Hume: Normative Ethics, Misc

How are we to understand Thomas Reid in relation to Bernard de Mandeville? I answer this question by considering two components of the assessment of Hume's theory of morals that Reid provides in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man: first, Reid's claim that Hume's system of morals cannot accommodate the Stoic conception of moral worth ; second, Reid's charge that Hume's account of morally meritorious action leads to an inflated and incoherent version of Epicurean virtue theory. I thus (...) determine the character of Reid's relation to Mandeville by examining the Stoic and anti-Epicurean assumptions involved in Reid's criticism of Hume's ethics. (shrink)

This article argues that Hume's brief essay, "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion," offers resources for three claims: (1) Delicate taste correlates with self-sufficiency and thus with a particularly Humean form of Magnanimity -- greatness of mind; (2) Delicate taste improves the capacity for profound friendships, characterized by mutual admiration and true compassion; and (3) magnanimity and compassion are thus not necessarily in tension with one another and may even proceed from and support harmony of character. These claims, in (...) turn, provide reasons to take seriously Hume's view that moral character depends, in part, on aesthetic character. (shrink)

By examining the theories of justice developed by Joseph Butler and David Hume, the author discloses the conceptual limits of their moral naturalism. Butler was unable to accommodate the possibility that justice is, at least to some extent, a social convention. Hume, who more presciently tried to spell out the conventional character of justice, was unable to carry through that project within the framework of his moral naturalism. These limits have gone unnoticed, largely because Butler and Hume have been misinterpreted, (...) their relation misconstrued. Exegetes have persistently misunderstood the differences that divide them, have misconceived the notion of "public utility" in Hume's account of justice, have wrongly interpreted Butler as a forerunner of Immanuel Kant, and have altogether missed the degree to which Hume stands in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This first volume contains the critical text of David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, followed by the shortin which Hume set out the key arguments of the larger work; the volume concludes with A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, Hume's defence of the Treatise when it was under attack from ministers seeking to prevent Hume's appointment as Professor of (...) Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

David Owen begins his contribution by setting out very clearly how my interpretation of Hume’s distinction between simple and complex perceptions helps to resolve some puzzles about apparent counterexamples to the two most fundamental principles of Hume’s cognitive psychology: the Copy Principle and the Separability Principle. His primary object of criticism is my interpretation of Hume’s famous conclusion that inductive inferences are “not determin’d by reason”. I am as grateful for Owen’s criticisms concerning my treatment of induction as I am (...) for his approval of my treatment of the simple/complex distinction, because his criticisms provide me with an opportunity to modify my earlier interpretation of Hume’s famous conclusion in a way that I hope will resolve the issue to everyone’s—including Owen’s—satisfaction. I will first explain Owen’s own interpretation and the most serious objection to which it is subject. I will then present my modified interpretation and explain how it avoids the objection while accommodating Owen’s central insight. I will conclude by responding to Owen’s two specific criticisms of the earlier version of my interpretation. (shrink)

Hume’s philosophical greatness is widely acknowledged, yet the interpretation of his philosophy is the subject of considerable disagreement and confusion. Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy is intended to support critical discussion and evaluation of Hume’s philosophy by offering more accurate interpretations of his treatments of a number of central philosophical topics. The book has three main strategic goals: to isolate and explain Hume’s most fundamental philosophical aims, methods, and principles; to set out and elucidate the content and structure of (...) the arguments he offers on central philosophical topics; and to analyze and explore the meaning of his conclusions and the nature of their interrelations. (shrink)

David Owen begins his contribution by setting out very clearly how my interpretation of Hume’s distinction between simple and complex perceptions helps to resolve some puzzles about apparent counterexamples to the two most fundamental principles of Hume’s cognitive psychology: the Copy Principle and the Separability Principle. His primary object of criticism is my interpretation of Hume’s famous conclusion that inductive inferences are “not determin’d by reason”. I am as grateful for Owen’s criticisms concerning my treatment of induction as I am (...) for his approval of my treatment of the simple/complex distinction, because his criticisms provide me with an opportunity to modify my earlier interpretation of Hume’s famous conclusion in a way that I hope will resolve the issue to everyone’s—including Owen’s—satisfaction. I will first explain Owen’s own interpretation and the most serious objection to which it is subject. I will then present my modified interpretation and explain how it avoids the objection while accommodating Owen’s central insight. I will conclude by responding to Owen’s two specific criticisms of the earlier version of my interpretation. (shrink)

It is widely believed that Hume often wrote carelessly and contradicted himself, and that no unified, sound philosophy emerges from his writings. Don Garrett demonstrates that such criticisms of Hume are without basis. Offering fresh and trenchant solutions to longstanding problems in Hume studies, Garrett's penetrating analysis also makes clear the continuing relevance of Hume's philosophy.

