Husserl: Ethics

This study is a conceptual dialogue aimed at attaining insight into reading and developing postintentional phenomenology as intercultural philosophical inquiry. This conversation commences with the problem of Eurocentric phenomenology and introduces several examples of intercultural phenomenological attempts which fail to move beyond the validation of non-European philosophy using a Eurocentric viewpoint. The first section of this study introduces possible conditions and approaches for intercultural phenomenology, drawing mainly on Kwok-Ying Lau’s work on phenomenology and intercultural understanding, with a view to extending (...) the scope of phenomenological research beyond the limitations of a Eurocentric attitude largely influenced by and inherited from Husserl. The second section considers ways in which the understanding and approach of post-intentional phenomenology could be widened and deepened by the intercultural dimension, and vice versa. Building on these discussions, the paper concludes with a brief consideration of the implications for phenomenological research and of how an intercultural understanding and approach inform research design. Following “lines of flight” in these discussions, post-intentional phenomenology is proposed as an ethical and transformative inquiry. (shrink)

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility of (...) a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

In the Kaizo articles, written between 1922 and 1924, Husserl drew on the intercultural relationship between Europe and non-Europe. The viewpoints he held in these articles do not deviate much from that in the Vienna lecture 1935, which is later included in Crisis. It is in the latter that Husserl delineates systematically what he thinks of the idea of Europe and what makes Europe different from the other parts of the world. Notably, these viewpoints were already disclosed in the Kaizo (...) articles, though in very different contexts. As is well known, the background of Crisis is the concern about the modern science which deviates more and more from the concrete lifeworld, whereas the Kaizo articles focus mainly on the ethical problems. Nevertheless both of them touch on the cultural as well as intercultural problematic, that Husserl deals with more and more intensively in his late philosophy. My essay will discuss the following questions: On what grounds does Husserl think that the philosophical rationality of Europe deserves being recommended to other cultures? How does he come to this conclusion in his discourse on ethics? In order to come to terms with these questions I will unfold my essay in three steps: first, I will sketch how Husserl understands ethics; secondly, explain the connection between ethics and philosophical rationality, and thirdly how these ethical thoughts have intercultural relevance. (shrink)

Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason orfeeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori principle being the binding principle (...) of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an “emotional a priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value. (shrink)

In this paper we want to focus on Husserl’s critique of Kantian ethics and to develop the following questions. Against the merely empiristic orientation of Hume’s ethics, the Kantian foundation of ethics has an aprioristic character; but does this aprioristic character have to be identified with the origin of ethical principles in the pure subjectivity, and if not, which is its phenomenological signification? The sense of the Copernican revolution is that the structures of the objects are in accordance with the (...) universal structures of the finite subject; a contrario, Husserl refuses this Copernican principle and assumes that every sort of object determines a regulative structure in the subject; is it possible to apply this anticopernican principle to the ethical sphere? As opposed to the Kantian principle of the supremacy of practical reason, we find in Husserl’s thought a supremacy of the theoretical reason; but which is the sense of this inversion? The concept of foundation has in Husserlian phenomenology a cardinal importance: all sorts of truth of superior degree are founded on the inferior level of sensible truth; is it possible to apply this principle of foundation to the ethical sphere, so that ethical consciousness would be founded on feelings? At last the Kantian concept of liberty is not an empirical one, but a cosmological and practical idea; which is the phenomenological sense of liberty? (shrink)

Starting with the ego's consciousness and emphasizing on staying at this realm, Husserl is accused of ignoring the absolute alterity of the other and reducing it to the presence of consciousness. By reducing the other he misses ethics and so embeds the violence at the heart of phenomenological discourse. Here we discuss on this criticism and then we try to defend Husserl against it. By putting phenomenology in its eidetic realm, we will try to answer these criticisms.

