Hobbes: Philosophy of Language

This book presents a new interpretation of the seventeenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy of religion. I argue that the key to Hobbes’s treatment of religion is his theory of religious language. On that theory, the proper function of religious speech is not to affirm truths, state facts, or describe anything, but only to express non-descriptive attitudes of honor, reverence, and humility before God, the incomprehensible great cause of nature. The traditional vocabulary of theism, natural religion, and even scriptural religion is (...) preserved intact, but only as a system of natural and conventional signs of honor, as we laud the ‘infinite,’ ‘wise,’ and ‘good’ cause of nature, and speak of it in conventionally-approved scriptural terms—not in an attempt to describe it, but only as a way of expressing our veneration. The proposed reading undercuts the most influential alternative interpretations, revealing that Hobbes is neither an atheist, nor a literal-minded theist with a realist conception of the traditional divine attributes. At the same time, understanding Hobbes’s non-descriptivist approach to religious discourse helps us to see why so many have found either an atheistic or a realist-minded theistic interpretation attractive. The book advances a comprehensive analysis of Hobbes’s highly original philosophy of religion, including both his treatment of natural religion and his treatment of revealed religion and scripture. It also connects his philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and theory of human nature to his engagé religious politics, including his views on religious toleration, sectarianism, religious education, ecclesiology, and the religious function of the civil state. (shrink)

La tarda scolastica, all’inizio del XVII secolo, è il teatro di un dibattito sulla definizione di segno, che si traduce nella suddivisione tra signum formale e signum instrumentale. Il primo è l’eco della tendenza medievale a considerare i concetti come segni. Il secondo corrisponde a una definizone che risale ad Agostino, secondo la quale il segno è una cosa sensibile che deve essere conosciuta per portare alla conoscenza di qualcosa d’altro. Smarcandosi dalla corrente che aveva fatto della sola Logica di (...) Port Royal il paradigma del pensiero semiotico del XVII secolo, quest’opera mostra, a partire da questo dibattito scolastico, che il XVII secolo si caratterizza globalmente per una translatio, un trasferimento, che è visibile in particolare in autori come Bayle, Gassendi e Hobbes, da un modello linguistico-psicologico a una semiotica ormai orientata all’epistemologia. (shrink)

Are human beings purely material creatures, or is there something else to them, an immaterial part that does some (or all) of the thinking, and might even be able to outlive the death of the body? This book is about how a series of seventeenth-century philosophers tried to answer that question. It begins by looking at the views of Thomas Hobbes, who developed a thoroughly materialist account of the human mind, and later of God as well.

Hobbes is often portrayed as a thinker who anticipated modern constructivist ideas of fiction and representation according to which reality is simply a social construction. This article questions t...

Hobbes repeatedly expressed concerns about moral and political language, e.g., about the bad consequences of various uses and misuses of language. He did not simply focus on the consequences though. He also attempted to understand the problems, using the central semantic notion in his philosophy of language, signification. Hobbes, in both the Elements of Law and Leviathan, argues that a wide variety of terms – including ‘good’, ‘bad’, and the names of virtues and vices – have a double and inconstant (...) signification. This paper explores and explains that theory of Hobbes's. (In the course of the discussion, two other interpretations of Hobbes's claims are discussed: Pettit’s discussion in terms of indexicals, and Alexandra’s in terms of sense and reference.) This phenomenon is, Hobbes thinks, pervasive in our use of moral and political language. Indeed he says his analysis applies to all “names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us” (Leviathan 4.24), which seems a very broad category indeed. This inconstancy of signification has considerable potential to cause confusion and conflict. Given those practical consequences, it is of some importance for Hobbes to find a solution to this problem. The paper examines several possible Hobbesian solutions to the problem. There is, however, reason to think that these suggested solutions cannot completely solve the problem. The paper concludes, then, by arguing that double and inconstant signification would always be a danger, even in a properly constituted Hobbesian commonwealth. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes, który badaniu języka poświęcił wiele miejsca, zastanawiał się, czy możliwe jest myślenie — myślenie w ogóle i myślenie abstrakcyjne — bez języka? Hobbes zakładał, że ludzie pozbawieni języka mogą tworzyć własne, niedoskonałe, prywatne języki, pozwalające im na swoiście rozumiane rozumowanie. Na Hobbesowskie pytanie trzysta lat później odpowiada twierdząco wybitny neurolog i literat Oliver Sacks. Na podstawie danych, jakie przyniosła mu praca z osobami głuchymi, nieznającymi żadnego, nawet migowego, języka, dowodzi, że słowa i inne znaki umowne stają się niezbędne (...) dopiero na pewnym etapie procesu myślowego, że myśl jest czymś znacznie szerszym niż słowo, że można — w pewnym sensie — myśleć bez słów. Jak wcześniej Hobbes, Sacks podkreśla, że myślenie, w którym nie korzysta się z powszechnie przyjętych znaków, ma jednak charakter ułomny i niepełny; myślenie takie nie znajduje uzewnętrznienia, izoluje jednostkę z życia w społeczeństwie. (shrink)

