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  1. Can’t Bottom-up Artificial Moral Agents Make Moral Judgements?Robert James M. Boyles - 2024 - Filosofija. Sociologija 35 (1).
    This article examines if bottom-up artificial moral agents are capable of making genuine moral judgements, specifically in light of David Hume’s is-ought problem. The latter underscores the notion that evaluative assertions could never be derived from purely factual propositions. Bottom-up technologies, on the other hand, are those designed via evolutionary, developmental, or learning techniques. In this paper, the nature of these systems is looked into with the aim of preliminarily assessing if there are good reasons to suspect that, on the (...)
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  2. On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law.Samuele Chilovi & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):633-653.
    Hume’s Law that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” has often been deemed to bear a significance that extends far beyond logic. Repeatedly, it has been invoked as posing a serious threat to views about normativity: naturalism in metaethics and positivism in jurisprudence. Yet in recent years, a puzzling asymmetry has emerged: while the view that Hume’s Law threatens naturalism has largely been abandoned (due mostly to Pigden’s work, see e.g. Pigden 1989), the thought that Hume’s Law is (...)
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  3. Laying Down Hume's Law.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):24-46.
    In this paper, I argue for an interpretation of Hume's Law that sees him as dismissing all possible arguments from is to ought on the basis of a comparison with his famous argument on induction.
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  4. Two Versions of Hume's Law.Campbell Brown - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):2-7.
    Moral conclusions cannot validly be inferred from nonmoral premises – this principle, commonly called “Hume’s law,” presents a conundrum. On one hand, it seems obviously true, and its truth is often simply taken for granted. On the other hand, an ingenious argument by A. N. Prior seems to refute it. My aim here is a resolution. I shall argue, first, that Hume’s law is ambiguous, admitting both a strong and a weak interpretation; second, that the strong interpretation is false, as (...)
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  5. Giving up Hume's Guillotine.Aaron Wolf - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):109-125.
    The appealing principle that you can't get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, sometimes called Hume's Guillotine , faces a well-known challenge: it must give a clear account of the distinction between normative and descriptive sentences while dodging counter-examples. I argue in this paper that recent efforts to answer this challenge fail because the distinction between normative and descriptive sentences cannot be described well enough to be of any help. As a result, no version of the principle is both true and (...)
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  6. Charles R. Pigden : Hume on Is and Ought: Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2010, xiv + 352 pp, ISBN: 978-0-230-20520-8, GBP 74.00.David Hommen - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1419-1422.
    Within a single paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume prompted what has become one of the most central orthodoxies in ethical theory: the thesis that one cannot derive what ought to be from what there is. In the aftermath of Hume’s seminal discussion, the No-Ought-From-Is-thesis has obtained approval among moral theorists to the point that it has been assigned the status of an undisputed ‘law’. As common with commonplaces in philosophy, alas, both the exact content and argument (...)
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  7. Hume e as teorias morais vulgares.Marco Antonio Oliveira de Azevedo - 2011 - Princípios 18 (29):321-338.
    Quais sáo as teorias vulgares da moralidade criticadas por Hume na famosa passagem is-ought ? Quais eram seus defensores? Neste ensaio, trato de algumas diferenças entre Hume e Hutcheson que podem iluminar algumas respostas. Hume, ao contrário de Hutcheson, combateu toda forma de separaçáo da natureza humana em componentes naturais e divinos. O conceito de simpatia cumpre uma funçáo essencial nesse aspecto. Há bons indícios de que o jovem Hume adotou no Tratado uma estratégia abertamente crítica a todas as teorias (...)
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  8. Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.
    Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...)
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  9. Hume and Searle : the ‘Is-Ought’ Gap versus Speech Act Theory.Daniel Schulthess - 2011
    The article compares David Humes’ and John Searle’s positions concerning the relation between descriptive and evaluative statements. Although the two positions seem to be just opposite in that Hume denies the derivability of the ought from the is, while Seale accepts it, the author shows that Hume and Searle have many similarities, for for both obligations rely upon the institution of promising. The difference is that for Hume the speech act of promising as such does not have intrinsic evaluative impact. (...)