The correlation between person and environment has long been a central focus of phenomenological analysis. While phenomenology is usually understood as a descriptive discipline showing how essential features of the human encounter with things and people in the world are articulated, phenomenology is also based on ethical concerns. Husserl himself, the founder of the movement, gave several lecture courses on ethics. This volume focuses on one trend in ethics-virtue ethics-and its connection to phenomenology. The essays explore how phenomenology contributes to (...) this field of ethics and clarifies some of its central issues, such as flourishing and good character traits. The volume initiates a conversation with virtue ethicists that is underrepresented in the current literature. -/- Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics offers contributions from prominent phenomenologists who explore the following issues: how phenomenology is connected to the ancient Greek or Christian virtue tradition, how phenomenology and its foundational thinkers are oriented toward virtue ethics, and how phenomenology is itself a virtue discipline. The focus on phenomenology and virtue ethics in a single volume is the first of its kind. (shrink)

According to a predominant view, reflection is constitutive of personhood. In this paper I first indicate how it might seem that such an account cannot do justice to the socially embedded nature ofpersonhood. I then present a phenomenologically-inspired account of reflection as critical stance taking and show how it accommodates the social embeddedness of persons. In concluding, I outline how this phenomenological account is also not vulnerable to a number of additional challenges that have been raised against accounts that consider (...) reflection to be constitutive of personhood and what matters for responsibility. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band, der außer Husserls Freiburger Einleitung in die Philosophie von 1919/20 auch die noch erhaltenen Teile seiner beiden ersten Freiburger Einleitungen in die Philosophie von 1916 und 1918 enthält, bietet eine sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Hinführung zur transzendentalphänomenologischen Philosophie auf dem Weg über die Ontologie und die Erkenntnistheorie. Im Ausgang von der Darstellung des Anstoßes durch die Sophisitk entwickelt Husserl ausführlich Platons Entdeckung des Apriori als den für die Folgezeit maßgeblichen Schritt zu einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie und (...) verfolgt in kritischen Analysen deren neuzeitliche Entwicklung seit Descartes über die rationalistischen und empiristischen Systeme bis hin zu Kant. -/- In den systematisch orientierten Abschnitten der Vorlesung stellt Husserl zunächst die grundlegenden Disziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie dar: die Erkenntnistheorie, die formale Wissenschaftslehre und die Ontologie, die sich in formale Ontologie, die materialen Ontologien und die von Aristoteles begründete Ontologie der realen Welt differenziert. Die praktische Philosophie behandelt Husserl in einer detaillierten Skizze der apriorischen Wertlehre und der in dieser fundierten apriorischen Ethik; diese beiden Prinzipienwissenschaften bilden für ihn die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Ethik. Diese aus der Göttinger Zeit stammende, unter dem Einfluss Brentanos stehende Konzeption von Ethik erfährt in der Vorlesung von 1919/20 bzw. in den wenig später in diese eingefügten kritischen Reflexionen gewichtige Korrekturen. Diese Korrekturen sowie die detailierte Analyse und Entfaltung des von Platon und Aristoteles grundgelegten, durch den Siegeszug der ateleologischen Naturwissenschaft verdrängten Gedankens einer teleologischen Welterklärung deuten vor auf Husserls späte Ethik und seine metaphysische Weltdeutung. (shrink)

Can we find a phenomenological basis for the ethical 'ought'? This essay addresses this question through a reflection on Husserl's fifth Meditation. In the fifth Meditation Husserl endeavors to show the manner in which I constitute the other through an associative pairing of the other with my own subjectivity. This essay argues that this same associative pairing forces me to acknowledge the other as a person of intrinsic worth insofar as I recognize myself as one. Having acknowledged the intrinsic worth (...) of the other in this way, I cannot but acknowledge my obligation to treat the other as I would like to be treated. Thus, the ethical imperative, in the form of the Golden Rule, proves to be implicated in the very constitution of the other in his or her otherness. (shrink)

The deliberations presented in the article are concentrated around a thesis that the unchanging framework of Husserl’s philosophical thinking is based on the simultaneous occurrence of theoretical and practical-ethical motive. This thesis, together with considerations presented in the text, are the result of reflection on the aim and tasks of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy, philosophy understood as science striving for the consolidating of cognition and revealing findings that are relevant to one’s life. The practical-ethical motivation that accompanies deliberations of epistemological (...) nature influences the specificity of phenomenological philosophy, phenomenological inquiries and the change of approach. Phenomenology considered in terms of theoretical and practical motives, in the rational and critical thinking, includes the relation between the sphere of cognition and the sphere of life, between the theoretical-scientific sphere and the practical-ethical one. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that Husserl, in his later ethics, reinterprets the philosophical content that discloses itself in the Kantian conception of a “fact of practical reason”. From 1917/18 on, Husserl increasingly ceases to pursue his initial idea of a scientific ethics. The reason for this move lies precisely in the phenomenological analysis of “Gemütsakte”, through which two main features of the fact of practical reason impose themselves more and more on Husserls thought: the personal concernment/obligation and the (...) primacy of the practical with the coeval call for universal validity. Husserl recognizes that the form of ethical facticity or entanglement cannot be grasped by a science of evidence, which speaks objectively and non-personally of acts of willing, valuing or preferring. Husserl thus gets to a reinterpretation of the fact of practical reason as the philosophical nucleus of his ethics, which is now a personal and affective ethics. He bestows a texture on this fact, however not as he would have thought in the first place: not as evident laws of a material apriori of “Gemüt”. In the person and her ethical experience as absolute affection Husserl rather discovers that which is per se not objectifiable and not to be made rationally evident. By this, Husserl captures and phenomenologically explains the non-objectifiable source of obligation and the possibility of complying with it. (shrink)