L’histoire de la pensée sémiotique se caractérise par une oscillation entre définition large et définition étroite de son objet. Au Moyen Âge, la définition augustinienne du signe est jugée trop étroite, car elle ne concerne que le signe sensible. De nouvelles définitions tentent alors de faire des concepts des signes qui renvoient aux choses. L’Âge moderne, au contraire, affirme une volonté de rétrécissement à l’égard de la notion de signe. Cet article montrera les caractéristiques d’une telle réflexion sémiotique à travers (...) deux auteurs représentatifs d’un premier empirisme moderne : Pierre Gassendi et Thomas Hobbes. Le retour à une sémiotique étroite s’effectue par la référence aux traditions stoïcienne, sceptique et épicurienne, ainsi qu’à un Aristote renouvelé, et par une prédilection affichée pour la valeur indiciaire du signe par rapport à sa valeur sémantique. Ceci veut dire que les empiristes vont insister avant tout sur la fonction remémorative du signe et sur sa valeur de probabilité. L’indice en tant que trace sera ainsi privilégié par rapport au signe communicationnel, et il s’agira d’en défendre la validité en tant qu’il s’inscrit dans une échelle de certitude, au sommet de laquelle se situe la preuve. (shrink)

T. A. Heinrichs sustentou que a análise de Hobbes da experiência e do pensamento dá origem a um aparente paradoxo. O paradoxo consiste no fato de que Hobbes teria reivindicado descobertas que a sua teoria implica que não poderiam ser feitas. Para resolver o problema, Heinrichs argumenta que a teoria hobbesiana da experiência e pensamento deveria ser interpretada com base em sua teoria da linguagem, no sentido forte de que suas descobertas são de fato descobertas sobre a linguagem. Neste artigo (...) será defendido, contra Heinrichs, que a interpretação mais plausível é que Hobbes baseou sua análise da linguagem em sua analise do pensamento e experiência. Portanto, a solução de Heinrichs para o paradoxo deve ser rejeitada. (shrink)

The aim of this collection is to illustrate the pervasive influence of humanist rhetoric on early-modern literature and philosophy. The first half of the book focuses on the classical rules of judicial rhetoric. One chapter considers the place of these rules in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, while two others concentrate on the technique of rhetorical redescription, pointing to its use in Machiavelli's The Prince as well as in several of Shakespeare's plays, notably Coriolanus. The second half of the book (...) examines the humanist background to the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. A major new essay discusses his typically humanist preoccupation with the visual presentation of his political ideas, while other chapters explore the rhetorical sources of his theory of persons and personation, thereby offering new insights into his views about citizenship, political representation, rights and obligations and the concept of the state. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes was, rather famously, a nominalist. The core of that nominalism is the belief that the only universal things are universal names: there are no universal objects, or universal ideas. This paper looks at what Hobbes's views about universal names were, how they evolved over time, and how Hobbes argued for them. The remainder of the paper considers two objections to Hobbes's view: a criticism made by several of Hobbes's contemporaries, that Hobbes's view could not account for people saying (...) the same thing in different languages; and a more recently popular criticism of Hobbes, that his nominalism's reliance on similarity implicitly (and inconsistently) involves reliance on a universal. (shrink)

Language was central to Hobbes's understanding of human beings and their mental abilities, and criticism of other philosophers' uses of language became a favorite critical tool for him. This paper connects Hobbes's theories about language to his criticisms of others' language, examining Hobbes's theories of propositions and truth, and how they relate to his claims that various sorts of proposition are absurd. It considers whether Hobbes in fact means anything more by 'absurd' than 'false'. And it pays particular attention to (...) Hobbes's categorization of causes of absurdity and of types of incoherent proposition, arguing that Hobbes's approach is only loosely related to later discussions of category mistakes. (shrink)

