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  1. added 2020-05-24
    Regularity and Certainty in Hume’s Treatise: A Humean Response to Husserl.Stefanie Rocknak - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-25
    La matematización galileana de la naturaleza según Husserl.Matías Osta-Vélez - 2017 - In La Filosofía y su Enseñanza. Montevideo: ANEP.
  3. added 2020-01-27
    Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology.Philipp Berghofer - forthcoming - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy.
    Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i.e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-12
    The Forgetting of Touch.Mark Paterson - 2005 - Angelaki 10 (3):115 – 132.
    We like Euclidean geometry because we are men [sic], and have eyes and hands, and need to operate a concept of space that will be independent of orientation, distance and size. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space.
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Husserl’s Phenomenology as Critique of Epistemic Ideology.Charles W. Harvey - 1990 - International Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1):33-42.
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  6. added 2016-09-19
    Russell and Husserl (1905–1918): The Not-So-Odd Couple.Nikolay Milkov - 2017 - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press. pp. 73-96.
    Historians of philosophy commonly regard as antipodal Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl, the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This paper, however, establishes that during a formative phase in both of their careers Russell and Husserl shared a range of seminal ideas. In particular, the essay adduces clear cases of family resemblance between Husserl’s and Russell’s philosophy during their middle period, which spanned the years 1905 through 1918. The paper thus challenges the received view of Husserl’s relation to early (...)
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  7. added 2015-08-26
    Is the Historicity of the Scientific Object a Threat to its Ideality? Foucault Complements Husserl.Arun A. Iyer - 2010 - Philosophy Today 54 (2):165-178.
    Are mathematical objects affected by their historicity? Do they simply lose their identity and their validity in the course of history? If not, how can they always be accessible in their ideality regardless of their transmission in the course of time? Husserl and Foucault have raised this question and offered accounts, both of which, albeit different in their originality, are equally provocative. Both acknowledge that a scientific object like a geometrical theorem or a chemical equation has a history because it (...)
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  8. added 2015-05-17
    Lo "Strutturalismo" di Edmund Husserl.SImone Aurora - 2014 - Janus. Quaderni Del Circolo Glossematico 13:21-36.
  9. added 2014-03-29
    Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question 'Was Die Evidenz Sei': A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of the Publication of Husserliana Volume XXX. [REVIEW]George Heffernan - 1998 - Husserl Studies 15 (1):1-75.
  10. added 2014-03-28
    A Study in the Sedimented Origins of Evidence: Husserl and His Contemporaries Engaged in a Collective Essay in the Phenomenology and Psychology of Epistemic Justification. [REVIEW]George Heffernan - 1999 - Husserl Studies 16 (2):83-181.
  11. added 2014-03-27
    Descartes and Husserl: The Philosophical Project of Radical Beginnings (Review). [REVIEW]Michael K. Shim - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (4):593-595.
  12. added 2014-03-25
    Apodictic Evidence.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2001 - Husserl Studies 17 (3):217-237.
  13. added 2014-03-09
    An Addendum to the Exchange with Walter Hopp on Phenomenology and Fallibility.George Heffernan - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (1):51-55.
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  14. added 2014-03-09
    Phenomenology and Fallibility.Walter Hopp - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (1):1-14.
    If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification. However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility, and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible (...)
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  15. added 2014-03-09
    On Husserl’s Remark That “[s]Elbst Eine Sich Als Apodiktisch Ausgebende Evidenz Kann Sich Als Täuschung Enthüllen …” : Does the Phenomenological Method Yield Any Epistemic Infallibility? [REVIEW]George Heffernan - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (1):15-43.
    Addressing Walter Hopp’s original application of the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility to phenomenological inquiry concerning epistemic justification, I question whether these are the only two forms of fallibility that are useful or whether there are not also others that are needed. In doing so, I draw my inspiration from Husserl, who in the beginnings of his phenomenological investigations struggled with the distinction between noetic and noematic analyses. For example, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Logical Investigations (...)
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  16. added 2014-03-09
    Reply to Heffernan.Walter Hopp - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (1):45-49.
    If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification. However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility, and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible (...)
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  17. added 2014-03-06
    Phenomenological Reflections on the Possibility of First Philosophy.Nam-In Lee - 2010 - Husserl Studies 26 (2):131-145.
    In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from (...)
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  18. added 2012-04-23
    Dharmakīrti and Husserl on Negative Judgments.Zhihua Yao - 2007 - In Chan-Fai Cheung & Chung-Chi Yu (eds.), Phenomenology 2005, Vol. I, Selected Essays from Asia,. Zeta Books. pp. 731-746.
    Among various opinions in the controversy over the the cognition of non-existent objects (asad-ālambana-vijñāna) among various Buddhist and Indian philosophical schools or in the debate on the objectless presentations (gegenstandslose Vorstellungen) happened in the early development of phenomenology and analytic philosophy, I find that Dharmakīrti and Husserl hold similar views. Both of them have less interest in redefining the ontological status of nonexistent objects than Russell and Meinong. Rather they engage themselves in analyzing the experiential structure of negative cognition and (...)
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  19. added 2012-02-24
    Epistemic Justification and Husserl's Phenomenology of Reason in Ideas I.Carlos Sanchez - 2010 - In Pol Vandevelde & Sebastian Luft (eds.), Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics: Current Investigations of Husserl's Corpus. Continuum.
    ...In what follows I lay out Husserl's theory of epistemic justification as he sketches it in Part IV of 'Ideas 1', especially in the section he appropriately titles the "Phenomenology of Reason," understood here to present a phenomenological analysis of how reason is given, namely, how reason manifests itself in conscious life. My claim is that Husserl's "phenomenology of reason," by clarifying the ways in which the "legitimizations of reason" take place can be ultimately understood as a theory of epistemic (...)
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  20. added 2012-02-24
    Richard Feist, Ed. 'Husserl and the Sciences'. [REVIEW]Abraham D. Stone - 2005 - Review of Metaphysics 58 (4):891-892.
  21. added 2012-02-24
    Husserl and the Search for Certitude.Leszek Kołakowski - 1975 - St. Augustine's Press.
    First lecture: The end -- Second lecture: The means -- Third lecture: The achievements.
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  22. added 2012-02-23
    On Husserl and Cavellian Scepticism.Abraham D. Stone - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):1-21.
  23. added 2012-02-23
    J. S. Beck and Husserl: The New Episteme in the Kantian Tradition.Ingrid M. Wallner - 1985 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (2):195-220.
  24. added 2012-02-22
    Phenomenological Epistemology.Henry Pietersma - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    This work offers a provocative new historical and systematic interpretation of the epistemological doctrines of three twentieth-century giants: Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Pietersma argues that these three philosophers, while connected by their phenomenological doctrines, have underappreciated and interestingly-linked views on the theory of knowledge.
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  25. added 2012-02-21
    Husserl, Phenomenology, and Foundationalism.Walter Hopp - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):194 – 216.
    Husserl is often taken, and not without reason, to endorse the view that phenomenology's task is to provide the “absolute foundation” of human knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that the most natural interpretation of this view, namely that all human knowledge depends for its justification, at least in part, on phenomenological knowledge, is philosophically untenable. I will also present evidence that Husserl himself held no such view, and will argue that Dan Zahavi and John Drummond, though reaching the (...)
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