Hume: Philosophy of Religion, Misc

Long before the current dispute in the USA about the teaching of evolution, Hume's dialogues presented and critically analyzed the idea of intelligent design. What should we teach our children about the creation of the world? What should we teach them about religion? The characters Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo passionately present and defend different answers to that question. Demea opens the dialogue with a position derived from René Descartes and Father Malebranche — God's nature is a mystery, but God's existence (...) can be proved logically. Cleanthes attacks that view, both because it leads to mysticsm and because it attempts the impossible task of trying to establish existence on the basis of pure reason, without appeal to sense experience. As an alternative, he offers a proof of both God's existence and God's nature based on the same kind of scientific reasoning established by Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton. Taking a skeptical approach, Philo presents a series of arguments that question any attempt to use reason as a basis for religious faith. He suggests that human beings might be better off without religion. The dialolgue ends without genuine agreement among the characters, justifying Hume's choice of dialogue as the form of presentation. (shrink)

Hume's essay "Of Miracles" has the reputation of providing, in Hume's own words, an "everlasting check" to accepting reports of miracles. Author Robert Larmer demonstrates that this reputation is undeserved. Taking seriously the environment in which "Of Miracles" was composed reveals that its arguments are neither original to Hume nor compelling. Both before and after the publication of "Of Miracles" these arguments received devastating criticisms by Hume's predecessors and contemporaries. Contemporary revisionary attempts to defend the argument by insisting that Hume (...) cannot really have meant what he has traditionally been understood to claim are inevitably guilty of eisegesis and systematically ignoring crucial passages fatal to their idiosyncratic readings. The clarity of Larmer's writing makes Hume's Counterfeit Check accessible both to professional academics and interested lay persons. Anyone interested in assessing the rationality of accepting testimonial evidence for the occurrence of miracles should view Hume's Counterfeit Check as required reading. (shrink)

Hume no comparte la indispensable premisa del ateísmo (Dios no existe), pero sostiene que solamente podemos afirmar que existe lo que se puede probar, comprobar y verificar. Tanto la causalidad como la sustancia como el propio yo son solo creencias. Este aplastante escepticismo influirá inevitablemente en la idea de Dios. La filosofía de Hume comparte con el ateísmo tres puntos cruciales: 1. Crítica al argumento del diseño; 2. Mortalidad del alma; 3. Crítica a los monoteísmos. Con este artículo me propongo (...) mostrar que la filosofía de Hume, aun siendo escéptica, supone una puerta hacia el ateísmo. (shrink)

The relationship of Hume’s thought with Calvinism is complex and difficult to pin down. He is mordantly critical of the theology and morality of the “predestinarian doctors” and out of tune with the rational theology of Francis Hutcheson and even with that of his friends, Enlightened Ministers of the Church of Scotland such as Hugh Blair and Robert Wallace. Nevertheless, a few of his key philosophical tenets are almost indistinguishable from the main ideas advanced in Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian (...) Religion. I argue that for this reason Hume’s philosophy of religion is an Enlightened form of Calvinism. These strongly parallel doctrines must be considered in any evenhanded interpretation of the chief principles of Hume’s philosophy of religion that are set forth in “Of Miracles,” in The Natural History of Religion, and in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. This approach also opens a thoughtful understanding of the main conclusions of the Dialogues. (shrink)

Hume argues that Christianity would be a superstitious delusion if it were based on the testimonial evidence that Christ performed miracles. Wittgenstein argues that those who base religious belief on evidence are 'ridiculous' and that evidence turns religion into 'superstition'. Despite appearing to undermine Christianity, I argue that Hume and Wittgenstein defend Christianity from being undermined when contextualised in their philosophical project. Their philosophical project aims to show what Christianity is like, and they show that it would be a superstitious (...) delusion if it were based on evidential reasoning. Therefore, if we think Christianity is not a superstitious delusion then we should think it is based on something else. Hume calls this something else 'faith' but doesn't tell us much about it nor what miracles do for it. Wittgenstein, however, does, and his views not only map Hume's but offer insight into Christian life. Read in this way, both philosophers remind us that Christ came to save souls through faith, not minds through reason. (shrink)

