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  1. added 2017-11-21
    Neil Sinhababu, Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2017 - Rivista di Filosofia 108 (3):503-505.
  2. added 2017-01-22
    Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise. [REVIEW]H. D. A. - 1949 - Journal of Philosophy 46 (24):796.
  3. added 2016-07-14
    Hume on the Stoic Rational Passions and "Original Existences".Jason R. Fisette - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (4):609-639.
    I argue that Hume’s characterization of the passions as “original existences” is shaped by his preoccupation with Stoicism, and is not (as most commentators suppose) a ridiculous or trifling remark. My argument has three parts. First, I show that Hume’s description of the passions as “original existences” is properly understood as part of his argument against the possibility of passions caused by reason alone (rational passions). Second, I establish that Hume was responding to the Stoics, who claimed that a rational (...)
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  4. added 2015-06-29
    An Analysis of Hume's Arguments Concerning the Role of Reason in Moral Decisions.Rowland David Broiles - 1963 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
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  5. added 2015-06-08
    Reason And Sentiment In Humes Moral Philosophy.Houghton Dalrymple - 1975 - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
  6. added 2015-01-20
    Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  7. added 2015-01-19
    Hume's Metaethical Cognitivism and the Natural Law Theory.Bernd Graefrath - 1991 - Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1):73-79.