Hume: Moral Judgment

In her book Experience Embodied, Anik Waldow challenges and reimagines the traditional interpretative approach to the concept of experience in the early modern period. Traditionally, commentators have emphasized early moderns’ views on the first-person perspective and eschewed the relevance of our embodiment to their epistemological outlooks. My focus here is on Waldow’s chapter on Hume, wherein she analyzes Hume’s account of our capacity for reflective moral judgment, arguing that he understands it as natural despite the countless ways in which our (...) embodied social experiences impinge on it. After detailing Waldow’s contributions, I clarify, corroborate, and criticize them. Since I contend that Waldow is broadly successful in her interpretative efforts, I suggest that she undermines the traditional interpretative approach to experience in the early modern period, but not in the sense that she moves us away from the epistemological towards other lenses. Rather, Waldow should be understood as showing that, at least in the case of Hume’s metaethics, the epistemological is embodied, is social, and is both cognitive and sentimental. (shrink)

I argue for a thorough reinterpretation of Hume’s “common point of view” thesis, at least within his moral Enquiry. Hume is typically understood to argue that we correct for sympathetically produced variations in our moral sentiments, by undertaking an imaginative exercise. I argue that Hume cannot consistently claim this, because he argues that we automatically experience the same degree of the same moral sentiment towards all tokens of any one type of character trait. I then argue that, in his Enquiry (...) at least, Hume only believes that we correct for variations in our non-moral sentiments. When he claims that we sometimes choose a “common point of view,” he just means that we sometimes choose to verbally express our calm, moral sentiments, and no other passions, when we publicly evaluate people’s characters. (shrink)

This paper argues that Hume was first and foremost a moral psychologist and a determinist, not a moralist. When confronting the fact of moral disagreement, notably in "A Dialogue" affixed to his moral enquiry, he maintained that it is not psychologically possible to approve of the conflicting norms of other cultures, except in the case of sometimes approving of individuals in other cultures for abiding by those objectionable norms rather than fomenting cultural upheaval. All cultures should nonetheless agree on the (...) most general and fundamental moral principles as well as on most specifics. But there are non-trivial specific cases on which there will be irreconcilable disagreements, based on conflicting beliefs concerning utilities, finer matters of taste, and uncertainties over how best to maximize conflicts between the useful/agreeable and the personal/social. In these cases, we would be wise to consider whether tolerating the conflicting views of others would be more useful and agreeable than attempting to enforce conformity. Toleration is among the less obvious virtues, but it is one that experience has by now taught us to adopt, at least in certain cases. (shrink)

Pamphilus’ introductory letter opens contradictory ways of reading Hume’s Dialogues. The first, suggested by Pamphilus' claim to be “mere auditor” to the dialogues, which were “deeply imprinted in [his] memory,” is the empiricist reading. This traditional reading could, and has, gone several ways, including to such conclusions as Philo forces upon Cleanthes, shocking Demea; e.g., that the design of the mosquito and other “curious artifices of nature,” which inflict pain and suffering on all, bespeaks an utterly careless and insensate, if (...) not malign creator. Pamphilus' preface also opens a more philosophical reading implied in his consideration of the ancient literary form of dialogue. This second interpretive path suspects more design in writing, and more revealed in it, than the simple empiricist reading(s) allow. Dialogically elucidating the Dialogues confronts us with the limits of empiricism in moral and religious philosophy. Hume's last work, if read philosophically, exhibits the vacancy of empiricism. (shrink)

I offer a novel two-stage reconstruction of Hume’s general-point-of-view account, modeled in part on his qualified-judges account in ‘Of the Standard of Taste.’ In particular, I argue that the general point of view needs to be jointly constructed by spectators who have sympathized with (at least some of) the agents in (at least some of) the actor’s circles of influence. The upshot of the account is two-fold. First, Hume’s later thought developed in such a way that it can rectify the (...) problems inherent in his Treatise account of the general point of view. Second, the proposed account provides the grounds for an adequate and well-motivated modest ideal observer theory of the standard of virtue. (shrink)

