Human Beings

El concepto de dignidad humana ha sido considerado o demasiado denso o demasiado delgado. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista del no-positivismo, la normatividad jurídica de la dignidad humana puede ser justificada y reforzada por medio de su corrección moral. Desde una perspectiva individual, la comprensión de Mencio sobre la dignidad humana como un valor intrínseco y el imperativo categórico de Kant (el ser humano como un fin en sí mismo) podrían ser adecuadamente comprendidos con base en la diferencia (...) (así como la conexión) entre el principium diiudicationis y el principium executionis, entre voluntad y “elección”; así como entre homo phaenomenon y homo noumenon (es decir, humanidad en la persona de los seres humanos). Desde una perspectiva social, las dimensiones del individuo y la persona social son construcciones ficticias; inclusive Radbruch -alguna vez defensor del derecho social- no remplazó el concepto de “persona jurídica” y, en el periodo de posguerra, reconoció la dignidad humana individual como el criterio para aplicar su famosa “fórmula de Radbruch". Por una parte, la dignidad humana muestra cuando menos un carácter normativo débil, el cual requiere, primero, ponderar entre el ejercicio de los poderes estatales y el control de constitucionalidad bajo la guía de la dimensión dual del ser humano y, segundo, la optimización del principio de la dignidad humana en casos particulares. Por otra, a través de la conexión necesaria entre el concepto de dignidad y personalidad, la dignidad humana puede exhibir un carácter normativo fuerte, el cual requiere inevitablemente una justificación metafísica. (shrink)

Catholic philosophical anthropologists have defended views of the human person on which we are not reducible to anything non-personal. For example, it is not the case that we are nothing but matter, souls, or parts of society. Nevertheless, most Catholic anthropologies have been reductionistic in other ways. Mark K. Spencer presents a philosophical portrait of human persons on which we are entirely irreducible to anything non-personal, by synthesizing claims from many strands of the Catholic tradition. These include Thomism, Scotism, phenomenology, (...) personalism, nouvelle théologie, analytic philosophy, Greek and Russian thought, and several others. It adjudicates among these traditions' claims by considering whether they are grounded in how we appear in experience and whether they are non-reductionistic. While many metaphysical claims about persons are defended, the picture that ultimately results is one on which persons are best grasped not through abstract concepts but through aesthetic perception, as unique kinds of beauty. This portrait also shows how we have many irreducible parts, principles, and powers. Various chapters explore the irreducibility of our subjectivity, senses, intellect, freedom, and affections, and of our souls, bodies, acts of existence, and activities. Readers will also find explorations of divine simplicity and causality, the nature of matter, organisms, and artifacts, all of which must be understood to fully grasp our own irreducibility. In considering how to synthesize various traditions' claims, the book also offers new solutions to a number of prominent debates in contemporary Catholic philosophy. These include debates over natural law, the natural desire to see God, the separated soul, the nature of gifts, integralism and personalism, idealist and realist phenomenology, and various scholastic accounts of the act of existence. The picture of persons thereby developed helps the reader to perceive persons more perfectly. (shrink)

“We are animals.” That’s what animalists say—that’s their slogan. But what animalists mean by their slogan varies. Many animalists are adamant that what they mean—and, indeed, what the true animalist thesis is—is that we are identical to animals (human animals, to be precise). But others say that’s not enough. They say that the animalist thesis has to be something more—perhaps that we are essentially or most fundamentally human animals. This paper argues that, depending on how we understand it, animalism is (...) either false or uninteresting. If animalism is just the claim that we are identical to animals, then it is uninteresting. For it doesn’t provide an answer to the question it’s meant to address. On the other hand, if animalism entails a stronger claim, such as that we are essentially animals, then animalism is false. Either way, we should set animalism aside. (shrink)

Context - my thought process as a sat and analysed my group of friends at a party... -/- Surrounding: -/- I feel as though I'm in a set although it's not a set but people performing with their emotions through true feeling, rather than manipulated which is acting, I believe everyone here is going through things in life weather minor or major but all can never he an excuse to true feeling which makes them who they are, it is interesting (...) how everyone is in their own bubble of thought and entertainment, people here are not literally talking but for the sake of talking in a way although they are talking to talk? But is it because none of it has any meaning? The next day all or this will have just been talk for entertainment, they are soo in level of not understanding that they do not understand why they do specific things though it is like an automated response? It is for they do not understand enough of life do they. -/- Interests: -/- People are interested in things why? Because they feel the need to have some sort of closeness with them or so they can have it in their collection as a conversation starter to gossip to another about which makes sense too. -/- Conclusion: -/- Overall I believe it is due to a lack of reasoning of specific things eg a super intelligence individual in school may not be soo intelligent when it comes to understanding other humans, which brings us to the final reasoning of people requiring a specific type of understanding to really reason an understanding in one and that it doesn't take just analysis but time which gives you enough data overall to conclude, people have character based virtue and it depends on the scale of that which makes them who they are, this isn't just being smart but being in the golden meaning of virtue. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Being and Time - Irfan Ajvazi.