Despite being averse to moral extravagance, Hume’s own conception of morality threatens to be too demanding and his view of human life to be too moralistic. The problem lies in the scope (and concomitantly the content) Hume assigns morality, the effect of which is the apparent exclusion of the morally indifferent and the morally supererogatory. This threatens to render the normative dimension of Hume’s account problematic. Sufficiently problematic to overmoralize the self? That is the question this essay seeks to motivate.

Impressions of Hume collects brand-new essays from leading scholars in different philosophical, historiographical, and literary traditions within which Hume is a canonical figure. To some his writings are vehicles for intuitions, problems, and arguments which are at the center of contemporary philosophical reflection; others locate Hume's views against the background of concerns and debates of his own time. Hume's texts may be read as highly sophisticated literary-cum-philosophical creations, or as moments in the construction of the ideology of modernity; these are (...) "open" texts which present their reader with a bounty of different materials and inspirations. (shrink)

This thesis is a Humean dialogue with David Hume on his influential ideas that are of contemporary philosophical influence and importance, in particular his ideas on the relation between morality and science. It interprets Hume's view of science in terms of his theory of causation and examines the connection that his causal theory of scientific explanation bears with his moral theory. The connection that Hume's causal theory bears with his moral theory has not been sufficiently appreciated and given a serious (...) attention. This thesis defends the connection and argues that Hume's naturalism about morality defends continuity between moral inquiries and scientific investigations in terms of their explanatory functions. Hume defended a moral science to ground moral explanations and judgments in scientific foundation. Naturalism is often confused with realism. Rejecting recent interpretation of Hume as a "naturalistic realist," I argue that Hume saw moral truths as not validated by mind-independent moral facts, as realist claim. Instead, in the Humean account, we induce moral truths from values that we project onto the world by collective agreement. This idea is supported by Hume's convention theory of collective agreement. Hume's causal theory of moral behavior raises many puzzles. It seems that his naturalistic theory cannot say anything coherent about free human agency and judgments of moral responsibility. His theory also raises issues about moral luck. The thesis discusses the problems and many more, such as the place of normativity in Hume's naturalism about morality. My Humean dialogue with Hume is an effort to reconstruct his ideas in a clearer and systematic fashion in response to new insights and challenges raised by our contemporary philosophical and scientific developments. My objective is not to respond to Hume's arguments as repositories of dead historical ideas to be criticized and dismissed. Rather, I engage in a dialogue with the rich ideas of Hume as a sympathetic and questioning reader to reawaken them into a new life by rearguing them in sustained and systematic ways that make the best out of them, and examine what can be learned from them. (shrink)

"It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise, which we bestow on the social virtues, that one would expect to meet with this principle every where in moral writers, as the chief foundation of their reasoning and enquiry". Even the difficulty of accounting the effects of usefulness or its contrary might have induced philosophers to rather employing any other principle in order to explain Morals genesis, the confirmation by experience in the theater of the world (...) shows us its unquestionable importance. (shrink)

David Hume is, arguably, the most important philosopher ever to have written in English. Although best known for his contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion, Hume also made substantial and influential contributions to psychology and the philosophy of mind, ethics, the philosophy of science, political and economic theory, political and social history, and, to a lesser extent, aesthetic and literary theory. All facets of Hume's output are discussed in this volume, the first genuinely comprehensive overview of his (...) work. The picture that emerges is of a thinker who, though critical to the point of scepticism, was nonetheless able to build on that scepticism a profoundly important, and still viable, constructive philosophy. (shrink)

This new edition of Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, published in the Oxford Philosophical Texts series, has been designed especially for the student reader. The text is preceded by a substantial introduction explaining the historical and intellectual background to the work and its relationship to the rest of Hume's philosophy. The volume also includes detailed explanatory notes on the text, a glossary of terms, and a section of supplementary readings.