Among the politics of belief that we encounter in Early Modern Philosophy, Hume's concept of natural belief is known as a problematic area to understand. Although Hume develops a concept of belief based on sensation the fact that it is controversial to consider it as an empiricist method when considered together with his scepticism is related to the fact that he sees the method he develops as a natural tendency and habit rather than an inferential method. Whether Hume's natural belief (...) has an epistemic basis or not is one of the main goals of this article, while determining whether he considers religious belief as natural belief or not is among the secondary goals of this article. Our argument is that Hume treats natural belief as a non-epistemic form of belief based on emotion, and religious belief as natural belief. In our study, how the concepts of natural belief and religious belief are understood according to Hume is presented, discussions about these concepts are included, and a conclusion is reached that religious belief is natural belief according to him. (shrink)

This paper examines Hume’s views on the origin of religion, the priority of polytheism, and the difference between popular religion and philosophical theism in _The Natural History of Religion_ (NHR). Firstly, the paper presents Hume’s account of the origin of religion as a criticism of Christianity. For Hume, both polytheism and popular, institutional monotheism have the same origin: ignorance about natural causes and laws, an unreliable tendency to anthropomorphize, irrational hope, and fear about uncertain future events. Secondly, this paper criticizes (...) two rival interpretative strategies: the _psychological reading_ (proposed by, among others, Emily Kelahan, Keith E. Yandell, and Richard Serjeantson) and the _destabilizing reading_ (defended by Peter Kail). Both approaches interpret Hume’s positive remarks on philosophical theism and his contrast of popular with philosophical religion as either insincere or, at best, irrelevant and inconsequential to the understanding of his position. By contrast, this paper defends a _positive reading_ according to which: (1) Hume’s positive remarks on philosophical theism should be taken in an epistemic sense, which implies the incompatibility of philosophical theism with popular religion (including Christianity); (2) his explanation of the origin of religion explains the origin of superstition only, and thus does not apply to philosophical theism. Although both theses are compatible with an agnostic reading of Hume’s position on theism, the textual and contextual evidence supports the conclusion that, in NHR, Hume took philosophical theism to be a reasonable position based on an inference from the evidence of design. (shrink)

David Hume was a great philosopher of religion and of common life. In this essay, I interpret him as making extreme religious skepticism one part of his overall rhetorical form. In all his religious writings, however, Hume always takes a step back from Pyrrhonian style results to a position that is more compatible with common life. The great twentieth-century religious studies scholar, Ninian Smart, offers seven dimensions of religion which show the extent to which it is thoroughly entwined with the (...) practices and beliefs of ordinary human life, and this connection to ordinary life makes Smart’s divisions a nice match for Hume and his philosophy of common life. I elucidate the ways in which Hume’s philosophy contributes to our understanding of religion in terms of Smart’s dimensions, and in each case, I argue that Hume treats religion not from the perspective of a hostile enemy, but as a student of religion who grounds it in common life and seeks to correct it from that vantage point. (shrink)

Hume doubted that the immediate experience of order, goodness, or beauty in the world, on which religion depends—“the feeling of design,” as J. C. A. Gaskin put it—is anything other than the product of an overactive imagination. But what were his reasons for doing so? And were they sufficient? Since the _Dialogues_ are the _locus classicus_ of Hume’s critique of religion, I propose to read them carefully, if critically, with both of these questions in mind. I conclude that Hume’s critique (...) of religion, while powerful in its way, does not ultimately succeed. (shrink)