Becoming Artificial is a collection of essays about the nature of humanity, technology, artifice, and the irreducible connections between them. -/- Artificial Intelligence (AI) was once the stuff of pure fantasy. Ideas about machines that could think seemed as plausible as space travel or inexpensive communication technology. The last two decades have introduced a number of game-changing innovations that make discussion of AI no longer a mere armchair speculation, but rather a serious topic of debate for everyone who will be (...) affected, from policy makers to an increasingly displaced workforce. The growth in power of AI algorithms and systems has sparked many thought-provoking questions: Is there something fundamental to being human or are humans simply biological computers? Will AI continue to assist us or eventually enslave us? Can self-driving cars be legally responsible for their actions? And most importantly, how can we chart a path for AI that ensures a humane and beneficial future for society? (shrink)

HIV and AIDS is still menace bedeviling society particularly in 3rd world countries such as Zimbabwe. The impacts of HIV/AIDS are gravely felt within workplaces as affected employees suffer from stigma and prejudice. Organizations also suffer as the pandemic leads to high absenteeism and a high rate of employee turnover. This writing therefore addresses the impact of HIV/AIDS in organizations and communities and how the Zimbabwean Government, NGOS, Trade Unions and Companies have been battling this pandemic and the achievements made (...) to date. (shrink)

The paper explores what it could mean to speak of love as involving a delight in ‘the simple actuality’ of another, or, as Buber does, of the ‘touchable’ human being as ‘unique and devoid of qualities’. Developing strands in Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of perception, it is argued that the relation between recognising this as a particular individual and recognising particular qualities in her may be close to the reverse of what might be supposed: a recognition of this distinctive smile being dependent (...) on a recognition of who this is. The fundamental place of particulars, as opposed to kinds, in our thought about those we know and care for is developed in part through a phenomenological treatment of our perception of faces. That treatment is set in a context of the justification of our judgements about who someone is, and is linked with a critique of treatments of proper names of individuals in the spirit of Frege. It is in our speaking to those we know that we find a relation to a particular that is direct—not mediated by a description of its properties—that Russell sought in ‘knowledge by acquaintance’. (shrink)

τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν: Another look at being, asking what a interlocutor means to show by saying they feel themselves to be something. An ambiguity of the verb "to be" is disambiguated to reveal that it can be meant to show what something is and a process of being something. The relationship between being and essence is made by describing engagement through the encounter, giving us a non-exhaustive account of something's essence. Practice is then understood as (...) a process within a social context where humans form the senses in which one can be, with their possibilities informed by encounters with what is substantive of those senses. The resulting implications with regards to authenticity, social belonging, and anthropology are briefly discussed. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity has been criticized as either too thick or too thin. However, according to the non-positivistic standpoint, the legal normativity of human dignity can be justified and thus strengthened by means of its moral correctness. From the individual perspective, Mencius’ understanding of human dignity as an intrinsic value and Kant’s formula of ‘man as an end in itself’ can be adequately understood based on the differentiation of, as well as the connection between, principium diiudicationis and principium (...) executionis, between will and choice, and between homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon (that is, ‘humanity in the personality’). From the social perspective, since the dual dimensions of the individual and the social person are both fictive constructions, even Radbruch, once as a supporter of social law, has not replaced the concept of ‘legal person’ and, in the post-War period, acknowledges individualistic human dignity as the criterion for applying the famous ‘disavowal formula’. On the one hand, human dignity shows at least a weak normative character, which requires, firstly, balancing between the exercise of state powers and the constitutional review under the guidance of the dual dimensions of man and, secondly, optimization of the principle of human dignity in individual cases. On the other hand, through the necessary connection between the concept of dignity and that of personality, human dignity can exhibit a strong normative character, which unavoidably requires a metaphysical justification. (shrink)

