Hume: Moral Noncognitivism

Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes the modern morality for having emotivist features and in his cent- ral book After Virtue he points out that David Hume is the main personality who provides these emotivist contents to the modern morality. According to MacIntyre, Hume’s and the modern emotivist moral philosophy include fundamental contrasts generally with the classical moral tradition particularly with Aristotle’s moral philosophy. However, MacIntyre underlines these contrasts in After Virtue, he in his other texts out of After Virtue, distinguishably brings Hume (...) and Aristotle together as they both have similar standpoints about how to understand morality. Therefore, MacIntyre’s interpretation on Hume needs to be examined with a perspective poin- ting these two different and seemingly mutually exclusive aspects. Putting together these two perspectives, this article aims to construct a holistic comprehension about MacIntyre’s placing Hume in the modern emotivism. (shrink)

I describe the various ways in which Hume's critique of practical reason derives from Hutcheson and then consider a tension that arises between Hutcheson's (and Hume's) critique of noninstrumental reasons and his account of calm passions.

Within a single paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume prompted what has become one of the most central orthodoxies in ethical theory: the thesis that one cannot derive what ought to be from what there is. In the aftermath of Hume’s seminal discussion, the No-Ought-From-Is-thesis has obtained approval among moral theorists to the point that it has been assigned the status of an undisputed ‘law’. As common with commonplaces in philosophy, alas, both the exact content and argument (...) of ‘Hume’s Law’ have proven to be quite elusive. The present anthology aims to clarify and discuss several controversies surrounding the No-Ought-From-Is-thesis. (shrink)

This thesis challenges a key assumption of criticism of Percy Bysshe Shelley since 1970; namely, that the poet's absorption of a philosophical skepticism implies an advocacy of a skeptical ethics. For Shelley the specifically epistemological skepticism developed within the first book of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume proves indispensable in clearing the mind of its "superstition" and in opening a "vacancy" in which a properly ethical faculty might be exercised. To assume that an epistemological skepticism serves as (...) its own ethic, however, is to characterize Shelley as a proponent of a utilitarianism or an "emotivism"---both forms of so-called "pernicious casuistry." ;Inspired by Shelley's study of ancient Greek philosophy, his ethic focuses on the fit performance of socially valued roles; and it emerges in distinct contrast to emotivism, the passional ethic developed in the final book of Hume's Treatise. Hume proposes this emotivism, which characterizes a given action's moral valence via the "feeling" or "passion" that one experiences in contemplating it, as a means of suppressing the radical political and moral implications of his own epistemological skepticism; namely, that "there is nothing which the human mind can conceive which it may not execute" once an impersonal "reason" has been destroyed within moral thinking. Hume's reactionary ethic unskeptically reinstates a received moral inheritance and, with it, the notion of personal identity to which traditional moral attributions apply. ;Shelley's stage drama of 1819, The Cenci, indicts emotivism as the cause of the "sad reality" of contemporary England; I extrapolate a positive ethics of radical selflessness via contrast to the restless pursuit of self that the antagonists Beatrice and Count Cenci exhibit. Shelley associates this radical selflessness with the "one mind" of theater, a collective event in which the individual self dissolves along with the personal pronouns of "I, you, and they." The Cenci evidences Shelley's "awakening" to a dramatic mode, one predicated on action and on exercise of the moral faculties, and a concomitant critique of the lyrical mode typical of William Wordsworth, one predicated on passivity or suffering. (shrink)

Present-Day humeans think hume was largely right that moral judgments cannot be principles of reason because reason alone cannot move us to action. None of the textually supported interpretations of the claim that "reason is inert" can save hume's antirationalist argument; it is either invalid, Or rests upon assumptions that contradict hume's other views and are probably false. Present-Day humeans reject hume's narrow conceptions of reason and desire, And so have a valid version of hume's antirationalist argument and can consistently (...) accept his two unstated assumptions. However, The needed assumptions prove quite difficult to defend. Present-Day humeans have not done so. (shrink)

Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (see (...) Section 7). (4) While some virtues and vices are natural (see Section 13), others, including justice, are artificial (see Section 9). There is heated debate about what Hume intends by each of these theses and how he argues for them. He articulates and defends them within the broader context of his metaethics and his ethic of virtue and vice. Hume's main ethical writings are Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Of Morals (which builds on Book 2, Of the Passions), his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and some of his Essays. In part the moral Enquiry simply recasts central ideas from the moral part of the Treatise in a more accessible style; but there are important differences. The ethical positions and arguments of the Treatise are set out below, noting where the moral Enquiry agrees; differences between the Enquiry and the Treatise are discussed afterwards. (shrink)

There are eight major misconceptions about Hume's moral theory. First,many believe that there is no essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry. Second, some commentators believe that Hume has an extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Third, many assume that Hume has an explicit theory of moral judgment. Fourth, several commentators have attributed to Hume a multiple theory about the relationship between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Fifth, some assert that Hume has a qualified- or ideal-spectator theory (...) of moral judgment based upon the extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Sixth, some assert that Hume has an emotivist theory of moral judgment. Seventh, several commentatorshave either accused Hume of violating his own argument against inferring "ought" from "is" or they have sought to show how Hume is justified in making an inference from "is" to "ought" by having the "is" refer to a special class of statements about feelings. Finally, some assert that Hume is a utilitarian in his theory of moral judgment. I shall comment briefly on each of these misconceptions. (shrink)

Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...) an account of imperative consequence that underwrites Hare’s principle that you cannot derive imperatives from indicatives. Thus if moral judgments contain an imperative component, it will be impossible to derive moral conclusions from indicative or non-moral premises. Given this account of imperative consequence, we can explain No-Ought-From-Is without appealing to anything as nebulous as the conservativeness of logic. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we have an inference to the best explanation for prescriptivism. Both lines of argument face problems from Prior. Given Prior’s counterexamples, No-Ought-From-Is as originally conceived is false. The version that survives is No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is. But the best explanation of this does not include non-cognitivism. With prescriptivism it is worse. For the version of No-Ought-From-Is that prescriptivism ‘explains’ – that is, the version of No-Ought-From-Is that prescriptivism implies – would exclude Prior’s counter-examples to Autonomy as invalid. But they are not invalid. Thus Prior’s counter-examples to No-Ought-From- Is refute prescriptivism. Thus from 1960 onwards R. M.Hare was a dead philosopher walking. But if non-cognitivism cannot be derived from No-Ought-From-Is, this suggests that it is not what Hume was trying to prove. I argue that what Hume was trying to prove is that moral truths are not demonstrable. To be demonstrable, a proposition must be either self-evident or logically derivable from self-evident propositions. By Treatise 3.1.1.27, Hume had proved to his own satisfaction that no moral propositions are self-evident. That leaves open the possibility that they are logically derivable from self-evident but NON-moral propositions. The point of No-Ought-From-Is was to exclude this possibility. If you cannot logically derive moral conclusions from non-moral premises, you cannot demonstrate the truths of morality by deriving them from self-evident but NON-moral truths. I also discuss why Hume abandoned No-Ought-From-Is in the EPM. He had no need of it since he thought he had a proof that (with some exceptions) no nontrivial truths are demonstrable. Hence no non-trivial MORAL truths are demonstrable. No-Ought-From-Is drops out as unnecessary. (shrink)

Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged question. (...) Thus the Motivation Argument fails BOTH as an argument for noncognitivism AND as an argument for what Hume actually believed, that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and that moral properties are akin to secondary qualities. So far as the Motivation Argument is concerned, both cognitivists and rationalists can rest easy. Themes: 1) Hume’s Slavery of Reason thesis is only defensible if passions are not only desires but sometimes dispositions to acquire desires (DTADs). 2) A desire for our good on the whole, which Humeans need to posit to fend off apparent counterexamples to the Slavery of Reason Thesis, does not sit well with the Humean theory of how novel desires arise (an objection due originally to Reid). 3) Hume is wrong to suppose that ‘abstract or demonstrative reasoning never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects’ as the examples of Russell and Hobbes convincingly demonstrate. This ironic as both Russell and Hobbes subscribed to the Slavery of Reason Thesis. 4) I critique Michael Smith’s critique of motivational externalism. (shrink)