Hobbes’s interpreters have struggled to find a plausible semantics for evaluative language in his writings. I argue that this search is misguided. Hobbes offers neither an account of the reference of evaluative terms nor a theory of the truth-conditions for evaluative statements. Rather, he sees evaluative language simply as having the non-representational function of prescribing actions and practical attitudes, its superficially representational appearance notwithstanding. I marshal the evidence for this prescriptivist reading of Hobbes on evaluative language and show how it (...) sidesteps various textual and philosophical problems that bedevil the traditional interpretations. (shrink)

Ce mini-dossier compte parmi les résultats d’un travail de séminaire de longue haleine, développé au cours d’un cycle de trois ans, portant sur les théories philosophiques du signe de l’Antiquité à nos jours, organisé à l’UMR STL 8163 par Claudio Majolino et Laurent Cesalli. Au sein de l’arc temporel visé par ce séminaire, le XVIIe siècle avait d’emblée une place privilégiée : conçu comme un siècle de rupture qui inaugure la période moderne, il illustre surtout, en particulier dep...

Hobbes établit une distinction entre signes certains et signes incertains, qui correspond à la distinction entre science et prudence. Mais il précise toutefois que les signes de la science ne sont pas tous certains, ni infaillibles. Cette recommandation n’est pas tant une critique de la science, qu’une mise en garde adressée à ceux qui renoncent à leur jugement naturel et s’en remettent aveuglément à l’autorité des livres. La certitude dépend donc d’un bon usage des signes de la part du sujet (...) qui connaît ou interprète. Hobbes affirme ainsi le primat du sujet ou de l’esprit dans la constitution du signe et sa manipulation. La différence entre signes certains et signes incertains ne dépend pas seulement du type de signes, mais également des conditions de l’interprétation. Cette solution s’impose si l’on comprend la définition de Hobbes selon laquelle il n’y a de signe que pour et par un sujet, comme une définition générale s’appliquant à tout type de signe. On pourra alors rendre compte de la certitude ou de l’incertitude des signes à partir de la manière dont le sujet fait usage des signes dans le calcul des conséquences. À cet égard, la distinction entre consécutions de l’imagination et consécutions de la raison joue un rôle au moins aussi essentiel que la distinction entre signes naturels et signes d’institution : s’il est vrai que l’imagination dépend de l’ordre aléatoire des perceptions, alors que les calculs de la raison se fondent sur des signes arbitraires, la notion de consécution apparaît comme le fondement de toute activité portant sur les signes, puisque tout signe, qu’il soit naturel ou conventionnel, suppose un rapport posé ou effectué par l’esprit. L’originalité de Hobbes consiste notamment à envisager le signe comme un rapport entre deux événements, entre un conséquent et un antécédent : plutôt que le rapport entre une présence et une absence, c’est la notion d’ordre qui est au cœur de la pensée hobbesienne du signe. (shrink)

Hobbes établit une distinction entre signes certains et signes incertains, qui correspond à la distinction entre science et prudence. Mais il précise toutefois que les signes de la science ne sont pas tous certains, ni infaillibles. Cette recommandation n’est pas tant une critique de la science, qu’une mise en garde adressée à ceux qui renoncent à leur jugement naturel et s’en remettent aveuglément à l’autorité des livres. La certitude dépend donc d’un bon usage des signes de la part du sujet (...) qui connaît ou interprète. Hobbes affirme ainsi le primat du sujet ou de l’esprit dans la constitution du signe et sa manipulation. La différence entre signes certains et signes incertains ne dépend pas seulement du type de signes, mais également des conditions de l’interprétation. Cette solution s’impose si l’on comprend la définition de Hobbes selon laquelle il n’y a de signe que pour et par un sujet, comme une définition générale s’appliquant à tout type de signe. On pourra alors rendre compte de la certitude ou de l’incertitude des signes à partir de la manière dont le sujet fait usage des signes dans le calcul des conséquences. À cet égard, la distinction entre consécutions de l’imagination et consécutions de la raison joue un rôle au moins aussi essentiel que la distinction entre signes naturels et signes d’institution : s’il est vrai que l’imagination dépend de l’ordre aléatoire des perceptions, alors que les calculs de la raison se fondent sur des signes arbitraires, la notion de consécution apparaît comme le fondement de toute activité portant sur les signes, puisque tout signe, qu’il soit naturel ou conventionnel, suppose un rapport posé ou effectué par l’esprit. L’originalité de Hobbes consiste notamment à envisager le signe comme un rapport entre deux événements, entre un conséquent et un antécédent : plutôt que le rapport entre une présence et une absence, c’est la notion d’ordre qui est au cœur de la pensée hobbesienne du signe. (shrink)

This article shows how the specific interaction and mutual dependence between language and curiosity accounts for the more general dialectic between reason and passion in Hobbes’ philosophy, providing the distinguishing trait of human beings and their behaviour.