It is a well-known fact that mathematics plays a crucial role in physics; in fact, it is virtually impossible to imagine contemporary physics without it. But it is questionable whether mathematical concepts could ever play such a role in psychology or philosophy. In this paper, we set out to examine a rather unobvious example of the application of topology, in the form of the theory of persons proposed by Kurt Lewin in his Principles of Topological Psychology. Our aim is to (...) show that this branch of mathematics can furnish a natural conceptual system for Gestalt psychology, in that it provides effective tools for describing global qualitative aspects of the latter’s object of investigation. We distinguish three possible ways in which mathematics can contribute to this: explanation, explication and metaphor. We hold that all three of these can be usefully characterized as throwing light on their subject matter, and argue that in each case this contrasts with the role of explanations in physics. Mathematics itself, we argue, provides something different from such explanations when applied in the field of psychology, and this is nevertheless still cognitively fruitful. (shrink)

Russian Abstract: Данный документ является сборником «заметок на полях», раскрывающих состав и содержание метода структурно-онтологического анализа. Указанный метод разработан для системного описания предметной области изучаемых явлений. Он включает специальную процедуру по построению структурно-онтологических матриц и алгоритм их описания. Междисциплинарная направленность метода продемонстрирована на примере анализа процесса социализации личности. English Abstract: This document is a collection of `marginal notes` revealing the composition and content of the structural ontological analysis method. The specified method is developed for a systemic description of the subject (...) matter area of the studied phenomena. It includes a special procedure for constructing structural-ontological matrices and an algorithm for their description. The interdisciplinary focus of the method is demonstrated by the example of an analysis of the personality socialization process. (shrink)

Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. – Trotz ihrer prominenten Rolle im Grundgesetz und in vielen anderen Dokumenten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg hat sich die moderne Philosophie lange Zeit nur wenig um die Menschenwürde gekümmert. Erst als um die Jahrtausendwende herum die Würde von Embryonen zur Diskussion stand, zeigte es sich, wie spannend und schwierig es ist, ein angemessenes philosophisches Verständnis der Menschenwürde zu finden. Dieses Buch basiert auf drei Grundgedanken: dass die Menschenwürde aus ihren Verletzungen heraus verstanden werden muss, (...) dass wir sie in ihrem historischen Kontext betrachten sollten und dass es vor allen Dingen wichtig ist, ihre vielfältige Verwendung in unterschiedlichen Feldern der Angewandten Ethik zu untersuchen. Entsprechend vereint das Buch theoretische philosophische Überlegungen mit konkreten Untersuchungen zu öffentlich vieldiskutierten Themen wie Hirntod, assistiertem Suizid, Todesstrafe und Ehrenmord. Reflexionen zur Würde des Kindes, des Alters und des Sterbens bilden den Abschluss des Buches. Dabei erweist es sich, dass der Menschenwürde eine unverzichtbare Rolle in der Ethik zukommt, weil sie die Bedeutung eines für jedermann geltenden Schutzes vor Erniedrigungen ausdrückt, und damit für uns alle einen – vielleicht sogar den – Kern unseres moralischen Status formuliert. (shrink)

Aquinas’ theory of being has received a growing amount of attention from contemporary scholars, both from a historic and a philosophical point of view. An important source of this attention is Geach’s seminal Form and Existence. In it, Geach argues that Aquinas subscribes to a tensed notion of existence and a theory of time according to which past and future entities do not exist in act. Subsequent commentators, such as Kenny in his Aquinas on Being, have agreed with Geach on (...) both points. In this paper, I argue that in several passages of his corpus, most notably those in which he is concerned with God’s knowledge of future contingents, Aquinas implicitly subscribes to a theory of being and time according to which: past and future entities are attributed existence in act, there is theoretical need for introducing a tenseless notion of existence. (shrink)

