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  1. added 2018-05-10
    Preserving Practicality: In Defense of Hume's Sympathy-Based Ethics.Lorenzo Greco - 2018 - In Philip Reed & Rico Vitz (eds.), Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology. London-New York: Routledge. pp. 170–190.
    In this essay, I examine the role played by sympathy in preserving the practical dimension of Hume’s ethics. I reconstruct how sympathy works for Hume by differentiating it from the contemporary understanding of empathy, and I counter some of the objections that have been moved against Humean sympathy. I argue that Humean sympathy is instrumental in bringing about a common point of view of morality, and capable of vindicating both how we form moral judgments, and how we are moved by (...)
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  2. added 2017-01-12
    Jacqueline A. Taylor, Reflecting Subjects: Passions, Sympathy, and Society in Hume's Philosophy (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). [REVIEW]Greco Lorenzo - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy (6):1-4.
  3. added 2015-06-01
    Annette Baier, "Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals". [REVIEW]Lorraine Code - 1987 - Dialogue 26 (1):201.
  4. added 2015-05-16
    Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment: A Study of "a Treatise of Human Nature".Walter Saul Brand - 1991 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    While Hume insists that "sympathy," or fellow feeling, is the primary source of moral evaluation, he recognizes that sympathetically acquired feelings vary in emotional intensity according to a number of factors he regards as morally irrelevant. The question arises as to how the changeableness of sympathy can be reconciled with the "stable" moral judgment. It emerges that the sympathetic judgment becomes corrected by adopting, what Hume calls, a "general point of view." Specifically, the theory of belief and "general rules" in (...)
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  5. added 2015-04-20
    Hume's Peculiar Sentiments: The Evolution of Hume's Moral Philosophy.Kate Abramson - 1997 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    This dissertation examines the evolution of David Hume's ethics, focusing on moral judgment, moral motivation and ethical normativity. In chapter one, I argue that previous scholars have missed a crucial distinction between two different sympathetic processes at work in the Treatise. The first sympathetic process, "particular sympathy" is analogous to ordinary empathy and variable in just the way empathy is, but a second, non-variable process, "extensive sympathy" is the source of our moral sentiments. In chapter two, I give an account (...)
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  6. added 2015-03-21
    Sympathie Restreinte Et Sympathie Étendue Dans le Traité de la Nature Humaine de David Hume.Philippe Blouin - 2010 - Gnosis 11 (3):1-15.
    Cet article consiste en une analyse critique de la notion de sympathie dansles deuxièmes et troisièmes tomes du *Traité de la Nature Humaine* de DavidHume. Il s’agit plus particulièrement de l’étude du passage de la sympathierestreinte à la sympathie étendue comme concept clé dans la philosophiepolitique de Hume. La lecture deleuzienne de Hume, telle qu’elle se donnedans *Empirisme et Subjectivité* est particulièrement mobilisée pour montreren quoi ce passage est représentatif des difficultés d’une philosophiepolitique qui, se voulant demeurer *empiriste*, doit passer (...)
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  7. added 2015-03-21
    Kant Et Smith, Critiques de la Philosophie Morale de Hume.Michaël Bizlou - 2000 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 190 (4):449-464.
    Malgré tout ce qui les distingue, la philosophie morale de Kant et celle de Smith ont pour point commun de se poser toutes les deux explicitement en critiques des positions de Hume. Ces critiques portent sur le même point, la façon dont Hume définit le concept de généralité. De là résultent des thèses parallèles : Kant et Smith proposent une conception formelle de la morale, débouchant sur l'idée d'un tribunal intérieur et sur celle d'un idéal moral. Mais jusqu'où ce parallèle (...)
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  8. added 2015-03-21
    Hume's Account of Moral Sentiment.John R. Boatright - 1976 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 30 (1/2=115/116):79-90.
    Hume holds that the moral sentiments are distinguished from other passions of the mind by two features among others: (1) that they are caused by the character of an agent, and (2) that they arise only when this character is viewed disinterestedly. this paper is an attempt to discover hume's reasons for believing that these features are true of the moral sentiments, and what i argue is, first, that hume believes that these features are required to account for certain features (...)
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  9. added 2015-02-08
    Cosmopolitanism and Hume's General Point of View.Neil McArthur - 2014 - European Journal of Political Theory 13 (3):321-340.
