Hume: Philosophy of Mathematics

Richard Kimberly Heck and Paolo Mancosu have claimed that the possibility of non-Cantorian assignments of cardinalities to infinite concepts shows that Hume's Principle (HP) is not implicit in the concept of cardinal number. Neologicism would therefore be threatened by the ‘good company' HP is kept by such alternative assignments. In his review of Mancosu's book, Bob Hale argues, however, that ‘getting different numerosities for different countable infinite collections depends on taking the groups in a certain order – but it is (...) of the essence of cardinal numbers that the cardinal size of a collection does not depend upon how its members are ordered'. This paper's goal is to implement Hale's response to the Good Company problem by producing a Cantorian argument for HP. In Section 2, we present the Heck-Mancosu argument against neologicism. In Section 3, we discuss Hale's defence of Hume's Principle. In Section 4, we discuss Cantor's abstractionist definitions of number. In Section 5, we argue that good abstraction must comply with what we call ‘Gödel’s Minimal Account of Abstraction’ (GMAA). We finally show (Sections 5 and 6) that non-Cantorian theories of cardinality fail to satisfy GMAA. (shrink)

Logicism finds a prominent place in textbooks as one of the main alternatives in the foundations of mathematics, even though it lost much of its attraction from about 1950. Of course the neologicist trend has revitalized the movement on the basis of Hume’s Principle and Frege’s Theorem, but even so neologicism restricts itself to arithmetic and does not aim to account for all of mathematics. The present contribution does not focus on the classical logicism of Frege and Dedekind, nor on (...) the Russell-Carnap period, and also not on recent neologicism; its aim is to call attention to some forms of heritage from logicism that normally go quite unnoticed. In the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, the logicist thesis became a stimulus for some deep innovations in the field of mathematical logic. One can argue, in particular, that two key ideas linked with formal semantics had their origins in the conception of logic associated with the logicist trend – the expansion of metamathematics brought about by Tarski, opening the way to model theory, and the insistence on the “full” set-theoretic semantics as “standard” for second-order logic. The paper proposes an analysis of those inheritances and argues that that logical theory ought to avoid some of their implications. (shrink)

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

According to Hume’s principle, a sentence of the form ⌜The number of Fs = the number of Gs⌝ is true if and only if the Fs are bijectively correlatable to the Gs. Neo-Fregeans maintain that this principle provides an implicit definition of the notion of cardinal number that vindicates a platonist construal of such numerical equations. Based on a clarification of the explanatory status of Hume’s principle, I will provide an argument in favour of a nominalist construal of numerical equations. (...) The neo-Fregean objections to such a construal will be examined and rejected. And the implications of the nominalist construal for the use of numerals and for the understanding of ontological questions for the existence of numbers will be spelled out. (shrink)

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents (...) a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same. (shrink)

In recent work Bruno Whittle has presented a new challenge to the Cantorian idea that there are different infinite cardinalities. Most challenges of this kind have tended to focus on the status of the axioms of standard set theory; Whittle’s is different in that he focuses on the connection between standard set theory and intuitive concepts related to cardinality. Specifically, Whittle argues we are not in a position to know a principle I call the Quantificational Hume Principle, which connects the (...) application of intuitive, quantificational cardinality concepts to claims involving the existence of functions. This paper responds to Whittle’s skeptical arguments by providing an argument justifying the QHP. (shrink)

The question of the analyticity of Hume’s Principle (HP) is central to the neo-logicist project. We take on this question with respect to Frege’s definition of analyticity, which entails that a sentence cannot be analytic if it can be consistently denied within the sphere of a special science. We show that HP can be denied within non-standard analysis and argue that if HP is taken to depend on Frege’s definition of number, it isn’t analytic, and if HP is taken to (...) be primitive there is only a very narrow range of circumstances where it might be taken to be analytic. The latter discussion also sheds some light on the connections between the Bad Company and Caesar objections. (shrink)

