Hume: Philosophy of Religion

I examine Hume’s claim in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals that the theistic form of religion tends to distort philosophical thought about the nature of morality. I argue that we can see this thesis as a local application of Hume’s wider claim, intimated in various other works, that theistic religion tends to deform philosophy more generally. Understanding Hume’s account of the general tendency of theistic religion to subjugate and deform philosophy helps us set the moral case in its (...) proper context. At the same time, the Enquiry’s account of the distortion of moral theorizing stands as Hume’s most detailed example of the kind of threat that theism poses to philosophy, and therefore helps to clarify Hume’s analysis of that more general threat. (shrink)

David Hume, the celebrated Scottish philosopher of the 18th century, wrote a work entitled Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in which he provides a detailed criticism of several theistic arguments. In the Dialogues there are found 3 interlocutors, each of whom approaches natural religion from a different philosophical standpoint. Cleanthes is the character upon whose argumentation we will mainly focus, as he is the defender of the a posteriori argument from Intelligent Design. Philo, another interlocutor, is a philosophical skeptic who opposes (...) Cleanthes' arguments. Out of the three, many consider Philo's positions to be representative of those of Hume himself. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Philo's objection to Cleanthes' Intelligent Design argument, and to show that the analogy within the ID argument is strong and that it warrants belief in the existence of a designer of the universe. (shrink)

Hume’s chapter “Of Miracles” has been widely discussed, and one issue is that Hume seems to simply beg the question. Hume has a strong but implicit naturalist bias when he argues against the existence of reliable testimony for miracles. In this article, I explain that Hume begs the question, despite what he says about the possibility of miracles occurring. The main point is that he never describes a violation of the laws of nature that could not be explained by scientific (...) theories. (shrink)

Peter Millican je profesor filosofie a Gilbert Ryle Fellow na Hertford College, University of Oxford. Věnuje se především epistemologii, filosofii jazyka a náboženství, zabývá se dílem Davida Huma a Alana Turinga. Je autorem více než padesáti časopisecky publikovaných studií, editoval sborníky The Legacy of Alan Turing (Oxford University Press, 1996) a Reading Hume on Human Understanding (Oxford University Press, 2002). Připravil kritické vydání Humova An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding v edici Oxford World's Classics (Oxford University Press, 2008) a spravuje internetový (...) archiv Humových textů na Hume Texts Online. Rozhovor, který se odehrál v létě roku 2016, poznámkami pod čarou opatřil překladatel. (shrink)

Žádnému tématu – s výjimkou historie Anglie – nevěnoval David Hume více pozornosti než náboženství. Jak už to ale s Humovým filosofickým odkazem bývá, i jeho teorie náboženství byla podrobena celé řadě mnohdy naprosto protikladných interpretací – a právě těm bude věnována první část mého článku. Došlo totiž k pokusům představit jej jako teistu, fideistu, deistu, agnostika nebo ateistu. Ve druhé části budu obhajovat hypotézu, podle níž je úsilí zařadit Huma do jediného údajně správného výkladu liché, protože každá taková snaha (...) naráží na nepřekonatelné terminologické spory, interpretační potíže a argumentační pochybení. Nemusí nás ovšem zajímat, co si Hume ve skutečnosti o náboženství myslel, případně za jaký typ věřícího či nevěřícího se považoval. Mnohem přínosnější je pochopit, jakým způsobem Humova koncepce předchází a obohacuje současnou ateologii. Ve třetí části proto představím textovou evidenci z primárních pramenů, v nichž se Hume zabýval kritikou zjeveného i přirozeného náboženství, morálních i psychologických aspektů religiozity. Závěrem se krátce zamyslím nad Humovou koncepcí „pravého náboženství“ a jejím uplatněním v sekulární společnosti. (shrink)