Initially, astrobiology subsumed into philosophy. However, philosophy has increasingly subsumed into astrobiology concurrent with it steadily becoming an observational and experimental activity that mainly focuses on the link between life and the cosmos, rather than on extra-terrestrial life per se. However, the steadily increasing probability of locating such extra-terrestrial life and the questions this will lead to might require a refinement of astrobiology, with a bifurcation into astrobiology and astrophilosophy. There are many reasons for the emergence and necessity of astrobiology. (...) One barely realized reason for its emergence, I will argue, is the dawning realization that biology, until now, has been under a geocentric limitation, which has unavoidably pervaded the perception of life. Additionally, as astrobiology can be said to be a long last movement away from this limitation, astrophilosophy represents a movement away from that limitation because philosophy has, strictly speaking, been restrained by the frames for one species, Homo sapiens. Thus, philosophy has, strictly speaking, been anthropomorphic. Thus, when philosophy, like astrobiology, incorporates the Copernican principle, assuming that terrestrial life, and the thinking of Homo sapiens, is not privileged in the universe, astrophilosophy emerges. Astrobiology and astrophilosophy are not competitors but are rather two distinct but complementary activities that address questions with their own well-defined methods and rigor while still informing each other in an inter-dependent manner. Astrophilosophy concerns questions that are philosophical in nature but are procured by an astrobiological perspective. By including scenarios procured by astrobiology, a number of questions regarding value, rights, communication and intelligence that could arise in the interaction between Homo sapiens and extra-terrestrial life can be addressed. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the relationship between British colonization and the intellectual underpinnings of natural history writing between the 17th and the early 19th centuries. During this period, I argue, a significant discursive shift reframed both natural history and the concept of humanity. In the early modern period, compiling natural histories was often conceived as an endeavour to understand God’s creation. Many of the natural historians involved in the early Royal Society of London were driven by a theological conviction (...) that the New World contained the natural knowledge once possessed by Adam, but lost in the Fall from Eden. By the early 19th century, however, this theological framework for natural history had been superseded by an avowedly progressive vision of the relationship between humanity and nature. No longer ontologically distinct from the rest of creation, the human became a subject of natural history writing in a new way. Encounters between colonizers and colonized thus became a touchstone for tensions between divine and natural historical knowledge. The resolution of these tensions lay in the emergence of a concept of savagery that imbibed both a rational account of historical progress towards civilization and a religious conviction that savage humanity needed rescue from its animal nature. (shrink)

Today’s technological-scientific prospect of posthumanity simultaneously evokes and defies historical understanding. On the one hand, it implies a historical claim of an epochal transformation concerning posthumanity as a new era. On the other, by postulating the birth of a novel, better-than-human subject for this new era, it eliminates the human subject of modern Western historical understanding. In this article, I attempt to understand posthumanity as measured against the story of humanity as the story of history itself. I examine the fate (...) of humanity as the central subject of history in three consecutive steps: first, by exploring how classical philosophies of history achieved the integrity of the greatest historical narrative of history itself through the very invention of humanity as its subject; second, by recounting how this central subject came under heavy criticism by postcolonial and gender studies in the last half-century, targeting the universalism of the story of humanity as the greatest historical narrative of history; and third, by conceptualizing the challenge of posthumanity against both the story of humanity and its criticism. Whereas criticism fragmented history but retained the possibility of smaller-scale narratives, posthumanity does not doubt the feasibility of the story of humanity. Instead, it necessarily invokes humanity, if only in order to be able to claim its supersession by a better-than-human subject. In that, it represents a fundamental challenge to the modern Western historical condition and the very possibility of historical narratives – small-scale or large-scale, fragmented or universal. (shrink)

El deseo de superar los límites físicos y cognoscitivos, y la posibilidad de lograrlo gracias al creciente progreso tecnológico, pone en relieve un tema filosófico antiguo pero actual: el tema de la identidad diacrónica de la persona. ¿Qué es la persona? ¿A qué cambios puede sobrevivir? La respuesta a estas cuestiones repercute sobre todo en temas de bioética y escatología. Mi propuesta antropologica parte de una visión constitutiva de la persona e integra algunos elementos de la ontología relacional. El resultado (...) es una visión antropológica llamada visión constitutivo-relacional. En esta visión, la continuidad de la persona no depende ni de la continuidad de un elemento inmaterial, ni de la continuidad del cuerpo biológico, sino de la propiedad de la persona de reconocerse a sí misma como sí misma y de su relación ontológica con el mundo. Esta propiedad no solo nos permite reconocer a la persona a través del tiempo, sino sostener que la persona es la misma a través del tiempo; esto coloca la investigación no solo en un horizonte epistemológico sino metafísico. (shrink)

