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  1. Goodman's Paradox, Hume's Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    This paper reports (in section 1 “Introduction”) some quotes from Nelson Goodman which clarify that, contrary to a common misunderstanding, Goodman always denied that “grue” requires temporal information and “green” does not require temporal information; and, more in general, that Goodman always denied that grue-like predicates require additional information compared to what green-like predicates require. One of the quotations is the following, taken from the first page of the Foreword to chapter 8 “Induction” of the Goodman’s book “Problems and Projects”: (...)
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  2. The Age of Trickery.Ghislain Guigon - manuscript
    This is partly fictional. It is chiefly a reconstruction (not always faithful) of Hume’s fundamental uses of notions of similarity, mostly based on Enquiry. It is the first part (out of four) of a monograph on the evolution of similarity toolmaking. Histories of doctrines are common in our discipline, not so for histories of tools; this is what it’s about. What’s disturbing: I write as if I were talking about the customs and beliefs of ancient tribes instead of real philosophers. (...)
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  3. What If the Principle of Induction is Normative? Means-Ends Epistemology and Hume's Problem.Daniel Steel - manuscript
    I develop a critique of Hume’s infamous problem of induction based upon the idea that the principle of induction (PI) is a normative rather than descriptive claim. I argue that Hume’s problem is a false dilemma, since the PI might be neither a “relation of ideas” nor a “matter of fact” but rather what I call a contingent normative statement. In this case, the PI could be justified by a means-ends argument in which the link between means and end is (...)
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  4. Synthetic a Priori Judgments and Kant’s Response to Hume on Induction.Hsueh Qu - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper will make the case that we can find in Kant’s Second Analogy a substantive response to Hume’s argument on induction. This response is substantive insofar as it does not merely consist in independently arguing for the opposite conclusion, but rather, it identifies and exploits a gap in this argument. More specifically, Hume misses the possibility of justifying the uniformity of nature as a synthetic a priori proposition, which Kant looks to establish in the Second Analogy. Note that the (...)
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  5. Regularity and Certainty in Hume’s Treatise: A Humean Response to Husserl.Stefanie Rocknak - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...)
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  6. The Unsolvability of Hume's Problem and Local Justification of Induction.Ju Sh - forthcoming - Epistemologia. Genova.
  7. A New Justification of Induction: Gerhard Schurz: Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2019. X + 386 Pp, £50.00 HB. [REVIEW]Michael Nielsen - 2020 - Metascience 29 (2):209-210.
  8. David Hume’un Nedensellik Eleştirisi Bağlamında Tümevarımsal Akıl Yürütmeye Yönelik Argümanlarının Yeniden Yapılandırılması.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2020 - Ankara, Türkiye: Gece Kitaplığı.
    Gözlemlenenlerden gözlemlen(e)meyenlere diğer bir deyişle genel yasalara ulaşma imkânı veren çıkarım yöntemi olarak tümevarımsal ya da endüktif akıl yürütmenin rasyonel olarak temellendirilmesinin imkanına yönelik soruşturma tarih içerisinde tümevarım sorunu ya da endüksiyon problemi olarak tezahür etmiştir. Bu sorunun temel argümanı tarihsel okumalara baktığımızda İskoç ampirist filozof David Hume tarafından öne sürülmüştür. Hume, tümevarımsal çıkarımlar temelinde, gözlenmeyen meseleler hakkındaki inançlarımıza hangi gerekçelerle ulaştığımızı soruşturmaktadır. Hume soruşturmasının sonucunda gözlemlenenden gözlemlen(e)meyen durumlara ilişkin yapılan olgu meseleleri ile ilgili bütün tümevarımsal akıl yürütmelerin dolaylı ya (...)
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  9. In Defense of Newtonian Induction: Hume’s Problem of Induction and the Universalization of Primary Qualities.Ori Belkind - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-26.
    This paper aims to advance two claims. First, it aims to show that Hume’s argument against the rationality of induction is sound. However, I claim that the conclusion does not follow merely from the self-defeating attempts to justify the rule of induction, unlike traditional readings of the argument. Rather, the skeptical conclusion must also take into account Hume’s argument that the secret powers that are present in bodies and give rise to sensible qualities are unknowable. The paper’s second aim is (...)
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  10. Bredo Johnsen. Righting Epistemology: Hume’s Revolution. [REVIEW]Matt Carlson - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):32-38.
  11. Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
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  12. How to Solve Hume's Problem of Induction.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):157-174.
