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1 — 50 / 195
  1. added 2020-05-24
    Regularity and Certainty in Hume’s Treatise: A Humean Response to Husserl.Stefanie Rocknak - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-08
    Goodman's Paradox, Hume's Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    ABSTRACT This paper reports (in section 1 “Introduction”) some quotes from Nelson Goodman which clarify that, contrary to a common misunderstanding, Goodman always denied that “grue” requires temporal information and “green” does not require temporal information; and, more in general, that Goodman always denied that grue-like predicates require additional information compared to what green-like predicates require. One of the quotations is the following, taken from the first page of the Foreword to chapter 8 “Induction” of the Goodman’s book “Problems and (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-23
    The Age of Trickery.Ghislain Guigon - manuscript
    This is partly fictional. It is chiefly a reconstruction (not always faithful) of Hume’s fundamental uses of notions of similarity, mostly based on Enquiry. It is the first part (out of four) of a monograph on the evolution of similarity toolmaking. Histories of doctrines are common in our discipline, not so for histories of tools; this is what it’s about. What’s disturbing: I write as if I were talking about the customs and beliefs of ancient tribes instead of real philosophers. (...)
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  4. added 2020-01-24
    Twenty Questions About Hume's “Of Miracles”.Peter Millican - 2011 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68:151-192.
    Hume's essay on the credibility of miracle reports has always been controversial, with much debate over how it should be interpreted, let alone assessed. My aim here is to summarise what I take to be the most plausible views on these issues, both interpretative and philosophical, with references to facilitate deeper investigation if desired. The paper is divided into small sections, each headed by a question that provides a focus. Broadly speaking, §§1–3 and §20 are on Hume's general philosophical framework (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-18
    O velho e novo problema da indução.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Neste texto inrodutório, apresento brevemente o que normalmente se entende pelo velho problema da indução e, em seguida, apresento um pouco mais detidamente, acentuando as diferenças e semelhanças, o novo enigma da indução.
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  6. added 2019-12-07
    Goodman’s Paradox, Hume’s Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    On page 14 of "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences" (section 4 of chapter 1) by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin is written: “Since ‘blue’ and ‘green’ are interdefinable with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, the question of which pair is basic and which pair derived is entirely a question of which pair we start with”. This paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “grueb”, which is a predicate that applies to (...)
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  7. added 2019-09-25
    Review: "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution," by Bredo Johnsen. [REVIEW]Matt Carlson - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):32-38.
  8. added 2019-06-06
    Does Hume's Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy?Samir Okasha - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):253-271.
    It is widely agreed that Hume's description of human inductive reasoning is inadequate. But many philosophers think that this inadequacy in no way affects the force of Hume's argument for the unjustifiability of inductive reasoning. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension, given that Hume was not merely pointing out that induction is fallible. I then explore a recent diagnosis of where Hume's sceptical argument goes wrong, due to Elliott Sober. Sober argues that Hume committed a (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Thomas Reid and the Problem of Induction: From Common Experience to Common Sense.Benjamin W. Redekop - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):35-57.
    By the middle of the eighteenth century the new science had challenged the intellectual primacy of common experience in favor of recondite, expert and even counter-intuitive knowledge increasingly mediated by specialized instruments. Meanwhile modern philosophy had also problematized the perceptions of common experience — in the case of David Hume this included our perception of causal relations in nature, a fundamental precondition of scientific endeavor.In this article I argue that, in responding to the ‘problem of induction’ as advanced by Hume, (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference. [REVIEW]François Beets - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):404-406.
    À la question de savoir si la pensée de Hume peut encore représenter un enjeu pour le philosophe des sciences de ce XXe siècle finissant, il faudra répondre oui, et produire l’ouvrage de Fred Wilson comme pièce à conviction. À la question de savoir si le.
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Justin Broackes - 1995 - Hume Studies 21 (1):138-139.
  12. added 2019-06-06
    Hegel and the Humean Problem of Induction.W. A. Suchting - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (3):493.
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Marcello Pera, "Hume, Kant E l'Induzione". [REVIEW]Maurice A. Finocchiaro - 1984 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (4):484.
  14. added 2019-06-06
    D. C. Stove, "Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism". [REVIEW]Donald W. Livingston - 1975 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (3):413.
  15. added 2019-06-05
    Russell and Humean Inferences.João Paulo Monteiro - 2001 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 5 (1-2):55-72.
    Russell's The Problems of Philosophy tries to establish a new theory of induction, at the same time that Hume is there accused of an irrational/ scepticism about induction". But a careful analysis of the theory of knowledge explicitly acknowledged by Hume reveals that, contrary to the standard interpretation in the XXth century, possibly influenced by Russell, Hume deals exclusively with causal inference, never with inductive inference in general, mainly generalizations about sensible qualities of objects. Russell's theories are thus only false (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-05
    Ceticismo E Indução.Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (1):135-168.