In the Introduction to the Treatise Hume very enthusiastically announces his project to provide a secure and solid foundation for the sciences by grounding them on his science of man. And Hume indicates in the Abstract that he carries out this project in the Treatise. But most interpreters do not believe that Hume's project comes to fruition. In this paper, I offer a general reading of what I call Hume's ‘foundational project’ in the Treatise, but I focus especially on Book (...) 1. I argue that in Book 1 much of Hume's logic is put in the service of the other sciences, in particular, mathematics and natural philosophy. I concentrate on Hume's negative thesis that many of the ideas central to the sciences are ideas that we cannot form. For Hume, this negative thesis has implications for the sciences, as many of the texts I discuss make evident. I consider and criticize different proposals for understanding these implications: the Criterion of Meaning and the ‘Inconceivability Principle’. I introduce what I call Hume's ‘No Reason to Believe’ Principle, which I argue captures more adequately the link Hume envisions between his logic, in particular his examination of ideas, and the other sciences. (shrink)

Sections “Introduction: Hume’s Principle, Basic Law V and Cardinal Arithmetic” and “The Julius Caesar Problem in Grundlagen—A Brief Characterization” are peparatory. In Section “Analyticity”, I consider the options that Frege might have had to establish the analyticity of Hume’s Principle, bearing in mind that with its analytic or non-analytic status the intended logical foundation of cardinal arithmetic stands or falls. Section “Thought Identity and Hume’s Principle” is concerned with the two criteria of thought identity that Frege states in 1906 and (...) their application to Hume’s Principle. In Section “The Nature ofion: A Critical Assessment of Grundlagen, §64”, I scrutinize Frege’s characterization of abstraction in Grundlagen, §64 and criticize in this context the currently widespread use of the terms “recarving” and “reconceptualization”. Section “Frege’s Proof of Hume’s Principle” is devoted to the formal details of Frege’s proof of Hume’s Principle. I begin by considering his proof sketch in Grundlagen and subsequently reconstruct in modern notation essential parts of the formal proof in Grundgesetze. In Section “Equinumerosity and Coextensiveness: Hume’s Principle and Basic Law V Again”, I discuss the criteria of identity embodied in Hume’s Principle and in Basic Law V, equinumerosity and coextensiveness. In Section “Julius Caesar and Cardinal Numbers—A Brief Comparison Between Grundlagen and Grundgesetze ”, I comment on the Julius Caesar problem arising from Hume’s Principle in Grundlagen and analyze the reasons for its absence in this form in Grundgesetze. I conclude with reflections on the introduction of the cardinals and the reals by abstraction in the context of Frege’s logicism. (shrink)

In a recent article, I have explored the historical, mathematical, and philosophical issues related to the new theory of numerosities. The theory of numerosities provides a context in which to assign numerosities to infinite sets of natural numbers in such a way as to preserve the part-whole principle, namely if a set A is properly included in B then the numerosity of A is strictly less than the numerosity of B. Numerosities assignments differ from the standard assignment of size provided (...) by Cantor’s cardinality assignments. In this talk, I generalize some specific worries emerging from the theory of numerosities to a line of thought resulting in what I call a ‘good company’ objection to Hume’s Principle (HP). The talk has four main parts. The first takes a historical look at 19th-century attributions of equality of numbers in terms of one-one correlations and argues that there was no agreement as to how to extend such determinations to infinite sets of objects. This leads to the second part where I show that there are countably infinite many abstraction principles that are ‘good’, in the sense that they share the same virtues of HP and from which we can derive the axioms of second order arithmetic. The third part connects this material to a debate on Finite Hume Principle between Heck and MacBride and states the ‘good company’ objection. Finally, the last part gives a tentative taxonomy of possible neo-logicist responses to the ‘good company’ objection and makes a foray into the relevance of this material for the issue of cross-sortal identifications for abstractions. (shrink)

Neo-Fregeans need their stipulation of Hume's Principle — $NxFx=NxGx \leftrightarrow \exists R (Fx \,1\hbox {-}1_R\, Gx)$ — to do two things. First, it must implicitly define the term-forming operator ‘Nx…x…’, and second it must guarantee that Hume's Principle as a whole is true. I distinguish two senses in which the neo-Fregeans might ‘stipulate’ Hume's Principle, and argue that while one sort of stipulation fixes a meaning for ‘Nx…x…’ and the other guarantees the truth of Hume's Principle, neither does both.

