History: Toleration

'What can you say to a man who tells you he prefers obeying God rather than men, and that as a result he's certain he'll go to heaven if he cuts your throat?'Voltaire's Pocket Philosophical Dictionary, first published in 1764, is a major work of the European Enlightenment. It is also a highly entertaining book: this is no 'dictionary' in the ordinary sense, nor does it treat 'philosophy' in the modern meaning of the term. It consists of a sequence of (...) short essays or articles, arranged in alphabetical order, and covering everything from Apocalypse and Atheism to Tolerance and Tyranny. The unifying thread of these articles is Voltaire's critique of established religion: ridicule of established dogma, attacks on superstition, and pleas for toleration. Witty and ironic, this is very much a work of combat, part of Voltaire's high-profile political struggle in the 1760s to defend the victims of religious and political intolerance. This new translation is based on the definitive French text, and reprints the edition that provoked widespread controversy and condemnation. In his Introduction Nicholas Cronk considers the work's continuing relevance to modern debates about religious intolerance and its consequences. (shrink)

What motivated an absolutist Erastian who rejected religious freedom, defended uniform public worship, and deemed the public expression of disagreement a catalyst for war to endorse a movement known to history as the champion of toleration, no coercion in religion, and separation of church and state? At least three factors motivated Hobbes’s 1651 endorsement of Independency: the Erastianism of Cromwellian Independency, the influence of the politique tradition, and, paradoxically, the contribution of early-modern practices of toleration to maintaining the public sphere’s (...) religious uniformity. The third factor illustrates how a key function of the emerging private sphere in the early-modern period was to protect uniformity, rather than diversity; it also shows that what was novel was not so much the public/private distinction itself, but the separation of two previously conflated dimensions of publicity – visibility and representativeness – that enabled early-modern Europeans to envisage modes of worship out in the open, yet still private. (shrink)

In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by its own meta-exclusivism.

The exacerbation of ethnic [natsional'nye] conflicts in the USSR is ruinous not only for our country. Polemics on the ethnic question are being waged at all levels and with all means, but what they lack most is a sober analysis of explosive problems. Even persons who in every other respect are distinguished by tolerance and common sense make an unworthy show of themselves on this sensitive question.

Conventionally lauded as the luminous Age of Reason in which the fogs of religious superstition lifted to reveal a new world of tolerance and human dignity, the Enlightenment also possessed what one might term its “dark side”. A small number of writers and visual artists – such as Sade, Choderlos de Laclos (author of Les Liaisons dangereuses) and Francisco Goya – recognised that the newfound paths of Reason and empiricism could lead in unexpected directions and reveal aspects of human experience (...) very much at odds with Enlightenment ideals. This paper focuses on aspects of the work of Goya. Struck down in his mmid-forties by an illness that left him deaf for life, Goya encountered a domain of irremediable suffering to which the categories of Enlightenment thought seemed to have nothing to say. The result was the three series of etchings known as the Caprichos, the Disasters of War and the Disparates, the so-called “black paintings” (such as Saturn devouring his children), and a number of related works including the celebrated Third of May 1808. These works represent a radical repudiation of the underlying confidence in humanity represented by Enlightenment thought. Rejecting what André Malraux terms the “ornate image of man” underpinning eighteenth century baroque art, they are a world away from Watteau’s fêtes galantes or Fragonard’s idyllic rustic scenes, replacing the “ornate image” with a relentless catalogue of humiliation, suffering and atrocity. Created semi-clandestinely, the etchings and black paintings, foreshadow modern art’s abandonment of Renaissance and Enlightenment humanism, and have often been read as prophetic of the twentieth-century nightmare world of total war and extermination camps. They reveal a sinister netherworld in which man is simply victim and all trace of humanism has been erased. (shrink)

