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  1. added 2018-12-18
    Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge.Lorenzo Greco - 2018 - Teoria: Rivista di Filosofia Fondata da Vittorio Sainati 38 (2):123-33.
    In this essay, I discuss some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that distinguish​ it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-03
    Justice, Sympathy and the Command of Our Esteem.Jacqueline Taylor - 2015 - Diametros 44:173-188.
    I have shown here the different roles that sympathy plays in the accounts of justice in the Treatise and Enquiry. In the former work, a redirected sympathy naturally extends our concern, and subsequently our moral approval or blame, to all those included within the scope of the rules of justice. In the Enquiry, we find this same progress of sentiments, but Hume’s introduction of the sentiment of humanity allows him to make a stronger case for the importance of those virtues (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-03
    Hume, Justice and Sympathy: A Reversal of the Natural Order?Sophie Botros - 2015 - Diametros 44:110-139.
    Hume’s view that the object of moral feeling is a natural passion, motivating action, causes problems for justice. There is apparently no appropriate natural motive, whilst, if there were, its “partiality” would unfit it to ground the requisite impartial approval. We offer a critique of such solutions as that the missing non-moral motive is enlightened self-interest, or that it is feigned, or that it consists in a just disposition. We reject Cohon’s postulation of a moral motive for just acts, and (...)
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  4. added 2018-10-20
    Tra Hume e Kant: il rapporto tra ragione e passioni e il carattere pratico della morale.Stefano Bacin - 2010 - In Etiche antiche, etiche moderne. Temi di discussione. Bologna BO, Italia: pp. 193-220.
  5. added 2018-09-17
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 224.
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  6. added 2018-09-16
    Moral Sense and Virtue in Hume's Ethics.Paul Russell - 2006 - In T. D. J. Chappell (ed.), Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    The problem that I am primarily concerned with in this paper is the nature of moral capacity as it relates to virtue in Hume’s ethical system.1 In particular, I am concerned with the relationship between virtue and moral sense. Hume’s remarks about this matter are both brief and scattered. I will argue, nevertheless, that when we piece together his various claims and observations on this subject we discover some important insights that add to the overall coherence and credibility of his (...)
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  7. added 2017-08-14
    The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
    Hume’s moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons “only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view... ” Rather, “we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may (...)
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  8. added 2017-06-30
    Hume and Hutcheson on Cicero's ‘Proof Against the Stoics’.Jeff Edwards - 2017 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15 (2):175-195.
    This article takes its cue from an intriguing passage in Hume's September 1739 letter to Hutcheson. After appealing to what Cicero proves ‘against the Stoics’ in book four of De finibus, Hume indicates that he and Hutcheson are in some respect opposed to one another as far as their views on virtue and moral motivation are concerned. While this may seem surprising, given the similarities between their approaches to the foundations of morals, careful analysis of Cicero's criticism of Stoic ethics (...)
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  9. added 2017-06-09
    Uma abordagem dos direitos humanos a partir de Hume e dos sentimentos morais/A human rights approach from Hume and moral sentiments.André Luiz Olivier da Silva - 2013 - Natureza Humana 15 (2).
    O presente artigo propõe uma abordagem dos direitos humanos a partir da perspectiva de Hume acerca dos sentimentos morais, ao mesmo tempo em que descarta a tese dos programas racionalistas de fundamentação dos direitos que chegam ao ponto de afirmar a existência de direitos naturais que todos possuiriam em razão de sua própria natureza humana. Contra esses programas, a postura cética e naturalista de Hume pode nos auxiliar a explicar o modo como os direitos humanos são enunciados por ativistas e (...)
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  10. added 2017-06-09
    Reason in Hume’s Passions.Nathan Brett & Katharina Paxman - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (1):43-59.
    Hume is famous for the view that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.” His claim that “we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes” is less well known. Each seems, in opposite ways, shocking to common sense. This paper explores the latter claim, looking for its source in Hume’s account of the passions and exploring its compatibility with his associationist psychology. We are led to the (...)
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  11. added 2017-06-09
    Review Of: S Botros, Hume, Reason and Morality. [REVIEW]Jonathan Dancy - unknown
  12. added 2017-06-09
    Razón y pasión en Hume.Yolanda de la Fuente - 2007 - Isegoría 36:239-260.
    Este artículo pretende mostrar la crítica de Hume a la tradicional oposición entre razón y pasión. Frente al modelo de razón geométrica y de metafísica esencialista de cuna platónico-pitagórica, Hume apuesta por otra fuente de certezas «a la medida de lo humano », capaz de superar las «miserias» —limitaciones y excesos ideológicos— de esa razón demostrativa e intuitiva. En las cuestiones de hecho y en la moral no hay autoevidencias geométricas. Sólo un nuevo y más amplio modelo de racionalidad será (...)
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  13. added 2017-06-09
    Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy Hume's Reasonable Passion.Daniel Shaw - 1998 - Edwin Mellen Press.
  14. added 2017-06-09
    Jones . - Hume's Sentiments. [REVIEW]D. Deleule - 1984 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 174:478.