In this essay, I argue that Hume’s theory of Quantitative and Numerical Philosophical Relations can be interpreted in a way which allows mathematical knowledge to be about a body of objective and necessary truths, while preserving Hume’s nominalism and the basic principles of his theory of ideas. Attempts are made to clear up a number of obscure points about Hume’s claims concerning the abstract sciences of Arithmetic and Algebra by means of re-examining what he says and what he could comfortably (...) have said about relations of qualitative resemblance. (shrink)

The paper addresses two difficulties that arise in Treatise 1.2.5. First, Hume appears to be inconsistent when he denies that we have an idea of a vacuum or empty space yet allows for the idea of an “invisible and intangible distance.” My solution to this difficulty is to develop the overlooked possibility that Hume does not take the invisible and intangible distance to be a distance at all. Second, although Hume denies that we have an idea of a vacuum, some (...) texts in Treatise 1.2.5 are taken by interpreters to suggest that Hume nonetheless believes that there are vacuums in nature. I discuss the relevant texts and defend the view that Hume does not in fact countenance belief in vacuums. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of Hume’s intention in the Treatise that allows us to understand his discussion of ideas as having implications for the sciences. (shrink)

Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...) this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume’s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume’s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume’s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume’s most original contributions. First, Hume’s epistemological model invokes the “confounding” of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume’s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the “loose judgements” of the vulgar. (shrink)

This paper presents new constructions of models of Hume's Principle and Basic Law V with restricted amounts of comprehension. The techniques used in these constructions are drawn from hyperarithmetic theory and the model theory of fields, and formalizing these techniques within various subsystems of second-order Peano arithmetic allows one to put upper and lower bounds on the interpretability strength of these theories and hence to compare these theories to the canonical subsystems of second-order arithmetic. The main results of this paper (...) are: (i) there is a consistent extension of the hyperarithmetic fragment of Basic Law V which interprets the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, and (ii) the hyperarithmetic fragment of Hume's Principle does not interpret the hyperarithmetic fragment of second-order Peano arithmetic, so that in this specific sense there is no predicative version of Frege's Theorem. (shrink)

It has been argued that there is a genuine conflict between the views of geometry defended by Hume in the Treatise and in the Enquiry: while the former work attributes to geometry a different status from that of arithmetic and algebra, the latter attempts to restore its status as an exact and certain science. A closer reading of Hume shows that, in fact, there is no conflict between the two works with respect to geometry. The key to understanding Hume's view (...) of geometry is the distinction he draws between two standards of equality in extension. (shrink)

Adherents of Ockham’s fundamental razor contend that considerations of ontological parsimony pertain primarily to fundamental objects. Derivative objects, on the other hand, are thought to be quite unobjectionable. One way to understand the fundamental vs. derivative distinction is in terms of the Aristotelian distinction between ontologically independent and dependent objects. In this paper I will defend the thesis that every natural number greater than 0 is an ontologically dependent object thereby exempting the natural numbers from Ockham’s fundamental razor.

In this note we derive Robinson???s Arithmetic from Hume???s Principle in the context of very weak theories of classes and relations.