One of the obstacles to progress in psychical research is irrational resistance to the phenomena. Among eighteenth-century Enlightenment writers, one type of resistance was evident that has persisted until present times. To illustrate, the present paper looks at David Hume’s discussion of miracles in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume’s essay actually lays out a good case for some extraordinary events reported about the death of the Jansenist Francois de Paris—phenomena produced by the so-called ‘‘convulsionaries of St. Medard.’’ The (...) contradiction is resolved by Hume himself, who naively reveals what motivates him to deny the overwhelming testimony he reviews: namely, his fear of validating religion. This paper notes the same pressure to deny ‘‘miracles’’ in another eighteenth-century writer, Edward Gibbon; Gibbon, however, unlike Hume, yields to the pressure of evidence and admits one startling instance of a well-documented preternatural event. A third figure from the same century is cited, a rationalistic Promotor Fidei of the Catholic Church, Prosper Lambertini, who, ironically, may be cited as having advanced the cause of the scientific investigation of psychic phenomena. The lesson from history is not to be seduced by stereotypes: an empiricist can deny and distort facts; a religious believer can be critical and objective. Keywords: David Hume—miracles—convulsionaries of St. Medard—Edward Gibbon—Prosper Lambertini. (shrink)

This paper critically examines David Berman's theological lying interpretation of Hume and identifies two types of theological lying: the denial of atheism strategy and the pious Christian strategy. It is argued that neither reading successfully establishes an atheist interpretation of Hume. Moreover, circumstantial evidence shows that Hume's position was different from that of the atheists of his time. Attributions theological lying to Hume, therefore, are unwarranted and should be rejected, even if we grant that this literary technique was used in (...) the early-modern era. Analysing other non-theistic readings of Hume is beyond the scope of this paper. However, given that Berman presents one of most elaborated atheist reinterpretations of Hume's affirmative theistic passages, the failure of Berman's analysis shows that rejecting these passages should not be the default interpretive approach, and it is reasonable to attribute to Hume a weak, indeterminate theism. (shrink)

Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion may be read in the way Cleanthes reads Nature, as analogous to human artifice and contrivance. The Dialogues and Nature then are both texts, with an intelligent author or Author, and analogies may be started from these five facts of Hume's text: the independence of Hume's characters; the non-straightforwardness of the characters' discourse; the way the characters interact and live; the entanglements of Pamphilus as an internal author; and the ways in which a reader is (...) also involved in making a dialogue. These and other analogies should reflect upon the Author of Nature as they do upon Hume's authorship: They do not prove the existence of their respective authors, but may well shed some light on the nature of these disparate beings. (shrink)

I clarify Hume's concept of miracle with Kierkegaard's concept of absolute paradox. I argue that absolute paradox is like that miracle which, according to Hume, allows a human being to believe Christianity against the principles of his understanding. I draw such a conclusion on the basis that Kierkegaard does not think Christianity is a doctrine with a truth value and, furthermore, he holds that all historical events are doubtful. Kierkegaard emphasizes the absolute paradox as the condition of faith in such (...) a way that it becomes close to Hume's idea of personal miracle which causes the subversion of the believer's principles of understanding. Hence, the absolute paradox cannot be a possible supporting event for the credibility of Christianity. Absolute paradox more closely approximates Hume's second miracle insofar as it makes persons believe contrary to their custom and experience. (shrink)

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its (...) reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists.Export citation. (shrink)

Although Joseph Priestley was notorious for rejecting much of orthodox Christianity and replacing it with a materialistic Unitarianism, in another respect he was an orthodox theist of his time in that he passionately upheld the Argument from Design. The Argument from Design was the heart of his “rational religion”. He contended that natural order, especially biological order, could only be successfully explained by intentional agency. At the time, however, the Argument was coming under attack, first from David Hume, then from (...) Matthew Turner, and lastly from Erasmus Darwin. Priestley replied to each of these critics. This article surveys his replies. The three critics of the Argument contended that intelligent agency could offer only a weak explanation of natural order or that natural order is self-explanatory or that natural mechanisms can explain biological order. Priestley in turn critiqued all three contentions, arguing that the Argument is a strong explanation; that natural order cannot be self-explanatory; and that the proposed natural explanations conflict with the empirical evidence. (shrink)