    Since Hume, the problem of induction is viewed as the problem of skeptical doubts concerning our empirical generalizations. In this paper, I argue that this problem is neither a question for epistemology nor a consequence of a skeptical view on the matter. Rather I argue that from the point of view of alethic skepticism, Hume´s problem appears to be an issue concerning the pragmatics of investigation, and I try to report some of its most basic aspects. The result is a (...)
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  17. added 2019-04-12
    A natureza da filosofia de Hume.Jaimir Conte - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):211-236.
    Meu objetivo neste artigo é destacar algumas das ideias centrais defendidas por Hume e, a fim de caracterizar a natureza de sua filosofia, contrapor duas interpretações frequentes de sua obra: a interpretação cética e interpretação naturalista. A fim de apontar as principais razões que estão por trás dessas duas interpretações que tentam apreender a natureza da filosofia de Hume, procuro abordar inicialmente alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria humeana e, em seguida, especialmente sua análise das inferências causais. No final, argumento (...)
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  18. added 2019-03-09
    How to Solve Hume's Problem of Induction.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):157-174.
    This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how (...)
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  19. added 2019-03-04
    Sellars and Hume on the Ontological Status of Theoretical-Explanatory Entities.David Landy - 2018 - In Luca Cortini, Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 59-78.
    Though Sellars often criticizes Hume, Hume's treatment of theoretical entities turns out to have more in common with Sellars' view of them than with the view of the logical positivists who claimed Hume as their predecessor.
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  20. added 2019-02-12
    Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
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  21. added 2019-02-10
    Is Hume an Inductivist?David Landy - 2015 - Hume Studies 41 (2):231-261.
    Across a series of papers and again in her recent book, Graciela De Pierris has argued that Hume is what she calls an inductivist about the methods of science. De Pierris takes Hume to follow Newton in holding that the ultimate aim of science is to seek "assurance concerning objects, which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses",1 and its method therefore to consist in the subsumption of observable particulars under inductively-established universal generalizations. As De Pierris (...)
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  22. added 2019-02-10
    A Problem for Hume’s Theory of Induction.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):169-187.
    According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But, as Price points out, Hume misrepresents ordinary induction: we experience very few constant conjunctions. In this paper, I examine several ways of defending Hume’s account of our practice against Price’s objection, and conclude that the theory cannot be upheld.
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  23. added 2019-02-10
    Is Hume a Sceptic About Induction?: On a Would-Be Revolution in the Interpretation of Hume's Philosophy.Adi Parush - 1977 - Hume Studies 3 (1):1-16.
  24. added 2019-01-21
    Not Actually Hume's Problem: On Induction and Knowing-How: Stephen Hetherington.Stephen Hetherington - 2008 - Philosophy 83 (4):459-481.
    Philosophers talk routinely of ‘Hume's problem of induction’. But the usual accompanying exegesis is mistaken in a way that has led epistemologists to conceive of ‘Hume's problem’ in needlessly narrow terms. They have overlooked a way of articulating the conceptual problem, along with a potential way of solving it. Indeed, they have overlooked Hume's own way. In explaining this, I will supplement Hume's insights by adapting Ryle's thinking on knowledge-how and knowledge-that. We will also see why Hume's ‘sceptical solution’ was (...)
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  25. added 2018-12-09
    Can the Best-Alternative Justification Solve Hume’s Problem? On the Limits of a Promising Approach.Eckhart Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):584-593.
    In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.
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  26. added 2018-12-09
    Hume, Induction and Single Experiments.J. P. Monteiro - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1):57-72.
    Hume fully recognised, and partially explained, the role of inductions from single experiments in human knowledge - something his Scottish critics, and some more recent ones, failed to understand. Those inferences, he maintains, depend on the use of a Newtonian rule and the removal of superfluous circumstances. But that rule is not sufficient, and Hume never stated the exact conditions of this removal. We should distinguish between survey and experience in his philosophy, to understand how experience of conjunctions where inductive (...)
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  27. added 2018-11-15
    Hume’s Theorem.Colin Howson - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):339-346.
    A common criticism of Hume’s famous anti-induction argument is that it is vitiated because it fails to foreclose the possibility of an authentically probabilistic justification of induction. I argue that this claim is false, and that on the contrary, the probability calculus itself, in the form of an elementary consequence that I call Hume’s Theorem, fully endorses Hume’s argument. Various objections, including the often-made claim that Hume is defeated by de Finetti’s exchangeability results, are considered and rejected.
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  28. added 2018-07-25
    Anti-Individualism, Materialism, Naturalism.Tomas Hribek - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (3):283-302.