This paper pursues a Kantian critique of Husserl’s theory of moral consciousness as it is found in his lectures on ethics and other shorter pieces on political and moral philosophy from the interwar period. The critique centers on Kant’s conception of moral personality, arguing that Husserl fails to appreciate the force of this idea, subsequently leaving himself open to the charge of moral perfectionism. The paper ends with a positive assessment of Husserl’s thought, however, arguing that Husserl provides important resources (...) for understanding moral consciousness as a sensibility for the possible, adding an important dimension to approaches in ethics that tend to center exclusively on questions of motivation and principle. (shrink)

In this paper we want to focus on Husserl’s critique of Kantian ethics and to develop the following questions. Against the merely empiristic orientation of Hume’s ethics, the Kantian foundation of ethics has an aprioristic character; but does this aprioristic character have to be identified with the origin of ethical principles in the pure subjectivity, and if not, which is its phenomenological signification? The sense of the Copernican revolution is that the structures of the objects are in accordance with the (...) universal structures of the finite subject; a contrario, Husserl refuses this Copernican principle and assumes that every sort of object determines a regulative structure in the subject; is it possible to apply this anticopernican principle to the ethical sphere? As opposed to the Kantian principle of the supremacy of practical reason, we find in Husserl’s thought a supremacy of the theoretical reason; but which is the sense of this inversion? The concept of foundation has in Husserlian phenomenology a cardinal importance: all sorts of truth of superior degree are founded on the inferior level of sensible truth; is it possible to apply this principle of foundation to the ethical sphere, so that ethical consciousness would be founded on feelings? At last the Kantian concept of liberty is not an empirical one, but a cosmological and practical idea; which is the phenomenological sense of liberty? (shrink)

Evidence is a central theme in Husserl´s transcendental phenomenology. This article investigates not only the theoretical aspects of evidence, but also tries to develop prolegomena for a phenomenological theory of moral evidence and moral truth. Nevertheless, this endeavor is based upon the theoretical insights of Husserl: the importance of intersubjectivity and the relevance of time, which are reviewed in the first two chapters. The temporal aspect, under the title of perpetuation, is crucial for the understanding of the concept of evidence. (...) But it becomes even more important when the question of moral truth is considered. Perpetuation is not only stressed in the understanding of values, but also in the unanimity of the ethical and loving person. As evidence of any kind can only be falsified by a higher evidence of the same character, moral evidence cannot be understood isolated from the living process of any prefigured moral settings of a society, moral evidence can give itself only in an interpersonal community and its moral tradition and demands the community’s own readiness for a critical habituality. (shrink)

Although cultures far away and with other languages and customs are felt to be exotic by many in one s own culture, all cultures recognize the importance of a consistent bodily praxis as a basis for ethical behavior. I show that thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Dewey, James, Peirce, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty all acknowledge this habitual-bodily basis as well as its deeply social character. So does Confucius, even if he emphasizes ceremonial aspects more than Aristotle, the American pragmatists, and phenomenologists. (...) Linking these thinkers is a common emphasis on the performative dimension of reliably repetitive bodily actions that engender effective social actions and interactions. (shrink)

This paper seeks to provide a phenomenological articulation of the Scotist notion of haecceitas, interpreting Scotus’s principle of individuation at once as an ontological as well as a moral principle. Growing out of certain suggestions made by James Hart in his Who One Is, this interpretation is meant to provide the phenomenological ethics of both Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler with a useful theoretical tool in the Scotist notion of haecceitas interpreted as a horizon of value in order more fully (...) to develop the phenomenological idea of the ethical life as a task that specifically seeks to realize as its highest goal the vocation of the person to his or her ideal, true self. The main implication of Scotus’s thought, here, for phenomenology will be the ability to further delimit haecceitas as an objective moral principle that refutes the frequent charge of relativistic subjectivism in the phenomenological theory of ethics. (shrink)

