Hume: Epistemology, Misc

Hsueh M. Qu has recently argued that Hume's famed "Separability Principle" from the Treatise entangles him in a contradiction. Qu offers a modified principle as a solution but also argues that the mature Hume would not have needed to avail himself of it, given that Hume's arguments in the first Enquiry do not depend on this principle in any form. To the contrary, I show that arguments in the first Enquiry depend on this principle, but I agree with Qu that (...) Qu's solution to Hume's quandary frees him of the contradiction. Next, I compare Qu's solution to Hume's original position. By analyzing the divergent forms of Hume's "Dictum" that follow from them, I show that Qu's solution and Hume's original position have significantly different consequences in a range of domains, including Hume's modality. Generally, Qu's solution fits better with Hume's other commitments—even though Hume often fails to recognize it—thereby increasing its plausibility. (shrink)

Hume’s empiricist reason for rejecting “school metaphysics” makes it natural to assume that Hume rejects all metaphysics. A.J. Ayer certainly reads Hume this way. The natural assumption is wrong, however. Hume only rejects the aprioricity of metaphysics, and not the science itself. I will argue that his empirical science of human nature supports three basic metaphysical principles. (1) The Contradiction Principle: The clearly conceivable implies no contradiction. (2) The Conceivability Principle: The clearly conceivable is possible. (3) The Conceptual Separability Principle: (...) Things are different if and only if distinguishable, and distinguishable if and only if separable in conception. On these principles the rest of Hume’s metaphysics is based, including his atomistic ontology and his denial of necessary connection. And so, for Hume metaphysics is an empirical science. (shrink)

En este artículo se sostiene la siguiente hipótesis: si una hipótesis tiene valor epistémico para Hume, este valor tiene que provenir de la intuición. Para ello se consideran las tres posibles fuentes de conocimiento en su pensamiento: la demostración, la experiencia y la intuición. Considerando que Hume presenta su doctrina de la creencia como una hipótesis, se argumenta que el valor epistémico de las hipótesis no puede provenir de la demostración ni de la experiencia y, por tanto, o las hipótesis (...) carecen de valor epistémico o su valor epistémico proviene de la intuición. Para sostener la hipótesis propuesta se ofrece un análisis de la evidencia textual sobre la hipótesis y la intuición a la luz de la literatura disponible sobre el tema. (shrink)

Response to Don Baxter, Don Garrett and Jennifer Marusic regarding my book Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; initially delivered at the 2016 Hume Conference in Sydney, Australia as part of the Author Meets Critics session.

According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...) even viable, is not our focus here. Rather, our issue is with Hume, particularly: How could Hume have responded? In this paper, I show that in Book I of the Treatise, Hume did—however implicitly—appeal to a “pre-theoretical” notion of belief, which meets Husserl’s demands for a pre-theoretical grounding, i.e. a justificatory grounding. And so, his method is, at least in this respect, justified. But this belief is by no means “prenaturalistic.” Rather, it is a function of empirical data. In particular, it is a product of the “constant and coherent” impressions that seem to naturally obtain of experience. As a result, Hume’s method, which, in agreement with Husserl, we may characterize as psychology, does admit of a certain degree of regularity, but an empirical regularity. And according to Hume, contra Husserl’s complaints, this is the best that we can hope for; regularity will have to suffice, not certainty. However, it must be noted up front that this justification is implicit—Hume is not nearly as forthright as he could have been. Thus, making his position more explicit is the task of this paper. I am not presenting my own position, where I offer my own arguments. Instead, I present textual evidence, contextualized with ample explication. It is my hope that by doing so, Hume may more effectively make his case. (shrink)

Hume is an experimental philosopher who attempts to understand why we think, feel, and act as we do. But how should we evaluate the adequacy of his proposals? This chapter examines Hume’s account from the perspective of interdisciplinary work in cognitive science.