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its (...) reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists. (shrink)

In March 2010, Professor Tom Devine, widely acknowledged as the leading academic historian of Scotland, presented a plenary lecture for the Royal Society of Edinburgh's yearly symposium, "Connections between Scotland and Slavery." Publicly advertised as a reply to the question "Did Slavery Make Scotland Great?" Devine's talk was eagerly anticipated by the group of international scholars gathered at the University of Edinburgh. His answer, however, may have been more controversial than the audience anticipated. Devine said that the economic transformation of (...) eighteenth-century Scotland was a direct result of capital produced by slave labor, disproportionately financed and largely managed by Scots. The notion that... (shrink)

Understandably, given the interpretive challenges posed by the dialogue form, the focus of David Hume's interest in religion in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion can be difficult to pinpoint.1 Much Hume scholarship on the Dialogues has traditionally suffered from two major shortcomings. First, its treatment of Hume's interest in religion is primarily theoretical or speculative, as though Hume were concerned above all to determine the nature of "true religion," say, or to dismiss religious belief altogether as simply irrational. Such scholarship (...) regards the Dialogues as a vehicle for delivering a theoretical or epistemological treatment of questions concerning the nature and existence of God, and has little... (shrink)

Close examination of the works of David Hume shows that his aim to explain the problem of evil is to attack natural theology and introduce it as a situation that is non-epistemological and unsystematic. So, contrary to what the majority of interpretations which typically express that he makes an argument against the existence of God, Hume wants to show that the statements of natural theology are rationally unprovable, and he does not want to totally decline them. As a matter of (...) fact, they ontologically exist, and are epistemologically out of human cognition. This article shows that the popular interpretation is false, and this would be done in two ways: the first is Hume’s statements about the cause of the world, and the second is Hume’s solutions for the problem of evil, that have mystical streaks. Based on these fact, it will be shown that Hume is not an atheist, but he is a mystical fideist. (shrink)

This thesis explores the implications of Hume’s puzzling concept of true religion. The existing literature tends to either take it as entirely tactical or to read it from a theistic perspective. Focusing mainly on the Dialogues, this dissertation takes another route, arguing that while Hume is serious about the notion of true religion, his concern is pragmatic rather than theistic. The central argument is that Hume has, in fact, provided two very different versions of true religion in the Dialogues: Philo’s (...) version is a minimized theology for “the learned”, while Cleanthes proposes an ideal of regulated popular religion for “the vulgar”. Overall, Hume attempts to find a proper position for religion in a modern society by restricting theology to a limited academic sphere and regulating the priestly power under the civil authority. In particular, Chapters 1 and 2 investigate the arguments and difficulties of the atheistic and theistic readings of Hume’s true religion, showing that true religion is likely to be Hume’s own idea and that his concern about the topic is secular in nature. Chapter 3 presents a textual reading of the statements of true religion by Philo and Cleanthes in the Dialogues, suggesting that their differences originate from Hume’s distinction between “the learned” and “the vulgar”, which is of great significance in his philosophy, as well as throughout his personal life. Chapters 4 and 5 explore the implications of Philo’s and Cleanthes’ concept of true religion respectively, showing that the former admits to a limited form of theism that rests on an epistemological “remote probability”, while the latter explores the potential benefits of popular religion in the moral and political sphere. Chapter 6 reconstructs three approaches to achieving the ideal of true religion from Hume’s texts: a philosophical cure, a tolerant state church, and historical education for the progress of moral taste. Finally, Chapter 7 evaluates the implications of Hume’s pragmatic concern and functional accounts of true religion, both historically and contemporarily. (shrink)

