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  1. added 2019-06-06
    Bayesian Analyses of Hume’s Argument Concerning Miracles.Michael Levine - 1997 - Philosophy and Theology 10 (1):101-106.
    Bayesian analyses are prominent among recent and allegedly novel interpretations of Hume’s argument against the justified belief in miracles. However, since there is no consensus on just what Hume’s argument is any Bayesian analysis will beg crucial issues of interpretation. Apart from independent philosophical arguments—arguments that would undermine the relevance of a Bayesian analysis to the question of the credibility of reports of the miraculous—no such analysis can, in principle, prove that no testimony can establish the credibility of a miracle. (...)
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  2. added 2019-06-06
    Philosophy and the Good Life: Hume's Defence of Probable Reasoning.David Owen - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):485-504.
    Could John Locke defend his view that the knowledge we acquire in intuition and demonstration is infallible, and should he try to defend it? Peter Schouls thinks the project is unviable, and I think Schouls is right. But I also think Locke should not even bother trying. I shall elaborate on the argument that he could not defend the view, indicate why I think he should abandon infallibility, given his other views, and then investigate what he might usefully say about (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-06
    Hume's Probability Argument of I,Iv,1.Richard DeWitt - 1985 - Hume Studies 11 (2):125-140.
  4. added 2019-04-08
    Hume’s Conceivability Arguments Reconsidered.Bo Chen & Jingxian Liu - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (5):541-559.
    This paper examines Hume’s formulations and uses of the conceivability principle and the inconceivability principle. In Hume’s works, we identify different versions of CP and ICP, including proper CP, proper ICP, the weak versions of CP and ICP, the epistemic versions of CP and ICP, and show that Hume not only expresses ICP, but also really maintains it. Assuming an axiomatic characterization of modalities, we argue that if there is a sharp distinction between levels of modalities, then Hume’s conceivability arguments (...)
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  5. added 2016-05-15
    "The Real 'Letter to Arbuthnot'? A Motive For Hume's Probability Theory in an Early Modern Design Argument".Catherine Kemp - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):468-491.
    John Arbuthnot's celebrated but flawed paper in the Philosophical Transactions of 1711-12 is a philosophically and historically plausible target of Hume's probability theory. Arbuthnot argues for providential design rather than chance as a cause of the annual birth ratio, and the paper was championed as a successful extension of the new calculations of the value of wagers in games of chance to wagers about natural and social phenomena. Arbuthnot replaces the earlier anti-Epicurean notion of chance with the equiprobability assumption of (...)
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  6. added 2016-05-02
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. G. Stove - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):237-239.
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  7. added 2016-05-02
    Hume's Probabilism.F. N. Harpley - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):146 – 151.
  8. added 2015-06-21
    Hume's Species of Probability.Ian Hacking - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 33 (1):21 - 37.
  9. added 2015-05-24
    STOVE, D. C. "Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism". [REVIEW]E. Millstone - 1976 - Mind 85:297.
  10. added 2015-05-11
    Hume, Probability, Lotteries and Miracles.Bruce Langtry - 1990 - Hume Studies 16 (1):67-74.
    Hume’s main argument against rational belief in miracles might seem to rule out rational belief in other antecedently improbable occurrences as well--for example, a certain person’s having won the lottery. Dorothy Coleman has recently defended Hume against the lottery counterexample, invoking Hume’s distinction between probability of chances and probability of causes. I argue that Coleman’s defence fails.
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  11. added 2015-05-11
    Hume, Miracles and Lotteries.Dorothy P. Coleman - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (2):328-346.
    THIS PAPER ANSWERS RECENT CRITICISMS OF HUME’S SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO MIRACLES BY THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT THERE ARE COUNTEREXAMPLES, ILLUSTRATED BY LOTTERIES, TO HUME’S ACCOUNT OF HOW THE TRUTH OF REPORTS ABOUT IMPROBABLE EVENTS MUST BE EVALUATED. THE AUTHOR FIRST SHOWS THAT THESE ARGUMENTS ARE ANALOGOUS TO BUTLER’S CRITICISM OF HUME’S PREDECESSORS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT MIRACLES. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT EACH OF THESE CRITICISMS COLLAPSES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROBABILITIES PERTAINING TO EVENTS QUA UNIQUE OCCURRENCES AND PROBABILITIES PERTAINING (...)