Proponho uma cosmovisão especial cujo ponto de partida é a teoria sobre o duplo tipo de conhecimento que os seres humanos possuem: o primeiro é o conceitual (que também chamaremos categorial ou abstrativo) e o segundo é o holístico. Com o primeiro tipo de conhecimento (conceitual), o indivíduo impõe suas próprias categorias (também chamadas formas, estruturas ou Gestalt2 ) aos dados que recebe através dos sentidos. Quando ele sabe por dentro, mediante essa primeira modalidade, o que ela realmente faz é (...) interpretar a realidade. Em contrapartida, com conhecimento holístico (também chamado de intuitivo), o sujeito consegue se desfazer (mesmo parcialmente) de suas próprias categorias e consegue um vislumbre do ser e da verdade. A verdade consiste nesse desvelamento do ser, que tem sido escondido por nossas próprias categorias cognitivas. A partir daqui podemos inferir algumas ideias típicas nesta cosmovisão integradora. a) A Filosofia consiste em um tipo de lente através da qual cada assunto imprime uma cor, um valor, uma estruturação especial (positiva ou negativa) para as coisas, pessoas e as situações que elas vivem. Isso é explicado com a teoria da matéria e a forma do conhecimento (que é uma aplicação de hilemorfismo, já explicado em Aristóteles): o assunto são os dados recebidos do lado de fora; a forma é a estrutura (lente) que o sujeito aplica sem perceber. O fenômeno percebido é a fusão desses dois elementos, e assim portanto, já contém a coloração aplicada pelo sujeito. Dessa forma, o ato de conhecer se torna no ato de interpretar os objetos ao seu redor de acordo com suas próprias lentes, que ele adquiriu ao longo de sua vida, com educação, ambiente e os padrões que recebeu. Cada indivíduo geralmente cai na ilusão de possuir a verdade definitiva. E, portanto, quando outros julgam as coisas de outra maneira, conclui que elas estão erradas, sem perceber o efeito de individualização que tem seu próprio mecanismo cognitivo. O estudo da Filosofia nos inicia nessa consciência sobre a qualidade interpretativa do nosso aparelho cognitivo. b) O conhecimento holístico ou intuição é alcançado quando um sujeito abdica, mesmo parcial e temporalmente, das próprias estruturas e categorias que normalmente usa em seu conhecimento conceitual. Podemos mencionar cinco grandes tipos de intuição: empatia, a experiência estética, a experiência axiológica, a experiência mística e a experiência criativa. A empatia consiste em capturar as categorias usadas por um interlocutor. Isso é possível quando dispensamos nossas próprias categorias e "nos colocamos nos sapatos do outro”. A experiência estética consiste em captar a harmonia intrínseca de um objeto. Isso é possível quando nos despojamos de nossas próprias lentes, que de alguma forma desfiguram a realidade presente. A experiência axiológica consiste em capturar os valores intrínsecos do objeto que se tem oposto. É semelhante à experiência estética, mas em um nível mais geral, porque não apenas o valor da beleza é percebido, mas também outros valores, como a verdade, bondade, virtude, etc. A experiência mística consiste em perceber novas soluções, novos relacionamentos, nova síntese de elementos previamente conhecidos. c) Cada indivíduo gera sua cosmovisão pessoal de acordo com as categorias (formas ou Gestalten) que gradualmente acumula ao longo de sua vida. Nessa visão de mundo, são instalados diversos valores, princípios, padrões éticos, padrões de conduta e outros elementos que caracterizam cada indivíduo. O realismo, idealismo, teocentrismo, pessimismo, a luta contra a alienação e o estabelecimento da própria liberdade são o resultado das formas assimiladas. Todo mundo vê as coisas e as pessoas com suas próprias lentes. A Filosofia proposta aqui explica essa diversidade de posições diante do mundo; é uma nova lente que vislumbra o efeito interpretativo de todas as lentes cognitivas; é uma lente integradora das outras posturas. Quem se tornar um adepto desta filosofia, torna-se mais tolerante e compreensivo com respeito as diferenças resolvidas pelos outros. Na realidade não há inimigos, apenas diversidade de pontos de vista. Essa é a Filosofia integradora proposta aqui. d) Uma das principais consequências de tudo isso é a tese de que: "de acordo com sua filosofia, assim será sua felicidade". De fato, existem certos conceitos dentro da filosofia de cada um que desfigura completamente a realidade, e com isso, as experiências adquirem um tom exagerado no plano emocional. A neurose consiste na arte da vida amarga de acordo com a filosofia da pessoa. O neurótico insiste em atribuir toda a culpa por seus infortúnios às circunstâncias e outras pessoas, e geralmente não percebe que a raiz de sua angústia vem de sua própria filosofia. A psicoterapia, no fundo, é a arte de mudar essa cosmovisão, os critérios de uma pessoa. "Não são as coisas que nos fazem sofrer, mas o que pensamos sobre elas", diz um famoso ditado latino. e) Quanto ao indivíduo, devemos distinguir a pessoa e personalidade. A pessoa é o núcleo interno, seu verdadeiro eu, sua energia permanente. Por outro lado, a personalidade é a maneira pela qual a pessoa se manifesta diante dos outros. Aqui está seu caráter, conhecimento, valores, padrões de comportamento, os elementos do seu inconsciente, seu status. Muitas pessoas se identificam com as características temporárias e frágeis de sua personalidade e não conseguem capturar e valorizar sua pessoa propriamente dita. O estudo da Filosofia ajuda a atingir esse horizonte novo, o que geralmente leva a um aumento na felicidade de alguém. (shrink)