Against the dominant view in contemporary Hobbes scholarship, I argue that Hobbes’ philosophy of language implicitly denies that linguistic expressions refer to anything. I defend this thesis both textually, in light of what Hobbes actually said, and contextually, in light of Hobbes’ desertion of the vocabulary of suppositio, which was prevalent in semantics leading up to Hobbes. Hobbes explained away the apparent fact of linguistic reference via a reductive analysis: the relation between words and things wholly reduces to a composite (...) of the relation of signification between words and conceptions on the one hand, and the relation of representation between conceptions and things on the other. Intentionality, for Hobbes, accrues to conceptions, not words. (shrink)

O artigo trata da ideia de paz política desde a mecânica dos corpos no Leviatã de Thomas Hobbes. Buscou-se compreender como um pressuposto egoísta pode chegar a uma ideia de consenso pela linguagem.

This article offers an account of the philosophy of language expounded in the Cogitata de interpretatione (1692) of the Dutch philosopher Johannes De Raey (1620-1702). In this work, De Raey provided a theory of the formation and meaning language based on the metaphysics of René Descartes. De Raey distinguished between words signifying passions and sensations, ideas of the intellect, or external things. The aim of this article is to shift away the discussion of De Raey’s critique on the application of (...) the language of practical matters by Lodewijk Meijer and Spinoza, and to redirect modern interpretations to the originality of De Raey’s own reflections on the uses of language. In his linguistic thought, De Raey criticized philosophers such as Hobbes, who supposedly deprived Aristotelian terminology of any reference and meaningful use. The analysis of De Raey testifies to the emergence of the philosophy of language out of the double traditions of logic and metaphysics. It is to be interpreted as an effect of the emergence of an alternative worldview to Aristotelianism. This called for an update of the semantic catalogue of philosophy and practical disciplines. (shrink)

Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one’s claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes’s theoretical account in De corpore and Leviathan nor with Hobbes’s scientific practice in De homine and elsewhere. Closely tied to (...) the conventionalist interpretation is the deductivist interpretation, on which it is claimed that Hobbes believed sciences such as optics are deduced from geometry. I argue that Hobbesian science places simplest conceptions as the foundation for geometry and the sciences in which we use geometry, which provides strong evidence against both the conventionalist and deductivist interpretations. (shrink)

This essay aims to present, but not fully substantiate, a way of undermining the notion of ‘ultimate interpreter’ in the sense of ‘a limited, appointed or elected, institutional body.’ One effective way of such presentation is, as I argue, in terms of interpretation of Hobbes’s theory as a response to the problem of political ambiguity. Thus interpreted, Hobbes’s theory presses on us the choice between normative and non-normative view of language. If we endorse the former, the argument against ‘ultimate interpreter’ (...) seems to hold.However, one can to a degree blunt the argument’s razor by making the status of the body dependent fully on the body’s theoretical performance, so that practical finality of the body’s deliberations tracks their theoretical finality, not the other way around. (shrink)

This paper makes a case for the centrality of the passion of curiosity to Hobbes’s account of human nature. Hobbes describes curiosity as one of only a few capacities differentiating human beings from animals, and I argue that it is in fact the fundamen- tal cause of humanity’s uniqueness, generating other important difference-makers such as language, science and politics. I qualify Philip Pettit’s (2008) claim that Hobbes believes language to be the essence of human difference, contending that Pettit grants language (...) too central a place in Hobbes’s psychology. Language is, for Hobbes, a tech- nology adopted on account of curiosity. Further, curiosity is necessary not only for linguistic but also for scientific activity. Only after what he calls original knowledge has been gathered are names employed to generate the conditional propositions that con- stitute science. Finally, curiosity can resolve another puzzle of Hobbesian psychology that Pettit leaves unanswered: our tendency towards strife. Hobbes believes that inso- far as human beings have an implacable hunger for knowledge of the future, we are unable to rest content with present gains and must always aspire to secure the best possible outcome for ourselves. (shrink)