Wśród prekursorów nowoczesnej nauki o religii David Hume zajmuje szczególne miejsce. Znany jest bowiem nie tylko jako dociekliwy badacz racjonalności religii, należącej do kluczowych problemów filozofii religii, ale także badacz naturalnych podstaw religii, zaprezentowanych zwłaszcza w „Naturalnej historii religii”. Jednym z najważniejszych dokonań Hume’a jest wyraźne oddzielenie, a zarazem komplementarność, dwóch sposobów badania religii, z których jeden koncentruje się na racjach wierzeń religijnych, zaś drugi na przyczynach występowania określonych wierzeń i praktyk. W wystąpieniu swoim argumentuję, że Hume’owski sposób myślenia o (...) religii nie tylko stanowił ważny etap na drodze do nowoczesnej nauki o religii, ale również wykazuję, że ta ostatnia w znacznym stopniu inspirowała się i nadal inspiruje Hume’owską krytyką religii. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Hume no comparte la indispensable premisa del ateísmo (Dios no existe), pero sostiene que solamente podemos afirmar que existe lo que se puede probar, comprobar y verificar. Tanto la causalidad como la sustancia como el propio yo son solo creencias. Este aplastante escepticismo influirá inevitablemente en la idea de Dios. La filosofía de Hume comparte con el ateísmo tres puntos cruciales: 1. Crítica al argumento del diseño; 2. Mortalidad del alma; 3. Crítica a los monoteísmos. Con este artículo me (...) propongo mostrar que la filosofía de Hume, aun siendo escéptica, supone una puerta hacia el ateísmo. PALABRAS CLAVE: escepticismo, agnosticismo, deísmo, ateísmo, monoteísmo, inmortalidad del alma./// ABSTRACT: Hume does not share atheism’s indispensable premise (God does not exist) but he argues that we only can assure what exists by proof and verification. Causality, substance, and the self are only beliefs. This overwhelming skepticism will influence inevitably his idea of God. Hume’s philosophy shares with atheism three cru- cial points: 1. Criticism of the design argument; 2. Mortality of the soul; 3. Criticism of the monotheistic religions. With this paper I intend to show that Hume’s philosophy, even though being skeptical, opens a door to atheism. KEYWORDS: skepticism, agnosticism, deism, atheism, monotheism, immortality of the soul. (shrink)

Hume had an abiding philosophical interest in religion. In his first monumental work, A Treatise of Human Nature, there are numerous references to religion and theology. It is well-known that Hume...

For over a century now, Hume’s work on religion has been better known than Butler’s. To understand the full significance of Butler and Hume in relation to each other, it is necessary to be clear about what the historical record shows. Once we have established what the record shows, we are faced with the question of what we are to make of the record. Butler, obviously, was speaking as a widely admired priest of the Church of England. Hume was speaking (...) primarily for himself as an aspiring man of letters. If Butler and Hume are read as adversaries, then history has already delivered its verdict. Hume’s opinion became better known, even though Butler enjoyed a long run of dominance in the nineteenth century. Finally, we must consider what we are to say to a public who remain as confused and distracted as ever on the great questions of God, freedom, and immortality. Hume and Butler advised that the public be presented with the evidence and then draw their own conclusions. There are many gaps in the record, but it is now possible to understand Butler and Hume as active in a dialectical process continued by Paley, Darwin, and their successors. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been stated in most accounts that Hume intends to make arguments against the existence of God, he aims to attack the claim that religious propositions can be argued; not completely reject these propositions. He considers these propositions epistemologically outside of human knowledge but ontologically accepts the existence of God. With such a view, we can dismiss atheistic-agnostic interpretations and relate him to a kind of mysticism. The key to deciding whether or not Hume is a mystic (...) is to determine what criteria we have to consider someone a mystic. Two very influential components here are (1)the belief in the existence of God; (2) the belief that the existence of God is far from our usual reasoning (antirational or irrational).And the second component is enough to call someone like Wittgenstein a fideist. We claim that there is clear evidence of these components in Hume’s works; therefore, what reason do we have to remove Hume from the circle of fideism and mysticism? In this study, after an introduction to the concept and types of fideism, we show that Hume, based on his works, surpasses skepticism and manifests a special kind of fideism.While there is an emphasis on the mystery of the proposition that God exists, he combines Christian faith, in aform that is inseparable from illogical and mysterious propositions such as the incarnation of God. Thus, Hume can be called a Christian mystic. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:This article examines Kant's response to the criticisms of natural theology that Hume articulates in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Though Kant was in agreement with the Dialogues' rejection of dogmatic theism, he equally viewed many of its arguments as a threat to his aim of constructing a critical theology. Kant is often taken to have successfully diffused this skeptical threat on the basis of a symbolic anthropomorphism articulated in the Prolegomena. However, I argue that the Prolegomena account remains susceptible (...) to Hume's criticisms, and that it was only several years later in the third Critique that Kant was able to show how the Dialogues' skeptical conclusions can be circumvented. In this manner, I aim to show that Hume's challenge is more significant, and Kant's response more complex, than has previously been acknowledged. (shrink)