The article began life as, and retains the character of, spoken argument for not allowing the neurosciences to shape the agenda of the history of the human sciences. This argument is then used to suggest purposes and content for the journal, History of the Human Sciences. The style is rhetorical, even polemical, but open-ended. I challenge two clichés about the neurosciences, that they intellectually challenge other areas of knowledge, and that they are reconfiguring the human with the notion of ‘brainhood’. (...) The suggestion is that the real challenges lie elsewhere; specifically with understanding the relations of different forms of knowledge and making it conceivable by political action, or simply mode of life, to implement one way of being human rather than another. The conclusion re-asserts the value of the heading, ‘history of the human sciences’, and of the value of the journal with this name, as a forum in which to reflect on the identity and relations of forms of knowledge about ‘the human’ in all their variety. (shrink)

Mesoamerican cosmologies have developed ideas about self using change-in-time as the principal orientation. These approaches conceive existence to be a phenomenon of temporal organization, which is radically different in assumptions and consequences than a metaphysics based on substances. The chief consequence of this is a continuity between human beings-in-time and other living and non- living entities.One 's character and destiny are of a kind with specific animals, meteorological phenomena, places, and objects. The qualities of the timed world and the qualities (...) of the person are one and the same. Understanding oneself,one 's role,and living well results from properly orientating oneself to this metaphysical order by embracing one's 'co-essence'. (shrink)

From a psychoanalytic point of view it is well established that an early development of a sense of self is crucial to a person's healthy development. At the same time, the psychoanalytic process can to a large extent be described as a deconstruction of narcissistic and illusionary apprehensions of oneself. With this as a background, I want to discuss the notion of self within a psychoanalytic perspective in relationship to the meaning of self and no-self within spiritual traditions. The most (...) striking similarity between psychoanalytical and spiritual practice is identified as the ego's surrender or letting go. The article ends with an attempt to characterize the self that is disclosed in the liberating experience of letting go. (shrink)

This paper explores the important place of psychological work in the service of spiritual development, as part of a larger question: how to realize impersonal true nature in a thoroughly personal, human form. The challenging truth is that spiritual realization is relatively easy compared with the much greater difficulty of actualizing it, integrating it fully into the fabric of one's embodiment and one's conditioning, To more deeply explore the relationship between contemplative practice and psychological understanding, personal and impersonal truth, individuation (...) and liberation, a larger. (shrink)

The view that we are animals -- animalism -- is often misunderstood. It is typically stated in unhelpful or misleading ways. Debates over animalism are often unclear about what question it purports to answer, and what the alternative answers are. The paper tries to state clearly what animalism says and does not say. This enables us to distinguish different versions of animalism.

The main theory at the core of this monograph is that the person is an entity ontologically new, since she is able to perform an act of self-transcendence, which is meant as her critical distancing from her own “self”, understood as subject of social recognition (Anerkennung), in order to open to the encounter with the world (Weltoffenheit). This allows us to consider a person in a new way, different both from confessional interpretations that see her only as a center of (...) the spirit and from reductivistic views. Schelling examines the act of self-transcendence through the concept of ecstasy, whereas Scheler associates it with the phenomenological reduction. The act of self-transcendence, that Schelling sees as originated by the “hunger of being”, is at the roots of the formation process of a person (Bildung): the person takes her shape by exiting from her own self-referential dimension and encountering otherness. If considered from this viewpoint, Plato’s “epimeleia heautou” exceeds an intimistic perspective: the “care” is no more a solipsistic self-care, but rather becomes the care through which the person transcends her own self to open to the relationships with otherness. It turns, therefore, into a care for world-openness (care for Weltoffenheit). The transformation of the individual and of society so becomes the double-faced aspect of the same process. The development of this set of problems occurs through a dialogue with Schelling’s and Scheler’s positions, but it is also supported by a historical-philosophical investigation, that for instance provides evidence of the influences of Schelling’s Berlin period on Scheler’s last theories and on the philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. Schelling was the first to conceive the concept of “eccentricity” in an anthropological sense, since until then the term had been confined to Kepler’s astronomy. Consequently, the planets’ elliptic (eccentric) movement heightens to an emblematic metaphor of human nature and freedom. The monograph also examines a possible convergence between Plato’s epimeleia heautou and Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. The book ends with a chapter on the topic of Vorbild. The exemplary testimony, that is Vorbild, becomes witnessing evidence immune from any pedagogical-moralistic intent: in fact, if it should relapse into the rhetoric of the “wish to give a good example”, it would immediately conform to the opposite logic of the model. A model is universal in so far as it makes everyone more like the others, nullifying the diversity, whereas exemplariness is universal in so far as it makes everyone more unique and motivates each one to follow her own characteristic path of existential trans-formation. Exemplarity doesn’t convey any contents, but rather encourages a kind of solidaristic involvement. Yet there are also negative exemplarities (Gegenbild) that place obstacles in the formation and block the existence of the personal center. (shrink)

