Husserl: Ethics

Following a brief summation of the phenomenological method, the paper considers three metaethical positions adopted by phenomenologists and the implications of those positions for a normative ethics. The metaethical positions combine epistemological and ontological viewpoints. They are non-intellectualism and strong value realism as represented by the axiological views of phenomenologists such as Scheler, Meinong, Reinach, Stein, Hartmann, von Hildebrand, and Steinbock; non-intellectualism and anti-realism as represented by the freedom-centered phenomenologies of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty; and weak intellectualism and weak value (...) realism as represented by Husserl and Drummond. The paper argues that only the third metaethical view can support a normative ethics that is consistent with the essential features of the phenomenological method, that allows for freedom in an agent’s choosing from a multiplicity of first-order goods, including vocational goods, practical identities, and life plans, available in the agent’s factical circumstances, and that provides norms governing the correctness of our actions and our obligations to others. The normative dimension is introduced, first, by the requirement that the fulfillment of first-order evaluations and choices be truthful, that is, that the evaluations be appropriate and the actions right. Second, transcendental considerations revealed in the phenomenological analysis of intentional experience disclose a notion of second-order goods of agency that universally bind agents in their exercise of freedom and their dealings with others. (shrink)

La reducción trascendental introdu-cida por Husserl en Ideas I le permite a nuestro autor, ya en Ideas II, definir la “actitud perso-nalista”, donde el “objeto intencional” abre paso a una nueva noción clave que es la de “motivación”. Dada la importancia que tiene la motivación para entender cualquier vida y también, por tanto, la vida moral, mi ponencia busca obtener una clasificación rigurosa de los distintos tipos de motivación que Husserl describe. Su objetivo es mostrar que aunque Husserl concede a (...) la motivación “racional” toda la importancia que merece, no por ello identifica motivación con racionalidad. En la motivación, que cubre por completo el ámbito personalista, Husserl incluye, en efecto, una motivación “prerracional” o asociativa, que nos lleva al terreno de la fenomeno-logía genética.The transcendental reduction introduced by Husserl in Ideas I allows him, in Ideas II, defining the "personalistic attitude" where the "intentional object" gives way to a new key notion, "motivation." Given the importance of motivation to understand any life and, therefore, moral life, my paper seeks a rigorous classification of the different types of motivation that Husserl describes. Its aim is showing that although Husserl gives importance to "rational" motivation, he does not identify motivation with rationality. In the motivation, that covers completely personalistic level, Husserl includes, in effect, a "pre-rational" or associative motivation, which leads us to the field of genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

Following up from the previous book, Human Emotions and the Origins of Bioethics, this volume focuses on four psychological problems, anxiety, narcissism, restlessness, and emotional numbness, and explores how these problems influence bioethical issues and what bioethics can do to fix them. The Role of Bioethics in Emotional Problems presents a phenomenological exploration of emotional intention and describes how one's choices can determine a better relationship to themselves and their community. Not only does this book provide the reader with an (...) exhaustive account of the philosophical and psychological meaning of practical intentionality within Husserl's phenomenology, but it also applies Husserl's ethics to contemporary studies of human emotions and bioethical problems. Offering a non-reductionist model for an interdisciplinary inquiry into an emotional experience, it integrates clinical practice and articulates foundational knowledge of human emotional life at a professional level. Aimed at students of philosophy, psychology, psychotherapy, and bioethics, this book is a unique phenomenological dialogue between these disciplines on emotional well-being. (shrink)

In this article, I foreground the role of relationality in Husserl’s later reflections on ethics and self-constitution, with a particular interest in Husserl’s account of sacrifice. I exposit how Husserl’s account of self-constitution and the conflict of absolute values between competing vocations offers a solution to Brentano’s rendering of the obligation to “choose the best among the ends attainable.” I explore the numerous instances in which Husserl uses the parent-child relation to illustrate the absolute value of our relation to an (...) individual and how this absolute value triumphs over other seemingly rational maxims. Although problematic in several ways, Husserl’s account of motherhood grounds his notion of self-constitution in particular relations with others, rather than in a general category of nation or humanity. I conclude by considering how his emphasis on phenomenological constitution and his approach to value and sacrifice may inform future projects in phenomenological relational ethics. (shrink)

This paper concerns both Aristotle's notion of right feelings and Husserl's account of intentional feelings and emotions as developed in their ethical writings and it discusses these approaches in relation to each other. It addresses the question of motivation and justification or evidence for moral feelings and actions. In particular, it focuses on the emotional states of Philia and love as well as the inherent relationship between affectivity and reason. The paper concludes with some reflections on the requirements for the (...) constitution of a moral self. (shrink)