Why do I have to be ethical? That is the essential question of a logical foundation of ethics in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. This article proposes to see the basic motivation of an ethical reason in the relationship between the two fundamental poles, that is the «Lifeworld» («Lebenswelt») and the «I-subject» («Ich-Subjekt»). This connection will be considered to constitute ethics in this article. This kind of ethics as a «condition of possibility» is then an a-priori ontological necessity. The article (...) will demonstrate how the composition of Husserl’s Prolegomena and his argumentation are an example of a foundation for phenomenological ethics: in this book Husserl derived logic as the first «condition of possibility». With logic’s three main characteristics — theory, normativity and praxis — it is the theoretical basis of a phenomenological ethics. (shrink)

Though Husserl tends to receive less attention than other phenomenologists, there is growing interest in his ethics. Proponents of Husserl’s ethics argue that his moral philosophy is not merely of historical interest; Husserl, they claim, can contribute positively to contemporary debates in ethics, specifically debates about the role of feelings in moral agency. This paper raises questions about this last claim. I argue that, on the one hand, Husserl’s moral psychology proves superior to some of his modern predecessors, insofar as (...) Husserl accounts for the intentionality of emotions and for their cognitive content, and for the connections between emotions and evaluation and between emotions and reasons. On the other hand, I argue that Husserl mistakenly claims that all valuing requires some feeling on the part of the person valuing. This error, I argue, is due to Husserl’s conflation of desires and emotions. I defend my critique of Husserl by reference to an Aristotelian account of rational and non-rational desires. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a brief presentation of Husserl’s lectures dedicated to the philosophy of Fichte, specifically the discussion of the relationship between ethics and religion that the fichtian texts develop in its intermediate phase. The course taught by Husserl, divided into three lessons and presented in the chair of Freiburg between the years 1917 and 1918, seems to clearly show the intimate connection between Husserl proposals on an absolute foundation of ethics and the theory advocated by Fichte about (...) the different stages or degrees of moral development of mankind. More than that, both idealistic philosophical positions conceive a close relation between the conception of an ethical ideal and the defense of a view about human nature that understands it as a pure acting of consciousness. In this regard, the paper aims to indicate, albeit incipiently, how epistemology, ethics, and religion appear intertwined in a systematic manner in the two theories. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the ethical motive which led Husserl to defend the transcendental subjectivity. The central thesis is that phenomenological attitude is more than a pure methodical and theoretical approach on human subjectivity. Husserlian’s use of the transcendental ego has a practical purpose. Considering that phenomenology always begins by the suspension of the natural attitude, the possibility of this suspension implicates a paradox: the ego must preserve his belief in reason and science in order to carry out the (...) neutralization of its beliefs concerning natural attitude. This belief is crucial in order to understand the ethical meaning of the transcendental reduction which is the beginning of an entirely new form of life. (shrink)

Through a commentary of the letter sent by Husserl to the 8th International Congress of Philosophy in 1934, the essay intends to clarify the concept of “responsibility” as a “universal form” thanks to which the rational human being orients his acts according to a consciously ethical direction. By focusing on the dynamics that characterize the relationship between Logos and Ethos, is then pointed up Husserl’s aim to build a gnoseology that can’t be solved in an abstract intellectualism as it embodies (...) always a constructive criticism of the present and its aberrations. The appeal contained in the letter of 1934 for an epoché of every historical tradition becomes therefore the premise for an overcoming of past conceptual forms in order to reach the “implicit” concealed into every historical event and whose grasp and interpretation is possible only to the eidetic view of the phenomenologist. (shrink)

There seems to be a shift in phenomenology in the 20th century from an ethics based on value theory to an ethics based on responsibility. This essay attempts to show the path marks of this transition. It begins with the historical development that led Husserl to address the question of ethical objectivity in terms of value theory, with a focus on Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. It then explains Husserl’s phenomenology of ethics as grounded in value theory, and takes into account (...) Heidegger’s objections to it. Finally, it considers Sartre as a transitional figure between value theory and an ethics of responsibility and attempts to show in what sense, if at all, Levinas’ phenomenology of ethics could be an absolute break with a phenomenological ethics based on values. (shrink)