    Hume’s writings, taken as a whole, address a dazzlingly broad range of topics. I argue that they do so as part of a coherent and interesting philosophical programme. While Hume’s doctrine of the general point of view provides an attractive way of understanding the process of moral judgement, it raises the threat of parochialism – that is, it potentially makes us prey to the limitations and prejudices of our society. I show that Hume endorses what I call “engaged cosmopolitanism”, which (...)
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  10. added 2015-01-27
    The Originality of Hume's Theory of Obligation.Henry David Aiken - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (3):374-383.
  11. added 2015-01-21
    Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances.Jon Rick - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158.
    The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the (...)
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  12. added 2015-01-21
    Is the General Point of View the Moral Point of View? [REVIEW]Charlotte Brown - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):197–203.
    I focus on Garrett’s account of Hume’s theory of moral evaluation, which Garrett calls “a cognitive history.” Before turning to his account, however, I briefly outline my own alternative reading of Hume’s theory of moral evaluation. One way in which my account differs from Garrett’s is that I follow Árdal, among others, in thinking that Hume takes the moral sentiments to be calm forms of love and hatred. Thus Hume says that approval and disapproval are “nothing but a fainter and (...)
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  13. added 2015-01-21
    The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1-2):3-42.
    Hume thinks moral judgments are based on sentiments of approval and disapproval we feel when we contemplate someone from a "general point of view." We view her through the eyes of her "narrow circle" and judge her in accordance with general rules. Why do we take up the general point of view? Hume also argues that approval is a calm form of love, love of character, which sets a normative standard for other forms of love. In this paper I explain (...)
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  14. added 2015-01-21
    Hume's General Point of View.William Davie - 1998 - Hume Studies 24 (2):275-294.
    Many readers see Hume's _General Point of View<D> as a cognitive achievement typically requiring a conscious effort of reason and imagination. Moral judging emerges as a special, relatively esoteric activity. Another reading depicts the _General Point of View<D> as largely a matter of habit (or custom). We are usually "insensible" of its operation. Morality appears to be ubiquitous and moral judging utterly commonplace, comparable to the habitual operations of causal inference without which life would be sheer chaos. The author finds (...)
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  15. added 2015-01-21
    On Why Hume's “General Point of View” Isn't Ideal–and Shouldn't Be.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):202-228.
    It is tempting and not at all uncommon to find the striking—even noble—visage of an Ideal Observer staring out from the center of Hume's moral theory. When Hume claims, for instance, that virtue is “ whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation ,” it is only natural to think that he must have in mind not just any spectator but a spectator who is fully informed and unsullied by prejudice. And when Hume writes (...)
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  16. added 2015-01-21
    Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of "Morality".Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (1):37-58.
    That Hume 's theory can be interpreted in two widely divergent ways-as a version of sentimentalism and as an ideal observer theory-is symptomatic of a puzzle ensconced in Hume 's theory. How can the ground of morality be internal and motivating when an inference to the feelings of a spectator in "the general point of view" is typically necessary to get to genuine moral distinctions? This paper considers and rejects the suggestion that in moral education, for Hume, the inculcation of (...)
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  17. added 2015-01-14
    Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination.Mark Collier - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):255-273.
    David Hume endorses three claims that are difficult to reconcile: (1) sympathy with those in distress is sufficient to produce compassion towards their plight, (2) adopting the general point of view often requires us to sympathize with the pain and suffering of distant strangers, but (3) our care and concern is limited to those in our close circle. Hume manages to resolve this tension, however, by distinguishing two types of sympathy. We feel compassion towards those around us because associative sympathy (...)
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  18. added 2014-03-31
    The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
    Hume's moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons "only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view..." Rather, "we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be (...)
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  19. added 2013-09-02
    The Moral Point of View.Carole Stewart - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (196):177 - 187.
    In his discussion of morals in the Third Book of the Treatise, Hume claims that the taking of what I shall call a general point of view is a necessary condition of the arousal of moral feelings. This aspect of Hume's theory has not received much attention from his commentators before now, although its implications for the theory as a whole might be regarded as significant.
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  20. added 2013-08-24
    Pleasure as the Standard of Virtue in Hume's Moral Philosophy.By Julia Driver - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):173–194.
    But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind (EPM, 173).
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