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  1. La raison pratique existe-t-elle? Examen critique de Hume, Treatise II.iii.3.Daniel Schulthess - 2004 - In Ali Benmakhlouf & Jean-François Lavigne (eds.), Avenir de la raison, Devenir des rationalités - Actes du XXXIXe Congrès de l'ASPLF, Nice, 27 août-1er septembre 2002. Paris: Vrin. pp. p. 215-220..
    The article proposes an interpretation of the role of practical reason in Hume. The starting point is the distinction between strong practical reason and weak practical reason. The distinction concerns the assignment of values to states of affairs: strong practical reason is itself involved in this assignment of values, whereas weak practical reason only deliberates on the basis of given assignments. According to the author of the article Hume, showing how our choices are produced from a mechanics of passions, refutes (...)
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  2. Reid on Favors, Injuries and the Natural Virtue of Justice.Lewis Powell & Gideon Yaffe - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press.
    Reid argues that Hume’s claim that justice is an artificial virtue is inconsistent with the fact that gratitude is a natural sentiment. This chapter shows that Reid’s argument succeeds only given a philosophy of mind and action that Hume rejects. Among other things, Reid assumes that one can conceive of one of a pair of contradictories only if one can conceive of the other—a claim that Hume denies. So, in the case of justice, the disagreement between Hume and Reid is, (...)
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  3. Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. [REVIEW]A. E. Pitson - 2006 - Hume Studies 32 (1):187-191.
  4. Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines.Francis Snare - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This 1991 book is about the continuing influence of Hume's ideas on moral and political philosophy. In part, it is a critical exegesis of Hume's most impressive and challenging doctrines in Book III of the Treatise of Human Nature on such topics as morals, motivation, justice, and social institutions. However, the main thrust of the argument is to throw into relief the importance of that discussion for contemporary philosophy. While the author subjects most contemporary defences of Humean doctrines to intense (...)
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  5. A New Worry for the Humean Internalist.Crystal Thorpe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):393-417.
    The Humean internalist finds Humean motivational theses and reasons internalism to be independently attractive. She therefore combines them, in the hope of creating a theory of reasons that is attractive for all of the reasons that each thesis is attractive. On this score, she succeeds. However, there is a drawback. Those who build a theory of reasons by combining Humean motivational theses and reasons internalism face a dilemma. If you combine these views, either you are committed to a theory of (...)
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  6. Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21-25.
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume's meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
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  7. Hume on the Normativity of Practical Reasons.Cass Weller - 2013 - Hume Studies 39 (1):3-35.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume accepts two claims. The first is that it is not possible for a human agent, having adopted an end, to remain committed to it, have it in view, and be indifferent to what he or she acknowledges as the proper means of realizing it, where indifference is the absence of a favoring attitude.1 The second is that, other things being equal, an agent who fails through weak resolve to take the acknowledged means to (...)
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  8. Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction.Sophie Botros - 2006 - Routledge.
    Covering an important theme in Humean studies, this book focuses on Hume's hugely influential attempt in book three of his _Treatise of Human Nature _to derive the conclusion that morality is a matter of feeling, not reason, from its link with action. Claiming that Hume's argument contains a fundamental contradiction that has gone unnoticed in modern debate, this fascinating volume contains a refreshing combination of historical-scholarly work and contemporary analysis that seeks to expose this contradiction and therefore provide a significant (...)
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  9. Teoria humeana de la motivació i sentimentalisme.Sergi Rosell - 2010 - Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència 40:63-73.
    This paper deals with Hume’s main claims on human action and morality. Three connected issues are considered: the so-called Humean theory of motivation, the sentimentalist basis for moral judgment and the consequential motivational internalism. After diagnosing a possible incoherency in Hume’s overall account, due to his aim of overcoming sheer subjectivism and to the resulting Possible Sentiment Problem, I present an alternative picture of the kind of sentiment involved in moral judgment that surmounts this problem and undoes the incoherency.
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  10. How a Modern-Day Hume Can Reject a Desire Categorically: A Perplexity and a Theoretically Modest Proposal.Regan Lance Reitsma & King’S. College - unknown
    We often treat our basic, unmotivated desires as reason-giving: you’re thirsty and take yourself to have a reason to walk to the drinking fountain; you care intrinsically about your young daughter and take yourself to have a reason to feed and clothe her. We (behave as though we) think these desires generate normative practical reasons. But are there (satisfiable) basic desires that don’t? It might seem so, for we sometimes find ourselves impelled to do some very strange, and some very (...)
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  11. On Humean Explanation and Practical Normativity.Graham Hubbs - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):78-95.
