Hume: Epistemology

Among the politics of belief that we encounter in Early Modern Philosophy, Hume's concept of natural belief is known as a problematic area to understand. Although Hume develops a concept of belief based on sensation and sensation, the fact that it is controversial to consider it as an empiricist method when considered together with his scepticism is related to the fact that he sees the method he develops as a natural tendency and habit rather than an inferential method. Whether Hume's (...) natural belief has an epistemic basis or not is one of the main goals of this article, while determining whether he considers religious belief as natural belief or not is among the secondary goals of this article. Our argument is that Hume treats natural belief as a non-epistemic form of belief based on emotion, and religious belief as natural belief. In our study, how the concepts of natural belief and religious belief are understood according to Hume is presented, discussions about these concepts are included, and a conclusion is reached that religious belief is natural belief according to him. (shrink)

In _A Treatise of Human Nature_, Hume proposes a new philosophical method. This method results from integrating an empirically founded skepticism with an innovative study of the epistemic role of emotions. This combination of skepticism, empiricism, and moral psychology aims to establish a virtuous way of doing philosophy based on the regulation of our epistemic emotions. In this paper, I present the operating principles of this virtuous way of doing philosophy. The paper has three parts. I firstly claim that four (...) principles compose Hume’s philosophical methodology. I contend that the moderation of curiosity plays the central role among them. Secondly, I claim that that is the case because of the pernicious effects resulting when this passion becomes excessive and misplaced. Finally, I show the role of curiosity’s moderation in the Conclusion of Book 1 of the _Treatise_, to substantiate the claim that the crisis Hume there depicts illustrates his virtuous way of doing philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In Treatise 1.4.4, on behalf of modern philosophers, Hume described a causal argument that shows that our impressions of secondary qualities do not resemble qualities of objects themselves. However, in their respective arguments, Hume’s philosophical predecessors did not argue causally, but appealed to contrary qualities. I argue that Hume’s presentation was not simply a “gratuitous” stylistic difference, but an important correction of his predecessors in light of his own philosophical discoveries. -/- RÉSUMÉ : Dans le Traité 1.4.4, Hume a (...) présenté au nom des philosophes modernes un argument causal qui démontre que nos impressions des qualités secondaires ne ressemblent pas aux qualités des objets eux-mêmes. Les prédécesseurs de Hume n’ont pourtant pas employé d’argument causal, mais l’argument des qualités contraires. Je soutiens que la présentation qu’en a fait Hume n’est pas simplement à mettre au compte d’une différence stylistique «gratuite» mais est une correction importante dans la foulée de ses propres découvertes philosophiques. (shrink)

At the beginning of his section “Of Miracles,” Hume mentions an argument of Dr. Tillotson. The doctrine of “the real presence” seems contradicted by our senses. We see a piece of bread, but are asked to believe it consists in the substance of the body of Christ.

The aim of this paper is to make clear in what sense Hume's actually very radical scepticism can nevertheless be called moderate, and not only leaves intact the praxis in daily life but is even compatible with a — modest and experimental — form of science. The first part stresses the theoretical profoundness of Hume's scepticism, and more specifically the arguments concerning the validity of reason and those concerning some typically 'metaphysical' objects. The former culminate in the impossibility of determining (...) a criterion of correctness and consequently in the degenerating of all knowledge into probability. The latter exceed the information of the senses, are therefore 'groundless' and yet in a way ineradicable, not as explanatory principles of reason but as factual constituents of human nature. The result is an overwhelming amount of contradictions and fictions within human imagination, mainly due to the inevitable presence of two contradictory beliefs, none of which are justifiable. In the second part it is shown how Hume succeeds in conquering scepticism without actually rebutting or revoking it. He is able to do so because his scepticism had, in fact, from the very beginning been elaborated as a form of naturalism, gradually minimizing the strength as well as the importance of reason as a theory, while at the same time stressing the deeply rooted and ultimately reliable character of reason as a praxis. The achievement of this naturalistic doctrine of 'belief is threefold : first, it is a critical weapon against metaphysical fictions, second, it gives man, and even the rational philosopher, an ineradicable peace of mind, and finally, it is the foundation of a special sort of science — the critical, experimentally rooted, modest and fundamentally doubtful science of human nature. (shrink)

