.L. Owen, David Bostock, and Michael Pakaluk. It then passes to the exegesis of the medieval Thomas Aquinas. Thomas’s reading of the texts is presented as a way to answer the difficulties brought up earlier and provide a solid (...) interpretation that is capable of uniting both of the definitions of the Stagirite. (shrink)

David Wootton has written an engaging book about the emergence of the theory that all human action is self-interested and that believes societies should be structured in ways that satisfy our “insa...

이 글은 『필레보스』에서 소크라테스가 나누는 즐거움의 종류가 대상의 존재론적 지위에 달려있기 때문에 오직 순수한 대상에 대한 즐거움만이 참된 즐거움이라는 기존의 해석을 비판적으로 검토하고 즐거움의 종류를 새롭게 구분하는 방법을 제안한다.『필레보스』의 소크라테스는 즐거움이라는 사태가 몸과 혼 모두 혹은 혼에만 작용하는 것이라고 보기 때문에, 극단적인 쾌락주의자의 입장을 비판하면서 즐거움이라는 경험에 있어서 판단이 핵심적이라는 점을 보인다. 그리고 판단의 참과 거짓 여부에 따라서 즐거움 또한 참과 거짓으로 구분된다고 주장한다. 모든 종류의 즐거움은 이에 대한 판단이 참되어야만 참될 수 있으며, 이때 판단이 참된 것은 기대의 내용 혹은 (...) 즐거움의 크기를 정확하게 판정할 수 있는지에 달려있다. (shrink)

In both the Laches (191d-e) and the Laws (1.633c-d, 1.634a-b, and 1. 635d), Plato has his protagonist defend the claim that courage (andreia) is not simply a matter of resisting pain and fear but about overcoming pleasure and desire as well. In this paper, I argue that Plato took the expansive view of courage seriously and that there are several reasons why we should too.

In this paper I aim to show that the restoration model of pleasure as we find it in Plato’s Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, and Philebus contain a common psychological core, despite the substantial developments and greater sophistication in the later works. I argue that, contrary to the scholarly consensus, all four dialogues take the necessary condition for pain to be a state of imbalance or disharmony rather than a process of destruction or deterioration. Given that the necessary condition for pleasure is (...) a process of restoration, it follows that the restoration model offers a strikingly asymmetrical account of pleasure and pain. This unorthodox interpretation of pain is not only favoured by the textual evidence but is also more charitable, as it attributes to Plato a more plausible view of impure pleasures, a more realistic account of desire, and a more compelling argument for the greater pleasantness of the philosophical life. (shrink)

Aristotle repeatedly qualifies the pleasure of courageous actions relative to other kinds of virtuous actions. This article argues that the pleasure of courageous actions is qualified because virtuous activity and its pleasure is dependent upon external conditions, and the external conditions of courageous actions are particularly constraining. The article shows that Curzer’s explanation of the qualified pleasure of courageous actions by the presence of pain violates Aristotle’s commitment to virtuous actions as being pleasant by their nature.

Though Plato's Phaedo does not focus on pleasure, some considerable talk on pleasure takes place in it. Socrates argues for the soul's immortality and, while doing so, hopes to highlight to his companions how important it is to take care of our soul by focussing on the intellect and by neglecting the bodily realm as far as is possible in this life. Doing philosophy, so his argument goes, is something like dying, if we grant that death is the separation of (...) the soul from the body and notice that genuine philosophers wish nothing else than to be detached from the bodily realm. For indulging into bodily pleasures has detrimental consequences on the soul, impeding the search of truth and distorting reality, and so philosophers should undertake to purify themselves from all bodily concerns and gratifications and love the objects of learning and knowledge without deviation and distraction. On the contrary, ordinary people fall for the bodily realm as the only real domain that should therefore be of priority and of their earnest concern. (shrink)

Scholars have characterised the trial of the life of pleasure in Philebus 20b-21d as digressive or pejorative. I argue that it is neither: it is a thought experiment containing an important argument, in the form of a reductio, of the hypothesis that a life could be most pleasant without cognition. It proceeds in a series of steps, culminating in the precisely chosen image of the jellyfish. Understanding the intended resonance of this creature, and the sense in which it is deprived, (...) is critical for reconstructing the argument, and yields new insight into Plato’s views on the minimal conditions for pleasure. (shrink)

What is the role of pleasure in Chinese intellectual traditions? Do Chinese thinkers shun all desire for pleasure? Contrary to received opinion, The Chinese Pleasure Book illustrates and argues that early Chinese thinkers across traditions, from the fourth century BCE to the eleventh century CE, all assume that pleasure-seeking and pleasure-taking are part of the human condition and that it is right to engage in such actions. The volume is an ambitious project and Nylan has done a superb job.

