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  1. Hume's Separability Principle, his Dictum, and their Implications.Graham Clay - forthcoming - Mind.
    Hsueh M. Qu has recently argued that Hume's famed "Separability Principle" from the Treatise entangles him in a contradiction. Qu offers a modified principle as a solution but also argues that the mature Hume would not have needed to avail himself of it, given that Hume's arguments in the first Enquiry do not depend on this principle in any form. To the contrary, I show that arguments in the first Enquiry depend on this principle, but I agree with Qu that (...)
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  2. Hume’s Empiricist Metaphysics.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2023 - Quaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 22:261-279.
    Hume’s empiricist reason for rejecting “school metaphysics” makes it natural to assume that Hume rejects all metaphysics. A.J. Ayer certainly reads Hume this way. The natural assumption is wrong, however. Hume only rejects the aprioricity of metaphysics, and not the science itself. I will argue that his empirical science of human nature supports three basic metaphysical principles. (1) The Contradiction Principle: The clearly conceivable implies no contradiction. (2) The Conceivability Principle: The clearly conceivable is possible. (3) The Conceptual Separability Principle: (...)
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  3. Metafysiikka valistuksena.Jani Hakkarainen - 2022 - In Hemmo Laiho (ed.), Valistuksen perinnöt: Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen kollokvion esitelmiä. Turku: University of Turku. pp. 37-48.
    Kirjoituksessa argumentoin, että metafysiikka on ollut valistusta, vaikka se edelleen kaipaa lisää valistumista, kun valistus ymmärretään avoimena prosessina, joka ei ole ajasta ja paikasta riippuvaista. Käsittelen ensin sitä, mitä metafysiikka ja valistus ovat. Sitten lausun länsimaisen metafysiikan historiasta hyvin lyhyesti. Päätän esseen argumentoimalla, että metafysiikka on valistunutta siinä mielessä, että klassisen substanssi-ominaisuus-skeeman sokeasta seuraamisesta on pitkälti päästy eroon. Metafysiikka kaipaa kuitenkin lisää valistusta ja kriittistä tarkastelua, jotta vapaudumme täysin kyseisen skeeman ja modernin predikaatti-logiikan johdatuksen aiheuttamasta kolmesta ongelmallisesta suositusta (tausta)oletuksesta: (1) (...)
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  4. Response to My Critics (The Sydney Sessions).Stefanie Rocknak - 2022 - Hume Studies 45 (1):77-93.
    Response to Don Baxter, Don Garrett and Jennifer Marusic regarding my book Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; initially delivered at the 2016 Hume Conference in Sydney, Australia as part of the Author Meets Critics session.
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  5. Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Causation and the Ontology of 'Double Existence' (revised) with an Appendix 2021.Paul Russell - 2021 - In Recasting Hume and early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays. New York, NY, USA: pp. 3-31.
    This essay provides an interpretation of Hume’s “two definitions” of causation. It argues that the two definitions of causation must be interpreted in terms of Hume’s fundamental ontological distinction between perceptions and (material) objects. Central to Hume’s position on this subject is the claim that, while there is a natural tendency to suppose that there exist (metaphysical) causal powers in objects themselves, this is a product of our failure to distinguish perceptions and objects. Properly understood, our idea of causation involves (...)
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  6. Comments on Rocknak's Imagined Causes.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2019 - Hume Studies 45 (1):51-58.
    Stefanie Rocknak has written an ambitious and challenging book1 in which she argues for a new interpretation of Hume's account of how we come to believe in external objects, and what it is we believe in. I am hampered by the fact that she and I seem to agree on so little. Thus, my criticisms run the danger of simply not seeing what she is up to.A preliminary terminological point: where Rocknak uses the word "object," I will often use the (...)
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  7. Hume on Distinctions of Reason: A Resemblance-First Interpretation.Taro Okamura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):423-436.
    To articulate their understanding of Hume’s discussion of ‘distinctions of reason’, commentators have often taken what I refer to as a ‘respect-first view’ on resemblance, in which they cat...
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  8. Hume and the External World.Stefanie Rocknak - 2019 - In Alex Sager & Angela Coventry (eds.), The Humean Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 124-136.
    Hume’s understanding of the external world, particularly, his conception of objects, or what he occasionally refers to as “bodies,” is the subject of much dispute. Are objects mind-independent? Or, are they just what we see, feel, smell, taste, or touch? In other words, are objects just sense data? Or, are they ideas about sense data? Or, are objects, somehow, mind-independent, but we have ideas of them, and we receive sense data from them? In this paper, I provide some answers to (...)