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  10. Substance, Content, Taxonomy and Consequence: A Comment on Stephen Maitzen.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 313-319.
    This is a response to Stephen Maitzen’s paper. ‘Moral Conclusions from Nonmoral Premises’. Maitzen thinks that No-Ought-From-Is is false. He does not dispute the formal proofs of Schurz and myself, but he thinks they are beside the point. For what the proponents of No-Ought-From-Is need to show is not that you cannot get SUBSTANTIVELY moral conclusions from FORMALLY non-moral premises but that you cannot get SUBSTANTIVELY moral conclusions from SUBSTANTIVELY non-moral premises. And he believes that he can derive substantively moral (...)
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  11. Snare's puzzle/Hume's purpose: Non-cognitivism and what Hume was really up to with no-ought-from-is.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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  12. Comments on 'Hume's Master Argument'.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 128-142.
    This is a commentary on Adrian Heathcote’s interesting paper ‘Hume’s Master Argument’. Heathcote contends that No-Ought-From-Is is primarily a logical thesis, a ban on Is/Ought inferences which Hume derives from the logic of Ockham. NOFI is thus a variation on what Heathcote calls ‘Hume’s Master Argument’, which he also deploys to prove that conclusions about the future (and therefore a-temporal generalizations) cannot be derived by reason from premises about the past, and that conclusions about external objects or other minds cannot (...)
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  13. Letter from a Gentleman in Dunedin to a Lady in the Countryside.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    I argue 1) That in his celebrated Is/Ought passage, Hume employs ‘deduction’ in the strict sense, according to which if a conclusion B is justly or evidently deduced from a set of premises A, A cannot be true and B false, or B false and the premises A true. 2) That Hume was following the common custom of his times which sometimes employed ‘deduction’ in a strict sense to denote inferences in which, in the words of Dr Watts’ Logick, ‘the (...)
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  14. Her Conclusions--With Which He Is in Love: Why Hume Would Fancy Anscombe.Margaret Watkins - 2008 - Christian Bioethics 14 (2):175-186.
    Elizabeth Anscombe tangos with Hume in the middle of her march toward the three theses of "Modern Moral Philosophy" that we should abandon moral philosophy "until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology"; that the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 'ought' "ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible;" and that "the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the (...)
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  15. Hutcheson and hume in a recent polemic.Luigi Turco - 2007 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 62 (3):171-198.
  16. Callicott’s Archimedean Point-the Problem of Transcending Hume’s is/Ought Dichotomy. Godzinski - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):115-130.
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  17. Hume's surprise and the logic of belief changes.Ingvar Johansson - 1998 - Synthese 117 (2):275-291.
    If the logic of belief changes is extended to cover belief states which contain both factual and normative beliefs, it is easily shown that a change of a factual belief (an 'Is') in a mixed belief state can imply a change of a normative belief (an 'Ought') in the same state. With regard to Hume's so-called 'Is-Ought problem', this means that one has to distinguish its statics from its dynamics. When this is done, it becomes clear that changes of factual (...)
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  18. Hume's problem and the possibility of normative ethics.Daniel E. Flage & Ronald J. Glass - 1995 - Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (2):231-239.
    In this essay we argue that if the covering-law model of moral justification is correct, Hume's "is"-"ought" paragraph calls the possibility of a justifiable theory of moral obligation in doubt. In the first section we delineate Hume's doubts. In the second section we develop a skeptical solution to those doubts.
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  19. The 'Is/Ought' Relation in Hume.Steven Barbone - 1994 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):129-146.
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  20. A note on the 'is/ought' problem in Hume's ethical writings.Bruno Garofalo - 1985 - Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (4):311-318.
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  21. Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'.C. Huang - 1985 - Philosophical Review (Taiwan) 8.
