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  1. added 2018-10-20
    Tra Hume e Kant: il rapporto tra ragione e passioni e il carattere pratico della morale.Stefano Bacin - 2010 - In Etiche antiche, etiche moderne. Temi di discussione. Bologna BO, Italia: pp. 193-220.
  2. added 2017-06-20
    Hume on the Direct Passions and Motivation.Tito Magri - 2011 - In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 185-200.
  3. added 2017-06-20
    Reason, Passion, and the Influencing Motives of the Will.Mikael M. Karlsson - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 235-255.
  4. added 2016-12-08
    The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended.Neil Sinhababu - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.
    This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean theory. The essay addresses the classic (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-08
    Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the (...)
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  6. added 2016-12-08
    Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality.Mark van Roojen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (1):37-57.
    Michael Smith's recent defence of the theory shows promise, in that it captures the most common reasons for accepting a Humean view. But, as I will argue, it falls short of vindicating the view. Smith's argument fails, because it ignores the role of rationality conditions on the ascription of motivating reason explanations. Because of these conditions, we must have a theory of rationality before we choose a theory of motivation. Thus, we cannot use Humean restrictions on motivation to argue for (...)
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  7. added 2016-09-15
    Practical Reasoning and Practical Reasons in Hume.Karl Schafer - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):189-208.
    Can desires and actions be evaluated as responsive or unresponsive to reasons, in ways that extend beyond the instrumental implications of one's (other) desires? And does there exist any form of inference or reasoning that is practical in nature? Hume is generally supposed to have given an unambiguously negative reply to both of these questions. In particular, he is often taken to have held that no desire, passion, or action may ever be said to be opposed to reasons, except (perhaps) (...)
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  8. added 2015-06-02
    The Inertness of Reason and Hume's Legacy (On-Line Publication 2015, Issue Backdated to 2012).Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):117-133.
    Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on (...)
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  9. added 2015-04-25
    Passion and Volition in Hume's "Treatise".Maurice Lemont Wade - 1982 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature is David Hume's only sustained expression of a theory of human emotion and motivation. Hume's theory has been much maligned and even dismissed as incoherent and philosophically uninteresting. This work shows that Hume's account of passion is indeed coherent and possessed of philosophical merit. In addition, this work shows that even though Hume's theory is an example of antiquated empirical psychology it is also and more importantly an instance of interesting conceptual analysis (...)
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  10. added 2015-01-26
    Hume, Motivation and “the Moral Problem”.Charles R. Pigden - 2007 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 62 (3):199-221.
    Hume is widely regarded as the grandfather of emotivism and indeed of non-cognitivism in general. For the chief argument for emotivism - the Argument from Motivation - is derived from him. In my opinion Hume was not an emotivist or proto-emotivist but a moral realist in the modern ‘response-dependent’ style. But my interest in this paper is not the historical Hume but the Hume of legend since the legendary Hume is one of the most influential philosophers of the present age. (...)
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  11. added 2015-01-26
    Is Hume a Noncognitivist in the Motivation Argument?Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.
  12. added 2015-01-21
    Hume, Motivation and Morality.John Bricke - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (1):1-24.
  13. added 2015-01-21
    Is Hume an Internalist?Charlotte Brown - 1988 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (1):69-87.
    Hume is committed, By one of his criticisms of reason as the route to moral knowledge, To an internalist position. In the argument from motivation, Hume starts by observing that morality is practical--That morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. But, Hume argues, Rationalist moral theories cannot explain how moral considerations motivate. This is because reason alone is incapable of motivating us. The premise that morality is practical, However, May be interpreted in two ways--Either in an externalist or internalist (...)
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  14. added 2015-01-20
    The Motivation Argument for Non-Cognitivism.Michael Smith - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105.
  15. added 2015-01-20
    Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  16. added 2015-01-19
    Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume.Richard Joyce - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    As a metaethicist, I am interested in whether expressivism is true, and thus interested in whether the argument that people think they find in Hume is a sound one. Not being a Hume scholar (but merely a devoted fan), I am less interested in whether Hume really was an expressivist or whether he really did present an argument in its favor. Hume’s metaethical views are very difficult to nail down, and by a careful selection of quotes one can present him (...)
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  17. added 2015-01-19
    The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.
    In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an (...)
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  18. added 2015-01-19
    Hume on Motivation and Virtue: New Essays.Charles R. Pigden (ed.) - 2009 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Contemporary ethical thought owes a great deal to David Hume whose work has inspired theories as diverse as non-cognitivism, error theory, quasi-realism, and instrumentalism about practical reason. This timely volume brings together an international range of distinguished scholars to discuss and dispute issues revolving around three closely related Humean themes which have recently come under close scrutiny. First is Hume's infamous claim that 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions'. Second, the Motivation Argument for the (...)
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  19. added 2015-01-16
    The Humean Theory of Motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
  20. added 2015-01-15
    The Humean Theory of Motivation and its Critics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2008 - In A Companion to Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.
  21. added 2015-01-15
    Hume - Not a "Humean" About Motivation.Ingmar Persson - 1997 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (2):189-206.
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  22. added 2015-01-14
    Humean Theories of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics , Volume 5. Oxford University Press. pp. 195-223.
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  23. added 2015-01-14
    Introduction to Hume on Motivation and Virtue.Charles Pigden - 2009 - In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. pp. 1-29.
    This includes a methodological meditation (in blank verse) on the history of philosophy as a contribution to philosophy (rather than as a contribution to history) plus a conspectus of the issues surrounding Hume, the Motivation Argument and the Slavery of Reason Thesis. However I am posting it here mainly because it contains a novel restatement of the Argument from Queerness. Big Thesis: the Slavery of Reason Thesis (via the Motivation Argument) provides no support for non-cognitivism or emotivism, but there is (...)
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  24. added 2015-01-12
    Hume's Theory of Motivation - Part 2.Daniel Shaw - 1992 - Hume Studies 18 (1):19-39.
  25. added 2015-01-12
    Hume's Theory of Motivation.Daniel Shaw - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):163-183.
    The paper defends a humean account of motivating desires as introspectible causes of actions against objections raised by b stroud and t nagel. Hume's doctrine of the calm passions and the incorrigibility thesis are discussed and defended with reference to conscious desires. The account is then extended to cover unconscious motivation as well.
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