Traditionally, Demea is considered to be the weakest character in Hume’s famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion; the stage is completely dominated by Cleanthes’ optimistic theism and by Philo’s skeptical critical manoeuvres against that. Contrary to this traditional approach, however, the ‘orthodox’ Demea will be defended here by maintaining that Demea contributes—though neither consciously intended nor recognized by Hume—the most interesting observations concerning religious belief. He points to a position lying beyond the metaphysical fantasies of theism on the one hand and (...) Philo’s destructiveness, which seems to amount to a moralized minimal version of faith on the other. It will be clear that this defense is not exegetically orientated, but rather reacts to a constellation personalized in Hume’s ‘casting’ that lets us see on which topics we shall continue to work theologically as well as philosophically today. Accordingly, a conceptual critique of Cleanthes and Philo will be elaborated, using three concrete examples to show what religious belief lying beyond metaphysical hopes that explain God as a person, as well as reductionist concessions that regard ‘God’ merely as an expression of a moral attitude, could look like. Thus Demea represents a ‘postmetaphysical’ image of religious belief—and, eventually, we are invited to belong to the “friends of Demea”. (shrink)

Os Diálogos sobre a Religião Naturalestão, certamente, entre as obras mais conhecidas de David Hume. Dividido em doze partes, o texto examina, por meio de um diálogo entre o místico Demea, o deísta Cleantes e o cético Filo, diversos argumentos acerca da existência e da suposta natureza da divindade. Trata-se de publicação que gerou enorme controvérsia. Hume afirma, em carta de 10 de março de 1751 a Sir Gilbert Elliot, que faz de Cleantes “o herói” da história. Ainda, em outra (...) correspondência, remetida em 8 de junho de 1776 a William Strahan, seu editor, Hume pretende convencê-lo a publicar os Diálogos, não sem apresentar a ressalva de que, ainda que o cético seja silenciado ao final, a obra apresenta, antes disso, tópicos que poderiam gerar comoção. (shrink)

Hume’s arguments against the cosmological argument have, in the past century, often been highly praised by commentators such as H.D.Aiken and E.C. Mossner. While Hume’s argument often receives strong philosophical support, the four major objections raised against the cosmological argument in book IX of his Dialogues hinge upon a misunderstanding of Newtonian natural philosophy. Hence, when the proper historical context is considered, Hume’s objections are weak at best, for they assume an understanding of matter and physical necessity that are inconsistent (...) with Newtonian natural philosophy. This paper will outline Hume’s objections, and explore how the formulation of the cosmological argument put forth by the English philosopher Samuel Clarke was reliant upon the best available scientific evidence, i.e. Newtonian philosophy. Consequently, any contemporary supporter of Hume who believes that his argument was successful in quenching the enlightenment era reiteration of the cosmological argument does so anachronistically. (shrink)

Traditionally, Demea is considered to be the weakest character in Hume’s famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion; the stage is completely dominated by Cleanthes’ optimistic theism and by Philo’s skeptical critical manoeuvres against that. Contrary to this traditional approach, however, the ‘orthodox’ Demea will be defended here by maintaining that Demea contributes—though neither consciously intended nor recognized by Hume—the most interesting observations concerning religious belief. He points to a position lying beyond the metaphysical fantasies of theism on the one hand and (...) Philo’s destructiveness, which seems to amount to a moralized minimal version of faith on the other. It will be clear that this defense is not exegetically orientated, but rather reacts to a constellation personalized in Hume’s ‘casting’ that lets us see on which topics we shall continue to work theologically as well as philosophically today. Accordingly, a conceptual critique of Cleanthes and Philo will be elaborated, using three concrete examples to show what religious belief lying beyond metaphysical hopes that explain God as a person, as well as reductionist concessions that regard ‘God’ merely as an expression of a moral attitude, could look like. Thus Demea represents a ‘postmetaphysical’ image of religious belief—and, eventually, we are invited to belong to the “friends of Demea”. (shrink)

Tradução para o português da obra "História natural da religião", de David Hume.Tradução, apresentação e notas: Jaimir Conte. Editora da UNESP: São Paulo, 1ª ed. 2005. ISBN: 8571396043.

Apresentação da tradução da obra "História Natural da Religião", de David Hume, publicada pela Editora Unesp em 2005.

This volume contains the Dialogues, The Natural History of Religion, and several short essays and selections from other works. The selection is a good one, but the editor's introduction does little to explicate the principles upon which Hume's writings on religion are based or to connect them with his other philosophical work.—A. F. G.