In a world where, as Martin Heidegger puts it, ‘homelessness’ has become its destiny, the colonized/Oriental Other that once exclusively constituted and was neglected from the matrix of the Western imaginary has no longer maintained its distance as ‘out there’. Instead it is embodied as a ‘refugee’ appearing on the borders of the ‘home’ with its complex cultural, colonial history. The majority of refugee studies feature the refugee as the outcome of the interplay of the two concepts of the ‘rights (...) of man’ and the ‘rights of the citizen’, who resides on the threshold of nativity and nationality as the limit phenomenon of the nation-state stands before the law in its totality but cannot be classified under any of its provisions. However, this thesis investigates the philosophical underpinnings of the emergence of the phenomenon of the refugee that appears at the threshold of one’s own experience of home as an alien who does not belong to the privileged normative structure of the home. Drawing on Anthony Steinbock’s approach to the Husserlian phenomenology of generativity, this study phenomenologically examines the possibility of an ethical relation in the Homeworld and Alienworld encounter. Focusing on the mode of givenness of the alien to the home in interpersonal relations, the main question of the thesis is:If phenomenologically the Other is accessible to home in a mode of inaccessibility, then how can the ‘I’ initiate an ethical relation to the Other?As the result of addressing this question, building on Edmund Husserl’s late project of ethical renewal and Bernhard Waldenfels’ phenomenological ethics of Responsivity alongside Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, I develop a new understanding of the experience of violence versus morally experiencing the Other. Although James Dodd contributed greatly to the development of the phenomenology of violence, this thesis gives a new perspective to the concept of ‘violence’ versus the ‘ethical’ from the perspective of types of phenomena and various modes of givenness. From a phenomenological perspective, by analyzing the mode of givenness peculiar to the experience of the Other in the intersubjective realm, I propose that violence is a disposition toward receiving the Other in experience as a denigrated phenomenon. However, an ethical relation to the Other means to receiving the Other as saturated phenomenon that is non-objectifiable. Chapter One discusses how phenomenology as critique can be a critical reflection on experience in order to justify and turn back to the question that concerns the refugee subject as ‘an alien other’. Applying Besinnung enables me to unravel the meaning structure that is operative in colonial subjectification and de-subjectification and the concept of violence that is embedded in the colonial situation. Dodd’s phenomenological account of violence and Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of ‘the camp’ gives me the opportunity to analyze the current manifestation of colonial violence in Australian offshore refugee detention camps. Considering various sorts of violence that are operative in the colonial structure, Chapter Two focuses on a specific type of violence that is hidden in the cognitive structure of our consciousness: epistemic violence. Building on Miranda Fricker’s notion of ‘epistemic injustice’ and Husserl’s phenomenological notion of ‘horizon-structure of experience’ that he proposed in Experience and judgment I develop a phenomenological analysis of the horizon structure of experiencing two types of epistemic injustice, which are testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Phenomenologically thematizing the intersubjective structure of the home, Chapter Three investigates the way the institutional violence of the colonial system can affect meaning constitution. A regressive inquiry into the pregiven lifeworld of the colonial situation as a violent situation that emerges out of the disrupted world of sense, the chapter enquires into the relation of the ‘I’ with the ‘alien’, and asks how does the ‘I’ experience the Other and constitute it as alien? Doing so, I argue that I experience the other as always present in its absence in a way that its presence is withdrawn from the accessibility of home as inaccessible. Chapter Four examines the mode of experiencing the alien Other by the home as a liminal experience in which the alienworld is inaccessible and incomprehensible to home. Furthermore, building on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Steinbock, I intend to liberate the phenomenon of the alien from the constitutive conditions of the home by discussing how the Other person is absolved from a disposal relation with me. This is to discover the most profound relation to the other that is given in moral experience. Chapter Five analyzes the moral experience of the Other in terms of the modality of the givenness of the Other, and in terms of the type of phenomena given in vertical givenness in the intersubjective realm. Reading Steinbock together with Marion, I explore the type of phenomenality of the alien Other who is given in the mode of revelation as a saturated phenomenon. I argue that by abandoning the givenness of the Other as a saturated phenomenon, I open the possibility of violence toward the Other. This way, I propose that the two concepts of violence and ethics are phenomenological orientations toward the reception of the call of the Other as a saturated phenomenon. (shrink)