Chapter One distinguishes the early, individualistic, writings from the later, more socially conscious ones. The metaphysical language of impermeable surfaces and levels, and rigid hierarchies, is consonant in James's writing with the assumption of what Dewey calls an individual/society split. ;Chapter Two focuses upon the relational self from the Principles of Psychology. The central pair of terms is that of strength/fragility, in which a self is revealed that is both functionally efficacious through activities of emphasis, selection, and negation, and permeable (...) to context. ;Chapter Three discusses the "social organism" and the "intellectual republic" from The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. James uses more socially conscious metaphors, and discusses the public and the private; "inner" and "outer" tolerance; and the "personal contribution," "X," which must be added to the "world," "M." ;Chapter Four discusses the "nucleus" of relations from Essays in Radical Empiricism. The personal aspect of social experience falls within the realm of "co-conscious relations" and the public falls within the sphere of the "conterminous." The strong side of the self, from Chapter Two; the private, or personal; inner tolerance; and the personal contribution, "X," from Chapter Three, belong to the sphere of co-conscious relations, as discussed in Chapter Four, just as the fragile side, the public; outer tolerance; and the world, "M," all belong to the sphere of conterminous relations. ;Chapter Five discusses the metaphor of Papini's corridor from Pragmatism. The adjoining rooms can be seen to symbolize the sphere of co-conscious relations, and the corridor of conterminous ones. The metaphysics of background and foreground points to an instrumentalist interpretation of the self, which represents a complete departure from James's early individualism. (shrink)

The term etonism is from «Etona» that means flag, marks, evidence, and reason in Kikôngo. The variants in Umbûndu: etonolo or etonuilo means, allegations, reasons, indulgence (tolerance). The Nyaneka form is etŏnya: 1) reasons, 2) allegations, 3) indulgence and 5) the justice and the tolerance. Etona is Angolan artist (sculptor/painter). In his sculpture they are morphologically evidenced three treatments in the surface of the matter, namely 1) flat treatment; 2) rude treatment and finally 3) accidental treatment. Each one is a (...) code: #1. The flat treatment indicates well-knowledge; a man of superior class; race or tribe or religion of majority; thought well-organized and structured. In painting, the hot intensity indicates dominance, prosperity, energy, intense desires; #2. The rude treatment reveals an acquired knowledge without academism, self-taught; medium class men; speech out of the scientific perimeters but with certain admissibility; race, tribe or religion of lot of people, but not of majority. In his painting, the neutral intensity marks the balance and inspires recomfort nurtured from two opposed poles (hot and cold); #3. The accidental part of the sculpture indicates some knowledge’s lack (pure empiricism); inferior class; race, tribe, religion of minority. In the painting, the cold intensity is naturally contrary of #1. Etonism is the tolerant reason between #1=I, #2=YOU and #3=HE. All of them form the coherent society that we call WE: the Etonian jusphilosophy that African peoples need for stability of their democracies and finishing their War. (shrink)

The term etonism reflects the Angolan ancestral philosophy… Etona in Kikôngo, etonolo or etonuilo in Umbûndu: allegations, reasons, indulgence (tolerance). In Nyaneka form is etŏnya. These significances constitute the essence of the etonism: 1) reasons, 2) allegations, 3) indulgence, 4) evidence that generates the justice and the tolerance. «Who is correct tolerates who is wrong». Also, Etonism identifies 1) racism, 2) tribalism and 3) discrimination as a serious sequel of neo-colonialism, and calls the attention of the Angolan people, using roots (...) of angolanity safeguarding a harmonious society in the future. It suggests the tolerant reason as one of the main form of tranquility in Angola after-war. (shrink)

This paper considers Hegel's analysis of conscientious conflict in the Phenomenology of Spirit as a resource for thinking through the possibility and nature of true community. Hegel's account speaks to the growing awareness that ideals of tolerance and of multicultural acceptance lack force in the face of the realities of intercultural conflict and violence that are increasingly manifest in our world. He shows that even with the best intentions, there can be no genuine community rooted in bare assertions of mutual (...) acceptance. Differences and conflict are not only inescapable, but can be productive insofar as we learn to interpret the inevitable conflicts that arise from these differences as legitimate expressions of the true nature of a shared situation. Genuine communities cannot be built either upon the mere celebration or violent suppression of differences, but only as "we" learn to take conflict and differences seriously and learn from them who "we" are together and allow these discoveries to shape who we will become. (shrink)