David Hume’un Doğal Din Üzerine Diyaloglar kitabı, başlığının da ima ettiği gibi, vahiy metinlerine başvurmadan Tanrı’nın varlığına ve niteliklerine ulaşılıp ulaşılamayacağını araştıran bir metindir. Metin boyunca, felsefe tarihinde de gördüğümüz, iki ana yaklaşımı temsil eden iki temel argüman sunulur. Bunlardan ilki, a priori yaklaşımı temsil eden kozmolojik argümandır. Diğeri ise, a posteriori yaklaşımı temsi eden zeki tasarım argümanıdır. Bu yazıda, Hume’un, diyalogdaki Philo karakteri üzerinden ortaya koyduğu, kozmolojik argümana yönelik eleştirileri ele alınıp, böyle bir argümanın neden Tanrı’nın varlığı ve nitelikleri (...) konusunda bizi bir sonuca ulaştırmayacağı ortaya konmuştur. (shrink)

Hume's Critique Of Religion: ‘Sick Men's Dreams’. By Bailey Alan, Brien Dan O’.

One of the most popular accounts of the teleological argument for the existence of God is the analogical account that is the center of Hume’s knocker criticisms. Since Hume’s age, many theist scholars have attempted to propose convincing responses. Motahari is one of the rigorous thinkers who tackled the challenges which Hume posed. The purpose of this paper is to address Hume’s criticisms and assess Motahari’s rejoinders to them. It will be argued that Motahari’s responses do not seem successful. Although (...) Motahari has tried to refute Hume’s criticisms in some of his works, he implicitly endorsed Hume’s assessment of the analogical account of the teleological argument in other works, and came ultimately close to the Hume’s view. As Hume believed that the argument from design is not a successful philosophical argument to prove God’s existence that the theist contend, Motahari also admits at the end that this argument alone cannot prove God’s existence and emphasizes that the argument from design cannot prove God of Abraham’s religions, that is a person with necessary being, who is immaterial and eternal, is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and the creator of the universe. Motahari ultimately believed in deficiency of the argument from design too, and assessed it as an argument with limited functions for God’s existence. (shrink)

David Hume escribió muchas obras sobre asuntos religiosos. Sus Diálogos sobre la religión natural presentan ideas de una teología natural y la así llamada religión natural. Mi objetivo en este estudio es subrayar algunos aspectos de su Historia Natural de la Religión, en la cual presenta una historia deductiva de las instituciones religiosas. Por “deductiva” quiero decir un método con una preconcepción del objeto de estudio que es interpretado dentro de este marco. Tal método usualmente produce una concepción muy limitada (...) del problema. Sin embargo, el estilo brillante de Hume y su aguda crítica, que se debe a los escritos de Bayle, han sido muy exitosos al modelar nuestra manera de dirigirnos a los asuntos religiosos. (shrink)

In professing to call attention to this often forgotten work of the great Scottish Philosopher one can- not help noticing how very similar the reception accorded to it by the outside world has been to its treatment at the hands of the author himself. During his lifetime he kept it in the safe obscurity of his study drawer, where it lay until the day of his death. The plan of the Dialogues had been clearly thought out by Hume as early (...) as 1750 and the active period of his contribution to philosophy proper having closed almost in the same year this excursion of his into natural theology might most fitly have been presented to his readers at once, especially if, as it seems to us now, it may he rightly regarded as the crown and consummation of his earlier speculations. indeed some such conception of the relation of the Dialogues to his other works underlies the outlining of his scheme upon its first page, where he founds his method "on the saying of" an ancient that students of philosophy ought first to learn Logics, then Ethics, next Physics, "last of all the nature of the Gods.". (shrink)