    This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how (...)
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  13. A causalidade e a indução: da crítica de Hume à resposta de Popper.Elan Marinho - 2019 - Pólemos 8 (16):56-74.
    Nesse artigo, apresento a crítica de Hume de seu Tratado da natureza humana contra a garantia de inferência de causalidade a partir de argumentos de cunho psicológico e de um argumento lógico. Em seguida, são esclarecidos os detalhes da crítica que Popper dirige contra Hume em seu artigo Ciência: Conjecturas e refutações, no qual foca em uma solução do Problema de Hume – considerado como uma faceta do Problema da Demarcação. Explicarei que Popper defende que a ciência avança sempre da (...)
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  14. Popper and Hume: Two Great Skeptics.Zuzana Parusniková - 2019 - In Raphael Sassower & Nathaniel Laor (eds.), The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie. Springer Verlag. pp. 207-223.
    Karl Popper explicitly discusses two problems in David Hume’s epistemology. He praises Hume for his critique of induction, specifically for his claim that inductive inferences are logically invalid. He rejects Hume’s psychological account of induction, specifically his theory of belief formation by repetition. Thus, Popper famously concludes that Hume buried the logical gems in the psychological mud and endorsed an irrationalist epistemology. The logical problem of induction gives Popper the impetus for spelling out his new, negative concept of reason, one (...)
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  15. Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction: By Gerhard Schurz, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2019, 386pp., $60.00, £50, ISBN: 9780262039727.Tomoji Shogenji - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):229-231.
    Volume 32, Issue 3-4, September - December 2019, Page 229-231.
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  16. Sellars and Hume on the Ontological Status of Theoretical-Explanatory Entities.David Landy - 2018 - In Luca Cortini, Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 59-78.
    Though Sellars often criticizes Hume, Hume's treatment of theoretical entities turns out to have more in common with Sellars' view of them than with the view of the logical positivists who claimed Hume as their predecessor.
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  17. Review of "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution". [REVIEW]Jared Bates - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
    Review of Bredo Johnsen's "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution" (OUP, 2017).
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  18. Hume’s Problem of Enumerative Induction Reconsidered.D. Christopoulou, D. Anapolitanos & M. Alexiadou - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiry 41 (1):86-97.
    This paper addresses Harman’s approach to enumerative induction as a case of inference to the best explanation. Αfter taking under brief consideration Hume’s critique to induction, the paper argues that Harman’s proposal does not improve the situation since the same characteristics of induction and the kind of skepticism associated with it reappear in case of inference to the best explanation. Then the paper questions Armstrong’s attempt to upgrade Harman’s suggestion by regarding a necessitation relation among two universals as the best (...)
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  19. Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism Concerning Knowledge and Causation. [REVIEW]Jonathan Cottrell - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):393-398.
  20. Hume's Scepticism Regarding Reason.John Asquith - 2016 - Dissertation, Oxford Brookes University
    There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic; it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason. In this context, the philosophy of David Hume presents something of a stark challenge: Although interpretations vary as to the extent and nature of his scepticism, one (...)
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  21. Is Hume an Inductivist?David Landy - 2015 - Hume Studies 41 (2):231-261.
    Across a series of papers and again in her recent book, Graciela De Pierris has argued that Hume is what she calls an inductivist about the methods of science. De Pierris takes Hume to follow Newton in holding that the ultimate aim of science is to seek "assurance concerning objects, which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses",1 and its method therefore to consist in the subsumption of observable particulars under inductively-established universal generalizations. As De Pierris (...)
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  22. Hume and Aristotle on Induction: A Comparative Study.Paolo C. Biondi - 2014 - In Louis F. Groarke & Paolo C. Biondi (eds.), Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. De Gruyter. pp. 51-122.
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  23. Is Hume's Critique of Induction Self‐Defeating?Charles Cassini - 2014 - Heythrop Journal 55 (1).
  24. Hume, Goodman and Radical Inductive Skepticism.Bredo Johnsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2791-2813.
    Goodman concurs in Hume’s contention that no theory has any probability relative to any set of data, and offers two accounts, compatible with that contention, of how some inductive inferences are nevertheless justified. The first, framed in terms of rules of inductive inference, is well known, significantly flawed, and enmeshed in Goodman’s unfortunate entrenchment theory and view of the mind as hypothesizing at random. The second, framed in terms of characteristics of inferred theories rather than rules of inference, is less (...)