David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a philosophical and literary classic of the highest order. It is also an extremely relevant work because of its engagement with issues as alive today as in Hume's time: the design argument for a deity, the problem of evil, the dangers of superstition and fanaticism, the psychological roots and social consequences of religion. In this outstanding and unorthodox collection, an international team of scholars engage with Hume's classic work. The chapters include state-of-the-art contributions (...) on the central interpretive questions posed by the Dialogues as well as major contributions relating it to contemporary issues in philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, moral psychology, and social philosophy. Additional contributions tackle the historical and philosophical background of the Dialogues, relating it to Hume's own systematic philosophy, to the work of other key seventeenth and eighteenth-century figures - Locke, Clarke, Bayle, Cudworth, Malebranche, Spinoza, Lord Bolingbroke, and Voltaire, among others - to early modern neo-Epicureanism in the life sciences, and, notably, to what Darwin missed by thinking too much like William Paley and not enough like Hume's Philo. Overall, this volume provides fresh and even groundbreaking perspectives on Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. It is essential reading for students and scholars of Hume, the history of modern philosophy, philosophy of religion and the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

In the field of philosophy of religion, the issue of the existence of world after death and the doctrine of rewards and punishments in the hereafter is one of the important and confusing issues as persuades theologians and philosophers of religion to present various and contradictory views about it. Meanwhile, despite David Hume's considerable reputation as one of the most important philosophical critics of religion, the secular irreligious significance of this philosopher's views, especially on the issue of induction and probable (...) reasoning, has not attracted the attention and energy of Hume's researchers in recent decades. The main objectives of this paper, on the basis of methodical research, are to identify the relevance of induction and probable reasoning to the problem of belief in a future state and to the doctrine of rewards and punishments of human acts in philosophy of religion, and to show that the goal of Hume's critical analysis of the credibility and practical significance of religious inductive arguments, by providing an account of the foundation of probable reasoning, is to reject the principal aims of defenders of Christian orthodoxy. It was orthodoxy defender’s aim to show, on the basis of our experience of this world, that there is a future state of rewards and punishments, and that prudence requires that we guide our conduct in this life with a view to our expectations of happiness or misery in the next. We will show that Hume provides a naturalistic account of the psychological mechanisms for the foundations of probable reasoning that generate our beliefs concerning the future, and this account serves to explain why religious arguments concerning the doctrine of a future state inevitably fail to persuade us or influence our conduct, so the doctrine of state of rewards and punishments is of little or no practical consequence for human. (shrink)

Hume's Natural History of Religion is generally regarded as a reductionist project, in which religion is traced to its universal natural roots in the passions and imagination. This interpretation neglects: Hume's view that humankind is social by nature, which implies that any naturalist explanation of religion cannot appeal to facts about individual minds alone, and Hume's interest in religion as it concerns religion's effects on morality and society, effects that occur within socio-historical contexts. Religion is generated out of universal propensities, (...) in response to the particular needs and values of communities. Both these aspects are relevant for religious policy. Hume's naturalist approach helps explain problems that attend religion, but questions about how to address these problems as they arise in particular cultures can be answered only in context. The salutary effects of toleration, for example, are not guaranteed at all times and places. The Natural History nevertheless urges the reader towards a tolerant mindset by exposing religion's universality as well as its diversity, and the moral importance of acknowledging both. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the epistemological positions of Philo and Cleanthes in the Dialogues. I find that Philo's attitude towards skepticism mirrors that of the first Enquiry, most notably in its endorsement of mitigated skepticism, and its treatment of religious reasoning as distinctly discontinuous with science and philosophy. Meanwhile, Cleanthes's epistemological framework corresponds to that of the Treatise, most notably in its adoption of something like the Title Principle, and its treatment of some forms of religious reasoning as broadly (...) continuous with science and philosophy. It is not merely that the epistemological systems of the Treatise and Enquiry are echoed in Cleanthes's and Philo's positions respectively; these frameworks seem to clarify, provide a substantive basis for, and render more complete their somewhat piecemeal statements on this topic in the Dialogues. Thus, Philo's and Cleanthes's dispute is not limited to the theological, but extends to the epistemological. -/- . (shrink)