In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...) localized a faculty to register them. We defend the perception of necessity against such Humeanism, drawing on examples from mathematics. (shrink)

in the treatise, hume claims to identify many “fictions of the imagination” among both “vulgar” and philosophical beliefs. To name just a few, these include the fiction of one aggregate composed of many parts,1 the fiction of a material object’s identity through change, and the fiction of a human mind’s identity through change and interruption in its existence. Hume claims that these fictions and others like them are somehow defective: in his words, they are “improper,” “inexact,” or not “strict”. I (...) will argue that this claim conflicts with other commitments.. (shrink)

No Tratado da natureza humana, David Hume dedica uma longa seção à problemática sobre a possibilidade da existência do mundo externo intitulada “Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos”. A seção traz idas e vindas do autor no que diz respeito à resposta para o problema. Inicialmente, Hume dá como certa a existência externa dos corpos, i.e., independente das percepções, e avisa que sua investigação se limitará, apenas, às causas que levam a crer nisso. Sua pretensão inicial não é cumprida e logo (...) dá espaço a uma rede de complexos argumentos céticos, os quais colocam em dúvida as realidades independentes das percepções. No último parágrafo, porém, Hume parece retroceder em sua posição e parece tomar como certa a existência independente dos corpos, mais uma vez, tal como fez no começo da seção. O objetivo desse trabalho foi, pois, evidenciar que há dois pontos bem diferentes que caracterizam sua argumentação sobre esse assunto: I) A existência do mundo externo; II) a possibilidade de conhecê-lo. Ao primeiro, a resposta de Hume será positiva, ao segundo ponto, negativa. O ceticismo, portanto, sempre decorreria de qualquer tentativa em conhecer tais realidades independentes, pois, através da argumentação filosófica, da razão, sempre se esbarraria na impossibilidade de sua existência. Ao mesmo tempo, sua realidade ontológica parece se impor pela própria natureza e, com isso, desativa os argumentos céticos, os quais sempre demonstram a impossibilidade de conhecê-lo, i.e., acessá-lo pela razão. Assim, o que se tem sobre o mundo externo são, apenas, impressões geradas através da experiência para com o mesmo. Em vista dos fins supracitados, foram utilizados, além do Tratado, a Investigação sobre o entendimento humano e outros textos do filósofo escocês. (shrink)

Da imaterialidade da alma: a desconstrução mais incisiva de Hume de um pressuposto metafísico .

Einstein acknowledged that his reading of Hume influenced the development of his special theory of relativity. In this article, I juxtapose Hume’s philosophy with Einstein’s philosophical analysis related to his special relativity. I argue that there are two common points to be found in their writings, namely an empiricist theory of ideas and concepts, and a relationist ontology regarding space and time. The main thesis of this article is that these two points are intertwined in Hume and Einstein.

While Kant does not address the problem of induction often attributed to Hume, he does, by way of a transcendental deduction of an a priori principle of reflecting empirical judgment, address a distinct problem Hume raises indirectly. This problem is that induction cannot be justified so long as it presupposes some empirical concept applying to or some empirical principle true of more than one object in nature, a presupposition neither determined by nor founded on reason. I draw on Hume’s positive (...) account of induction to motivate the following objection to Kant: in so far as induction can be justified, there is reason to doubt that it would be so in virtue of any a priori feature. (shrink)

In this book, Schmitt claims that Hume, however implicitly, employs a fully-developed epistemology in the Treatise. In particular, Hume employs a “veritistic” epistemology, i.e. one that is grounded in truth, particularly, true beliefs. In some cases, these true beliefs are “certain,” are “infallible” (78) and are justified, as in the case of knowledge, i.e. demonstrations. In other cases, we acquire these beliefs through a reliable method, i.e. when they are produced by causal proofs. Such beliefs are also “certain” (69, 81) (...) and are (defeasibly) justified. Thus, although demonstrative knowledge and beliefs produced by causal proofs are produced by different psychological processes, and so, admit of specific kinds of “certainty,” they are nevertheless, both certain, and so, they share the same “epistemic status” (68-69). As a result, although it is clear that Hume makes a psychological distinction between demonstrations and causally produced beliefs (proofs) it may be argued that Hume does not make an epistemological distinction between knowledge (demonstrations) and causally produced beliefs (proofs). Thus, in regard to epistemic status, the latter are not necessarily inferior to the former. This has larger implications for Hume’s method; if we can say that he employs a method that invokes knowledge, or at least, beliefs that share the same epistemic status as knowledge, then Hume need not be entirely skeptical about the results of his method. Rather, the possession of true belief is Hume's ultimate goal. (380). (shrink)

Hume is widely read as committed to a kind of anti-realism about secondary qualities, on which secondary qualities are less real than primary qualities. I argue that Hume is not an anti-realist about secondary qualities as such, and I explain why Hume’s remarks on the primary-secondary distinction are better read as abstaining from the realist/anti-realist debate as it was understood by modern philosophers such as Locke. By contextualizing Hume’s discussion of the primary-secondary distinction in Treatise 1.4.4 as a response to (...) a broadly Lockean understanding of the distinction, my analysis retrieves Hume’s critique of the resemblance and inseparability theses that structure Locke’s version of the distinction and establishes that Hume has epistemic reasons to reject Locke’s metaphysical conclusions about the distinction. (shrink)

Discusses Hume's considered view of what "good" belief-formation consists in. In doing so, attributes to Hume a sentimentalist picture of epistemic virtue in which the passion of curiosity plays a foundational role.