Hume’s Principle states that for any two concepts, F and G, the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs iff the Fs are one-one correlated with the Gs. Backed by second-order logic HP is supposed to be the starting point for the neo-logicist program of the foundations of arithmetic. The principle brings a number of formal and philosophical controversies. In this paper I discuss some arguments against it brought out by Trobok, as well as by Potter and (...) Smiley, designed to undermine a claim that HP and its instances are true. Their criticism starts from distinguishing the objective truth from a weak or stipulative one, and focusing on fictional identities such as “Hamlet = Hamlet” or “Jekyll = Hyde.” They argue that numerical identities are much the same as fictional identities; that we can attribute them only a weak or stipulative truth; and, consequently, that neo-logicists are not entitled to ontological conclusions concerning numbers they derive from HP and its instances. As opposed to that, I argue that such a criticism is ill-conceived. The analogy between the numerical and fictional identities is far-fetched. So, relative to such a criticism, HP has more prospects than some authors are prepared to admit. (shrink)

A number of formal constraints on acceptable abstraction principles have been proposed, including conservativeness and irenicity. Hume’s Principle, of course, satisfies these constraints. Here, variants of Hume’s Principle that allow us to count concepts instead of objects are examined. It is argued that, prima facie, these principles ought to be no more problematic than HP itself. But, as is shown here, these principles only enjoy the formal properties that have been suggested as indicative of acceptability if certain constraints on the (...) size of the continuum hold. As a result, whether or not these higher-order versions of Hume’s Principle are acceptable seems to be independent of standard (ZFC) set theory. This places the abstractionist in an uncomfortable dilemma: Either there is some inherent difference between counting objects and counting concepts, or new criteria for acceptability will need to be found. It is argued that neither horn looks promising. (shrink)

Hume describes the sciences as "noble entertainments" that are "proper food and nourishment" for reasonable beings (EHU 1.5-6; SBN 8).1 But mathematics, in particular, is more than noble entertainment; for millennia, agriculture, building, commerce, and other sciences have depended upon applying mathematics.2 In simpler cases, applied mathematics consists in inferring one matter of fact from another, say, the area of a floor from its length and width. In more sophisticated cases, applied mathematics consists in giving scientific theory a mathematical form (...) and then explaining and predicting matters of fact by means of mathematics and the theory. Since Hume holds that, "All inferences from experience are . . . .. (shrink)

It has been argued that Hume’s denial of infinite divisibility entails the falsity of most of the familiar theorems of Euclidean geometry, including the Pythagorean theorem and the bisection theorem. I argue that Hume’s thesis that there are indivisibles is not incompatible with the Pythagorean theorem and other central theorems of Euclidean geometry, but only with those theorems that deal with matters of minuteness. The key to understanding Hume’s view of geometry is the distinction he draws between a precise and (...) an imprecise standard of equality in extension. Hume’s project is different from the attempt made by Berkeley in some of his later writings to save Euclidean geometry. Unlike Berkeley, who interprets the theorems of Euclidean geometry as false albeit useful approximations of geometrical facts, Hume is able to save most of the central theorems as true. (shrink)

If Tahiti suggested to theorists comfortably at home in Europe thoughts of noble savages without clothes, those who paid for and went on voyages there were in pursuit of a quite opposite human ideal. Cook's voyage to observe the transit of Venus in 1769 symbolises the eighteenth century's commitment to numbers and accuracy, and its willingness to spend a lot of public money on acquiring them. The state supported the organisation of quantitative researches, employing surveyors and collecting statistics to..

In this paper, I shall discuss several topics related to Frege’s paradigms of second-order abstraction principles and his logicism. The discussion includes a critical examination of some controversial views put forward mainly by Robin Jeshion, Tyler Burge, Crispin Wright, Richard Heck and John MacFarlane. In the introductory section, I try to shed light on the connection between logical abstraction and logical objects. The second section contains a critical appraisal of Frege’s notion of evidence and its interpretation by Jeshion, the introduction (...) of the course-of-values operator and Frege’s attitude towards Axiom V, in the expression of which this operator occurs as the key primitive term. Axiom V says that the course-of-values of the function f is identical with the course-of-values of the function g if and only if f and g are coextensional. In the third section, I intend to show that in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) Frege hardly could have construed Hume’s Principle (HP) as a primitive truth of logic and used it as an axiom governing the cardinality operator as a primitive sign. HP expresses that the number of Fs is identical with the number of Gs if and only if F and G are equinumerous. In the fourth section, I argue that Wright falls short of making a convincing case for the alleged analyticity of HP. In the final section, I canvass Heck’s arguments for his contention that Frege knew he could deduce the simplest laws of arithmetic from HP without invoking Axiom V. I argue that they do not carry conviction. I conclude this section by rejecting an interpretation concerning HP suggested by MacFarlane. (shrink)