Given the importance of sympathetic pleasures within Hume’s account of approval and moral motivation, why does Hume think we feel obliged to act justly on those occasions when we know that doing so will benefit nobody? I argue that Hume uses the case of justice as evidence for a key claim regarding all virtues. Hume does not think we approve of token virtuous actions, whether natural or artificial, because they cause or aim to cause happiness in others. It is sufficient (...) for the action to be of a type which has “a tendency to the public good” for us to feel approval of it, and to be motivated to perform it. Once we are aware that just actions tend to cause happiness, we approve of all just actions, even token actions which cause more unhappiness than happiness. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to recover an 18th Century approach to moral theory that can be called Moral Taste Theory. Through an exploration of 18th Century sources I define the characteristics of moral taste theory and to distinguish it from its closest rival, moral sense theory. In general a moral taste theorist holds that moral judgments are analogous to aesthetic judgments while a moral sense theorist holds that moral judgments are analogous to physical sense perception. Francis Hutcheson was a (...) paradigmatic moral sense theorist, but I argue that David Hume is best understood as a moral taste theorist. If we do not understand the concept of moral taste, we cannot understand 18th Century moral philosophy, and, more importantly, we will miss out on an important source of inspiration for 21st Century moral philosophy. (shrink)

Hume’s ethics is concerned not only with the metaphysical status of moral qualities but equally, if not more, with the problem of determining to what extent and under what conditions issues of moral disagreement and inquiry can be decided by rational argumentation. This paper argues that Hume’s solution to the second problem is a form of perspectivism: the rational decidability of moral issues depends on the existence of shared perspectives, or sets of assumptions and correlated dispositions to feelings, and is (...) largely independent of the metaphysical status of moral qualities. An issue of disagree- ment may thus be rationally decidable among people with certain dispositions to feeling but not among others. A similar perspectivist reading is suggested for Hume’s analysis of knowledge about causes and effects. (shrink)

In the Treatise, Hume writes several seemingly incompatible things about the moral sentiments, thus there is no general agreement about where they fit within his taxonomy of the perceptions. Some passages speak in favor of the view that moral sentiments are indirect passions, a few in favor of the view that they are direct passions, and yet a couple of explicit statements strongly suggest otherwise. Due to these tensions in Hume’s text, we find at least five competing characterizations in the (...) literature: • Moral sentiments are calm emotions. • Moral sentiments are calm direct passions. • Moral sentiments are calm versions of the indirect passions of love or hatred. • Moral sentiments are unique species of calm indirect passions. • Moral sentiments are indirect secondary impressions. This paper assesses each of these interpretations. When their virtues are brought together, a new interpretation of the origin of moral sentiments starts to emerge. (shrink)

Hume did not criticize Hutcheson’s moral-empirical argument in his published philosophical works, even though he forcefully denied, especially in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, that we could empirically prove the moral attributes of the Deity. Yet he seemingly rejected this particular reasoning in a famous letter to Hutcheson, dated March 16, 1740. Hutcheson’s claim that our moral sense is a likely to be expected effect of divine benevolence and Hume’s critique of this claim are analyzed (...) in this essay. It is argued that the particular criticism presented by Hume in that letter is not sufficient to refute Hutcheson’s argument. It is also suggested that Hume may be right after all in rejecting Hutcheson’s inference about God’s benevolent design on other grounds, that is, our deep-rooted knowledge of the annoying conspicuousness of evil in the world. (shrink)

David Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception (...) of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments. (shrink)

The concern of this paper is to relate the moral philosophy of Hutcheson with a traditional point of view, according to which moral philosophy depends on natural theology. The analysis of this relationship is important because it is a crucial feature of the Hutchesonian moral philosophy. However, this theological outlook does not entirely match his empirical moral epistemology, and this inconsistency allowed David Hume and Adam Smith to throw aside the theological foundation, taking from Hutcheson only the empirical aspects of (...) his epistemology. The intention of this paper is to explain why this theological outlook cannot match a moral epistemology which lacks a metaphysical foundation. (shrink)