This article investigates the relationship between Hume’s causal philosophy and Newton ’s philosophy of nature. I claim that Newton ’s experimentalist methodology in gravity research is an important background for understanding Hume’s conception of causality: Hume sees the relation of cause and effect as not being founded on a priori reasoning, similar to the way that Newton criticized non - empirical hypotheses about the properties of gravity. However, according to Hume’s criteria of causal inference, the law of universal gravitation is (...) not a complete causal law, since it does not include a reference either to contiguity or to temporal priority. It is still argued that because of the empirical success of Newton ’s theory—the law is a statement of an exceptionless repetition—Hume gives his support to it in interpreting gravity force instrumentally as if it bore a causal relation to motion. (shrink)

Vivacity, the “liveliness” of perceptions, is central to Hume’s epistemology. Hume equated belief with vivid ideas. Vivacity is a conscious quality so believable ideas are felt to be lively. Hume’s empiricism revolves around a phenomenological, inner epistemology. Through copying, Hume bases vivacity in impressions. Sensory vivacity also concerns liveliness or patterns of change. Through learnt skillful use, it tracks change specific to intentional sense-perceptual experience, Hume’s “coherent and constant” complex impressions. Copying, in turn, communicates the conscious skill of vivacity to (...) ideas where it becomes an indicator of believable ideas. Hume’s copying concerns then the causation of conscious skills required for the identification of empirically warranted structures. Copying allows Hume to combine a radically externalist empiricism with a portable phenomenological inner epistemology. (shrink)

There has been a recent flurry of work comparing and contrasting the respective methodologies of David Hume and his contemporary Thomas Reid. Both writers are explicit in their commitments to a Newtonian methodology. Yet they diverge radically on the issue of human liberty. In this paper I want to unpack the methodological commitments underlying the two different accounts of liberty. How is it that two avowed Newtonians end up diametrically opposed to one another with respect to such a fundamental aspect (...) of human mentality? (shrink)

Reid declared Hume's appeal to variation in the magnitude of a table with distance to be the best argument that had ever been offered for the ‘ideal hypothesis’ that we experience nothing but our own mental states. Reid's principal objection to this argument fails to apply to minimally visible points. He did establish that we have reason to take our perceptions to be caused by external objects. But his case that we directly perceive external objects is undermined by what Hume (...) had to say about the role played by color in our perception of the primary qualities of bodies. (shrink)

My topic here is metaphilosophy, the question of how philosophy is properly done. For some years now, I've been developing a particularly austere, roughly naturalistic approach to philosophical questions that I call 'second philosophy'. It has seemed to me that one effective way to convey the spirit of second philosophy is to compare and contrast it with other more familiar methods, like transcendental or therapeutic philosophy. Here I hope to pursue this sort of engagement with two other venerable schools of (...) thought: Hume's 'science of man' and Reid's 'philosophy of common sense'. Hume presents a fitting starting point for any discussion of naturalism -- even more so when Reid is on the agenda -- so my first pass at a portrait of the second philosopher traces her relations to the 'scientist of man'. Of course, Hume's cheerfully industrious inquirer eventually lands on the barren rock of skepticism, so we'll also take a second-philosophical look at the kinds of considerations that led poor Hume to his shipwreck. This sets the stage for Reid. (shrink)

Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come from? “Why [do] we conclude that … particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?” In 1.3.6 of the Treatise, Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason. However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists of Hume’s “negative” argument concerning induction. This argument has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention. How could causal inferences be justified if they are (...) not justified by reason? If we believe that p causes q, isn’t it reason that allows us to conclude q when we see p with some assurance, i.e. with some necessity? (shrink)