    If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are “entirely different” matters, then it would seem to follow that endorsing a given account of action-explanation does not restrict the account of practical normativity one may simultaneously endorse. In this essay, I challenge the antecedent of this conditional by targeting its consequent. Specifically, I argue that if one endorses a Humean account of action-explanation, which many find attractive, one is thereby committed to a Humean account of practical normativity, which (...)
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  12. Hume and the Metaphysics of Agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):87-112.
    I examine Hume’s ‘construal of the basic structure of human agency’ and his ‘analysis of human agency’ as they arise in his investigation of causal power. Hume’s construal holds both that volition is separable from action and that the causal mechanism of voluntary action is incomprehensible. Hume’s analysis argues, on the basis of these two claims, that we cannot draw the concept of causal power from human agency. Some commentators suggest that Hume’s construal of human agency is untenable, unduly skeptical, (...)
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  13. Humean Rationality.Michael Smith - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--92.
    Smith begins by noting the isomorphism between the rational transition to a psychological state from others and the derivation of a concluding proposition from premises in the deductive theoretical realm, and he argues that this isomorphism led Hume to think that the rationality of the psychological transition is to be explained by the deductive validity of the derivation. Generalizing, Smith argues, Hume concluded that the concept of a reason—that is, the concept of a consideration that justifies—must be prior to and (...)
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  14. Action, Reason, and the Passions.Constantine Sandis - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. pp. 199--213.
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  15. Hume's Volitions.J. Bricke - 1984 - In Hope (ed.), Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment.
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  16. David Hume and the Concept of Volition.John M. Connolly & Thomas Keutner - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):275-275.
  17. Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction (Review).Alessio Vaccari - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):193-195.
  18. Hume and Practical Reason: A Non-Sceptical Interpretation.Camillia Kong - 2013 - History of Political Thought 34 (1):89-113.
    It has become increasingly common to interpret Hume as a `sceptic' of practical reason. This means that Hume supposedly contests, not only the ability of reason to provide demonstrable truths, in the conventional rationalist sense, but also reason's ability to guide our practical action. Proponents of this reading include Jean Hampton, Elijah Millgram and Christine Korsgaard. If this `sceptical reading' of Hume is correct, he would lack the philosophical resources to justify his account of political justice. However, if examined further, (...)
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  19. Moral Relativism, Internalism, and the "Humean" View of Practical Reason.John J. Tilley - 1992 - Modern Schoolman 69 (2):81-109.
  20. Hume and Humeanism in Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):99.
    Present-Day humeans think hume was largely right that moral judgments cannot be principles of reason because reason alone cannot move us to action. None of the textually supported interpretations of the claim that "reason is inert" can save hume's antirationalist argument; it is either invalid, Or rests upon assumptions that contradict hume's other views and are probably false. Present-Day humeans reject hume's narrow conceptions of reason and desire, And so have a valid version of hume's antirationalist argument and can consistently (...)
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  21. Hume on the Reasonableness of Human Actions.P. Roy - 1979 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 6 (3):505-515.
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  22. David Hume E a Questão Básica de Critica da Razão Pratica.E. O. C. Chaves - 1977 - Rev. Latinoam. Fil. 2:215-41.
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  23. Because I Believe It's the Right Thing to Do.Joshua May - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.
    Our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform clearly have an effect on what we do. But so-called “Humean” theories—holding that all motivation has its source in desire—insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. Rationalists, on the other hand, allow normative beliefs a more independent role. I argue in favor of the rationalist view in two stages. First, I show that the Humean theory rules out some of the ways we ordinarily explain actions. This shifts the burden (...)
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  24. Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    In broad outlines, the first of these claims that beliefs and other cognitive states, on their own, can never motivate a new desire, intention, or action. Rather, on this view, what motivates us to desire, intend, or act is always the cooperation of some desire (or other conative state) with such cognitive states. Thus, on HTM, practical motivation is always the product of two fundamentally distinct categories of mental states operating in conjunction with one another.
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  25. Hume and Reid on the Nature of Action.R. F. Stalley - 1998 - Reid Studies 1 (2):33-48.
  26. Still Waiting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.
    In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to bear on the problem of (...)
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  27. Hume on Passion, Pleasure, and the Reasonableness of Ends.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1994 - Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):1-11.
  28. Toward a Transactional Theory of Decision Making: Creative Rationality as Functional Coordination in Context.Shabnam Mousavi & Jim Garrison - 2003 - Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (2):131-156.
    This paper poses a Deweyan challenge to both the neoclassical framework of rational choice and models of bounded rationality and deliberation, especially the procedural theory of rationality advanced by Herbert Simon. We demonstrate how modern theories on procedural or instrumental rationality trace their origin to the tradition of British empiricism, especially the philosophy of David Hume. Most theories of action such as Simon's assume actors may control their bodies 'at will.' For Dewey, habits are will; we control them when we (...)