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  25. Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
    Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I (...)
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  26. Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 4 (48):595-625.
    Disputants in the debate regarding whether Hume's argument on induction is descriptive or normative have by and large ignored Hume’s positive argument (that custom is what determines inferences to the unobserved), largely confining themselves to intricate debates within the negative argument (that inferences to the unobserved are not founded on reason). I believe that this is a mistake, for I think Hume’s positive argument to have significant implications for the interpretation of his negative argument. In this paper, I will argue (...)
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  27. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume: Revised Edition.Galen Strawson - 2014 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In this revised and updated edition of The Secret Connexion, Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in all philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. Strawson challenges the standard view of Hume, according to which he thinks that there is no such thing as causal influence, and that there is nothing more to causation than things of one kind regularly following things things of another kind. He argues that Hume does believe in causal influence, but insists that we (...)
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  28. Is Hume's Critique of Induction Self‐Defeating?Charles Cassini - 2013 - Heythrop Journal 60 (2).
  29. Hume’s Theorem.Colin Howson - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):339-346.
    A common criticism of Hume’s famous anti-induction argument is that it is vitiated because it fails to foreclose the possibility of an authentically probabilistic justification of induction. I argue that this claim is false, and that on the contrary, the probability calculus itself, in the form of an elementary consequence that I call Hume’s Theorem, fully endorses Hume’s argument. Various objections, including the often-made claim that Hume is defeated by de Finetti’s exchangeability results, are considered and rejected.
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  30. Is the Humean Defeated by Induction?Benjamin T. H. Smart - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):319-332.
    Many necessitarians about cause and law (Armstrong 1983; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007) have argued that Humeans are unable to justify their inductive inferences, as Humean laws are nothing but the sum of their instances. In this paper I argue against these necessitarian claims. I show that Armstrong is committed to the explanatory value of Humean laws (in the form of universally quantified statements), and that contra Armstrong, brute regularities often do have genuine explanatory value. I finish with a Humean attempt (...)
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  31. A New Humean Criticism of Our Inductive Practice.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - The European Legacy 18 (4):420-431.
    Hume?s familiar sceptical argument against induction brands as irrational our practice of generalising from observed regularities because of its reliance on the assumption that nature is uniform, an assumption which is unjustifiable. The argument which I wish to consider focuses instead on the observed regularities that are required if we are legitimately to extrapolate from experience. According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But in fact we do not encounter such invariable uniformities: our experience (...)
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  32. The Psychology and Epistemology of Hume's Account of Probable Reasoning.Lorne Falkenstein - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. pp. 104.
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  33. Kaila's Reception of Hume.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 89:147-162.
    In this paper, I discuss Eino Kaila's (1890-1958) understanding of David Hume. Kaila was one of the leading Finnish philosophers of the 20th century and a correspondent of the Vienna Circle. He introduced logical empiricism into Finland and taught Georg Henrik von Wright. Final draft.
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  34. The Relation Between the General Maxim of Causality and the Principle of Uniformity in Hume's Theory of Knowledge.José Oscar de Almeida Marques - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (1):85-98.
    ABSTRACT When Hume, in the Treatise on Human Nature, began his examination of the relation of cause and effect, in particular, of the idea of necessary connection which is its essential constituent, he identified two preliminary questions that should guide his research: For what reason we pronounce it necessary that every thing whose existence has a beginning should also have a cause and Why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects? Hume observes that our belief (...)
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  35. Hume's 'Scepticism'about Induction.Peter Millican - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum.
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  36. Hume, Popper y el problema epistemológico de la inducción.José Andrés Forero Mora - 2012 - Logos: Revista de la Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades 21:179-191.
    This paper analyzes the treatment given by Hume and Popper to the problem of induction, and questions the supposed Popper’s overcoming of such problem. In order to do this, it was divided into three main parts: First, Hume’s treatment to the problem of induction —that is, the psychological perspective—; second, Popper’s scientific-objective perspective, and third, a balance of the problem stated under the observation that both approaches are essentially grounded on a different conception of knowledge acquisition.
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  37. No Answer to Hume.Colin Howson - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):279 - 284.
    In a recent article in this journal, Daniel Steel charges me with committing a fallacy in my discussion of inductive rules. I show that the charge is false, and that Steel's own attempt to validate enumerative induction in terms of formal learning theory is itself fallacious. I go on to argue that, contra Steel, formal learning theory is in principle incapable of answering Hume's famous claim that any attempt to justify induction will beg the question.