One of the reasons for many different and even opposing interpretations of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is the absence of consensus concerning the question of which character in the Dialogues represents Hume. In this paper I argue that taking Philo to be his primary spokesperson provides us with the most consistent reading of the whole work and helps us better understand Hume's religious viewpoint. I first stress the specific dialogue form of Hume's work, which requires us to take into (...) account literary tools such as irony and double-talk when interpreting it. From there I proceed to show why I believe that my hypothesis is better supported than the other two main hypotheses concerning Hume's presence in the Dialogues, the first one being that Cleanthes represents Hume and the other one that none of the characters consistently speaks for Hume but rather that the whole structure of the work does that. Although there is both textual and historical evidence which suggests that Hume favoured Cleanthes, I show that his opinions deviate from Hume's well-known views on important subjects such as scepticism, morality and Christianity, while Philo's opinions on these subjects agree with Hume's almost verbatim. The second hypothesis is proven to be wrong by the fact that Philo actually consistently defends Hume's opinions. Finally, I argue that Philo's understanding of true religion as a philosophical position devoid of any religious import agrees with Hume's religious scepticism. (shrink)

I argue that Hume's naturalistic explanation of religious belief in the Natural History of Religion has significant epistemic consequences. While he argues in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (and in other works) that belief in God is not justified on the basis of testimony or philosophical argument, this is not enough to show that religious belief is not warranted. In the Natural History, Hume provides a genetic explanation for religious belief. I contend that the explanation of religious belief in the (...) Natural History, given Hume's conclusions in his other works, provides grounds to reject religious belief. Thus, I conclude that the Natural History plays an important role in Hume's overall critique of religion insofar as it is a necessary component in Hume's arsenal against the warrant of religious belief. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) describes a philosophical discussion on the validity of the argument from design. What Hume investigates, however, is not the rational grounds of religion, but human nature and its attraction to the idea of design. I argue that the key to understanding Hume’s Dialogues is his conception of the imagination as described in the Treatise. Hume characterizes the human imagination or mind as self-indulgent, with a strong drive to unite perceptions in relations of resemblance, (...) contiguity or causality, often adding fictional constructions to create an easy transition between ideas. Natural religion is a prime example, as the whole universe is united in orderly means-to-ends relations and provided with a familiar cause: something resembling the human mind. This reading of the Dialogues, however, does not warrant the conclusion that Hume provides a reductionist natural explanation of natural religion. Knowing human nature helps to understand religion’s attraction and the attraction of religion helps to understand humans, because it is paradigmatic of who we are. To connect perceptions, construct wholes and create meaning out of chaos is an essential feature of human nature, and a source of great pleasure. (shrink)

Pamphilus's neglected role of narrator in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), with its twin themes of piety and world origination, is vital in appreciating the significance of the work. Pamphilus illustrates the stultifying effects of the early inculcation of piety on the creative arguments of natural religion and mirrors the contemporary institutional opposition to Hume. The DNR is not simply a brilliant dissection of divine authorship of morality and creation; it is a model of impiety. Philo's brilliant attack on (...) the morality of the deity, the foundation of piety, and his analysis of divine models of world origination, fails to move the pious Pamphilus who finds for his tutor, Cleanthes, at the conclusion of the debate. (shrink)

Pas de deux with a theological legacy. Jürgen Habermas on David Hume and Immanuel Kant In his latest opus magnum, Jürgen Habermas reconsiders the history of philosophy from a peculiar perspective: the true and unique nature of philosophy is shown to have been given shape in philosophy’s dispute with Christian theology. This article reviews Habermas’ chapter on the Enlightenment, in which Habermas casts David Hume and Immanuel Kant dancing their own pas de deux with that theological legacy. After having sketched (...) the historical scripts in which Hume and Kant are involved by Habermas, I will critically assess the author’s claim that while Hume ends up refusing the dance and (hence) betraying (enlightened) philosophy’s nature, Kant accepts and transforms the heritage, yet ends up failing to give his pas de deux a genuine modern and enlightened twist. (shrink)