According to a standard interpretation of Hume’s argument against infinite divisibility, Hume is raising a purely formal problem for mathematical constructions of infinite divisibility, divorced from all thought of the stuffing or filling of actual physical continua. I resist this. Hume’s argument must be understood in the context of a popular early modern account of the metaphysical status of the parts of physical quantities. This interpretation disarms the standard mathematical objections to Hume’s reasoning; I also defend it on textual and (...) contextual grounds. (shrink)

We can modify Hume’s Principle in the same manner that George Boolos suggested for modifying Frege’s Basic Law V. This leads to the principle Small Hume. Then, we can show that Small Hume is interderivable with Hume’s Principle.

The present work considers Hume's critique of infinity in historical context as a product of Enlightenment theory of knowledge, and assesses the prospects of ...

Explains why Bob Hale's proposed notion of weak sense cannot explain the analyticity of Hume's principle as he claims. Argues that no other notion of the sort Hale wants could do the job either.

This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might be problematic. Also the so-called `surplus content' worry is discussed, (...) which points out that the conceptual resources to grasp Hume's Principle vastly outstrip the conceptual resources employed in arithmetical reasoning. And lastly whether Hume's Principle is in bad company with other unsuccessful implicit definitions. In the last section, an account towards our entitlement to Hume&'s Principle is sketched. (shrink)

Here, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright assemble the key writings that lead to their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to fourteen previously published papers, the volume features a new paper on the Julius Caesar problem; a substantial new introduction mapping out the program and the contributions made to it by the various papers; a section explaining which issues most require further attention; and bibliographies of references and further useful sources. It will be recognized as the (...) most powerful presentation yet of a neo-Fregean program. (shrink)

In “Hume on Geometry and Infinite Divisibility in the Treatise”, H. Mark Pressman charges that “the geometry Hume presents in the Treatise faces a serious set of problems”. This may well be; however, at least one of the charges Pressman levels against Hume invokes a false dichotomy, and a second rests on a non sequitur.

Neo-Fregeanism contends that knowledge of arithmetic may be acquired by second-order logical reflection upon Hume's principle. Heck argues that Hume's principle doesn't inform ordinary arithmetical reasoning and so knowledge derived from it cannot be genuinely arithmetical. To suppose otherwise, Heck claims, is to fail to comprehend the magnitude of Cantor's conceptual contribution to mathematics. Heck recommends that finite Hume's principle be employed instead to generate arithmetical knowledge. But a better understanding of Cantor's contribution is achieved if it is supposed that (...) Hume's principle really does inform arithmetical practice. More generally, Heck's arguments misconceive the epistemological character of neo-Fregeanism. (shrink)

El análisis de los conceptos de espacio y tiempo es generalmente considerado uno de los aspectos menos satisfactorios de la obra de Hume. Kemp Smith ha demostrado que en esta sección del Tratado Hume estaba respondiendo a los argumentos que Pierre Bayle había utilizado para probar que el razonamiento humano siempre termina refutándose a sí mismo. En este ensayo expongo las falacias en los argumentos de Bayle, las cuales están basadas en una comprensión inadecuada del concepto de extensión. Hume no (...) logró detectar dichas falacias y repitió los mismos errores de Bayle, lo cual explica la absurda doctrina del espacio que defiende en el Tratado. (shrink)

George Boolos, Crispin Wright, and others have demonstrated how most of Frege's treatment of arithmetic can be obtained from a second-order statement that Boolos dubbed ‘Hume's principle’. This note explores the historical evidence that Frege originally planned to develop a philosophical approach to numbers in which Hume's principle is central, but this strategy was abandoned midway through his Grundlagen.

