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  1. added 2017-09-04
    Two Different Perspectives of MacIntyre on Hume: Revisiting Alasdair MacIntyre’s Approach to David Hume’s Moral Philosophy.Eli̇f Nur Erkan Balci - 2016 - Sakarya Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 18 (34):31-31.
    Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes the modern morality for having emotivist features and in his cent- ral book After Virtue he points out that David Hume is the main personality who provides these emotivist contents to the modern morality. According to MacIntyre, Hume’s and the modern emotivist moral philosophy include fundamental contrasts generally with the classical moral tradition particularly with Aristotle’s moral philosophy. However, MacIntyre underlines these contrasts in After Virtue, he in his other texts out of After Virtue, distinguishably brings Hume (...)
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  2. added 2016-01-30
    Hutcheson on Practical Reason.Stephen Darwall - 1997 - Hume Studies 23 (1):73-89.
    I describe the various ways in which Hume's critique of practical reason derives from Hutcheson and then consider a tension that arises between Hutcheson's (and Hume's) critique of noninstrumental reasons and his account of calm passions.
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  3. added 2015-08-26
    Charles R. Pigden : Hume on Is and Ought.David Hommen - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1419-1422.
    Within a single paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume prompted what has become one of the most central orthodoxies in ethical theory: the thesis that one cannot derive what ought to be from what there is. In the aftermath of Hume’s seminal discussion, the No-Ought-From-Is-thesis has obtained approval among moral theorists to the point that it has been assigned the status of an undisputed ‘law’. As common with commonplaces in philosophy, alas, both the exact content and argument (...)
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  4. added 2015-06-29
    The Ethics of Performance in Shelley's "the Cenci".Scott Edward Boehnen - 2000 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    This thesis challenges a key assumption of criticism of Percy Bysshe Shelley since 1970; namely, that the poet's absorption of a philosophical skepticism implies an advocacy of a skeptical ethics. For Shelley the specifically epistemological skepticism developed within the first book of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume proves indispensable in clearing the mind of its "superstition" and in opening a "vacancy" in which a properly ethical faculty might be exercised. To assume that an epistemological skepticism serves as (...)
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  5. added 2015-06-05
    Hume and Humeanism in Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):99.
    Present-Day humeans think hume was largely right that moral judgments cannot be principles of reason because reason alone cannot move us to action. None of the textually supported interpretations of the claim that "reason is inert" can save hume's antirationalist argument; it is either invalid, Or rests upon assumptions that contradict hume's other views and are probably false. Present-Day humeans reject hume's narrow conceptions of reason and desire, And so have a valid version of hume's antirationalist argument and can consistently (...)
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  6. added 2015-06-04
    Hume's Moral Philosophy.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (see (...)
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  7. added 2015-05-24
    Some Misconceptions About Hume's Moral Theory.Nicholas Capaldi - 1966 - Ethics 76 (3):208-211.
    There are eight major misconceptions about Hume's moral theory. First,many believe that there is no essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry. Second, some commentators believe that Hume has an extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Third, many assume that Hume has an explicit theory of moral judgment. Fourth, several commentators have attributed to Hume a multiple theory about the relationship between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Fifth, some assert that Hume has a qualified- or ideal-spectator theory (...)
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  8. added 2015-02-08
    Hume's Moral Theory. [REVIEW]Páll S. Árdal - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):293-303.
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  9. added 2015-01-26
    Is Hume a Noncognitivist in the Motivation Argument?Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.
  10. added 2015-01-20
    The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism.Michael Smith - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105.
  11. added 2015-01-19
    Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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  12. added 2015-01-19
    If Not Non-Cognitivism, Then What?Charles R. Pigden - 2009 - In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged question. (...)
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  13. added 2015-01-18
    Hume's Metaethics: Is Hume a Moral Noncognitivist?Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2008 - In Elizabeth Radcliffe (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Hume. Blackwell.
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