Nos proponemos llevar a cabo una aufhebung de la crítica a la religión de Hume. De un lado queremos «superar» la crítica humeana mediante el crisol del evangelio de Jesús de Nazaret. Pero no solo es necesario «superar», también hay que «recuperar» en un estadio superior la crítica que Hume realiza a la religión. El Dios de Hume, su concepción de la religión y su proyecto socio-político tienen una nada oculta pretensión legitimadora y sustentadora de la organización social liberal-burguesa. Pero (...) Hume nos puede aportar un impulso para llevar a cabo el proyecto cristiano hoy: nos enseña que debemos «respetar» a Dios y no rebajarlo a un diosesito a la medida de nuestras necesidades; que la razón humana debe tener en cuenta sus propios límites sin absolutizarse; y que la religión puede ser una mediación de humanidad. El riesgo estriba en que, históricamente, las religiones han caído en una perversión de su ser, en una falsa creencia, alejándose de su verdadera tarea, es decir, ser un factor de realización del hombre en la sociedad, y ser el medio en el que se pueden relacionar el hombre y Dios. We propose to realize an aufhebung about the Hume’s religion critic. By one hand, we want to “overcome” the Hume’s critic through of the Gospel of Jesus from Nazaret. But it is not just necessary to “overcome” it, but it is also necessary to “recuperate” in a superior way the critic that Hume makes about the religion. The Hume’s God, his conception about religion and his social-politic project have a very clear intention which is an authentic support for the social liberal-bourgeois organization. But Hume can contribute us with a thrust to realize the christian project nowadays. He teaches us that we must “respect” God ant not to reduce him like a little-god according to our necessities; what the human reason must remain its own limits without absoluting, and that religion can be an instrument for constructing the human society. Historically, the risk rest on the fact that the religions have become in a perversion of its being, in a false belief, moving away from its real task, that is to say, to be a factor of achievement of man in society, and being the way in which man and God con be related. (shrink)

David Hume puede ser considerado con toda justicia como el representante más preclaro de la crítica religiosa de la Ilustración. Su diálogo con la tradición crítica desde Epicuro, así como la toma en consideración de la nueva filosofía nacida al calor de la ciencia newtoniana, le hacen acreedor de una toma en consideración más avisada en el contexto actual. Tanto si queremos dialogar con la modernidad secularizada, como si queremos hacerlo con el amplio espectro de las religiones mundiales en un (...) contexto de crisis de la razón moderna, Hume se convierte en el mediador necesario. La crítica de las pruebas de la existencia de Dios –núcleo de este artículo– es la médula del pensamiento crítico humeano. Toda la filosofía de la religión se ha enfrentado con esta misma problemática y no ha hallado respuesta más coherente y filosóficamente estructurada que la de Hume. Él es el gozne de todo el pensamiento crítico de la religión desde Epicuro. (shrink)

Humean philosophy has been defined in the following ways. A system based on the classical influence of Cicero. An attempt to offer a parallel in moral philosophy to Sir Isaac Newton's contribution to the physical sciences. Intuitionism based on the Shaftesbury/Hutcheson tradition. If we consider Hume's scholarly output as a whole, it would appear difficult to select one work and claim that it represents a definitive, final position. The approach which is taken in this study is that of following the (...) development of Hume's thinking, from his early education through to that stage in his career which saw the completion of his major philosophical works. For a significant part of the later period of his career he broke no new ground in his philosophical studies; but was content to revise his earlier works, turning attention instead to literature, history and religious disputes. When this approach is followed it becomes obvious that the secular interpretation of Humean philosophy, which has gained a great deal of acceptance this century, is far from convincing. Hume in fact wrote a fairly conservative work on natural Religion. Moreover, his Intuitionism makes little sense without the religious foundation which Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had taken for granted. What new, significant contribution did Hume make? His work can be looked upon as a fine example of 'applied philosophy', anticipating the insights of modern clinical psychology at a number of points. It is important to see Hume as working in an educational tradition. Scottish, humanistic, Reformed. His family was Presbyterian, and the young Hume would have received a good Christian training. Although he was not considered an outstandingly bright pupil, he attended Edinburgh University at an early age, and soon developed a voracious appetite for reading scholarly literature on his own. The deeply introspective side of his philosophical studies may well have come from his Presbyterian background. (shrink)