No Abstract In his graduate-seminar lectures on Kant—published as Kant and Pre-Kantian Themes (Sellars, 2002)—Wilfrid Sellars argues that because Hume cannot distinguish between a vivacious idea and an idea of something vivacious he cannot account for the human ability to represent temporally complex states of affairs. The first section of this paper aims to show that this argument is not properly aimed at the historical Hume who can, on a proper reading, distinguish these kinds of representations. This is not, however, (...) Sellars’ only argument for this conclusion. The next section of this paper continues with a discussion of an argument that Sellars presents on Kant’s behalf in Science and Metaphysics, and its key Kantian premise that, contra Hume, only conceptual representations can represent any complex states of affairs as such. The conclusion of this discussion is that Sellars does indeed present compelling reasons for rejecting a Humean account, reasons centered on the ambiguity of the associative structure of mental representation (which Sellars subsequently replaces with inferential structure). The paper concludes with an examination of the sense in which non-conceptual representations—such as those that Hume considers—represent and the role that these play in conceptual representation for both Sellars and Kant. (shrink)

Coady misrepresents Hume as a reductivist about testimony. Hume occasionally writes carelessly as if what goes for beliefs based on induction will also go for beliefs obtained from testimony. But, in fact, he has no theory of testimony at all, though in his more considered remarks he rightly thinks, as does Reid, that the natural response to a bit of testimony is simply to accept the information which it contains. The sense in which we owe the beliefs we get from (...) testimony to experience, according to Hume, is this: we each learn about the business of testimony from being exposed to it, and in particular to cases where what is told is manifestly true. Hume is also interested in the question of how we may be prompted to view some testimonies with suspicion, and how we should then respond to them. It is wrong, however, to take his thoughts about this as embodying an implicit theory of the basic mechanism of testimony. In fact he has a problem accounting for the human propensity to accept extraordinary testimonies within the general framework of his doctrine; the Treatise solution is wisely abandoned in the Enquiry.Author Keywords: Hume; Reid; Coady; Testimony; Reductivism; Knowledge. (shrink)

Henry Allison offers a new understanding of Hume's theory of knowledge, as contained in the first book of his Treatise. Allison provides a comprehensive and detailed critical analysis of Hume's views on the subject, and an extensive comparison with Kant on a range of issues including space and time, causation, existence, and the self.

My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. Second, I offer a brief (...) criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world". The two parts are tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally.One caveat:. (shrink)

We can understand epistemic naturalism as the view that there are cases in which we are justified in holding a belief and cases in which we are not so justified, and that we can distinguish cases of one sort from cases of the other with reference to non-normative facts about the mechanisms that produce them. By my lights, Hume is an epistemic naturalist of this sort, and I propose in this paper a novel and detailed account of his epistemic naturalism. (...) On my account, which I call the determinacy account, Hume characterizes epistemic justification in terms of the mind's feeling determined by the relation of cause and effect to move from one impression (or idea) to an(other) idea. I find a statement of this account, which Hume applies initially to what he calls the second system of realities, in Treatise 1.3.9. After rejecting other accounts of Hume's epistemic naturalism, I show how the determinacy account handles the cases Hume considers later in Treatise 1.3. (shrink)

In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise ("Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses"), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume's position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first (...) detailed analysis of this evolution, which includes an explanation of T 1.4.2's four-part system. (shrink)

Hume argues that the difference between belief and mere conception consists in a difference in the manner of conception. His argument assumes that the difference between belief and mere conception must be a function of either the content conceived or of the manner of conception; however, it is unclear what justifies this assumption. I argue that the assumption depends on Hume’s confidence that we can know immediately that we believe when we believe, and that we can only have such knowledge (...) of intrinsic features of our perceptions. I then claim that Hume’s argument against the view that the difference between belief and mere conception is a function of the content conceived faces a difficulty, because it relies on an apparently implausible view about mental representation. I propose an interpretation of the argument that avoids the difficulty and explains Hume’s puzzling claim that his account of belief answers “a new question unthought of by philosophers.”. (shrink)