In the first two books ofDe finibus(=Fin.), Cicero deals with the Epicurean view of the final goal of life. This philosophical discussion, which is preceded by a rhetorical proem that stands on itself, is framed as a dialogue between Torquatus, who defends the Epicurean position, Cicero, who attacks it, and Triarius, who confines himself to a few critical interventions. If philosophy starts in wonder, according to the celebrated passage from Plato'sTheaetetus(155d), the company meets this criterion admirably well, for the actual (...) discussion starts with Torquatus’ surprise about Cicero's aversion to the Epicurean view (Fin.1.13). He even suggests that this aversion has nothing to do with a fundamental disapproval of Epicurus’ doctrines but that it should rather be sought in stylistic concerns. (shrink)

In Book 9 of Plato's Republic we find three proofs for the claim that the just person is happier than the unjust person. Curiously, Socrates does not seem to consider these arguments to be coequal when he announces the third and final proof as ‘the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows’. This remark raises a couple of related questions for the interpreter. Whatever precise sense we give to μέγιστον and κυριώτατον in this passage, Socrates is clearly appealing to an (...) argumentative standard of some kind, and claiming that his final argument alone meets this standard. But what precise standard is Socrates invoking here? And given that the first two arguments of Book 9 fall short of this standard, why does he not simply leap directly to the third, most decisive proof? (shrink)

This paper addresses two interpretive puzzles in Plato’s Philebus. The first concerns the claim, endorsed by both interlocutors, that the most godlike of lives is a pleasureless life of pure thinking. This appears to run afoul of the verdict of the earlier so-called ‘Choice of Lives’ argument that a mixed life is superior to either of its ‘pure’ rivals. A second concerns Socrates’ discussion of false pleasure, in which he appears to be guilty of rank equivocation. I argue that we (...) can solve both puzzles by attributing to Plato an account of pleasure as a species of intentional attitude. (shrink)

앤스콤(G. E. M. Anscombe)은 아리스토텔레스가 그의 『니코마코스 윤리학』안에 있는 두 가지로 나눌 수 있는 논의, 즉 A논의(제7권 11장-14장)와 B논의(제10권 1장-5장) 안에서 즐거움에 대한 양립할 수 없는 설명들을 제시하고 있다고 말한다. 그녀에 의하면, 아리스토텔레스의 즐거움에 대한 양자의 논의는 결론적으로 분명치 않은 표현 또는 거슬리는 판단 쪽으로 환원되는 논제들 중의 하나였다. 왜냐하면 아리스토텔레스는 좋은 이유 때문에 즐거움이 활동과 ‘동일시되는 것’과 그와는 반대로 ‘다르게 되는 것’ 둘 다를 원했기 때문이다.BR 몇몇의 학자들은 그것들이 단순히 양립할 수 없다고 결론을 내린 반면에, 일부의 학자들은 이러한 두 (...) 가지의 명백하게 양립할 수 없는 설명들을 조화시키려고 노력해왔다. 여기에서 연구자는 아리스토텔레스의 A논의와 B논의가 상이한 정의를 내리고 있다는 것을 인정하지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 그러한 정의들이 양립할 수 없는 것은 아니라고 주장한다. 왜냐하면 그것들은 상이한 현상들에 대한 정의를 내리는 것을 목적으로 하고 있기 때문이다. 그러한 관점에 의하면, 양자는 상호 보충적이라는 희망 안에서 정의들 사이의 차이점을 강조하고 있다. 연구자는 본 글에서 이러한 입장을 취하면서 다음과 같이 주장할 것이다.BR 첫째, 연구자는 “A논의 안에서의 본성적 상태의 방해받지 않는 활동이라는 공식이 즐거움의 주관적이고 객관적 요소들 둘 다를 함유하고 있는 것으로 해석되어야한다”고 주장한다. 왜냐하면, 아리스토텔레스에 의하면 ‘본성적 상태의 활동’은 어떤 것이 본성적으로 즐거운 것이기 때문이며(객관적 즐거움), ‘방해받지 않는’이라는 것은 활동이 행위자에게 즐겁다는 것을 나타내고 있기 때문이다(주관적 즐거움).BR 둘째, 연구자는 “‘즐거움’에 관한 기능론적 해석으로서 B논의도 또한 즐거움의 주관적이고 객관적인 요소 둘 다를 함유하고 있는 것으로 해석되어야한다”고 주장한다. 왜냐하면 아리스토텔레스는 “뚜렷한 인간적인 즐거움들은 정확하게 탁월성에 따르는 즐거움들을 동반하는 즐거움들이며(객관적 즐거움들), 우리가 심사숙고하여 그러한 즐거움들을 목적으로 삼음으로써 우리는 더 큰 강도와 집중력을 가지고서 탁월성 있게 행위 하도록 자극받을 수 있다(주관적 즐거움)”고 말하고 있기 때문이다.BR 셋째, 연구자는 “아리스토텔레스가 즐거움에 관한 A논의와 B논의를 형이상학적으로 해석함으로써 양자를 상호보충적인 것으로 받아들이고 있다”고 주장한다. 왜냐하면 아리스토텔레스는 “즐거움은 행위의 목적이며 그리하여 목적인일수도 있다. 그리고 즐거움이 존재할 때, 그리고 즐거움이 이러한 활동들을 존재하는 것으로 만들 때, 즐거움은 그것들의 작용인이다. 그리고 즐거움은 이러한 동일한 이유 때문에 형상인이다”라고 해석하고 있기 때문이다.BR 결론적으로, 연구자는 ‘즐거움’에 관한 아리스토텔레스의 관점들을 검토함으로써 이러한 주장들이 무엇을 의미하는지 그리고 그가 왜 그렇게 말하려고 했는지를 이해하려고 노력해왔다. 그 결과, 연구자는 본 글에서 앤스콤을 비롯한 몇몇 연구자들과는 다르게 아리스토텔레스가 그의 『니코마코스 윤리학』안에 있는 두 가지로 분리되는 논의 안에서 ‘즐거움’에 관한 양립 가능하고도 상호보충적인 설명을 제시하고 있다고 결론을 내린다. (shrink)