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  12. added 2015-01-27
    The Theorem of Convergence of Opinions and Hume's Problem.Chen Xiaoping - 2008 - Modern Philosophy 5:014.
    The theorem of convergence of opinions is an important theorem in the subjective theory of probability.It demonstrates that the subjectivity of a prior probability will be substituted with the objectivity of a posterior probability as evidences increase.The theorem of convergence of opinions is regarded as the dynamic principle of rationality concerning the subjective probability,and therefore is used to resolve Hume's problem,i.e.,the problem of inductive rationality.However,Hacking convincingly argues that the theorem of convergence of opinions is not about the convergence of a (...)
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  13. added 2015-01-24
    Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism. [REVIEW]Maria Wolf - 1976 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 25:353-353.
  14. added 2015-01-24
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism. By D. C. Stove. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. 132. £ 3.00. [REVIEW]James Noxon - 1973 - Dialogue 12 (4):735-741.
  15. added 2015-01-14
    Vindicating a Bayesian Approach to Confirming Miracles: A Response to Jordan Howard Sobel's Reading of Hume.John DePoe - 2008 - Philosophia Christi 10 (1):229 - 238.
    This paper defends a Bayesian approach to confirming a miracle against Jordan Howard Sobel’s recent novel interpretation of Hume’s criticisms. In his book, ’Logic and Theism’, Sobel offers an intriguing and original way to apply Hume’s criticisms against the possibility of having sufficient evidence to confirm a miracle. The key idea behind Sobel’s approach is to employ infinitesimal probabilities to neutralize the cumulative effects of positive evidence for any miracle. This paper aims to undermine Sobel’s use of infinitesimal probabilities to (...)
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  16. added 2015-01-11
    Baconian Probability and Hume’s Theory of Testimony.Dorothy Coleman - 2001 - Hume Studies 27 (2):195-226.
    The foremost advocate of Baconian probability, L. J. Cohen, has credited Hume for being the first to explicitly recognize that there is an important kind of probability which does not fit into the framework afforded by the calculus of chance, a recognition that is evident in Hume's distinction between analogical probability and probabilities arising from chance or cause. This essay defends Hume's account of the credibility of testimony, including his notorious argument against the credibility of testimony to miracles, in light (...)
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  17. added 2015-01-07
    The Best Humean System for Statistical Mechanics.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):551-574.
    Classical statistical mechanics posits probabilities for various events to occur, and these probabilities seem to be objective chances. This does not seem to sit well with the fact that the theory’s time evolution is deterministic. We argue that the tension between the two is only apparent. We present a theory of Humean objective chance and show that chances thus understood are compatible with underlying determinism and provide an interpretation of the probabilities we find in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics.
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  18. added 2015-01-07
    Unsharp Humean Chances in Statistical Physics: A Reply to Beisbart.Luke Glynn, Radin Dardashti, Karim P. Y. Thebault & Mathias Frisch - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 531-542.
    In an illuminating article, Claus Beisbart argues that the recently-popular thesis that the probabilities of statistical mechanics (SM) are Best System chances runs into a serious obstacle: there is no one axiomatization of SM that is robustly best, as judged by the theoretical virtues of simplicity, strength, and fit. Beisbart takes this 'no clear winner' result to imply that the probabilities yielded by the competing axiomatizations simply fail to count as Best System chances. In this reply, we express sympathy for (...)
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  19. added 2015-01-07
    Physics and the Humean Approach to Probability.Carl Hoefer - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. pp. 321.
  20. added 2015-01-07
    David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance.Barry Loewer - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.
    The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual “interpretations of probability” give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance” he described a framework (...)
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  21. added 2015-01-07
    La Causalidad Probabilista Y Las Dificultades Del Enfoque Humeano (Probabilistic Causality and the Difficulties of the Humean Approach).Sebastián Alvarez - 1998 - Theoria 13 (3):521-542.
    Comienzo este artículo mostrando que las teorías neohumeanas de la causalidad probabilista basadas en la noción de relevancia estadlstica (como la teoria de Suppes, 1970) se encuentran con múltiples e insuperables dificultades. Luego analizo brevemente algunas versiones de la causalidad probabilista que relativizan o prescinden de dicha noción: la de Cartwright, que postula la existencia de capacidades causales, y las de Salmon y Dowe, quienes, aunque se proponen no abandonar el suelo humeano, creen necesario introducir una ontología de propensiones. Y (...)