The book has two aims. First, to examine the extent and significance of the connection between Hume's aesthetics and his moral philosophy; and, second, to consider how, in light of the connection, his moral philosophy answers central questions in ethics. The first aim is realized in chapters 1-4. Chapter 1 examines Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" to understand his search for a "standard" and how this affects the scope of his aesthetics. Chapter 2 establishes that he treats beauty (...) in nature and art and moral beauty as similar in kind, and applies the conclusions about his aesthetics to his moral thought. Chapter 3 solves a puzzle to which this gives rise, namely, how individuals both accept general standards that they also contravene in the course of aesthetic and moral activity. Chapter 4 takes up the normative aspect of Hume's approach by understanding moral character through his view of moral beauty. The second aim of the book is realized in chapters 5-7 by entertaining three objections against Hume's moral philosophy. First, if morality is an immediate reaction to the beauty of vice and the deformity of virtue, why is perfect virtue not the general condition of every human individual? Second, if morality consists of sentiments that arise in the subject, how can moral judgments be objective and claim universal validity? And third, if one can talk of "general standards" governing conduct, how does one account for the diversity of moral systems and their change over time? The first is answered by showing that like good taste in aesthetics, 'right taste' in morals requires that the sentiments are educated; the second, by arguing against the view that Hume is a subjectivist and a relativist, and the third, by showing that his approach contains a view of progress left untouched by any personal prejudices Hume himself might harbor. The book concludes in chapter 7 by showing how Hume's view of philosophy affects the scope of any normative ethics. (shrink)

The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the (...) construction of a moral point of view, acknowledged by both writers, as my primary platform. My contention is that Humean sympathy is too mechanistic to actually deliver an impartial adjudicatory perspective, and that Smithian sympathy, with its evaluative, imaginative components, succeeds where Hume's account falls short. The paper is comprised of six sections: (i) introductory remarks, (ii) a discussion of Humean sympathy, (iii) a discussion of Smithian sympathy and its distinctness, (iv) a critical analysis of Hume's attempt to correct for sympathetic partiality in the construction of the judicial spectator's general point of view, (v) a critical discussion of sympathetic partiality in Smithian sympathy & (vi) a critical analysis of Smith's construction of the impartial spectator perspective as a moral point of view. (shrink)

Among contemporary ethicists, Hume is perhaps best known for his views about morality’s practical import and his spectator-centered account of moral evaluation. Yet according to the so-called “spectator complaint”, these two aspects of Hume’s moral theory cannot be reconciled with one another. I argue that the answer to the spectator complaint lies in Hume’s account of “goodness” and “greatness of mind”. Through a discussion of these two virtues, Hume makes clear the connection between his views about moral motivation and his (...) understanding of moral evaluation by providing us with two portraits of the Humean moral agent. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates the role of beauty in the moral philosophies of Hume and Kant. It interprets Hume's thought by showing how he applies "beauty" to conduct and character as well as nature and art; how his "critique" of philosophical reason informs his view of morality; and how his approach compares and contrasts to that of Kant. ;Chapter one examines Hume's concept of "general rules," concluding that philosophy involves reflecting upon ordinary life and formulating "principles" to explain it. This clarifies (...) the aim of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste." Chapter two employs this argument to show that in his moral philosophy Hume conceives "moral beauty" by analogy with natural and artistic beauty. As in his aesthetics, he approaches moral life by discovering principles which explain conduct. This makes his thought "descriptive" rather than "normative." ;Chapter three responds to the charge that Hume "recommends" one sort of conduct over another. By investigating reflection and character, it argues that these "normative" elements are not recommendations of an "ethical" sort, but part of Hume's philosophical explanandum. This conclusion is central to chapter four which compares "Of the Standard of Taste" with Kant's "Antinomy of Taste," and his notion of "sentiment" with Kant's concept of "feeling." Although points of agreement emerge, the two thinkers are seen to have different views of philosophy and the role it plays in human life. This is reflected in the regulative role Kant assigns to reason, the task he delegates to moral philosophy, and his contention that beauty is a "symbol" of the good. ;Chapter five examines Hume's specific contribution to moral philosophy by articulating three objections to his approach, viz., that he fails to explain, first, the existence of moral imperfection; second, why moral judgments are universally valid; and, third, how "general standards" can be reconciled with cultural diversity and moral improvement. Concentrating on taste and education, subjectivism and relativism, and a "progress of sentiments," respectively, a Humean response to each objection is articulated. The study concludes with a consideration of Hume's "critique" of philosophy and emphasizes his suggestion that philosophical inquiry is itself a matter of "taste.". (shrink)

O que pretendo defender neste texto é que uma posição empirista na moral é compatível com uma pretensão de validade intersubjetiva de juízos morais. Essa pretensão deve, nesse caso, estar calcada na naturalização dos fundamentos da moralidade, mas tem de conviver com limites acerca da justificação de enunciados de valor. Para defender esse ponto, sirvo-me da filosofia moral de Hume, como ele a expôs no seu texto Uma investigação sobre os princípios da moral. No que diz respeito à filosofia de (...) Hume, o objetivo deste texto é explicitar o caráter empírico seja de seu método de investigação da moral, seja do princípio que para ela ele encontra. (shrink)