This paper aims at showing that Hobbes's theory of language, which allows men to communicate among themselves like no other animal species, is an importante factor in the integration of modern states. Both his nominalism and the fact that he considers language previous to reason play a role in the formation of social groups. This leads him, as Johnston points out, to make political order depend upon linguistic order. In consequence, Hobbes aims at building a political philosophy by introducing a (...) suitable vocabulary and setting basic propositions from which to deduce valid conclusions, proceding more geometrico . He also points out the importance of language for men to emerge from the state of nature and to draw a compact for peace and security. He also stresses the relation between language and power. Biblical references are included to reinforce the role of language in society, It is also shown that occasionally language may be a disgregating factor. Examples are put rather to show the integrating force of language. (shrink)

The notion of signification is an important part of Hobbes's philosophy of language. It also has broader relevance, as Hobbes argues that key terms used by his opponents are insignificant. However Hobbes's talk about names' signification is puzzling, as he appears to have advocated conflicting views. This paper argues that Hobbes endorsed two different views of names' signification in two different contexts. When stating his theoretical views about signification, Hobbes claimed that names signify ideas. Elsewhere he talked as if words (...) signified the things they named. Seeing this does not just resolve a puzzle about Hobbes's statements about signification. It also helps us to understand how Hobbes's arguments about insignificant speech work. With one important exception, they depend on the view that names signify things, not on Hobbes's stated theory that words signify ideas. The paper concludes by discussing whether arguments about insignificant speech can provide independent support for Hobbes's views about other issues, such as materialism. (shrink)

This article explores the radical changes in the relationship between philosophy and the study of language in early modern Europe. It describes the context in which questions concerning language were approached in early modern Europe and outlines some aspects of the disciplines traditionally concerned with language, which include logic, grammar, and rhetoric. It discusses the views of language held by some of the most influential philosophers of the period including Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and Thomas Hobbes.

This paper is a critique of coercive theories of meaning, that is, theories (or criteria) of meaning designed to do down ones opponents by representing their views as meaningless or unintelligible. Many philosophers from Hobbes through Berkeley and Hume to the pragmatists, the logical positivists and (above all) Wittgenstein have devised such theories and criteria in order to discredit their opponents. I argue 1) that such theories and criteria are morally obnoxious, a) because they smack of the totalitarian linguistic tactics (...) of the Party in Orwell’s 1984 and b) because they dehumanize the opposition by portraying them as mere spouters of gibberish; 2) that they are profoundly illiberal since if true, they would undermine Mill’s arguments for free speech; 3) that such theories are prone to self-contradiction, pragmatic and otherwise; 4) that they often turn against their creators including what they were meant to exclude and excluding what they were meant to include; 5) that such theories are susceptible to a modus tollens pioneered by Richard Price in his Review Concerning the Principle Questions of Morals(1758); and 6) that such theories are prima facie false since they fail to ‘predict’ the data that is it their business to explain (or, in the case of criteria, fail to capture the concept that they allegedly represent). The butcher’s bill is quite considerable: some of Hobbes, a fair bit of Locke, half of Berkeley, large chunks of Hume, Russell's Theory of Types, verificationism in its positivist and Dummettian variants, much of pragmatism and most of Wittgenstein - all these have to be sacrificed if we are to save our souls as philosophic liberals. (shrink)

Hobbes's place in the history of political philosophy is a highly controversial one. An international symposium held at Queen Mary, University of London in February 2009 was devoted to debating his significance and legacy. The event focussed on recent books on Hobbes by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, and was organised around four commentaries on these new works by distinguished scholars. This paper is designed to introduce the subject of the symposium together with the commentaries and subsequent responses from Petit (...) and Skinner. It examines the themes of language and liberty in the philosophy of Hobbes and concludes by highlighting some of the ways in which further research into Hobbes's debt to Aristotle's Politics will prove fruitful and illuminating. (shrink)

In this article I explore two aspects of Pettit's thesis about Hobbes' innovation with regard to the transformative and central role of language in thought and politics. First, I argue that while Hobbes had many debts to both traditionalists and innovators, he did break new ground in characterising language as in some ways constitutive of thought - a conclusion he came to as a consequence not only of his extreme nominalism, but also of his views on the exceptional sensibility of (...) words. Second, I argue that while language is part of a matrix of the forces which shape politics, it plays a powerful and indispensable part in both saving and cursing society. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), whose current reputation rests largely on his political philosophy, was a thinker with wide ranging interests. In philosophy, he defended a range of materialist, nominalist, and empiricist views against Cartesian and Aristotelian alternatives. In physics, his work was influential on Leibniz, and lead him into disputes with Boyle and the experimentalists of the early Royal Society. In history, he translated Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War into English, and later wrote his own history of the Long Parliament. (...) In mathematics he was less successful, and is best remembered for his repeated unsuccessful attempts to square the circle. But despite that, Hobbes was a serious and prominent participant in the intellectual life of his time. (shrink)

He has an astonishing range, and in this book he expands it still further. More than a mere introduction, Made with Words offers a coherent and well-argued picture of most of the main components of Hobbes's wide-ranging philosophy.