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  38. Inducción, causalidad y psicologismo en Hume.Oscar Pineda Lemus - 2011 - A Parte Rei 73.
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  39. Twenty Questions About Hume's “Of Miracles”.Peter Millican - 2011 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68:151-192.
    Hume's essay on the credibility of miracle reports has always been controversial, with much debate over how it should be interpreted, let alone assessed. My aim here is to summarise what I take to be the most plausible views on these issues, both interpretative and philosophical, with references to facilitate deeper investigation if desired. The paper is divided into small sections, each headed by a question that provides a focus. Broadly speaking, §§1–3 and §20 are on Hume's general philosophical framework (...)
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  40. Hume's Negative Argument Concerning Induction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come from? “Why [do] we conclude that … particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?” In 1.3.6 of the Treatise, Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason. However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists of Hume’s “negative” argument concerning induction. This argument has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention. How could causal inferences be justified if they are (...)
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  41. The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume’s Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):263-287.
    Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume’s psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume’s recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we (...)
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  42. Hume's Problem of Induction.James E. Taylor - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  43. Hume and the Problem of Induction.James E. Taylor & Stefanie Rocknak - 2011 - In Michael Bruce Steven Barbone (ed.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 174--179.
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  44. Normativity and Probable Reasoning: Hume on Induction.Chon Tejedor - 2011 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 52:15-32.
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  45. Can the Best-Alternative Justification Solve Hume’s Problem? On the Limits of a Promising Approach.Eckhart Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):584-593.
    In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.
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  46. A natureza da filosofia de Hume.Jaimir Conte - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):211-236.
    Meu objetivo neste artigo é destacar algumas das ideias centrais defendidas por Hume e, a fim de caracterizar a natureza de sua filosofia, contrapor duas interpretações frequentes de sua obra: a interpretação cética e interpretação naturalista. A fim de apontar as principais razões que estão por trás dessas duas interpretações que tentam apreender a natureza da filosofia de Hume, procuro abordar inicialmente alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria humeana e, em seguida, especialmente sua análise das inferências causais. No final, argumento (...)
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  47. Hume on Knowledge of Metaphysical Modalities.Daniel Dohrn - 2010 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 13.
    I outline Hume’s views about conceivability evidence. Then I critically scrutinize two threats to conceivability-based modal epistemology. Both arise from Hume’s criticism of claims to knowing necessary causal relationships: Firstly, a sceptical stance towards causal necessity may carry over to necessity claims in general. Secondly, since – according to a sceptical realist reading – Hume grants the eventuality of causal powers grounded in essential features of objects, conceivability-based claims to comprehensive metaphysical possibilities seem endangered. I argue that although normal conceivability-based (...)
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  48. Hume, Norton, and Induction Without Rules.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):754-764.
    With respect to inductive reasoning, there are at least two broad projects that have been of interest to philosophers. The first project is that of accurately describing paradigmatic instances of inductive reasoning in the sciences and in everyday life. Thus, we might ask, of some particular historical episode, how exactly Newton, or Darwin, or Einstein arrived at some conclusion on the basis of the evidence that was before him. The second project is one of justification. The task here is that (...)
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  49. Hume's Argument Concerning Induction – Skeptical or Explanatory?Paweł Miech - 2010 - Diametros 24:1-13.
    The essay deals with problems that emerge in new interpretations of Hume’s famous argument concerning induction. In modern Hume scholarship there is a growing tendency to view Hume’s argument not as reasoning concerning the evidential value of our inductions but rather as a kind of explanation of the cognitive process of making causal inferences. The essay describes the main tenets of two currently dominant interpretations . In addition to discussing both interpretations, the article engages in a discussion about the meaning (...)
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  50. Three Ways of Getting It Wrong: Induction in Wonderland.Brendan Shea - 2010 - In Richard Brian Davis (ed.), Alice in Wonderland and Philosophy: Curiouser and Curiouser. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 93-107.
    Alice encounters at least three distinct problems in her struggles to understand and navigate Wonderland. The first arises when she attempts to predict what will happen in Wonderland based on what she has experienced outside of Wonderland. In many cases, this proves difficult -- she fails to predict that babies might turn into pigs, that a grin could survive without a cat or that playing cards could hold criminal trials. Alice's second problem involves her efforts to figure out the basic (...)
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