    This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and — rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution — to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution. However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it follows that materialism (...)
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  29. added 2018-06-19
    On Natural Selection and Hume's Second Problem.Armando Aranda-Anzaldo - 1998 - Evolution and Cognition 4 (2):156-172.
    David Hume's famous riddle of induction implies a second problem related to the question of whether the laws and principles of nature might change in the course of time. Claims have been made that modern developments in physics and astrophysics corroborate the translational invariance of the laws of physics in time. However, the appearance of a new general principle of nature, which might not be derivable from the known laws of physics, or that might actually be a non-physical one (this (...)
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  30. added 2018-06-04
    Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism Concerning Knowledge and Causation. [REVIEW]Jonathan Cottrell - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):393-398.
  31. added 2018-02-18
    Hume and Locke on Scientific Methodology: The Newtonian Legacy.Graciela De Pierris - 2006 - Hume Studies 32 (2):277-329.
    Hume follows Newton in replacing the mechanical philosophy’s demonstrative ideal of science by the Principia’s ideal of inductive proof ; in this respect, Hume differs sharply from Locke. Hume is also guided by Newton’s own criticisms of the mechanical philosophers’ hypotheses. The first stage of Hume’s skeptical argument concerning causation targets central tenets of the mechanical philosophers’ conception of causation, all of which rely on the a priori postulation of a hidden configuration of primary qualities. The skeptical argument concerning the (...)
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  32. added 2018-01-22
    Hume's Scepticism Regarding Reason.John Asquith - 2016 - Dissertation, Oxford Brookes University
    There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic; it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason. In this context, the philosophy of David Hume presents something of a stark challenge: Although interpretations vary as to the extent and nature of his scepticism, one (...)
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  33. added 2018-01-03
    Review of "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution". [REVIEW]Jared Bates - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
    Review of Bredo Johnsen's "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution" (OUP, 2017).
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  34. added 2017-11-16
    Response to Wilson.Bernie Koenig - 1988 - Dialogue 27 (2):357-.
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  35. added 2017-10-25
    The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume’s Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):263-287.
    Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume’s psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume’s recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we (...)
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  36. added 2017-10-23
    Hume's Attack on Human Rationality.Idan Shimony - 2005 - Dissertation, Tel Aviv University
  37. added 2016-12-21
    Kaila's Reception of Hume.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 89:147-162.
    In this paper, I discuss Eino Kaila's (1890-1958) understanding of David Hume. Kaila was one of the leading Finnish philosophers of the 20th century and a correspondent of the Vienna Circle. He introduced logical empiricism into Finland and taught Georg Henrik von Wright. Final draft.
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  38. added 2016-05-02
    Is Hume's Critique of Induction Self‐Defeating?Charles Cassini - 2013 - Heythrop Journal 60 (2).
  39. added 2016-05-02
    Inducción, causalidad y psicologismo en Hume.Oscar Pineda Lemus - 2011 - A Parte Rei 73.
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  40. added 2016-05-02
    A Crítica De Popper A Hume: O Problema da Indução.Osvaldino Marra Rodrigues - 2009 - A Parte Rei 66.
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  41. added 2016-05-02
    Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle.Nathan Stemmer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):137-159.
    Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume's account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman's opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the (...)
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  42. added 2016-05-02
    Hume: de la naturaleza psicológica de la inducción.Alex Espinoza Verdejo - 2004 - Analogía Filosófica: Revista de Filosofía, Investigación y Difusión 18 (1):83-106.
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  43. added 2016-05-02
    Is Goodman's Solution of Hume's Riddle Too Strong?Timothy Chambers - 1999 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 34 (74):63-70.
  44. added 2016-05-02
    M. Pera, Hume, Kant e l'induzione. [REVIEW]C. La Rocca - 1989 - Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 80 (3):354.
  45. added 2016-05-02
    Pera . - Hume, Kant e l'induzione. [REVIEW]A. Stanguennec - 1984 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 174:481.
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  46. added 2016-05-02
    M. Pera, "Hume, Kant e l'induzione". [REVIEW]M. Buzzoni - 1984 - Epistemologia 7 (1):162.
  47. added 2016-05-02
    M. PERA, "Hume, Kant e l'induzione". [REVIEW]R. Gilardi - 1983 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 75:168.
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  48. added 2016-05-02
    Hume, Kant e l'induzione. [REVIEW]Elvira Pera Genzone - 1983 - Filosofia 34 (3):284.
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  49. added 2016-05-02
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. G. Stove - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):237-239.
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  50. added 2016-05-02
    Der Induktionsbegriff. Hume und Husserl.Ram Adhar Mall - 1975 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 29 (1):34 - 62.
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