Hume’s criticisms of divine causation are insufficient because he does not respond to important philosophical positions that are defended by those whom he closely read. Hume’s arguments might work against the background of a Cartesian definition of body, or a Malebranchian conception of causation, or some defenses of occasionalism. At least, I will not here argue that they succeed or fail against those targets. Instead, I will lay out two major deficiencies in his arguments against divine causation. I call these (...) “deficiencies” because Hume does not adequately address live positions. This does not mean, of course, that there are not problems with these views or that Hume could not have given strong arguments against them. Rather, Hume’s arguments, which can seem comprehensive to the twenty-first century reader, are in fact not so. For the deficiencies discussed in this essay, I point to writers from Hume’s near context (many of whom we know he read carefully) who held the views not discussed, and I provide reasons why Hume seems not to have entertained these possibilities. I won’t distinguish between accidentally overlooking and actively ignoring. By drawing attention to these three deficiencies, I have two goals. The first is to demonstrate the diversity of seventeenth and early eighteenth century views on divine causation, especially among philosophers in England, Scotland, and Ireland, who are often ignored by philosophers today who, like Hume, focus on continental Cartesians while ignoring British dualists and vitalists. The second goal is to make today’s readers aware of shortcomings in Hume’s arguments to encourage productively contextual readings of Hume and his contemporaries. (shrink)

Urbaniana University Journal 73.3 (2020): 73-99. -/- A close reading of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reveals that it is not what it appears. Rather than a work of natural theology, meant to show something about arguments concerning the existence and nature of God, the Dialogues turn out to embody a moral pedagogy exemplifying and attempting to instill a conception of piety and religion as virtues. This paper defends this interpretation by reviewing three alternative, but ultimately inadequate, interpretations of the (...) text, and then compares Hume’s moral pedagogy with that of Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae to highlight the ambition, and the limitation,of Hume’s attempt to characterize piety without metaphysics. (shrink)

I examine Hume’s claim in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals that the theistic form of religion tends to distort philosophical thought about the nature of morality. I argue that we can see this thesis as a local application of Hume’s wider claim, intimated in various other works, that theistic religion tends to deform philosophy more generally. Understanding Hume’s account of the general tendency of theistic religion to subjugate and deform philosophy helps us set the moral case in its (...) proper context. At the same time, the Enquiry’s account of the distortion of moral theorizing stands as Hume’s most detailed example of the kind of threat that theism poses to philosophy, and therefore helps to clarify Hume’s analysis of that more general threat. (shrink)

Was David Hume an atheist? This chapter argues that the answer to this question is less interesting and less important than the answer to a related question: What, according to Hume, does a theist believe? The chapter argues that Hume distinguishes a variety of different forms of theism, ranging from vulgar superstition to refined theism, and that he is much more firmly opposed to theism in its popular and vulgar forms.

This article presents a kind of unconventional attempt to show the logical and philosophical defect faced by any attempt of criticizing or even questioning the principle of causality. The main focus in this article is the attempt of David Hume, regarding its broad impact on atheists and materialists, and because it summarized all that has been said or is said about the apparent criticisms of this principle and its implications like the rejection and doubt in the proofs of divine existence. (...) It has been shown in the article that the application of the principle of causality is a basis not only for the knowledge but also for the skepticism and for being aware of the ignorance. So, whoever apparently and verbally claims that he does not believe in this principle could never doubt or say that he doesn't know, and even such a recognition would be impossible without employing the principle. Therefore, the atheistic and agnostic stances are logically invalid. (shrink)

David Hume's writings on history, politics and philosophy have shaped thought to this day. His bold scepticism ranged from common notions of the 'self' to criticism of standard theistic proofs. He insisted on grounding understandings of popular religious beliefs in human psychology rather than divine revelation, and he aimed to disentangle philosophy from religion in order to allow the former to pursue its own ends. In this book, Professors David W Purdie and Peter S Fosl decipher some of Hume's most (...) challenging texts for the modern reader, while preserving the sharp intellect and undaunted nerve for which Hume is famous. Hume's spirit is brought alive for contemporary times and his writing is made accessible for its intended audience: the general public."-- Back cover. (shrink)

Hume contrasts two different ways in which we might speak about the attributes of the first cause of all: first, in an attempt to describe the actual nature of this ultimate being or principle; or second, in ascribing attributes to it as so many honorifics, with no intention to describe but merely to express our own reverence. I survey Hume’s skeptical critique of the former, descriptive kind of talk, and also examine his purposes in considering and, through his character Philo, (...) apparently valorizing the latter, reverence-expressing kind of religious speech. (shrink)