In this article I develop two arguments, taking Max Scheler’s phenomenology as a starting point. The first one is that emotions are not private and internal states of consciousness, but what makes us come into contact with the expressive dimension of reality, by orienting our placement in the world and our interaction with others. The second thesis is that some emotions have an “anthropogenetic” nature that is at the roots of the ontology of a person and of social ontology: it (...) is through practices of “sharing” certain emotions that the humanity has been born and that the various forms of social realities are established. In accordance with one of María Zambrano’s phrases, I propose to trace these anthropogenetic emotions back to the «hambre de nacer del todo» («hunger for being fully born») of a being that never stops being born again. (shrink)

In the early seventeenth century Francis Bacon called for the institution of a distinct field of theoretical and practical knowledge that would deal with the tight interrelationship between the mind and the body of man, which he dubbed “the inquirie tovching hvmane natvre entyre” (Advancement of Learning, Book II). According to Bacon, such knowledge was already in existence, but unfortunately scattered in medical and religious texts. As a remedy, he proposed an integrated and autonomous account that would constitute “one general (...) science concerning the Nature and State of Man” (De augmentis scientiarum, Book IV). Such an account would concern itself with both the nature of the bond (vinculum) between mind and body (ibid.) and with the medical-religious care of man in his entirety. My purpose here is to identify a number of late Renaissance contexts that flagged a comparable type of preoccupation with the nature and care of the ‘whole man’ from a perspective that similarly strove to combine philosophy, medicine and theology. (shrink)

This article gives an overview of the visual culture shared by a number of scientists studying human variation in the first half of the 20th century. This was a time when most scientists shared the conceptual and terminological framework of ‘racial classifications’ to capture the structure of human variation. Clearly, drawings – and later photographs – of people from all over the world constituted a crucial part of the well-established visual culture concerned with human variation. The article, however, focuses on (...) the representational tools for visualizing aspects of human variation that were not so obvious to the eye of the observer. It contextualizes researchers’ strategies of visualizing human diversity within the pictorial traditions of relevant fields, particularly physical anthropology and human genetics. Starting from 1900, the article demonstrates how scientists built up a rich visual repertoire for understanding human diversity, one that integrated maps, tables, photos, drawings, diagrams, family and phylogenetic trees. The representations included abstract and non-abstract elements, but increasingly rested on diagrammatic visualizations. Notably, although these diagrammatic visualizations grew in sophistication and methodological rigor, they were rarely used in academic textbooks. More often, mixed strategies of visualizations – diagrammatic elements integrated into non-diagrammatic images – were chosen as representations for human diversity. In the postwar period, most of those visualizations disappeared from scientific publications, but not from popular media. For the scientific publications, one can argue that a number of scientists paid specific attention to visualizations and their deterministic potential. Some argued that particularly maps and trees were altogether problematic in their visualization of human evolution and human diversity. Others sought out new and better ways of constructing trees and maps to visualize truth-claims about human diversity. Here, diagrammatic elements played a key role. Notably, researchers who employed typological approaches for physical anthropology, and who admitted that there was a moment of intuition in their practices, aspired to meet the demands of mechanical objectivity by establishing abstract inscriptions of their typological assessments. (shrink)

Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.

This is a review of the excellent collection by Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon which collates essays pertaining to Animalism: the theory that we human persons are identical with the human animals we share our lives with, and thus have the property of being human animals; perhaps essentially and most fundamentally.

A resale copy of a special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Volume 14, Issue 5-6, 2007). This collection of original articles considers the perennial question ‘What are persons?’ It aims first of all to clarify the nature of the question and its relation to associated questions such as the nature of the human animal; how the concepts of human being, person, subject, and self are related; the persistence and unity of persons; and questions as to the conditions for personhood (...) and personality.The ‘dimensions’ of the book’s title reflects the volume’s focus on the relations that persons have with themselves and each other. (shrink)

