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  1. added 2017-11-21
    Neil Sinhababu, Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2017 - Rivista di Filosofia 108 (3):503-505.
  2. added 2015-12-05
    Review of Sophie Botros, Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction[REVIEW]Tamra Frei - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).
  3. added 2015-08-29
    Calling All Knaves: Hume on Moral Motivation.Susan Dimock - 1992 - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):179-197.
  4. added 2015-06-09
    Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics.Stephen Darwall - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):415-448.
    :Hume distinguishes natural obligation, the motive of self-interest, from moral obligation, the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation. I argue that his discussion of justice makes use of a third notion, in addition to the other two: rule-obligation. For Hume, the just person regulates her conduct by mutually advantageous rules of justice. Rule-obligation is the notion she requires to express her acceptance of these rules in so regulating herself. I place these ideas in relation to Hume's official theory of the will (...)
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  5. added 2015-05-21
    Humean Agency of the Just Person.Christopher Caldwell - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):199-205.
  6. added 2015-05-20
    Moral Theory and the Passions.Charlotte Randall Brown - 1983 - Dissertation, Yale University
    In my dissertation I consider how far it is possible to found a moral theory in the emotions. I am interested in emotion-based theories because I believe that the foundation sought for morality should show that moral considerations by themselves are capable of motivating agents to act morally. On this view, which recent writers such as Frankena and Nagel classify as internalist, an agent is moved by the thought or perception that something is morally good, right, or worthy. I argue (...)
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  7. added 2015-01-26
    Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume.Richard Joyce - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    As a metaethicist, I am interested in whether expressivism is true, and thus interested in whether the argument that people think they find in Hume is a sound one. Not being a Hume scholar (but merely a devoted fan), I am less interested in whether Hume really was an expressivist or whether he really did present an argument in its favor. Hume’s metaethical views are very difficult to nail down, and by a careful selection of quotes one can present him (...)
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  8. added 2015-01-21
    David Hume on the Motivating Effect of Moral Perception: Internalist or Externalist?Stefan Kalt - 2005 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (2):143 - 160.
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  9. added 2015-01-21
    Is Hume an Internalist?Charlotte Brown - 1988 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (1):69-87.
    Hume is committed, By one of his criticisms of reason as the route to moral knowledge, To an internalist position. In the argument from motivation, Hume starts by observing that morality is practical--That morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. But, Hume argues, Rationalist moral theories cannot explain how moral considerations motivate. This is because reason alone is incapable of motivating us. The premise that morality is practical, However, May be interpreted in two ways--Either in an externalist or internalist (...)
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  10. added 2015-01-20
    Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  11. added 2014-01-18
    Introduction to Hume on Motivation and Virtue.Charles Pigden - 2009 - In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. pp. 1-29.
    This includes a methodological meditation (in blank verse) on the history of philosophy as a contribution to philosophy (rather than as a contribution to history) plus a conspectus of the issues surrounding Hume, the Motivation Argument and the Slavery of Reason Thesis. However I am posting it here mainly because it contains a novel restatement of the Argument from Queerness. Big Thesis: the Slavery of Reason Thesis (via the Motivation Argument) provides no support for non-cognitivism or emotivism, but there is (...)
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