This reply argues five points, in response to the commentaries on my book, “Made with Words”. First, that Hobbes's theory of language may have supported his materialism, as his materialism supported the theory of language. Second, that for Hobbes legal penalties as such do not take from freedom, only legal obligations. Third, that his emphasis on maker's knowledge explains his theory of a priori demonstrable knowledge and, in particular, the importance he gives to definitions. Fourth, that Hobbes's theory of the (...) desire for power suggests, against his own strategy, that people each ought to seek the equality that goes with others not having power over them; this is the next best to the inequality a person would enjoy in having power over others. And fifth, that Hobbes's theory of freedom is inferior in a number of respects to the republican theory of freedom as non-domination that he opposed. (shrink)

Lo que el título de este artículo designa como “la tragedia del lenguaje” constituye una de las dimensiones del “trasfondo trágico” sobre el que se recortan las líneas mayores de la gran teoría política moderna. Me gustaría mostrar que hay una dimensión propiamente trágica en el pensamiento de Hobbes y que una parte importante de la tragedia con la que lidia el autor del Leviatán es la que se refiere a las palabras y sus significados, e ilustrar este punto a (...) partir de una comparación entre el tratamiento que da Hobbes al problema del lenguaje y el que puede encontrarse en una pieza literaria mayor del teatro isabelino: Hamlet, de Shakespeare, donde esa “tragedia del lenguaje” se expresa a través de numerosos y célebres juegos de palabras. Eso nos permitirá, adicionalmente, ensayar una reflexión sobre la relación entre la tragedia y la comedia, y observar el modo en que el pensamiento hobbesiano limita y dialoga con ambas. (shrink)

Hobbes conception of reason as computation or reckoning is significantly different in Part I of De Corpore from what I take to be the later treatment in Leviathan. In the late actual computation with words starts with making an affirmation, framing a proposition. Reckoning then has to do with the consequences of propositions, or how they connect the facts, states of affairs or actions which they refer tor account. Starting from this it can be made clear how Hobbes understood the (...) crucial application of this conception to natural law, identified as 'right reason'. (shrink)

The author argues that Thomas Hobbes anticipates a set of questions about meaning and semantic order that come to fuller expression in the 20th century, in the writings of W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. Despite their different points of departure, these 20th-century writers pose a number of profound questions about the conditions for the stability of meaning, and about the conditions that govern the use of the term “language” itself. Though the more recent debate (...) benefits from a set of philosophical tools unavailable in the seventeenth century, the author further argues that Hobbes performs a number of maneuvers in his texts from which his 20th-century successors would profit. (shrink)

While critics have relied upon bibliographical data and his translation of Thucydides to establish the early Thomas Hobbes as a humanist, this essay argues that substantive evidence to support this conclusion can be found in the comparatively neglected discourses of the Horae Subsecivae. Reading Hobbe's contribution to the Horae alongside his translation of Thucydides reveals a consistent concern with the political potential of both verbal and visual images and with the dangers rhetorical manipulation could pose to individual and sovereign authority. (...) Together these texts demonstrate an early Hobbes already deeply invested in the political debates and crises of his era. (shrink)

The concept of binding force is at stake in this book on two different levels: there is an investigation of how, within the work of Hobbes, Hegel and Heidegger, conscience is described as binding upon us; and further, Feldman considers how ...

This paper analyzes Hobbes’s understanding of signification, the process whereby words come to have meaning. Most generally, Hobbes develops and extends the nominalist critique of universals as it is found in Ockham and subsequently carried forward by early moderns such as Descartes. Hobbes’s radicality emerges in comparison with Ockham and Descartes, as, unlike them, Hobbes also reduces the intellectual faculty entirely to imagination. According to Hobbes, we have nothing in which a stabilizing, pre-discursive mental language could inhere. Hobbes thus concludes (...) that all thinking is affective and semiotic, and depends on the regulation of conventionally established regimes of signs. Establishing this regulation is one of the central functions of the Hobbesian commonwealth. (shrink)