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility of (...) a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

This study is a conceptual dialogue aimed at attaining insight into reading and developing postintentional phenomenology as intercultural philosophical inquiry. This conversation commences with the problem of Eurocentric phenomenology and introduces several examples of intercultural phenomenological attempts which fail to move beyond the validation of non-European philosophy using a Eurocentric viewpoint. The first section of this study introduces possible conditions and approaches for intercultural phenomenology, drawing mainly on Kwok-Ying Lau’s (2016) work on phenomenology and intercultural understanding, with a view to (...) extending the scope of phenomenological research beyond the limitations of a Eurocentric attitude largely influenced by and inherited from Husserl. The second section considers ways in which the understanding and approach of post-intentional phenomenology could be widened and deepened by the intercultural dimension, and vice versa. Building on these discussions, the paper concludes with a brief consideration of the implications for phenomenological research and of how an intercultural understanding and approach inform research design. Following “lines of flight” in these discussions, post-intentional phenomenology is proposed as an ethical and transformative inquiry. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAusgehend von der Beobachtung, dass moralische Kündergestalten sowohl Faszination als auch Anfeindung auslösen, gehe ich in meinem Aufsatz der Frage nach, wie sich die ethische Selbstspaltung, die in den transzendentalphilosophischen Ethikansätzen Kants und Husserls aufgewiesen wird, in der Konstitution eines moralischen Gemeinwesens durch kommunikative Akte auswirkt. Nach einer Darstellung der Selbstspaltung bei Kant und Husserl wird ein kurzer Blick auf das Verhältnis von passiv vorgegebener und reflexiv gestalteter Sozialität geworfen, um das Verständnis der Selbstspaltung im sozialen Kontext nachvollziehen zu können. (...) Von diesen theoretischen Erwägungen ausgehend, lässt sich die soziale Spaltung in Beziehung zum Risiko moralischer Kommunikation setzen, deren Akteure in Konflikte mit der passiven Einstimmigkeit geraten und durch Machtverschiebungen gewaltsame Reaktionen hervorrufen. Andererseits macht das personale Risiko der Tat-Forderung als einer besonderen Form der moralischen Kommunikation auch die Apodiktizität des transzendentalphilosophisch erwiesenen absoluten Sollens in seiner sozial unmittelbaren Konkretion sichtbar. (shrink)

The depiction of the relation of God and man is one of the most difficult challenges of religious philosophy and even more the understanding of God and the human self-conception are deeply entwined. Trying an access to both questions starting from subjectivity, the idea of God is investigated in Descartes, Feuerbach and Husserl. After a discussion of the idea of God in Descartes and its consequences for human aspiration, the opposite standpoint of Feuerbach and his so-called theory of projection will (...) be examined. Finally, aspects from both thinkers are brought together in Husserl’s phenomenological ethics. The idea of God is the entelechy of reason and self-realizing goodness, in which the searching person can realize its own potentials as much as its own abyss, yet is always called to advance beyond herself and toward the ever-beyond God within. (shrink)

Husserl beruft sich immer wieder programmatisch auf Platon als den Gründervater der europäischen Philosophie, arbeitet jedoch die Bezüge der Phänomenologie zum Platonismus nie auf - obwohl er die "historische Rückbesinnung" auf die Urstiftung seines Denkens als wesentlichen Bestandteil der "Selbstbesinnung auf ein Selbstverständnis dessen hin, worauf man eigentlich hinaus will, als der man ist, als historisches Wesen" charakterisiert. Die vorliegende Arbeit will diese Reflexion leisten. Ihr Gegenstand ist mithin die Transformation Platonischer Gedanken in Husserls Phänomenologie. Dabei werden sechs Problemgebiete thematisiert: (...) A) Philosophie als Wissenschaft, B) Philosophie als Ethik, C) Philosophie als Polemik, D) Philosophie und das Ende der Lebenswelt, E) Philosophie und das Eigenrecht des Eidetischen, F) Philosophie und das Absolute. Den Abschnitten folgen jeweils kritische Erwägungen zu den Spannungen, die vor dem Platonischen Hintergrund innerhalb der Phänomenologie sichtbar werden. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Phänomenologie tatsächlich als eine eigenwillige Endstiftung des Platonismus betrachtet werden kann, wodurch sich eine neue Perspektive auf ihre programmatische und systematische Grundkonfiguration ergibt. (shrink)

The Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the article attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its ethical perspectives toward an ethic that intends to be inclusive. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of (...) inclusion in the life-world, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the live-world thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness, which is open, latent, included in the life-world, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character. (shrink)

Evidence is a central theme in Husserl´s transcendental phenomenology. This article investigates not only the theoretical aspects of evidence, but also tries to develop prolegomena for a phenomenological theory of moral evidence and moral truth. Nevertheless, this endeavor is based upon the theoretical insights of Husserl: the importance of intersubjectivity and the relevance of time, which are reviewed in the first two chapters. The temporal aspect, under the title of perpetuation, is crucial for the understanding of the concept of evidence. (...) But it becomes even more important when the question of moral truth is considered. Perpetuation is not only stressed in the understanding of values, but also in the unanimity of the ethical and loving person. As evidence of any kind can only be falsified by a higher evidence of the same character, moral evidence cannot be understood isolated from the living process of any prefigured moral settings of a society, moral evidence can give itself only in an interpersonal community and its moral tradition and demands the community’s own readiness for a critical habituality. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the ethical motive which led Husserl to defend the transcendental subjectivity. The central thesis is that phenomenological attitude is more than a pure methodical and theoretical approach on human subjectivity. Husserlian’s use of the transcendental ego has a practical purpose. Considering that phenomenology always begins by the suspension of the natural attitude, the possibility of this suspension implicates a paradox: the ego must preserve his belief in reason and science in order to carry out the (...) neutralization of its beliefs concerning natural attitude. This belief is crucial in order to understand the ethical meaning of the transcendental reduction which is the beginning of an entirely new form of life. (shrink)

According to a predominant view, reflection is constitutive of personhood. In this paper I first indicate how it might seem that such an account cannot do justice to the socially embedded nature ofpersonhood. I then present a phenomenologically-inspired account of reflection as critical stance taking and show how it accommodates the social embeddedness of persons. In concluding, I outline how this phenomenological account is also not vulnerable to a number of additional challenges that have been raised against accounts that consider (...) reflection to be constitutive of personhood and what matters for responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper we want to focus on Husserl’s critique of Kantian ethics and to develop the following questions. Against the merely empiristic orientation of Hume’s ethics, the Kantian foundation of ethics has an aprioristic character; but does this aprioristic character have to be identified with the origin of ethical principles in the pure subjectivity, and if not, which is its phenomenological signification? The sense of the Copernican revolution is that the structures of the objects are in accordance with the (...) universal structures of the finite subject; a contrario, Husserl refuses this Copernican principle and assumes that every sort of object determines a regulative structure in the subject; is it possible to apply this anticopernican principle to the ethical sphere? As opposed to the Kantian principle of the supremacy of practical reason, we find in Husserl’s thought a supremacy of the theoretical reason; but which is the sense of this inversion? The concept of foundation has in Husserlian phenomenology a cardinal importance: all sorts of truth of superior degree are founded on the inferior level of sensible truth; is it possible to apply this principle of foundation to the ethical sphere, so that ethical consciousness would be founded on feelings? At last the Kantian concept of liberty is not an empirical one, but a cosmological and practical idea; which is the phenomenological sense of liberty? (shrink)

In this paper we want to focus on Husserl’s critique of Kantian ethics and to develop the following questions. Against the merely empiristic orientation of Hume’s ethics, the Kantian foundation of ethics has an aprioristic character; but does this aprioristic character have to be identified with the origin of ethical principles in the pure subjectivity, and if not, which is its phenomenological signification? The sense of the Copernican revolution is that the structures of the objects are in accordance with the (...) universal structures of the finite subject; a contrario, Husserl refuses this Copernican principle and assumes that every sort of object determines a regulative structure in the subject; is it possible to apply this anticopernican principle to the ethical sphere? As opposed to the Kantian principle of the supremacy of practical reason, we find in Husserl’s thought a supremacy of the theoretical reason; but which is the sense of this inversion? The concept of foundation has in Husserlian phenomenology a cardinal importance: all sorts of truth of superior degree are founded on the inferior level of sensible truth; is it possible to apply this principle of foundation to the ethical sphere, so that ethical consciousness would be founded on feelings? At last the Kantian concept of liberty is not an empirical one, but a cosmological and practical idea; which is the phenomenological sense of liberty? (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a brief presentation of Husserl’s lectures dedicated to the philosophy of Fichte, specifically the discussion of the relationship between ethics and religion that the fichtian texts develop in its intermediate phase. The course taught by Husserl, divided into three lessons and presented in the chair of Freiburg between the years 1917 and 1918, seems to clearly show the intimate connection between Husserl proposals on an absolute foundation of ethics and the theory advocated by Fichte about (...) the different stages or degrees of moral development of mankind. More than that, both idealistic philosophical positions conceive a close relation between the conception of an ethical ideal and the defense of a view about human nature that understands it as a pure acting of consciousness. In this regard, the paper aims to indicate, albeit incipiently, how epistemology, ethics, and religion appear intertwined in a systematic manner in the two theories. (shrink)