  15. added 2017-06-09
    The moral philosophy of David Hume. [REVIEW]André-Louis Leroy - 1967 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 157:401-402.
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  16. added 2017-06-09
    The Moral Philosophy of David Hume. [REVIEW]Antony Flew - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (64):279-280.
  17. added 2017-06-09
    The Moral Philosophy of David Hume. [REVIEW]Páll S. Árdal - 1965 - Philosophy 40 (154):354-355.
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  18. added 2017-02-15
    The Nature of Virtue.Dario Perinetti - 2013 - In James A. Harris (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 333.
    This chapter examines the different answers that British moralists gave to the question ‘what does virtue consist in?’ Rather than as a royal road to present-day views in ethics, their answers are best understood when considered against the background of early modern natural law theories and their projected metaphysics of morals. The emerging ‘science of morality’ dealt with the metaphysical problem of determining what sort of thing virtue is. Considered from this vantage point, the British moralists struggled with the problem (...)
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  19. added 2017-01-25
    Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. [REVIEW]Donald Ainslie - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):596.
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  20. added 2017-01-09
    The Moral Sentiments in Hume’s Treatise.Åsa Carlson - 2014 - Hume Studies 40 (1):73-94.
    In the Treatise, Hume writes several seemingly incompatible things about the moral sentiments, thus there is no general agreement about where they fit within his taxonomy of the perceptions. Some passages speak in favor of the view that moral sentiments are indirect passions, a few in favor of the view that they are direct passions, and yet a couple of explicit statements strongly suggest otherwise. Due to these tensions in Hume’s text, we find at least five competing characterizations in the (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    Humean Moral Pluralism.Michael B. Gill - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Michael B. Gill offers a new account of Humean moral pluralism: the view that there are different moral reasons for action, which are based on human sentiments. He explores its historical origins, and argues that it offers the most compelling view of our moral experience. Together, pluralism and Humeanism make a philosophically powerful couple.
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  22. added 2016-12-08
    Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.David R. Raynor - 1984 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1):51-79.
    This article reprints the text of a review of adam smith's "theory of moral sentiments", And presents arguments for ascribing it to david hume. Hume's subsequent criticism of what he called "the hinge" of adam smith's moral system ("viz." that "all kinds of sympathy are necessarily agreeable") is also examined, And it is argued that smith failed to appreciate the nature and extent of this criticism. It is concluded that "the hinge" of smith's novel theory is a false assumption; yet (...)
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  23. added 2016-09-16
    Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction.Sophie Botros - 2006 - Routledge.
    Covering an important theme in Humean studies, this book focuses on Hume's hugely influential attempt in book three of his _Treatise of Human Nature _to derive the conclusion that morality is a matter of feeling, not reason, from its link with action. Claiming that Hume's argument contains a fundamental contradiction that has gone unnoticed in modern debate, this fascinating volume contains a refreshing combination of historical-scholarly work and contemporary analysis that seeks to expose this contradiction and therefore provide a significant (...)
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  24. added 2016-09-14
    Effects on the Mind as Objects of Reasoning: A Perspectivist Reading of the Reason–Passion Relation in Hume's Ethics.Henrik Bohlin - 2014 - Hume Studies 40 (1):29-51.
    Hume’s ethics is concerned not only with the metaphysical status of moral qualities but equally, if not more, with the problem of determining to what extent and under what conditions issues of moral disagreement and inquiry can be decided by rational argumentation. This paper argues that Hume’s solution to the second problem is a form of perspectivism: the rational decidability of moral issues depends on the existence of shared perspectives, or sets of assumptions and correlated dispositions to feelings, and is (...)
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  25. added 2016-09-09
    Hume’s Correction of the Sentiments. Intersubjectivity Without Objectivity.Max Barkhausen - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
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  26. added 2016-09-08
    Razão e sentimento na teoria moral de Hume.Marcos Balleiro - 2005 - Cadernos de Ética E Filosofia Política 7:22-35.
    Resumo: Os papéis desempenhados pela razão e pelo sentimento na teoria moral de Hume têm gerado algumas controvérsias entre os comentadores da obra do filósofo escocês. Alguns, como David Fate Norton, vêem com certo estranhamento o fato de o tom do texto de Hume buscar desqualificar a influência da razão nas distinções morais realizadas pelos homens quando, na verdade, a argumentação do filósofo parece atribuir um papel a ela. Outros comentadores defendem a tese de que o termo razão, nos textos (...)
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  27. added 2016-08-31
    El sentimentalismo moral en Hume y el derecho como hecho en Olivecrona.Alejandro Patiño Arango - 2007 - Discusiones Filosóficas 8:149-171.
    En primer lugar, pretendo mostrar en estetrabajo la autonomía de la moral que Humedesarrolló en el tercer libro del Tratado dela Naturaleza Humana. Fundamento estaconcepción en el principio que Humeformula: las conclusiones de la moralno se der i van de l a r azón. Pr i nci pi onegativo que lo conduce a elaborar elprincipio afirmativo: las conclusiones dela moral se derivan de un sentimiento.En segundo lugar, pretendo desarrollarla noción de performativo jurídico enOl i vecrona al most rar como l (...)