Scheler called “material ethics of value” his own phenomenological ethics. Therefore, to clarify the concept of “value” is the most important step for a good understanding of his phenomenological material ethics of value. In the whole framework of the phenomenological movement, many phenomeno-ogists such as Husserl, Scheler, and N. Hartmann and so on developed their own ethics of value. But we can see the fundamental difference between Husserl’s or Hartmann’s ethics of value and Scheler’s one. The reason for this is (...) that they prescribed “value” differently. In Scheler’s phenomenological material ethics of value, there are two basic formulations of value: the former is the value a priori as material a priori , and the latter, the value being as a ultimately basic form of being . On the one hand, in contrast with Husserl, Scheler regarded value a priori as primal-phenomenon; On the other hand, unlike N. Hartmann, Scheler prescribed value-being as “the relative being of act”. In this sense, Scheler’s phenomenological material ethics of value is founded neither merely on the value a priori in the sense of thing-phenomenology, nor merely on emotional a priori in the sense of the act-phenomenology, but on a “material apriorism”. There are three kinds of a priori in such a “material apriorism”: value a priori, emotional a priori and the relevant a priori between fact and act. (shrink)

In respect to the issue of ethics, Waldenfels’ position can be located between Levinas’ and Merleau Ponty’s. This “in-between” position allows an enormous enrichment of the phenomenological analysis. This essay aims at a stronger emphasis regarding the analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s “intercorporéité ”. To this purpose, I am discussing important insights from Husserl’s lecture “Einleitung in die Ethik, 1920 – 24”, and the turn from an egologic interpretation of affection towards an intermonadic interpretation of pre-affection. This approach works towards the establishment (...) of the field of research of ethics in the genetic phenomenology, in which the more wide ranging scope of Waldenfels’ contribution can be shown clearly. (shrink)

The unitary description both of the thing and of the other allowed to the Husserlian phenomenology to overcome the classical distinction between representation and will and to treat the volition and action as specific objects. In the following paper we shall investigate the basic concepts of a phenomenology of will and action comparing it with Kant's position in this respect. Our research will focus on the phenomenological description of the passage from the inchoative moment of the action to the action (...) to the ethical action and on the manner in which normativity arises in the milieu of the interaction. Korsgaard's concept of reflective endorsement will be our main reference in this field. (shrink)

This paper starts with an explanation of Aristotle’s conception of physis, namely as nature where the essence or form comes out of matter, but not, like techne, out of a cra sman’s thinking. en I try to point out how this conception is implicated in Husserl’s phenomenology. We see that Husserl’s phenomenological method lets us come back to the things themselves. We can experience them as physis. But what and how can the transcendental subjectivity, being what Husserl’s phenomenological method aims (...) to expose, contribute to it? (shrink)