Introduction: Redeeming recognition -- Oppression reconsidered -- Foundations of a liberal conception -- Toward a liberal conception of oppression -- Conclusion : A liberal conception of oppression -- Misrecognition as oppression -- Exploitation and disempowerment -- Cultural imperialism -- Marginalization -- Violence -- Conclusion: Misrecognition as oppression -- Overcoming oppression : the limits of toleration -- Contemporary differences : matters of toleration -- John Rawls : political liberalism -- Will Kymlicka : multicultural citizenship -- Conclusion: Accommodating differences : the limits (...) of toleration -- Beyond toleration : toward a concept of recognition -- Hegel's early Jena theory of recognition -- Axel Honneth's critical social theory of recognition -- Charles Taylor's politics of recognition -- Conclusion: Toward a concept of public recognition -- Hegel's theory of recognition in the phenomenology : recognitive understanding and freedom -- The centrality of recognition in the phenomenology -- The pure concept of recognition and its failure in mastery and slavery -- The achievement of mutual recognition through recognitive understanding -- Challenges to Hegel's recognition theory -- Conclusion: Hegel's theory of recognition in the phenomenology -- Recognition in the philosophy of right : particularity and its right -- Recognition in the philosophy of right -- Particularity in the free market : the benefits and liabilities of free subjectivity -- Conclusion: The significance of the right of particularity -- Winning the right of particularity : recognizing difference in ethical life -- How particularity wins its right : the bildung of true conscience -- Exercising the right of particularity : corporations as sites of public recognition -- Challenges to Hegel's treatment of difference in ethical life -- Conclusion: The public recognition of difference in civil society -- Conclusion: Hegel, recognition, and ethical liberal modernity. (shrink)

This paper looks at the state of research on churchstate relations in post-communist Romania in order to provide an outline of the most important questions which need to be addressed in the coming years. The article consists of two parts. First, a survey of academic studies published over the past two decades on the relationship between the country’s churches and state after 1990. Secondly, a breakdown of pressing churchstate issues today, accompanied by short discussions of existing studies and suggestions as (...) to what future research should probe into. (shrink)

It is said that Europe finds itself today in a post-christian situa-tion. Further, there are many who advocate abandoning monotheism in order to get back to prechristian polytheism in the hope that the plurality of gods would favour a democratic tolerance in a pluralistic world. In this article the author firstly asks if European Christians have not gone back to adoring idols and to attempting to distinguish between them in the new forms of devotion to possessiveness, to power and to (...) pleasure. He then goes on to ask about the possibilities of pro-claiming the God of Jesus Christ. The third and the fourth part of the article point out several forms of necessary witness to God in contemporary society, with special reference made to European society in the conclusion. (shrink)

Leibniz is not commonly numbered amongst canonical writers on toleration. One obvious reason is that, unlike Locke, he wrote no treatise specifically devoted to that doctrine. Another is the enormous amount of energy which he famously devoted to ecclesiastical reunification. Promoting the reunification of Christian churches is an objective quite different from promoting the toleration of different religious faiths – so different, in fact, that they are sometimes even construed as mutually exclusive. Ecclesiastical reunification aims to find agreement at least (...) on the most important doctrines. Religious toleration involves accepting and respecting disagreement even on the most important doctrines. If one regards these two projects as alternative rather than complementary strategies for dealing with religious diversity, Leibniz might more readily be characterised as an ecumenist rather than a tolerationist. Such appears to be the conclusion, at any rate, implicit in the balance of critical literature on these topics: whereas a steady stream of studies has discussed Leibniz’s project of ecclesiastical reunification, only a meager trickle has been devoted to his views on toleration; and some of these studies go so far as to conclude that Leibniz had no doctrine of toleration at all. This paper will attempt to show, on the contrary, that a robust, many-layered, and unusually inclusive doctrine of toleration can be gleaned from Leibniz’s writings. This doctrine operated at least at three different levels: philosophical, theological, and pragmatic. As this implies, the doctrine of religious toleration, rather than being in collision with Leibniz’s core project of ecclesiastical reunification, was an essential element of that very project: it should be seen, in other words, not as a competing goal, but as a necessary first step toward ecclesiastical reunification. Yet at the same time it will also emerge that Leibniz’s doctrine of toleration was no mere function of this intra-Christian project of reunification: rather it was a still more fundamental principle which extended beyond the ecumenical project as well. It had the resources for accepting and respecting irreducible religious diversity and disagreement on points of importance not only between Christian communities, but also between Christians and non-Christians, including, in principle, even the atheists. These points will emerge from a discussion of statements on the philosophical, theological, and pragmatic justifications of religious toleration scattered throughout Leibniz’s sprawling corpus of writings. (shrink)

As one might expect, throughout his life Leibniz assumed an attitude of religious toleration both ad intra (that is, toward Christians of other confessions) and ad extra (that is, toward non-Christians, notably Muslims). Focusing in particular on his epistolary exchange with the French Catholic convert Paul Pellisson-Fontanier, I argue that neither toleration ad intra nor toleration ad extra is grounded for Leibniz in indifference toward the content of revealed religion. On the contrary, Leibniz remained convinced of the objective truth of (...) the Christian religion as it is handed down by the millennia-old tradition of the truly universal church. In his view, reasons internal to the very nature of salvation and to the conception of God and man explicitly contained in or, at least, in accord with this tradition present religious toleration as the only justifiable answer to the differences among religions. (shrink)