Článek má za cíl ukázat podobnosti mezi Humovou a Madisonovou politickou filozofií v oblasti politiky náboženské tolerance. Humův kritický postoj k církvím a k náboženství je dnes v interpretační literatuře velmi známý. Často se však zapomíná na důsledky, které z tohoto postoje plynou pro jeho politickou filozofii. Hume se totiž na mnoha místech svého rozsáhlého filozofického díla (kam je třeba řadit i jeho Dějiny Anglie a mnohé eseje) zamýšlel nad otázkou, jak řídit stát nábožensky roztříštěný do církví a sekt. Podobně (...) se i jeden z nejvýznamnějších otců zakladatelů, James Madison, obával názorově roztříštěné společnosti; přičemž co do důvodů i řešení tohoto problému je patrná podobnost mezi jeho a Humovými myšlenkami. Hume i Madison shodně považovali za zdroj lidské tendence ke stranictví lidskou přirozenost a řešení této stranickosti spatřovali jednak v ustavení státu na co nejširším území, a jednak v co největší míře tolerance rozličných názorů i v náboženských otázkách. Oba argumentovali tím, že se v dějinách prakticky ukázalo jako nejúčinnější právě zavedení co nejširší náboženské tolerance. Kromě toho Madison používá stejné metafory a výrazy ve stejném kontextu jako Hume. Humův vliv na Madisona v otázce náboženské tolerance tak nelze při interpretaci intelektuálních zdrojů Jamese Madisona dále přehlížet. (shrink)

Foreword from the Guest Editor to the special issue of Diametros – “Enlightenment and Secularism.”.

Žádnému tématu – s výjimkou historie Anglie – nevěnoval David Hume více pozornosti než náboženství. Jak už to ale s Humovým filosofickým odkazem bývá, i jeho teorie náboženství byla podrobena celé řadě mnohdy naprosto protikladných interpretací – a právě těm bude věnována první část mého článku. Došlo totiž k pokusům představit jej jako teistu, fideistu, deistu, agnostika nebo ateistu. Ve druhé části budu obhajovat hypotézu, podle níž je úsilí zařadit Huma do jediného údajně správného výkladu liché, protože každá taková snaha (...) naráží na nepřekonatelné terminologické spory, interpretační potíže a argumentační pochybení. Nemusí nás ovšem zajímat, co si Hume ve skutečnosti o náboženství myslel, případně za jaký typ věřícího či nevěřícího se považoval. Mnohem přínosnější je pochopit, jakým způsobem Humova koncepce předchází a obohacuje současnou ateologii. Ve třetí části proto představím textovou evidenci z primárních pramenů, v nichž se Hume zabýval kritikou zjeveného i přirozeného náboženství, morálních i psychologických aspektů religiozity. Závěrem se krátce zamyslím nad Humovou koncepcí „pravého náboženství“ a jejím uplatněním v sekulární společnosti. (shrink)

Peter Millican je profesor filosofie a Gilbert Ryle Fellow na Hertford College, University of Oxford. Věnuje se především epistemologii, filosofii jazyka a náboženství, zabývá se dílem Davida Huma a Alana Turinga. Je autorem více než padesáti časopisecky publikovaných studií, editoval sborníky The Legacy of Alan Turing (Oxford University Press, 1996) a Reading Hume on Human Understanding (Oxford University Press, 2002). Připravil kritické vydání Humova An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding v edici Oxford World's Classics (Oxford University Press, 2008) a spravuje internetový (...) archiv Humových textů na Hume Texts Online. Rozhovor, který se odehrál v létě roku 2016, poznámkami pod čarou opatřil překladatel. (shrink)

This article aims to illuminate the background and intention of Hume's Dialogues. It argues that ‘Cleanthes’ is significantly modeled after Butler's thought by showing the connection between Part IX of the Dialogues and Butler's early correspondence with Clarke regarding the concepts of probability and conceivability. This clarifies Philo's ‘reversal’ in Part XII. Butler's theory of probability provides a clue to Hume's moderate skepticism which stops short of endorsing atheism. Hume presents a philosophical narrative in which readers are invited to entertain (...) philosophical thinking on natural theology as a preliminary to identifying ‘true’ religion rather than affirming atheism. (shrink)

Diálogos sobre a religião natural -- Cartas selecionadas.