Husserl's philosophy is often labeled as "epistemology," the name, but, in fact, he also attached great importance to ethics. Husserl good behavior of his theory of the method used to study extended to the study of the practice act, which, with the intention to enrich this concept is the best example, were originally used to construct the theory of knowledge, then, Husserl also among them the introduction of research ethics, however, this transplant is effective, it will be caught in a (...) dilemma? This followed the development of Husserl's ethics process, with the intent of the concept and enrich it for clues, trying to study such a transplant effectiveness, and the appearance of Husserl's intention to question the model. Despite the fact that Husserl's philosophy is always labeled "epistemology", he puts a lot of stress on ethics. Husserl is adept at adapting his theoretical methodology to the sphere of practical acts, which can well be seen in the following pair of concepts: intention and fulfillment. From the outset, they were used to construct his type of epistemology. Then they are introduced into ethics. However, it is not clear whether this transplant will run into a dilemma? This essay, along the lines of Husserl's ethics led by the concepts of intention and fulfillment, attempts to test the validity of this transplant and to question the representational mode of intentionality. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analize both the side that points to a field of possibilities and the side that points to the moment of a particular action in Husserl's formulation of the categorical imperative: "Do at every moment the best that is attainable!" First, the author surveys the range of possibilities considered by Husserl in order to delineate the best course of action. This analysis leads to a twofold enlargement of the practical horizon. On the one hand (...) a personal life-horizon involves both a unified style or habituality and a decision endorsing a profession or vocation, on the other hand an intersubjective horizon entails the attainment of a community of love as the highest form of community. Second, the paper explores the development of the categorical imperative with the purpose of stressing its subordination to the values of love and its teleological orientation toward a more perfect accomplishment of what is only partially attained. It is argued that, whereas determinateness in the horizon of practical possibilities leads to a discussion of the best possible action within a limited sphere, indeterminateness motivates the best possible approximation to a teleological ideal. Finally, the paper examines the moment of a particular action in order to show how the notion of kairós plays a role in different stages in the development of the categorical imperative that involve a critical moment of opportunity.El propósito de este artículo es analizar tanto el lado que se orienta al campo de posibilidades como el lado que se dirige al momento de una acción particular en la formulación husserliana del imperativo categórico: "¡Haz en todo momento lo mejor entre lo alcanzable!" En primer lugar, el autor examina el alcance de las posibilidades que Husserl considera a fin de delinear el mejor curso de acción. Este análisis desemboca en una doble ampliación del horizonte práctico. Por un lado, un horizonte personal de vida implica tanto una habitualidad o estilo unitario como una decisión que elige una profesión o vocación; por el otro, un horizonte intersubjetivo implica el logro de una comunidad del amor como la más alta forma de comunidad. En segundo lugar, el artículo explora la evolución del imperativo categórico con el objeto de subrayar su subordinación a los valores del amor y su orientación teleológica hacia una realización más perfecta de lo que solo ha sido alcanzado parcialmente. Se sostiene que, mientras la determinación en el horizonte de posibilidades prácticas lleva al examen de la mejor acción posible dentro de una esfera limitada, la indeterminación motiva la mejor aproximación posible a un ideal teleológico. Por último, se analiza el momento de una acción particular a fin de mostrar cómo la noción de kairós desempeña un papel en diferentes estadios en el desenvolvimiento del imperativo categórico que encierran un momento crítico de oportunidad. (shrink)

O texto apresenta uma análise sobre a fenomenologia husserliana e sua crítica ao objetivismo, que tem orientado a filosofia, as ciências e as demais práticas humanas. Inicia-se com a apresentação da origem da fenomenologia, seguida da crítica ao objetivismo, da concepção husserliana sobre a ética e das contribuições destas concepções para a educação. É uma pesquisa bibliográfica realizada a partir de obras de Husserl e de comentadores do pensamento deste filósofo.The paper presents an analysis of Husserl phenomenology and his critique (...) of objectivism that has guided philosophy, science and other human practices. It begins with the presentation of the origin of phenomenology, followed by the critique of objectivism, Husserl conception about ethics and the contributions of these conceptions for education. It is a bibliographical research realized from Husserl works and commentators of the thought of this philosopher. (shrink)

A first aspect has to do with the non-intentional and primal praxis of the living body. To this is added its status as a support for the sensuous values of comfort and health and a springboard for spiritual values, the highest level of which lies in the ethical values of the person. These Husserlian views find new developments in phenomenology: M. Henry highlights a pre-intentional “I can”, M. Scheler analyzes the relationship between hedonistic, vital, and spiritual values, and P. Ricoeur (...) describes the living body both as the “source” of its own proper values and the “affective resonator” of all values, and also outlines a view on happiness that encompasses particular bodily attunements. Finally, Husserl considers the offering of the living body to spiritual values in sacrifice as the positive assertion of humankind’s life. J. Patočka and E. Levinas have developed this line of thought. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to ascertain whether or not, within the framework of Edmund Husserl's philosophy, ethical standards are objectively true. The procedure used is tripartite. First, an exploratory sketch is made of some common intuitions about moral standards and their possible objectivity. Second, a close textual examination of Husserl reveals that an ethical concern is the root motivation of Husserl's philosophy. Third, a reconstruction is made of the ethical forms implied by this analysis. Key forms examined include: the need for (...) an interactive affective structure for interpersonal relations; the necessity for an essential relation between ethical knowledge and motivation; the centrality of respect for others and self-respect to any grounded ethic; the interdependence of respect for others and self-respect. It is shown that Husserl did not follow the implications of his philosophy because of an inadequate conception of affectivity and his overwhelming monadic prejudice. It is shown that affective acts are both epistemic and constitutive. A conclusion describes some transcendental structures of affectively, interactively perceived evidence, which fulfill the goal at which Husserl aimed. (shrink)