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  9. Sellars and Hume on the Ontological Status of Theoretical-Explanatory Entities.David Landy - 2018 - In Luca Cortini, Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 59-78.
    Though Sellars often criticizes Hume, Hume's treatment of theoretical entities turns out to have more in common with Sellars' view of them than with the view of the logical positivists who claimed Hume as their predecessor.
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  10. Hume on Abstraction and Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2017 - In Stefano Di Bella & Tad M. Schmaltz (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 285-304.
    Hume’s critique of traditional abstraction entails a result that undercuts his account of the idea of identity. To save his account of identity, Hume would have to accept abstraction as well. What links these two discussions is (1) Hume’s widely shared assumption that traditional abstraction is separating in the mind what are inseparable in reality, (2) his principle that what are different are mentally separable, and (3) his principle that we cannot conceive of the impossible. Given these, it will turn (...)
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  11. Minds, Composition, and Hume's Skepticism in the Appendix.Jonathan Cottrell - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (4):533-569.
    This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions. But—this essay argues—he also held that several perceptions form a whole only if the mind to which they belong supplies a “connexion” among them. In order to do so, it (...)
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  12. Hume on Spatial Properties.Jani Hakkarainen - 2015 - In Guigon Ghislain & Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays. Routledge. pp. 79-94.
    I defend a reading of David Hume’s nominalism that he comes close to Keith Campbell's contemporary trope theory in the specific case of spatial properties. I argue that Hume's view should be construed as classifying spatial properties as Campbellian tropes (particular properties): abstract, particular, determinate and qualitatively simple properties. This has implications for reconstructing Hume's answer to the problem of universals. I argue that Hume’s account of objects resembling each other in respect of spatial properties is grounded in the resemblance (...)
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  13. The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2014 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies. ATINER. pp. 5-15.
    Section III of part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise entitled “Of the ancient philosophy” has been virtually ignored by most Hume scholars. Although philosophers seem to concentrate on sections II and VI of part IV and pay little or no attention to section III, the latter section is paramount in showing how serious Hume's skepticism is, and how Hume's philosophy, contrary to his intention, is far removed from "the sentiments of the vulgar". In this paper I shall first (...)
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  14. Hume on the Lockean Metaphysics of Secondary Qualities.Jason R. Fisette - 2014 - Hume Studies 40 (1):95-136.
    Hume is widely read as committed to a kind of anti-realism about secondary qualities, on which secondary qualities are less real than primary qualities. I argue that Hume is not an anti-realist about secondary qualities as such, and I explain why Hume’s remarks on the primary-secondary distinction are better read as abstaining from the realist/anti-realist debate as it was understood by modern philosophers such as Locke. By contextualizing Hume’s discussion of the primary-secondary distinction in Treatise 1.4.4 as a response to (...)
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  15. Constancy and Coherence in 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise: The Root of “Indirect” Causation and Hume’s Position on Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - The European Legacy (4):444-456.
    This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect (...)
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  16. A Third Type of Distinction in the Treatise.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Hume Studies 38 (1):55-78.
    In this paper, I resolve a potential contradiction between two of Hume's central tenets: that complex perceptions consist of simple perceptions and that distinct things are separable. The former implies that a complex perception is not separable from its constituent simple perceptions, as a change in its constituents destroys its identity. The latter entails that the complex perception is separable from these simple perceptions, since it is distinct from them. This is a contradiction. I resolve it by appealing to a (...)
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  17. Hume as a Trope Nominalist.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):55-66.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading (...)
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  18. Imagined Causes: Hume’s Conception of Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2012 - Springer.
    This book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of the Treatise. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, I show that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. However, I argue that he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are (...)
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  19. Hume on the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities.Jani Hakkarainen - 2011 - In Dana Jalobeanu & Peter Anstey (eds.), Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion: Descartes and Beyond. London: Routledge. pp. 235-259.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume has an insight into the heart of most of “new philosophy” when he claims that according to it, proper sensibles are not Real properties of material substance and Real bodies. I call this tenet “the Proper Sensibles Principle” (PSP). In the second part of the paper, I defend the interpretation - mainly against Don Garrett’s doubts - that the PSP is a rational tenet in Hume’s view and he thus endorses it. Its rationality (...)