Quais sáo as teorias vulgares da moralidade criticadas por Hume na famosa passagem is-ought ? Quais eram seus defensores? Neste ensaio, trato de algumas diferenças entre Hume e Hutcheson que podem iluminar algumas respostas. Hume, ao contrário de Hutcheson, combateu toda forma de separaçáo da natureza humana em componentes naturais e divinos. O conceito de simpatia cumpre uma funçáo essencial nesse aspecto. Há bons indícios de que o jovem Hume adotou no Tratado uma estratégia abertamente crítica a todas as teorias (...) morais defendidas pelos pensadores, religiosos e moralistas de sua época. Isso inclui o voluntarismo contratualista, as éticas racionalistas, bem como as concepções religiosas influenciadas pelo dogmatismo evangélico escocês. Nisso Hume distanciou-se de Hutcheson, pois sua crítica também incluía as visões influenciadas pelas teorias do direito natural com referência na providência divina. A passagem is-ought sinaliza essa intençáo. Todavia, todo esse ímpeto juvenil resultou numa série de maus resultados pessoais, o que o levou, na maturidade a mitigar sua agressividade filosófica e a adotar, em seus escritos, uma atitude mais equilibrada. (shrink)

The eighteenth century philosopher David Hume was much influenced by Greek philosophy and literature. His favourite writer was the satirist Lucian. What is David Hume’s thanatotherapy (therapy of the fear of death)? Is he an Epicurean or Pyrrhonian thanatotherapist? I argue that, while he is in part an Epicurean who is sceptical about his Epicureanism, he is primarily a Lucianic thanatotherapist. A Lucianic thanatotherapist uses self and other deprecating irony as a form of therapy. He also ruthlessly satirises religious consolations. (...) I use Hume’s deathbed allusions to Lucian’s Kataplous (floating downwards) and the Dialogues of the Dead to explain my view. (shrink)

Sprott reviews the writings on suicide which appeared in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He is interested in efforts, most notably those of Donne and Hume, to argue, in the face of religious and other opposition, that suicide can be committed without involving moral offense. He is also interested in the actual cases of suicide during the period and endeavors to correlate the literature with fluctuations in the suicide rate and with legal attitudes toward suicides and their families.--A. (...) C. (shrink)

David Hume is widely recognised as the greatest philosopher to have written in the English language. His Treatise on Human Nature is one of the most important works of moral philosophy ever written. Hume on Morality introduces and assesses * Hume's life and the background of the Treatise * The ideas and text in the Treatise * Hume's continuing importance to philosophy.

This chapter begins with a description of the general character of Hume's ethics, which are Epicurean in that he assumes that pleasure is good, and every good thing is pleasing. All virtues, for him, are ‘agreeable or useful’ to their possessor or to others, and the useful is defined as what can be expected to yield future pleasure. The discussion then covers Hume's views on sympathy and the principles governing our approbations; trust and its enlargement by social ‘artifices’; natural virtues, (...) natural duties, and what they include and exclude; responsibility; the role of reason; rights; and his influence on subsequent moral philosophers. (shrink)

" By the end, we can see the cause to which Hume has been true throughout the work.

This paper deals with what I take to be one woman’s literary response to a philosophical problem. The woman is Jane Austen, the problem is the rationality of Hume’s ‘sensible knave’, and Austen’s response is to deepen the problem. Despite his enthusiasm for virtue, Hume reluctantly concedes in the EPM that injustice can be a rational strategy for ‘sensible knaves’, intelligent but selfish agents who feel no aversion towards thoughts of villainy or baseness. Austen agrees, but adds that ABSENT CONSIDERATIONS (...) OF A FUTURE STATE, other vices besides injustice can be rationally indulged with tolerable prospects of worldly happiness. Austen’s creation Mr Elliot in Persuasion is just such an agent – sensible and knavish but not technically ‘unjust’. Despite and partly because of his vices – ingratitude, avarice and duplicity – he manages to be both successful and reasonably happy. There are plenty of other reasonably happy knaves in Jane Austen, some of whom are not particularly sensible. This is not to say that either Austen or Hume is in favor of knavery It is just that they both think that only those with the right sensibility can be argued out of it. (shrink)