Although Hume's analysis of geometry continues to serve as a reference point for many contemporary discussions in the philosophy of science, the fact that the first Enquiry presents a radical revision of Hume's conception of geometry in the Treatise has never been explained. The present essay closely examines Hume's early and late discussions of geometry and proposes a reconstruction of the reasons behind the change in his views on the subject. Hume's early conception of geometry as an inexact non-demonstrative science (...) is argued to be a consequence of his attempt to discredit geometrical proofs of infinite divisibility of extension by anchoring the meaning of geometrical concepts in inherently inexact qualitative measurement procedures. This measurement-based attack on the exactness and certainty of geometry is analyzed and shown to be both self-refuting and inconsistent with the general epistemological framework of the Treatise. The revised conception of geometry as a demonstrative science in the first Enquiry is then interpreted as Hume's response to the failure of his earlier attempt to discredit geometrical proofs of infinite divisibility of extension. (shrink)

Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. xiv + 270, Hb 40.00 ISBN 0-19-509721-1.

The paper formulates and proves a strengthening of 'Frege's Theorem', which states that axioms for second-order arithmetic are derivable in second-order logic from Hume's Principle, which itself says that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs just in case the Fs and Gs are equinumerous. The improvement consists in restricting this claim to finite concepts, so that nothing is claimed about the circumstances under which infinite concepts have the same number. 'Finite Hume's Principle' also suffices (...) for the derivation of axioms for arithmetic and, indeed, is equivalent to a version of them, in the presence of Frege's definitions of the primitive expressions of the language of arithmetic. The philosophical significance of this result is also discussed. (shrink)

David Hume's central distinction in the Treatise and Enquiry is between relations of ideas and matters of fact. Although most of the attention in the secondary literature is on the latter, I am directly concerned with analyzing Hume's characterization of relations of ideas. In particular, I analyze Hume's attempt to secure certainty and necessity within his empiricist system since these are the defining characteristics of Hume's perfect species of knowledge--arithmetic. The focus, then, is on how Hume justifies the special status (...) of arithmetical knowledge. ;Two interpretations of Hume's philosophy of arithmetic have been offered in the secondary literature. But I argue that both are inadequate since, among other things, they fail to render arithmetic consistent with Hume's general theory of meaning nor do they connect the certainty of arithmetic with Hume's discussion of 1-1 correspondence. After critically analyzing these two positions, I argue for a new interpretation. I show that Hume's aversion to abstraction and infinite divisibility leads to a constructivist account of number--one which bears a strong resemblance to mathematical intuitionism. ;Not surprisingly, certainty and necessity are difficult to obtain in the Humean system. The subjective nature of psychological links of association precludes certainty. So Hume needs to connect arithmetic with something outside of his phenomenological experience. And I argue that this something else is the metaphysical makeup of space. In Book I, Part II of the Treatise, Hume adapts Zeno's metrical paradox to demonstrate that objective reality must consist of absolute simples, which Hume calls "units". Hume then uses these units as the building blocks for his constructivist theory of number. For only after establishing the existence of units, does Hume make his central distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact and deploy his constructivism. ;Although problematic, Hume's philosophy of arithmetic provides us with a new perspective on his empiricism. Hume's frequently ignored discussion of space is found to impact directly his views on arithmetic. And his commitment to absolute simples provides direct evidence that Hume is a skeptical realist, having more in common with Locke than previously recognized. (shrink)

Throughout history, almost all mathematicians, physicists and philosophers have been of the opinion that space and time are infinitely divisible. That is, it is usually believed that space and time do not consist of atoms, but that any piece of space and time of non-zero size, however small, can itself be divided into still smaller parts. This assumption is included in geometry, as in Euclid, and also in the Euclidean and non- Euclidean geometries used in modern physics. Of the few (...) who have denied that space and time are infinitely divisible, the most notable are the ancient atomists, and Berkeley and Hume. All of these assert not only that space and time might be atomic, but that they must be. Infinite divisibility is, they say, impossible on purely conceptual grounds. (shrink)