Ecology - unlike astronomy, physics, or chemistry - is a science with an associated political and ethical movement: the Green Movement. As a result, the ecological position is often accompanied by appeals to holism, and by a mystical quasi-religious conception of the ecosystem. In this title, first published in 1988, Andrew Brennan argues that we can reduce much of the mysticism surrounding ecological discussions by placing them within a larger context, and illustrating that our individual interests are bound with larger, (...) community interests. Using an interdisciplinary approach, which bridges the gap between the sciences, philosophy, and ethics, this is an accessible title, which will be of particular value to students with an interest in the philosophy of environmental science and ethics. (shrink)

This book, originally published in Germany in 1951 under the title Menschlichkeit, is a religious reading of human nature culminating in the assertion that, "The ultimate meaning of man can belong only to his relationship to the absolute, the relation which he has to God." Inspired by Fichte, and emphasizing the unity of Kant’s three critiques which together address the "lived" human experience, the author attempts to address the "whole" man, not only his intellect, his objectivity or his historicity. This (...) concern with the "whole" man leads him, within the context of a critique of Husserl, to assert the limitations of science, "Scientific knowledge seeks objectivity;... [But] objectivity offers no ultimately valid truth." When we have moved beyond science and objectivity Medicus "invites" us to seek the "unconditionally true" by pursuing the good, the beautiful, and the just. These eternal values rise from the depths of man’s being, "bringing him the awareness that he must make decisions by means of which he will be enabled to escape the contingency of changing circumstances and the power of time." Medicus devotes considerable effort to rejecting Nietzsche on the grounds that his glorification of man actually cuts us off from these inner roots and finally sets us in opposition to our own "creatureliness." The book is characterized by an eclectic pedantry that proceeds not so much by argument and analysis as by quotation cliche and assertion.—S.L.W. (shrink)

This article explores young children’s moral sensitivity regarding online disclosure. Drawing on psychological theory, moral sensitivity is defined as the ability to express and show moral consideration in terms of empathy, role-taking and pro-social moral reasoning. Twenty-five preadolescent children aged 9 to 11, all living in Belgium, were asked in focus group interviews to share their reflections about and experiences with self-disclosure and privacy in internet environments. The findings demonstrate that young children are capable of imagining the moral consequences of (...) disclosing personal information about oneself and about others. Their moral reflections are embedded in a more general concern of children’s vulnerability to other, more powerful information circulators in their social networks, such as older children, siblings, but also parents or the internet crowd. A strong sense of children’s entitlements to online privacy is articulated. Also, the decision of disclosing personal information about the other is carefully considered when the other is emotionally important to the children. (shrink)

Displaying her intellectual and literary abilities from a young age, 'Mrs Taylor of Ongar' enjoyed writing all her life. She had eleven children, of whom six survived to adulthood. Her published works began with advice books for her own daughters, produced when increasing deafness made ordinary conversation difficult for her. This book, published in 1818, follows her earlier works for young women with a guide to conduct and 'reciprocal duties' within the family. Stern warnings and cautionary tales are given to (...) show the importance of duty to and respect for parents by children, but the parental duties of care in rearing and especially in education are emphasised. Early discipline, lovingly applied, is seen as the key to successful parenting, and its absence is deemed disastrous. Like Ann Taylor's Practical Hints to Young Females, the book offers fascinating insights into the middle-class ideal of domestic happiness. (shrink)

The paper questions the scientific rather than ideological problem of an eventual biological successor of the mankind. The concept of superhumans is usually linked to Nietzsche or to Heidegger’s criticism or even to the ideology of Nazism. However, the superhuman can be also viewed as that biological species who will originate from humans eventually in the course of evolution.While the society is reached a natural limitation of globalism, technics depends on the amount of utilized energy, and the mind is restricted (...) by its carrier, i.e. by the brain, it is language which seems to be the frontier of any future development of humans or superhumans. Language is a symbolization of the world and thus doubling in an ideal or virtual world fruitful for creativity and the modeling of the former. Consequently, the gap between the material and the ideal world is both produced by and productive for language. (shrink)

I argue that meaning or significanceper se, along with the capacity to be conscious thereof, and the values, motives and aspirations, etc. central to the constitution of our intrinsic personal identities, arise, as indeed do our extrinsic social identities, and our very self-consciousness as such, from socio-cultural structures and relations to others. However, so far from our identities and behavior therefore being determined, I argue that the capacity for critical reflection and evaluation emerge from these same structural relations, the more (...) complex and quintessentially human aspects of our behavior being explained not in terms of responses to stimuli but as choices reflecting our evaluation of meaningful or significant alternatives. Finally I provide theoretical grounds for accepting the existence of other subjects and give a holistic, as opposed to a dialectical, account of the way individuals may challenge and change the very socio-cultural ways of relating to and interacting with others so central to constituting their capacities and identities. (shrink)