This lively little book — 170 small-format pages, excluding front and end matter — has its origin in the author’s 1995 Romanell-Phi Beta Kappa lectures at Dartmouth College. Consistent with this origin, it speaks primarily to a general audience rather than to philosophical specialists. Nevertheless, even specialist readers will find Walking the Tightrope of Reason valuable. It revisits figures and issues that have long and productively occupied Fogelin, and here we see his thoughts about these figures and issues clearly and (...) whole. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:125, HUME'S PROBABILITY ARGUMENT OF?,??,? In the Treatise,?,??,?, Hume presents an follows:' argument which, in the barest of outlines, goes as 1 (Pl) Every proposition has a probability less than one. (P2) If reason were the basis of our beliefs, then we would have no beliefs. (follows from (Pl)) (P3) We in fact do have beliefs. Hence, (P4) Reason is not the basis of our beliefs. The argument has (...) not been particularly well received. D. C. Stove, for example, refers to it as being "not merely defective, but one of the worst 2 arguments ever to impose itself on a man of genius." While not everyone is as unsympathetic as Stove, it nonetheless is difficult to find commentators favorably disposed toward the argument. Various sections of the Treatise are notoriously unclear.?,??,? is such a section; as such, it is difficult to say just what Hume intended his argument to be. My contention in the present paper is that there are two reasonable ways of reconstructing Hume's argument, both consistent with what Hume writes in?,??,?. The first reconstruction is clearly unsound; the second reconstruction fares somewhat better. In particular, my contention will be that this second reconstruction, if not sound, is at least valid 4 and contains no obviously false premises. Allow me to make some preliminary comments before presenting these reconstructions. The reconstructions to follow will primarily be concerned with premise (P2) above; in particular, the 126. reconstructions will focus on how Hume can claim that (P2) follows from (Pl). Premise (Pl) is a common 5 sceptical claim, not obviously false, and certainly not unique to Hume. As such, it strikes me that the more interesting part of the argument is Hume's claim that (P2) follows from (Pl), and such will be the focus of the reconstructions (although (Pl) will be discussed toward the end of this paper). Concerning (P2), why does Hume think this follows from (Pl)? His reasoning is contained in the following passage; Having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv'd from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having adjusted these two together, we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. This is a doubt, which immediately occurs to us, and of which, if we wou'd closely pursue our reason, we cannot avoid giving a decision. But this decision, tho' it shou'd be favourable to our preceeding judgment, being founded only on probability, must weaken still further our first evidence, and must itself be weaken'd by a fourth doubt of the same kind, and so on in infinitum; till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty. No finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum; and even the vastest quantity, which can enter into human imagination, must in this manner be reduc'd to nothing. (T182) Not for nothing did I claim that this section of the Treatise is unclear. At best, I can discern only the outline of Hume's reasoning, which seems to go as follows: first, when we assign a probability to some 127, proposition, reason dictates that we re-evaluate this probability. In particular, reason dictates that we "add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties." Note that Hume never specifies the object of this 'new doubt.' He might mean a) that our doubt concerns whether the probability we assigned the proposition is correct, or b) that our doubt concerns the evidence on which we based the assignment of that probability. Whatever the case, this 'new doubt' must "weaken still further our first evidence," presumably resulting in a lowering of the probability we originally assigned to the proposition. We then repeat this doubting process, adding new doubts of the same kind in infinitum, "till at last there remain nothing of the original... (shrink)

In the Treatise, Book I, Part iv, Section 2, Hume seeks to explain what causes us to believe that objects continue to exist even when they are not perceived. He argues that we won't be able to prov...

Beginning with an overview of the knowledge claims proposed by John Locke and David Hume, this essay first explores the respective responses of Newman and W. G. Ward and then updates the discussion by bringing Newman into dialogue with the thoughtof Alasdair MacIntyre.