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  22. Hume's Law and Legal Positivism.Jose Brito - 1982 - Memoria Del X Congreso Mundial Ordinario de Filosofia Del Derecho y Filosofia Social 8.
  23. (1 other version)Hume's 'Ought' and 'Is' Statement: A Radical Behaviorist's Perspective.E. A. Vargas - 1982 - Behaviorism 7 (1):1-23.
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  24. Hume on is-ought and the standard of taste.J. J. A. Mooij - 1980 - Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (3-4):319-332.
  25. On Deriving an Ought from an Is: A Retrospective Look.Kai Nielsen - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (3):487 - 514.
    ARGUMENT ABOUT whether in any significant sense we can derive an ought from an is has been persistent and intractable. Fifteen to twenty years ago it was orthodoxy in analytical philosophical circles to claim that for all their other differences Hume and Moore were right in agreeing that in no significant sense can we derive an ought from an is. At present there is no orthodoxy or even anything like a dominant view and, given our current understanding of how language (...)
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  26. On Hume's Is-Ought Thesis.D. C. Stove - 1978 - Hume Studies 4 (2):64-72.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:64. ON HUME'S IS-OUGHT THESIS The famous thesis of Hume about "is" and "ought" I take to be, as I believe it has generally been taken to be: (1) For any factual statement e and any ethical statement h, h is not deducible from e. My object in these brief notes is neither to defend nor to attack (1), but just to point out certain mistakes which have been (...)
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  27. Hume on Is and Ought.W. D. Falk - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):359 - 378.
    Unlike old soldiers, the rhetoric of the great neither dies nor fades away. And so Hume's celebrated ‘is-ought’ passage still provokes debate.Hume was worried about the relation between ought statements and those supporting them: between ‘tolerence brings peace’ or ‘is God's will’, and ‘so one ought to be tolerant’. He denies the deducibility of the latter from the former, as the ‘ought’ expresses ‘a new relation or affirmation’, ‘entirely different from the others’. And this is commonly taken as saying that (...)
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  28. The Moral Philosophy of David Hume and the 'is - Ought' Question.Henry W. Dmochowski - 1974 - Dissertation, New York University
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  29. Symposium: Hume's Law.G. R. Grice & R. Edgley - 1970 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 44 (1):89 - 119.
  30. Hume's rejection of "ought" as a moral category.Nicholas Capaldi - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):126-137.
    One of the most persistent issues of contemporary moral theory is the possibility of inferring moral judgments from factual nonmoral judgments. Another way of stating this issue is to inquire into the possibility of inferring "ought-judgments" from "is-judgments." It is generally accepted that the first person to deny the possibility of this inference was David Hume. The denial is supposed to be articulated in the last paragraph of the section of A Treatise of Human Nature entitled "Moral Distinctions not derived (...)
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  31. Some misconceptions about Hume's moral theory.Nicholas Capaldi - 1966 - Ethics 76 (3):208-211.
    There are eight major misconceptions about Hume's moral theory. First,many believe that there is no essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry. Second, some commentators believe that Hume has an extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Third, many assume that Hume has an explicit theory of moral judgment. Fourth, several commentators have attributed to Hume a multiple theory about the relationship between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Fifth, some assert that Hume has a qualified- or ideal-spectator theory (...)
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  32. The Moral Philosophy of David Hume. [REVIEW]Antony Flew - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (64):279-280.
  33. Hume On Is-Ought: A Reinterpretation.Aryeh Botwinick - unknown
  34. The Is-Ought Problem Stems From Morality as a Simplifying Framework.Uri Harris - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that David Hume's is-ought problem stems from morality as a simplifying framework. Morality is the attempt to describe human behaviour and its relation to nature through a court framework, dating to prehistoric times. Such a court does not really exist, hence we are not referring to anything directly when we make moral statements, and therefore 'is' and 'ought' do not align. The solution is to replace morality with what it's really trying to describe: patterns in (...)
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