Meu objetivo neste artigo é destacar algumas das ideias centrais defendidas por Hume e, a fim de caracterizar a natureza de sua filosofia, contrapor duas interpretações frequentes de sua obra: a interpretação cética e interpretação naturalista. A fim de apontar as principais razões que estão por trás dessas duas interpretações que tentam apreender a natureza da filosofia de Hume, procuro abordar inicialmente alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria humeana e, em seguida, especialmente sua análise das inferências causais. No final, argumento (...) que o ceticismo e o naturalismo de Hume não são incompatíveis. Ao contrário, devem ser entendidos como duas faces de uma mesma filosofia. (shrink)

The notion of idea is a key concept in early modern philosophy. From Descartes seminal works at the beginning of the 17th century to the work of Thomas Reid in the closing years of the 18th century, discussion in theoretical philosophy is dominated by the debate about the core concept of idea. This two-volume textbook introduces eleven key authors from this period. The first volume presents the central texts in modern translation, often new translations based on the source texts. The (...) second volume contains commentaries on each text with a systematic introduction, a line-by-line commentary and a contextualisation of the contents. Thus this textbook provides students of philosophy with a comprehensive overview of the modern discussion of the concept of idea. ". (shrink)

Resenha do livro de MONTEIRO, Joáo Paulo. Hume e a Epistemologia ; revisáo de Frederico Diehl [1ª. ed. brasileira]. – Sáo Paulo: Editora UNESP; Discurso Editorial, 2009. (232 p).

The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.

This book, now available in paperback, was not reviewed in this journal when it first appeared, but that omission is corrected here. Since its first appearance, the book has established itself as an important contribution to the philosophy of history and Hume’s place in it. Because of the scope of this journal, I shall mainly focus on Professor Pompa’s discussion of Hume, but the three thinkers—Hume, Hegel, and Vico—are a nice contrast. In his concluding chapter 4, Pompa sums up this (...) contrast in the following way. (shrink)

This book, now available in paperback, was not reviewed in this journal when it first appeared, but that omission is corrected here. Since its first appearance, the book has established itself as an important contribution to the philosophy of history and Hume’s place in it. Because of the scope of this journal, I shall mainly focus on Professor Pompa’s discussion of Hume, but the three thinkers—Hume, Hegel, and Vico—are a nice contrast. In his concluding chapter 4, Pompa sums up this (...) contrast in the following way. (shrink)

Hume is widely regarded as an antirationalist and skeptic about reason. Yet he often appeals to reason. He also treats “understanding” and “reason” as virtually synonymous and ascribes seemingly cognitive functions to the imagination and the passions—functions that he elsewhere attributes to reason. What, then, is reason and how is it connected to reasoning in Hume's philosophy?

The paper reconstructs the reception of Descartes's work by the Scottish Enlighteners, from Colin MacLaurin to Dugald Stewart. The Scots' image of Descartes was a byproduct of a scientific controversy; philosophical arguments were brought into the picture more as asides than as a primary focus of interest. As soon as the Cartesian physics withered away as a real alternative to Newtonian physics, only the philosophical arguments were left, with no memory of the context out of which they originated, and the (...) focus of the discussion shifts from physics to the philosophy of mind and the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Here we will see that contrary to the party line, Hume’s notion of a relation should be understood, in all cases, as a peculiar non-necessary synthetic relation; unique, but similar in a certain constructive sense to what I characterize as a mathematical notion of synthesis. And, most controversially, I argue that this non-necessary synthetic notion of a relation includes Hume’s arithmetical relations, which have typically been interpreted as either “analytic,” necessary, or both. In this general respect, Hume anticipates Quine’s attack (...) on the analytic/synthetic distinction. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue that Hume consistently affirms, both in the _Treatise<D> and in the second _Enquiry<D>, (i) that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel (...) benevolence more strongly for one with whom he or she has a 'connexion', e.g., a family member or friend. (shrink)

The paper describes how a simple idea, that of a new foundation of moral philosophy taking Galilean new natural philosophy as a mode , lead to unforeseen developments once the competition between a Cartesian and a Newtonian paradigm emerged. Those developments are reconstructed in Hume, Smith, Ferguson.

Anmerk. g.) „als (in den genannten Wissenschaften) zwischen Vernunft und Erfahrung zu unterscheiden und beide Erkenntnissarten ganz auseinander zu halten . . . .. Fasst man aber die Erkenntnisse, welche als Produkte des reinen Denkens ...