Hume’s moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons “only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view... ” Rather, “we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may (...) be our present situation” (T 581-82), in order to “correct” our situated sentiments. This seems to create two serious difficulties for Hume’s theory. First, moral evaluations become inductive, empirical beliefs about what we would feel if we really occupied the imagined common point of view, and hence are the deliverances of causal reason; this contradicts Hume’s claim that the making of a moral evaluation is not an activity of reason but of sentiment. Secondly, given Hume’s thesis that the passions do not represent anything else, he cannot say that our moral evaluations will better represent the object being judged if they are made from the common point of view. This leaves no clear reason to adopt it, rather than making judgments from our real position. Hume says that left to our particular points of view, we will encounter contradictions and be unable to communicate, but it is hard to see why.My interpretation resolves these two difficulties. I argue that every time we reflect upon someone’s character from the common point of view, we feel an actual sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, which may alter and merge with the situated sentiment or may fail to do so, leaving two different feelings about the same character. Furthermore, whenever we make moral evaluations we also simultaneously make objective, causal judgments about the love and hatred, pride and humility that the trait will produce. We routinely take up the common point of view in order to achieve truth and consistency in our causal judgments, to avoid grave practical problems. (shrink)

This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.

La investigación humeana acerca de los principios de la moral parte de la pasión como motivo de la acción y al mismo tiempo pretende que su valoración ha de guiarse por la utilidad. Si bien son dos afirmaciones difíciles de combinar, la tesis del presente estudio es que la posibilidad de tender un puente entre la aspiración a la felicidad privada y el interés por el bienestar público está anclada, en su origen, en el sentimiento de benevolencia que el autor (...) descubre como principio original de la mente, pero logra sus efectos solamente en virtud de la fuerza de la simpatía y del espectáculo de la vida social y la conversación. Así, la moralidad -como posibilidad de realización de distinciones morales, de aprobar o censurar desde el punto devista del espectador- se articula y afina en el flujo incesante decontaminación y contagio de afecciones. (shrink)

The central, general claim that Brand defends is that an understanding of Hume's view of general rules in book 1 of the Treatise is crucial to a full appreciation of Hume's account of moral judgment in book 3. Although Brand also discusses other respects in which the Treatise is a unified work, both the book's title and subtitle suggest a study more wide-ranging than we actually find. Moreover, discussion of some of the issues important for Brand's interpretation, such as the (...) sense in which Humean sympathy itself is cognitive or subject to reason and how Hume's view of moral judgment squares with his view of moral motivation, is absent or difficult to follow. Thus, the book is likely to find a narrower audience than one might have expected. (shrink)

While Hume insists that "sympathy," or fellow feeling, is the primary source of moral evaluation, he recognizes that sympathetically acquired feelings vary in emotional intensity according to a number of factors he regards as morally irrelevant. The question arises as to how the changeableness of sympathy can be reconciled with the "stable" moral judgment. It emerges that the sympathetic judgment becomes corrected by adopting, what Hume calls, a "general point of view." Specifically, the theory of belief and "general rules" in (...) Bk.I of the Treatise accounts for both the prejudice which besets the moralist and the method which corrects such prejudice. In Bk.III, Hume only makes implicit references to the place of general rules in moral judgment. It is urged that without a full appreciation of the theory of belief and general rules in Bk.I, Hume's ideas about moral judgment are far too brief to be understood and are therefore subject to a number of misconceptions. Part One examines Hume's ideas about human reason and Part Two aims to clarify Hume's notion of sympathy. Both parts seek to explain how the "trivial properties" of the imagination are responsible for the "unreasonable" judgment of fact and the "partial" judgment of merit. These properties, or over-generalizing propensities, generate the general rules of the imagination. It is by means of the general rules of the understanding, the rules which regulate initial judgments by an act of reflection, that factual judgments become reasonable and moral judgments impartial. What is of interest is the ongoing dialectic of the two sorts of general rules, the "combat" of reason and imagination, which, it is maintained, Hume never resolves. Although it is concluded that Hume's theory of moral judgment ends with the same skepticism as does his theory of belief and general rules at the close of Bk.I, the positive role that both reason and imagination play in the development of science and morality is also stressed. (shrink)