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  22. added 2014-03-31
    Hume on Probability.Barry Gower - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (1):1-19.
  23. added 2014-03-26
    Hume's Inductive Logic.Alberto Mura - 1998 - Synthese 115 (3):303-331.
    This paper presents a new account of Hume’s “probability of causes”. There are two main results attained in this investigation. The first, and perhaps the most significant, is that Hume developed – albeit informally – an essentially sound system of probabilistic inductive logic that turns out to be a powerful forerunner of Carnap’s systems. The Humean set of principles include, along with rules that turn out to be new for us, well known Carnapian principles, such as the axioms of semiregularity, (...)
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  24. added 2014-03-22
    Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God.Rodney D. Holder - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):49-65.
    Hume's argument concerning miracles is interpreted by making approximations to terms in Bayes's theorem. This formulation is then used to analyse the impact of multiple testimony. Individual testimonies which are ‘non-miraculous’ in Hume's sense can in principle be accumulated to yield a high probability both for the occurrence of a single miracle and for the occurrence of at least one of a set of miracles. Conditions are given under which testimony for miracles may provide support for the existence of God.
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  25. added 2014-03-18
    Bayesianism, Analogy, and Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.Sally Ferguson - 2002 - Hume Studies 28 (1):113-130.
    Analyses of the argument from design in Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion have generally treated that argument as an example of reasoning by analogy. In this paper I examine whether it is in accord with Hume's thinking about the argument to subsume the version of it given in the Dialogues under the model of probabilistic reasoning offered by Bayes's theorem. Wesley Salmon attempted this project in 1978. In related projects, David Owen as well as Philip Dawid and Donald Gillies have (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-15
    Hume on Knowledge, Certainty and Probability: Anticipating the Disintegration of the Analytic/Synthetic Divide?Kevin Meeker - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):226–242.
    This paper contends that the first argument of Hume's "Of scepticism with regard to reason" entails that humans have no knowledge as Hume understands knowledge. In defending this claim, we also see how Hume's argument anticipates an important aspect of an extremely influential 20th century development: the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  27. added 2014-03-07
    A New Look at Hume’s Theory of Probabilistic Inference.Mark Collier - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (1):21-36.
    We must rethink our assessment of Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference. Hume scholars have traditionally dismissed his naturalistic explanation of how we make inferences under conditions of uncertainty; however, psychological experiments and computer models from cognitive science provide substantial support for Hume’s account. Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference is far from obsolete or outdated; on the contrary, it stands at the leading edge of our contemporary science of the mind.
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  28. added 2014-03-07
    Miracles, Historical Testimonies, and Probabilities.Aviezer Tucker - 2005 - History and Theory 44 (3):373–390.
    The topic and methods of David Hume’s "Of Miracles" resemble his historiographical more than his philosophical works. Unfortunately, Hume and his critics and apologists have shared the prescientific, indeed ahistorical, limitations of Hume’s original historical investigations. I demonstrate the advantages of the critical methodological approach to testimonies, developed initially by German biblical critics in the late eighteenth century, to a priori discussions of miracles. Any future discussion of miracles and Hume must use the critical method to improve the quality and (...)
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  29. added 2013-12-08
    Hume on Probability. David - 1986 - In Moyal (ed.), Early Modem Philosophy. Caravan Books.
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  30. added 2013-09-04
    Certainty, Necessity, and Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Miren Boehm - 2013 - In Stanley Tweyman (ed.), David Hume, A Tercentenary Tribute [the version in PhilPapers is the accurate, final version of the paper].
    Hume appeals to different kinds of certainties and necessities in the Treatise. He contrasts the certainty that arises from intuition and demonstrative reasoning with the certainty that arises from causal reasoning. He denies that the causal maxim is absolutely or metaphysically necessary, but he nonetheless takes the causal maxim and ‘proofs’ to be necessary. The focus of this paper is the certainty and necessity involved in Hume’s concept of knowledge. I defend the view that intuitive certainty, in particular, is certainty (...)
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  31. added 2013-09-02
    'Why Should Probability Be the Guide of Life?D. C. Stove - 1976 - In 50-68 Livingston & King (ed.), Hume.
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  32. added 2013-08-21
    Probabilistic Induction and Hume's Problem: Reply to Lange.Samir Okasha - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):419–424.