In a crucial passage in the Treatise, Hume argues that all our sense impressions are dependent for their existence upon the state of our sense organs. Hume points out that this is not the same as an ontological dependence upon minds; and moreover the argument is clearly causal. Hume uses it to establish the system of the philosophers as opposed to the system of the vulgar. This paper argues that Hume’s case parallels that which, in this century, the critical realists (...) made against the new realists. Consequently, it is also argued, Hume is best construed, in this passage at least, as defending critical realism, rather than, as many critics contend, a version of subjectivistic scepticism. (shrink)

In this paper, the author discusses the feasibility of constructing a Humean model of the psychological realities of categorical propositions and syllogistic deduction by employing only Hume’s kinds of “ideas” and kinds of mental operations on ideas which Hume explicitly or implicitly postulated in his theory of discursive thinking.

In this paper I aim to do two things. First, I attempt to illustrate an interesting pattern of argument one can find in Hume's work. Next, I employ this Humean pattern of argument to show that IF there is a cogent and intuitive argument for any form of epistemological skepticism, which despite its cogency and intuitiveness has a unbelievable conclusion, THEN we lack a very important form of doxastic self-control, which I call rational self-control, over the beliefs problematized by that (...) skeptical argument. Thus, the challenge posed by skepticism is even deeper and more radical than commonly supposed: If any form of skepticism proves unanswerable and yet unbelievable, then we demonstrably lack RSC in the domain problematized by that form of skepticism. Thus, one's views on skepticism may entail definite views on doxastic self-control. (shrink)

This paper examines the principal objections that Hume’s Scots contemporaries, George Campbell, James Beattie, and Thomas Reid raised against his views of testimony, belief, and the “theory of ideas.” In opposition to Kant’s claim that “Reid, Oswald, and Beattie” had “appealed to common sense as an oracle when insight and research [failed them]” and had “[taken] for granted what [Hume] meant to call into doubt while emphatically, and often with great indignation, demonstrating what he had never thought to question” it (...) is shown that, in each case, Hume’s critics understood him correctly and raised serious objections. But it is also shown that Hume’s work contains all the materials necessary to mount an effective response to their objections. (shrink)

This essay provides a survey of the central role of various radically skeptical arguments in David Hume's philosophy. The discussion relies upon a distinction between theoretical skepticism and prescriptive skepticism. A theoretical skepticism calls into question the grounds or the warrant for some important class of beliefs, e.g., our inductive beliefs about the future and our beliefs about the external world. A prescriptive skepticism recommends the suspension of belief for some class of beliefs. This essay is an attempt to show (...) that Hume was an unmitigated theoretical skeptic over a wide range of areas, but for the most part he was a moderate or mitigated prescriptive skeptic. (shrink)

Hume assigns a pivotal role to stability in understanding normativity in a variety of theoretical contexts, including the passions, justice, and moral judgment; in epistemology, he seeks to sustain his pretheoretical epistemic intuitions in terms of a stability‐based theory of justification. A distinctive feature of Hume's naturalism is that he tends to ground epistemic obligation in the desire to relieve the discomfort or felt uneasiness in unsettled states. Since he rejects the Pyrrhonian claim that ataraxia or quietude results from an (...) equipollence of opposing arguments where belief is suspended, if tranquillity is to be secured, it will have to be within a system of beliefs. In this regard, a series of hopeful results ultimately give way to a destructive conclusion, a negative assessment of the prospects for stability in belief, and hence for justified belief, at least for the reflective person. This overall interpretive perspective is compared to that of Kemp Smith, MacNabb and Passmore, Garrett, and the reflexive approval interpretation of Baier and Korsgaard. (shrink)

In Treatise I.iii.5–10, Hume's claim that association by the relation of cause and effect produces belief is often intertwined – though without his remarking on this fact – with the claim that belief based on causal inference is justified. To explain this, I offer the hypothesis that, in Hume's view, stability plays a double role: whether belief is justified depends upon considerations of stability, and fixity, a species of stability is also essential to belief itself. Hume identifies belief with steadiness, (...) an infixed disposition, rather than vivacity or a lively idea. To establish that a state is a belief is thus to establish that it is stable, other things being equal. In one version of this stability‐based interpretation, the justification of a belief is a matter of its stability in the belief system of a fully reflective person; in a second version, justification is to be assessed in terms of the degree to which the person who holds the belief is reflective. (shrink)