A Husserl-based social ethics is within the noetic-noematic field as disclosed through various reductions. The focus is how at the passive and active levels a bsic sense of will is in play as well as the "telos" of subjectivity in terms of both a "godly" intersubjective ideal "we". This is inseparable form the disclosure of the full sense of person through an "absolute ought" and the "truth of will" wherein the common world and common goods are tied to an ideal (...) community as a person of a higher order. (shrink)

The development of genetic phenomenology marks a change in Husserl's thinking which occurred between 1917 and 1921. Much of the second half of his philosophical life was devoted to genetic phenomenology as a supplement to the static phenomenology of his earlier writings. I argue that the development of genetic phenomenology, which involves a regressive inquiry into the genesis of the ego and of meaning, coincided with and made possible a greater emphasis on ethical and intersubjective positions in Husserl's later writings. (...) ;I trace the development of three prominent themes in Husserl's thought: time-consciousness, intersubjectivity, and ethics. In each case it is possible to see that prior to 1917 Husserl's phenomenology was not equipped to address such topics with the complexity they require. Static phenomenology has a rigid structure focusing on complete constitution of meaning by an already fully active ego. This position lacks the framework for investigating the development of the ego itself and of the transformation of meaning through time. In moving his thought beyond that rigid structure and addressing questions of historicity, Husserl began to incorporate an understanding of intersubjectivity based on the sedimentation of meanings built up through successive generations. Such an approach provides a way to think plurality in community without either the elimination of ethical foundations or the elimination of the importance of inherited convictions. The same sensitivity to the historical development of meaning made possible the later Husserl's theory of renewal and critique of history and tradition. ;This study concludes that Husserl's static phenomenological investigation into essences in combination with his genetic inquiry into origins provides a model of philosophical thinking that offers a balanced account both of individual freedom and of historical and traditional context. The goal of this project is to demonstrate that Husserl's later understanding of the human being as inheritor of an ethical tradition, but as still responsible for the taking-up of that tradition, would not have been possible had he not developed genetic phenomenology as an explanatory supplement to static phenomenology. (shrink)

My thesis is that there is a way of understanding moral knowledge in terms of Husserl's theory of the fulfillment of consciousness which may unify the main types of views held with respect to "the practicality of reason." By "the practicality of reason" I mean the claim that moral knowledge of the appropriate kind constrains moral action. This knowledge is intuitive or experiential knowledge in contrast to mere thought, intentionality or reasoning. I claim that such knowledge is possible and that (...) it places a greater constraint on action than mere moral thought or reasoning. ;The aim of the historical part of my thesis is to delimit the three main types of views held with respect to this thesis, i.e., the traditional, the Humean empiricist and the Kantian idealist, and to show that they all concede some form of "intuitive" or experiential constraint over action, but do not provide an adequate elucidation of it. In Hume's case, the attribution of selectively intentional features to moral sentiment allows for a plausible interpretation of Hume's view as consistent with, if not a concession to, the thesis. In Kant's case, his repeated, although unclarified, appeal to moral "experience" in conjunction with his ultimate appeal to reason supports our contention that he too adheres to the thesis. ;The primary "proof" of my thesis, however, proceeds by way of an independent phenomenological analysis of conscientious action. The moral intuitionism of Richard Price is refined and defended by the application of Husserl's analysis of the intuitive fulfillment of consciousness to moral experience and the will thereto in conscientious action. This analysis reveals that all thought, but especially intuitive thought, involves motivational structures with specific active tendencies. Intuitive moral thought, therefore, constrains to a much greater degree than mere intentional moral thought alone. We conclude with the observation that although the theory of moral perception is highly complex, it is in principle no more complex than an adequate theory of knowledge generally. The intuitive justification of moral knowledge may stand or fall with the intuitive justification of anything at all. (shrink)

The debate over the ethics of radically, technologically altering the capacities and traditional form of the human body is rife with appeals to and dismissals of the importance of the integrity of the human species. Species-integrist arguments can be found in authors as varied as Annas, Fukuyama, Habermas, and Agar. However, the ethical salience of species integrity is widely contested by authors such as Buchanan, Daniels, Fenton, and Juengst. This article proposes a Phenomenological approach to the question of species-integrity, arguing (...) in favor of a phenomenon of species-recognition that carries an ethical pull. Building on Husserl’s Phenomenological account of empathy and the lived-body, as well as Schopenhauer’s concept of compassion as an ethical urphenomenon, I develop a “Phenomenological species concept” , which I argue has the ethical significance that biological species concepts do not. The PSC reorients the debate over human alteration and species integrity. (shrink)