It is commonly held that moral judgements are implicitly general — or universalizable — in that if anyone is morally obligated to perform or refrain from some action, everyone in relevantly similar circumstances is similarly obligated. I undertake here to show that David Hume fully subscribed to this thesis and that because of the way it is related to his conceptions of obligation and what he terms the practicality of morals he is pushed to insist that the moral sentiments of (...) human beings across space and time are much more uniform than he knew them to be. My discussion places Hume in the historical context of the controversy about 'the general foundation of morals' referred to near the beginning of the second Enquiry, and it is part of my thesis that Hume's moral philosophy can be understood only in terms of arguments and counter-arguments developed by other contributors to the controversy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:191 A PERSONAL ELEMENT IN MORALITY In his quest for the truth about moral life, Hume steers between the Scylla of Sentiment and the Charybdis of Reason. Sentiment operating alone, as a basis for morality, would threaten to engulf humanity with as many relativistic moral truths as there are individuals. Reason alone would produce objective, impersonal truths, but these would be powerless to move us. Hume's developed theory ingeniously (...) shows how Reason and Sentiment can operate together, to produce judgments based on feelings which are nonetheless impersonal and objective (T 581-584; E 227-229). Hume is acutely aware (as we shall see below) that there exists a considerable disparity between the impartiality required of us by moral theory and what in practice people think when it comes to moral matters. There would seem to be only two ways of accommodating this fact. One is to regard the disparity as a mark of the moral mediocrity of ordinary people; we are not as objective in our judgments as we could be. The other way is to treat the disparity as a token of failure and inadequacy in the theory; our best philosophical reasoning about morals fails to capture its subject matter without distortion. Our rational powers fall short, not only in Book I of the Treatise, where the task is to explain the foundation of our beliefs, but also in Book III, where Hume attempts to elucidate moral life. Certainly the first way would reduce the gap to some extent; some people, perhaps many, are moral truly low achievers. I want to show that Hume also suggests the second way; he is willing to deflate the 192 pretensions of philosophy, even when it comes to his own state-of-the-art efforts. I. The Objectivity of Certain Feeling-Based Judgments In the moral arena of life we make judgments which are based on feelings, on 'certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust' (T 581). "To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character" (T 471). Of course not just any feeling will do; it must be of a peculiar kind, which we can experience only under specific conditions. At first Hume characterizes the necessary condition as follows: 'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil (T 472). Later on Hume provides a fuller account. Characteristically he elaborates in response to an anticipated objection. The objection is that our sympathetic feelings of pleasure and pain fluctuate wildly, depending mainly upon our distance, so to speak, from the character we assess, in space, time, and kind of relationship. Our moral judgments do not vary in this way; we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England (T 581). So (it is concluded) our moral judgments do not rest upon sympathy. Hume's response is that, as a necessary condition for moral judgment and communication, we must "fix on some steady and general points of view" (T 581-2). He proceeds to employ an analogy with our situation regarding perception of (and communication about) the things which make up our common world. 193 Here a man obviously cannot consider things 'only as they appear from his peculiar point of view' (T 581). For instance I cannot describe my desk to a friend by reporting on how I perceive it at this moment — because at this moment the light is dim and I am standing across the room from the desk. If I were to do a painting of the scene before me, the desk would be black, its top a trapezoid shape on the canvas. What I say, however, is that I have a walnut desk of a medium brown color and it has a rectangular top. I say, in effect, how the desk would look under standard conditions of light and perspective. In the Enquiry version Hume spells out his analogy more fully. Again he addresses the case in which our sentiments, e.g., about two men, one distant and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:30 HUME'S APOLOGY Imagine our reaction if some moralist were to pronounce, in all apparent seriousness, that even the best people do not live up to what morality requires of them, and it is a good thing that they do not. Suppose he then offers an apology in behalf of humankind, an excuse for our moral mediocrity: we are painfully limited creatures, our lives are so complex, events are (...) so ambiguous, there are so many contingencies — in short, we can't help it. Besides, humanity is better off when people are not too strict in their moral stance. Certainly we would be surprised, even shocked, by these assertions. After a little reflection we would want to scrutinize the conception of morality which figures in this moralist's reasoning — has he been entranced by some false and unworkable ideal? Something has surely gone wrong. David Hume apparently has the viewpoint we have imagined. He offers the apology, the excuse, in a little-noticed footnote in the Enquiry Concerning Morals. If it were another philosopher we might let this strange note pass as a slip or oddity, but with 2 Hume we must take the apology seriously. The truth is that Hume's innocent-seeming footnote of moral apology precisely touches a sore spot in modern ethical theory, a point of instability which threatens to topple the whole edifice that rests on the twin cornerstones of Hume and Kant. Only recently has any clear awareness of the problem 3 begun to emerge in the philosophical literature. In this paper I will draw attention to the problem of which Hume's apology seems to be a warning sign. 31 I. Hume's Picture of Morality If we are to appreciate Hume's apology, we must first remind ourselves of the things morality, in Hume's view of it, requires of people. Hume's account