    Marc Lange has criticized my assertion that relative to a Bayesian conception of inductive reasoning, Hume's argument for inductive scepticism cannot be run. I reply that the way in which Lange suggests one should run the Humean argument in a Bayesian framework ignores the fact that in Bayesian models of learning from experience, the domain of an agent's probability measure is exogenously determined. I also show that Lange is incorrect to equate probability distributions which 'support inductive inferences' with probability distributions (...)
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  33. added 2013-08-19
    Probability in Hume's Science of Man.Patrick Maher - 1981 - Hume Studies 7 (2):137-153.
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  34. added 2013-08-18
    The Logic of Probabilities in Hume's Argument Against Miracles.Fred Wilson - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (2):255-275.
  35. added 2013-08-18
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1973 - Oxford, UK: Oxford, Clarendon Press.
    This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Hume's argument that induction must be either deductively valid or circular because based (...)
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  36. added 2013-08-18
    Hume, Probability, and Induction.D. Stove - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (2):160-177.
  37. added 2013-08-17
    Induction, Hume, and Probability.Dugald Murdoch - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):185 - 199.
  38. added 2013-08-17
    Probability and Causality: Why Hume and Indeterminism Don't Mix.John Dupre & Nancy Cartwright - 1988 - Noûs 22 (4):521-536.
  39. added 2013-08-17
    On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):166-186.
    A BAYESIAN ARTICULATION OF HUME’S VIEWS IS OFFERED BASED ON A FORM OF THE BAYES-LAPLACE THEOREM THAT IS SUPERFICIALLY LIKE A FORMULA OF CONDORCET’S. INFINITESIMAL PROBABILITIES ARE EMPLOYED FOR MIRACLES AGAINST WHICH THERE ARE ’PROOFS’ THAT ARE NOT OPPOSED BY ’PROOFS’. OBJECTIONS MADE BY RICHARD PRICE ARE DEALT WITH, AND RECENT EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED BY AMOS TVERSKY AND DANIEL KAHNEMAN ARE CONSIDERED IN WHICH PERSONS TEND TO DISCOUNT PRIOR IMPROBABILITIES WHEN ASSESSING REPORTS OF WITNESSES.
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  40. added 2013-08-16
    Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation.David Owen - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):187-202.
    Hume’s celebrated argument concerning miracles, and an 18th century criticism of it put forward by Richard Price, is here interpreted in terms of the modern controversy over the base-rate fallacy. When considering to what degree we should trust a witness, should we or should we not take into account the prior probability of the event reported? The reliability of the witness (’Pr’(says e/e)) is distinguished from the credibility of the testimony (’Pr’(e/says e)), and it is argued that Hume, as a (...)
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  41. added 2013-08-15
    Hume, Miracles, and Probabilities: Meeting Earman's Challenge.Peter Millican - manuscript
    The centrepiece of Earman’s provocatively titled book Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles is a probabilistic interpretation of Hume’s famous ‘maxim’ concerning the credibility of miracle reports, followed by a trenchant critique of the maxim when thus interpreted. He argues that the first part of this maxim, once its obscurity is removed, is simply trivial, while the second part is nonsensical. His subsequent discussion culminates with a forthright challenge to any would-be defender of Hume to ‘point to some thesis (...)
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  42. added 2013-08-15
    Hume, Induction, and Probability.Peter Millican - manuscript
    The overall aim of this thesis is to understand Hume’s famous argument concerning induction, and to appraise its success in establishing its conclusion. The thesis accordingly falls into two main parts, the first being concerned with analysis and interpretation of the argument itself, and the second with investigation of possible responses to it. Naturally the argument’s interpretation strongly constrains the range of possible replies, and indeed the results of Part I indicate that the only kind of strategy which stands much (...)
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  43. added 2013-08-15
    Hume's Knowledge of Bayes's Theorem.David Raynor - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):105 - 106.
  44. added 2013-08-14
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism. [REVIEW]Clifford A. Hooker - 1975 - Hume Studies 1 (1):25-29.
  45. added 2013-08-13
    Bayes, Hume, and Miracles.John Earman - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):293-310.
    Recent attempts to cast Hume’s argument against miracles in a Bayesian form are examined. It is shown how the Bayesian apparatus does serve to clarify the structure and substance of Hume’s argument. But the apparatus does not underwrite Hume’s various claims, such as that no testimony serves to establish the credibility of a miracle; indeed, the Bayesian analysis reveals various conditions under which it would be reasonable to reject the more interesting of Hume’s claims.
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