Although cultures far away and with other languages and customs are felt to be exotic by many in one s own culture, all cultures recognize the importance of a consistent bodily praxis as a basis for ethical behavior. I show that thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Dewey, James, Peirce, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty all acknowledge this habitual-bodily basis as well as its deeply social character. So does Confucius, even if he emphasizes ceremonial aspects more than Aristotle, the American pragmatists, and phenomenologists. (...) Linking these thinkers is a common emphasis on the performative dimension of reliably repetitive bodily actions that engender effective social actions and interactions. (shrink)

Husserl's 20th-century phenomenological project remains the cornerstone of modern European philosophy. The place of ethics is of importance to the ongoing legacy and study of phenomenology itself. Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality constitutes one of the major new interventions in this burgeoning field of Husserl scholarship, and offers an unrivaled perspective on the question of ethics in Husserl's philosophy through a focus on volumes not yet translated into English. This book offers a refreshing perspective on stagnating ethical debates that pivot (...) around conceptions of relativism and universalism, shedding light on a phenomenological ethics beyond the common dichotomy. (shrink)

Im Zuge des wiedererstarkten Interesses an der Phänomenologie öffnet Philippe Merz mit seiner Untersuchung Werterfahrung und Wahrheit nun auch Husserls ethische und freiheitstheoretische Studien für die Gegenwart. Unsere moralischen Wertungen und Normen prägen unser Selbst- und Weltverständnis zutiefst. Aber wie überzeugend lassen sie sich begründen oder vielleicht sogar als wahrheitsfähig erweisen? Und inwiefern stellt die Freiheit, verstanden als unsere Fähigkeit zur begrenzten rationalen Selbstbestimmung, nicht nur die wesentliche Bedingung, sondern auch das Ziel eines verantwortlichen und gelingenden Lebensvollzugs dar? Merz widmet (...) sich diesen Fragen im Anschluss an Husserls Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Ethik. Dabei werden Husserls Ansätze systematisiert, kritisch überprüft und konstruktiv weiterentwickelt. (shrink)

The deliberations presented in the article are concentrated around a thesis that the unchanging framework of Husserl’s philosophical thinking is based on the simultaneous occurrence of theoretical and practical-ethical motive. This thesis, together with considerations presented in the text, are the result of reflection on the aim and tasks of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy, philosophy understood as science striving for the consolidating of cognition and revealing findings that are relevant to one’s life. The practical-ethical motivation that accompanies deliberations of epistemological (...) nature influences the specificity of phenomenological philosophy, phenomenological inquiries and the change of approach. Phenomenology considered in terms of theoretical and practical motives, in the rational and critical thinking, includes the relation between the sphere of cognition and the sphere of life, between the theoretical-scientific sphere and the practical-ethical one. (shrink)

Some aspects of professional activity of the scientist presented in ethical works of E. Husserl are considered in this article. Responsibility to reason and consequences of scientific activity before civilization come to light as the ethical center of the phenomenological doctrine of Husserl. The author demonstrates that the aspect of formal following to the chosen norms and values, especially within his professional activity is very important for Husserl. The German phenomenologist selects various laws such as absorption and summaring defining standards (...) and valuable behavior of the person in his professional activities and going beyond their limits. He speaks about professional life in high sense of the word as the value giving calling and “pure” satisfaction to the person. Husserl emphasizes that it is already impossible to tear off theoretical life from practical, to split concrete life of the theorist on two parallel vital activity and professional activity of the scientist is filled with a true meaning in the self-realization as we are based on phenomenological position. (shrink)

There seems to be a shift in phenomenology in the 20th century from an ethics based on value theory to an ethics based on responsibility. This essay attempts to show the path marks of this transition. It begins with the historical development that led Husserl to address the question of ethical objectivity in terms of value theory, with a focus on Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. It then explains Husserl’s phenomenology of ethics as grounded in value theory, and takes into account (...) Heidegger’s objections to it. Finally, it considers Sartre as a transitional figure between value theory and an ethics of responsibility and attempts to show in what sense, if at all, Levinas’ phenomenology of ethics could be an absolute break with a phenomenological ethics based on values. (shrink)