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  20. Hume and the sensible qualities.Kenneth P. Winkler - 2011 - In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
  21. Hume, Distinctions of Reason, and Differential Resemblance.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):156-182.
    Hume discusses the distinction of reason to explain how we distinguish things inseparable, and so identical, e.g., the color and figure of a white globe. He says we note the respect in which the globe is similar to a white cube and dissimilar to a black sphere, and the respect in which it is dissimilar to the first and similar to the second. Unfortunately, Hume takes these differing respects of resemblance to be identical with the white globe itself. Contradiction results, (...)
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  22. Replies to Perry, Falkenstein, and Garrett. [REVIEW]Donald L. M. Baxter - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):445 - 455.
    Pace Perry, wondering whether perceived things are identical is thinking about them, for Hume, with no thought of perceptions of them. Hume is not a proto-Fregean; Hume's Difficulty is not a version of Frege's Puzzle. Pace Falkenstein, wondering about an identity is not wondering whether clearly distinct things--stages, surfaces, names--are connected in some way. Pace Garrett, wondering about the identity of an observed object is wondering whether it is really one or two things, not whether there is one F or (...)
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  23. Replies to Perry, Falkenstein, and Garrett.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):445-455.
    Replies to criticisms by John Perry, Lorne Falkenstein, and Don Garrett of my book HUME'S DIFFICULTY: TIME AND IDENTITY IN THE TREATISE, in a book symposium in PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES.
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  24. The Vulgar Conception of Objects in "Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses".Stefanie Rocknak - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):67-90.
    In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise ("Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses"), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume's position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first (...)
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  25. Hume e l'immaterialismo.Daniele Bertini - 2006 - Aquinas (2/3).
    In this paper I provide a definition of immaterialism as a kind of philosophy holding five grounding principles: a) any evidence is ontologically unsubsisting without the mind; b) all evidences are ontologically unrelated among them; c) the mind supports the subsistence of what is actually evident to her perceiving; d) the mind produces or acknoweldges an order in the coming of an evidence after the others; e) experience is the symbolic framing of relationships among given elements. After having defined immaterialism, (...)
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  26. Hume's Reality: A Lesson in Causality.Stefanie Rocknak - 2003 - In Proceedings Metaphysics 2003 Second World Conference. Rome, Metropolitan City of Rome, Italy:
    In Book I, III §9 of the Treatise, Hume makes the claim that “[all general] belief arises only from causation” (T 107). Following, he makes the even stronger claim that all general beliefs are to be thought of as beliefs in reality, and thus, all belief in reality is dependent on pre-established beliefs in both specific causal relations and the causal relation in general (T 108). In the first part of this paper, I explain Hume’s motivation behind both claims, while (...)
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  27. The New Hume Debate, Edited By Rupert Read, Kenneth Richman. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (1):132-134.
    Review of The New Hume Debate Revised Edition Edited By Rupert Read, Kenneth Richman: Pub: 2000 -/- '... The editors have done an excellent job of choosing and presenting some of the more important papers on this subject. The volume contains a useful bibliography and a citation index. ... There is also a helpful introduction, written by Richman, which provides a synopsis of the individual papers in this volume. A few important contributions are not included in the collection ... Nevertheless, (...)
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  28. Abstraction, inseparability, and identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):307-330.
    Berkeley and Hume object to Locke's account of abstraction. Abstraction is separating in the mind what cannot be separated in reality. Their objection is that if a is inseparable in reality from b, then the idea of a is inseparable from the idea of b. The former inseparability is the reason for the latter. In most interpretations, however, commentators leave the former unexplained in explaining the latter. This article assumes that Berkeley and Hume present a unified front against Locke. Hume (...)
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  29. Hume on Virtue, Beauty, Composites, and Secondary Qualities.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):103-118.
    Hume’s account of virtue (and beauty) entails that distinct things--a quality in the contemplated and a perception in the contemplator--are the same thing--a given virtue. I show this inconsistency is consistent with his intent. A virtue is a composite of quality and perception, and for Hume a composite is distinct things--the parts--falsely supposed to be a single thing. False or unsubstantiated supposition is for Hume the basis of most of our beliefs. I end with an argument that for Hume secondary (...)
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  30. The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense.S. A. Grave - 1960 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to piece together in some detail the philosophy of Common Sense from its fragmentary state in the writings of Thomas Reid and the other members of his school, to consider it in relation to David Hume, and to try and show the significance of its account of the nature and authority of common sense for present-day discussion.
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