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  28. added 2015-12-05
    Review of Sophie Botros, Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction[REVIEW]Tamra Frei - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).
  29. added 2015-12-05
    Moral Sentiment and Moral Judgment in Hume.Dennis Farrell Fried - 1977 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
  30. added 2015-08-06
    The Humean Approach to Moral Diversity.Mark Collier - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (1):41-52.
    In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt (...)
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  31. added 2015-08-06
    Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination.Mark Collier - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):255-273.
    David Hume endorses three claims that are difficult to reconcile: (1) sympathy with those in distress is sufficient to produce compassion towards their plight, (2) adopting the general point of view often requires us to sympathize with the pain and suffering of distant strangers, but (3) our care and concern is limited to those in our close circle. Hume manages to resolve this tension, however, by distinguishing two types of sympathy. We feel compassion towards those around us because associative sympathy (...)
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  32. added 2015-06-09
    Can We Trust Annette Baier?Jonathan Dancy - 1995 - Philosophical Books 36 (4):237-245.
  33. added 2015-06-09
    A Personal Element in Morality.William Davie - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (1):191-205.
  34. added 2015-06-09
    Reason And Sentiment In Humes Moral Philosophy.Houghton Dalrymple - 1975 - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
  35. added 2015-06-06
    The Textual and Philosophical Significance of Hume's Ms Alterations to Treatise Iii.R. W. Connon - 1977 - In George Morice (ed.), David Hume: Bicentenary Papers. University Presses of Edinburgh and Texas. pp. 186-204.
  36. added 2015-06-04
    Hume's Moral Philosophy.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (see (...)
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  37. added 2015-05-29
    Judgment and Sentiment in Hume's Moral Theory.Nicholas Capaldi - 1965 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  38. added 2015-05-24
    Some Misconceptions About Hume's Moral Theory.Nicholas Capaldi - 1966 - Ethics 76 (3):208-211.
    There are eight major misconceptions about Hume's moral theory. First,many believe that there is no essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry. Second, some commentators believe that Hume has an extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Third, many assume that Hume has an explicit theory of moral judgment. Fourth, several commentators have attributed to Hume a multiple theory about the relationship between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Fifth, some assert that Hume has a qualified- or ideal-spectator theory (...)
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  39. added 2015-05-21
    The Humean Moral Sentiment: A Unique Feeling.Cheshire C. H. Calhoun - 1980 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):69-78.
  40. added 2015-05-20
    Moral Theory and the Passions.Charlotte Randall Brown - 1983 - Dissertation, Yale University
    In my dissertation I consider how far it is possible to found a moral theory in the emotions. I am interested in emotion-based theories because I believe that the foundation sought for morality should show that moral considerations by themselves are capable of motivating agents to act morally. On this view, which recent writers such as Frankena and Nagel classify as internalist, an agent is moved by the thought or perception that something is morally good, right, or worthy. I argue (...)
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  41. added 2015-04-20
    Smith, Pritchard, and the Moral Sentiment of Global Joy.Chad Allen - 1995 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 17:29-38.
  42. added 2015-03-03
    Slaves of the Passions by Mark Schroeder. [REVIEW]Melissa Barry - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):225–228.
    In Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder provides a systematic, rigorously argued defense of a Humean theory of reasons for action, taking pains to respond to influential objections to the view. While inspired by Hume, Schroeder makes it clear that he aims to develop a Humean theory, not necessarily one that Hume himself embraced, and for this reason little is said about Hume in the book. One respect in which Schroeder takes himself to be departing from Hume is in developing (...)
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  43. added 2015-03-02
    Response to My Critics.Annette C. Baier - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (2):211-218.
  44. added 2015-02-22
    Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.
    Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...)
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  45. added 2015-01-24
    :Freedom, and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. [REVIEW]Ira Singer - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):459-461.
    In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of the "compatibilist" position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as (...)
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  46. added 2015-01-21
    Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances.Jon Rick - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158.
    The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the (...)
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  47. added 2015-01-21
    Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. [REVIEW]Kenneth A. Richman - 1996 - Philosophy in Review 16 (5):371-373.
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  48. added 2015-01-21
    Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility.Paul Russell - 1995 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of a compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as (...)
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  49. added 2015-01-21
    Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of "Morality".Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (1):37-58.
    That Hume 's theory can be interpreted in two widely divergent ways-as a version of sentimentalism and as an ideal observer theory-is symptomatic of a puzzle ensconced in Hume 's theory. How can the ground of morality be internal and motivating when an inference to the feelings of a spectator in "the general point of view" is typically necessary to get to genuine moral distinctions? This paper considers and rejects the suggestion that in moral education, for Hume, the inculcation of (...)
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  50. added 2015-01-21
    Projectionism, Realism, and Hume's Moral Sense Theory.A. E. Pitson - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):61-92.
    My concern is the character of hume's moral theory. I contrast two interpretations of hume, The projectionist and the realist, Which disagree about how seriously we should take hume's own description of his theory as one according to which moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense. I offer reasons for rejecting the projectionist reading, And I explore the parallels drawn by hume between the operation of the moral sense and that of the external senses. I conclude that if there (...)
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