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  29. Slaves of the Passions by Mark Schroeder. [REVIEW]Melissa Barry - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):225–228.
    In Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder provides a systematic, rigorously argued defense of a Humean theory of reasons for action, taking pains to respond to influential objections to the view. While inspired by Hume, Schroeder makes it clear that he aims to develop a Humean theory, not necessarily one that Hume himself embraced, and for this reason little is said about Hume in the book. One respect in which Schroeder takes himself to be departing from Hume is in developing (...)
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  30. Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives.Rachel Cohon - 2010 - Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
    There is considerable evidence that Hume thinks the moral sentiments move us to action, at least in some circumstances. For one thing, he relies on the premise that moral evaluations move us to action to argue that moral evaluations are not derived from reason alone, in his most famous anti-rationalist argument. Presumably, this capacity of moral evaluations can be explained by the fact that such evaluations are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. But this raises three interconnected interpretive questions. (...)
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  31. Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume's Ethical System.Clarence Sholé Johnson - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:225-238.
    But for a very recent exception, Hume has generally been thought to deny that cognitive reason plays a distinctive role in morality. The cornerstone of this view has been his notorious remark that reason is and ought only to be the slave of passion and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey passion. But, this remark notwithstanding, Hume’s view about the significance of intention in moral processes suggests that he does assign to cognitive reason a (...)
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  32. Freedom and Moral Sentiment.Robert Shaver - 2004 - International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):280-281.
  33. Kantian Tunes on a Humean Instrument: Why Hume Is Not Really a Skeptic About Practical Reasoning.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):247 -.
  34. Can Humeans Ask "Why Be Rational?".Evan Tiffany - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):133 - 145.
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  35. Two Kinds of Normativity : Korsgaard V. Hume.Luke Russell - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 208.
  36. Why Internalists About Reasons Should Be Humeans About Motivation.Kent Hurtig - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  37. Experiences of Value.Graham Oddie - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 121.
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  38. Is Hume Inconsistent? : Motivation and Morals.Norva Y. S. Lo - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 57.
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  39. Reason and Desire in Motivation.Stuart E. Rosenbaum - 1982 - Philosophical Topics 13 (Supplement):87-92.
    This paper seeks to find a middle way between the views of hume and kant on the issue of the motivation of action-hume holding reason to be important in the production of action, and kant holding action in accord with reason alone to be possible. it further suggests that sustaining the middle way requires insisting on an account of the nature of values different from that held by either hume or kant.
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  40. Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy.Daniel Shaw - 1992 - Hume Studies 18 (2):349-367.
  41. Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):121-144.
    Hard determinists hold that we never have alternative possibilities of action—that we only can do what we actually do. This means that if hard determinists accept the “ought implies can” principle, they mustaccept that it is never the case that we ought to do anything we do not do. In other words, they must reject the view that there can be “ought”- based moral reasons to do things we do not do. Hard determinists who wish to accommodate moral reasons to (...)
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  42. Inconsistency Within a Reconciling Project.Antony Flew - 1978 - Hume Studies 4 (1):1-6.
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  43. Hume on Responsibility.Lloyd Fields - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (1):161-175.
  44. Morals, Motivation and Convention.Beryl Logan - 1992 - Hume Studies 18 (1):113-114.
  45. Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?Jean Hampton - 1995 - Hume Studies 21 (1):57-74.
    Many philosophers and social scientists regard the instrumental theory of practical reason as highly plausible, and standardly credit David Hume as the first philosopher to formulate this conception of reason clearly. Yet Hume does not advocate the instrumental conception of practical reason as that conception is normally understood by contemporary theorists who endorse it. Instead, Hume's view is that there is no such thing as "practical reason", that is, no such thing as a form of reason that has either motivational (...)
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  46. Hume on Practical Reason.David Phillips - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (2):299-316.
    I argue for an interpretation of Hume on practical reason different both from the traditional instrumentalist interpretation and the more recent nihilist interpretation. Both involve reading Hume as making normative claims. On the nihilist interpretation, Hume denies that either passions or actions can violate authoritative norms of reason; on the instrumentalist interpretation, Hume denies that passions can violate authoritative norms of reason, but holds that instrumentally irrational actions violate the one such authoritative norm. I argue instead for a purely psychological (...)
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  47. The Will as Impression.John M. Connolly - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):276-305.
  48. Conclusion.Thomas Keutner - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):322-322.
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  49. The Will as Wish.Thomas Keutner - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):306-321.
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  50. Hume on Liberty, Necessity and Verbal Disputes.Eric Steinberg - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):113-137.
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