of value is founded upon a general fact of nature, namely, that animals react with feelings in a wide variety of circumstances. These feelings may be crudely categorized as pleasures and pains. Our natural reactions form the basis for every judgment of value, however refined; at bottom what is good, in Hume's view, is pleasurable experience and what is bad is painful experience. There are two kinds of case to be considered. we may find something immediately pleasant or painful, as when we taste chocolate or burn our hand on the stove, or we may find that a thing produces a pleasant or painful result, as when manure makes plants thrive or salt kills the grass. In the latter kind of case the thing is good (or bad) because of its utility. For Hume all assertions concerning value must hinge on immediate feeling reactions, utility, or both. Now someone might hastily conclude that Hume must be a subjectivist in ethics. After all, if he thinks the whole enterprise of valuing things rests upon our feeling reactions, which are notoriously variable, then he must hold that value judgments are variable too. Moral communication becomes a matter of venting each individual's supply of feelings and radical relativism threatens to engulf us. However, we do not as yet have Hume's finished picture of morality; the most important qualification remains to be seen. Hume will effectively quell the threat of subjectivism by showing how we can and do adopt standards in the area 4 of feeling. We do so for the sake of being able to 32 communicate regarding values, especially the important moral values. The general problem of communication, for Hume, is the problem of transferring ideas (mental pictures) from one mind to another using language as a medium. In the Enquiry Concerning Morals it is taken for granted that we can communicate our ideas. Moral communication involves something more, namely, the transfer of feelings as well as ideas. If moral communication is successful, the parties involved will actually share a feeling. How do we manage to transfer feelings? we use language, but the words we use are special ones. They contain as part of their meaning, their sense, something which moral beings feel. The meaning of a word can include a pleasure or a pain, and not... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:JOHN PASSMORE AND HUME'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY1 A quarter century ago, the message undergraduates absorbed about David Hume was as an extremely favourable one. He was the great precursor of logical empiricism and so his philosophy, at least in its main lines, must be nearer the mark than that of any other of the great names. Hume had discovered the right view of causation. He had exposed and banished school (...) metaphysics. He had rightly drawn attention to the problem of induction. He had discovered the isought gap and revealed the practical impotence of reason in the face of the passions. But for his weight problem, he could have walked on water. Those were the circumstances in which I first read John Passmore's book on Hume. Because he was plainly not, like many of Hume's critics, an apologist for Thomism or any of Hegel's offspring, his work could not be dismissed on the grounds of parti pris. It was 2 a shock, therefore, to find him, in Hume's Intentions, presenting an image of Hume a considerable distance this side of idolatry. Passmore's critical and, for its time, boldly unfashionable appraisal is to be admired, taken to heart, and extended. Hume's Intentions concentrates on Hume's philosophy of the understanding. It takes up strands of that philosophy and points to their inherent implausibility and mutual incompatibility. Yet these problems also vitiate other parts of Hume's position. In this paper I attempt to introduce the Passmorian method of reasoning into what are nowadays the moral subjects. Let me remind you of the structure of Passmore's book: it does not mount a consecutive argument so much as take up, tease out, and display one or other leading element in the Humean philosophy. Thus we have chapters on Hume as an enthusiast for the 110. moral (that is, human, or social) sciences, as a critic of traditional Aristotelian logic, as a developer of more suitable methods for scientific advance, as a positivist, a phenomenalist, an associationist theoretician in psychology, and a sceptic. We learn as we read that in these respects Hume is not consistent. Principles which he espouses, principally negative and sceptical principles, lead to conclusions too extreme to suit his major purposes. Accordingly, they must not be pressed to their proper conclusions. Hume's philosophy of the study must be abandoned rather than actually taken seriously. Thus, for example: in methodology, Hume insists that reason cannot yield results in the contingent and fallible natural and human sciences. This should lead him to the view that any scientific hypothesis which goes beyond immediate experience is, so far as reason goes, as good, or as bad, as any other. But he recoils from this, distinguishing sensible men from the foolish and superstitious on the basis of the regularity and consistency of the experiences on which the wise rely. Yet as Passmore points out, on Hume's principles, the preference for regularity and consistency cannot be more than a prejudice. Prejudices do not admit of any genuinely rational defence. There is real substance to the superiority claimed for the wise. Again, consider Hume's positivism. He offers a beguilingly short way with nonsense, especially learned and theological nonsense. School metaphysics and superstition (i.e. Christianity) are to be banished by the use of the impressions and ideas test: When you come upon a word whose meaning you would discover, ask if it refers to an impression or an idea. If to an impression, well and good, its meaning is to be found in present experience. If to an idea, ask from which impression (or impressions) the idea did (or could) Ill, derive. If you cannot find any suitable impressions, the idea is chimerical, and is to be excised from thought as a pathological intruder. This procedure produces most satisfactorily negative results when it comes to the Trinity and the sacraments, or essence, inherence, substantial form, and such metaphysical extravagances. Unhappily the very same procedure, the impressions and ideas test, also wrecks the foundations of Hume's own thought. As Passmore makes sure we remember, the test robs Hume of the resources with which to account for substance and... (shrink)