This work is the second in the Routledge Series of Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers . Each volume of the series presents a comprehensive selection of the critical literature commenting on the life and works of a major political philosopher. John Locke (1632-1704) is a key figure because his political philosophy was one of the foundations for both the American Constitution and the French Revolution. He defined government as based on a free contract between people which can be subsequently (...) modified, and he stressed the importance of religious toleration. Locke also wrote extensively on other aspects of philosophy, on education, and on religion. The present volumes provide students of politics and philosophy with immediate access to Locke's contribution and show how his work has been received and modified by others. (shrink)

This paper intends a comparative analysis of freedom of thought and toleration,as these concepts appear by the end of the 17th century in Locke's Epistola de Tolerantia and Bayle's Commentaire Philosophique. Nowadays we think that an open society implies freedom of thought as one of its pillars, and so an unlimited toleration, except in case others were injured. For Locke, things were different: freedom of thought was, for him, obedience to natural law, the basis of human society, and this purported (...) that those who did not recognize the law were excluded. Bayle, on the other hand, showed that the only truth subsistent in issues concerning religious matters was a relative, "putative truth", something that catholics, mahometans and atheists pretended to possess. There was no reason, therefore, to exclude those groups from human society. In his book, Bayle is sometimes against himself. On the contrary, Locke's theory is clear and well founded. But, and this is our conclusion, not always attentive to practical life contingencies.Este trabajo se propone un análisis comparativo de la libertad de pensamiento y tolerancia, tal como estos conceptos aparecen hacia fines del siglo XVII en la Epistola de Tolerantia de Locke y en el Commentaire Philosophique de Bayle. Actualmente pensamos que una sociedad abierta implica libertad de pensamiento como uno de sus pilares, y así una tolerancia ilimitada, excepto en caso que otros resultaran dañados. Para Locke, las cosas eran diferentes: libertad de pensamiento era para él obediencia a la ley natural , base de la sociedad humana, y ello implicaba que aquellos quienes no reconocieran la ley serían excluidos. Bayle, por el contrario, mostró que la única verdad subsistente en las cuestiones concernientes a temas religiosos era una verdad relativa, una "verdad putativa", algo que católicos, mahometanos y ateos pretendían poseer. No había, en consecuencia, razón para excluir a tales grupos de la sociedad humana. En este libro, Bayle estaba a veces contra sí mismo. Por el contrario, la teoría de Locke es clara y bien fundamentada. Pero -y ésta es nuestra conclusión-, no siempre atenta a las contingencias de la vida práctica. (shrink)

The comparative study of Romanian and Hungarian Neopagan organizations with an ethnocentric or "Ethno-pagan" ideology is an exploratory research aimed at mapping the similarities and the differences between these religious minorities, with a highlight on their level of institutionalization, their core values and degree of political mobilization. Zalmoxian groups and organizations promote the revival of Romanian spirituality through a process of reconnection to its ancient, supposedly Dacian and Thracian roots; by the same token, Hungarian Shamanist movements are aimed at recovering (...) a supposedly lost spirituality, built-in into the deepest layers of Hungarian language and cultural practices. A web rhetoric analysis of these organizations is carried out in order to assess audience involvement, communication style and the use of multimedia tools to convey their messages. (shrink)

This article explores the role of religion in Ottoman political legitimation. It shows that the Ottoman rulers were interested in a much more expansive, diverse form of political legitimation that included Islamic religious legitimation, but also used toleration and sultanic law to construct a more capacious form of political legitimation that included Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the empire.

The purpose of this paper is to articulate a new perspective on British multi-faith religious education that both complements and, in part, subsumes existing critiques. My argument, while controversial, is straightforward: it is that British religious education has misrepresented the nature of religion in efforts to commend itself as contributing to the social aims of education, as these are typically framed in liberal democratic societies. Contemporary multi-faith religious education is placed in context and its underlying theological and philosophical commitments identified (...) and criticised. It is concluded that current representations of religion in British religious education are limited in their capacity to challenge racism and religious intolerance, chiefly because they are conceptually ill equipped to develop respect for difference. (shrink)