In Book III of A Treatise on Human Nature,' Hume puts two questions which he says are distinct. The first concerns "the manner in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men." The second concerns "the reasons which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity." Whatever his sympathies, the reader is bound to be struck by the sustained ingenuity of Hume's answer to the first question. He (...) is likely to be less impressed by the way in which Hume copes with the second. I shall be concerned with certain difficulties in Hume's treatment in the Treatise of this second question-difficulties which are of far more than exegetical interest. However, because the two questions are by no means as distinct as Hume declares-something which is rapidly made evident even by Hume's own discussion-I cannot exclude all reference to the first. What I shall avoid is any attempt to assess what is commonly received as Hume's answer to that question. Furthermore, I say next to nothing about what Hume takes just and unjust behaviour to consist in: about that remarkably confined area of human affairs which for Hume defines the limits within which people may be said to behave justly (and unjustly)-and, of course, to display other parasitic artificial virtues (and vices). My concern is rather with Hume's efforts to explain how there can be as well as natural, artificial virtues; how certain practices, whatever their detailed anatomies and inter-connexions, can be found morally estimable. And my conclusion is that his efforts are bound to fail. (shrink)

One of the most persistent issues of contemporary moral theory is the possibility of inferring moral judgments from factual nonmoral judgments. Another way of stating this issue is to inquire into the possibility of inferring "ought-judgments" from "is-judgments." It is generally accepted that the first person to deny the possibility of this inference was David Hume. The denial is supposed to be articulated in the last paragraph of the section of A Treatise of Human Nature entitled "Moral Distinctions not derived (...) from Reason," pages 469-470 in the Selby-Bigge edition. Hereafter I shall refer to this paragraph, the "is-oughtparagraph," as (I-0). The purpose of this article is to show that in (I-0) Hume makes no such denial, and to outline the implications of this revelation. (shrink)

There are eight major misconceptions about Hume's moral theory. First,many believe that there is no essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry. Second, some commentators believe that Hume has an extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Third, many assume that Hume has an explicit theory of moral judgment. Fourth, several commentators have attributed to Hume a multiple theory about the relationship between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Fifth, some assert that Hume has a qualified- or ideal-spectator theory (...) of moral judgment based upon the extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Sixth, some assert that Hume has an emotivist theory of moral judgment. Seventh, several commentatorshave either accused Hume of violating his own argument against inferring "ought" from "is" or they have sought to show how Hume is justified in making an inference from "is" to "ought" by having the "is" refer to a special class of statements about feelings. Finally, some assert that Hume is a utilitarian in his theory of moral judgment. I shall comment briefly on each of these misconceptions. (shrink)