The debate over the ethics of radically, technologically altering the capacities and traditional form of the human body is rife with appeals to and dismissals of the importance of the integrity of the human species. Species-integrist arguments can be found in authors as varied as Annas, Fukuyama, Habermas, and Agar. However, the ethical salience of species integrity is widely contested by authors such as Buchanan, Daniels, Fenton, and Juengst. This article proposes a Phenomenological approach to the question of species-integrity, arguing (...) in favor of a phenomenon of species-recognition that carries an ethical pull. Building on Husserl’s Phenomenological account of empathy and the lived-body, as well as Schopenhauer’s concept of compassion as an ethical urphenomenon, I develop a “Phenomenological species concept” , which I argue has the ethical significance that biological species concepts do not. The PSC reorients the debate over human alteration and species integrity. (shrink)

A first aspect has to do with the non-intentional and primal praxis of the living body. To this is added its status as a support for the sensuous values of comfort and health and a springboard for spiritual values, the highest level of which lies in the ethical values of the person. These Husserlian views find new developments in phenomenology: M. Henry highlights a pre-intentional “I can”, M. Scheler analyzes the relationship between hedonistic, vital, and spiritual values, and P. Ricoeur (...) describes the living body both as the “source” of its own proper values and the “affective resonator” of all values, and also outlines a view on happiness that encompasses particular bodily attunements. Finally, Husserl considers the offering of the living body to spiritual values in sacrifice as the positive assertion of humankind’s life. J. Patočka and E. Levinas have developed this line of thought. (shrink)

Starting with the ego's consciousness and emphasizing on staying at this realm, Husserl is accused of ignoring the absolute alterity of the other and reducing it to the presence of consciousness. By reducing the other he misses ethics and so embeds the violence at the heart of phenomenological discourse. Here we discuss on this criticism and then we try to defend Husserl against it. By putting phenomenology in its eidetic realm, we will try to answer these criticisms.

The correlation between person and environment has long been a central focus of phenomenological analysis. While phenomenology is usually understood as a descriptive discipline showing how essential features of the human encounter with things and people in the world are articulated, phenomenology is also based on ethical concerns. Husserl himself, the founder of the movement, gave several lecture courses on ethics. This volume focuses on one trend in ethics-virtue ethics-and its connection to phenomenology. The essays explore how phenomenology contributes to (...) this field of ethics and clarifies some of its central issues, such as flourishing and good character traits. The volume initiates a conversation with virtue ethicists that is underrepresented in the current literature. -/- Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics offers contributions from prominent phenomenologists who explore the following issues: how phenomenology is connected to the ancient Greek or Christian virtue tradition, how phenomenology and its foundational thinkers are oriented toward virtue ethics, and how phenomenology is itself a virtue discipline. The focus on phenomenology and virtue ethics in a single volume is the first of its kind. (shrink)

This paper seeks to provide a phenomenological articulation of the Scotist notion of haecceitas, interpreting Scotus’s principle of individuation at once as an ontological as well as a moral principle. Growing out of certain suggestions made by James Hart in his Who One Is, this interpretation is meant to provide the phenomenological ethics of both Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler with a useful theoretical tool in the Scotist notion of haecceitas interpreted as a horizon of value in order more fully (...) to develop the phenomenological idea of the ethical life as a task that specifically seeks to realize as its highest goal the vocation of the person to his or her ideal, true self. The main implication of Scotus’s thought, here, for phenomenology will be the ability to further delimit haecceitas as an objective moral principle that refutes the frequent charge of relativistic subjectivism in the phenomenological theory of ethics. (shrink)

What types of unity and disunity belong to a group of people sharing a culture? Husserl illuminates these communities by helping us trace their origin to two types of interpersonal act—cooperation and influence—though cultural communities are distinguished from both cooperative groups and mere communities of related influences. This analysis has consequences for contemporary concerns about multi- or mono-culturalism and the relationship between culture and politics. It also leads us to critique Husserl’s desire for a new humanity, one that is rational, (...) cooperatively united, and animated by a universal philosophical culture. Reflecting on culture, a spiritually shaped and shared domain of the world, draws us to reflect also on ourselves as social and rational animals, and to ask, what should we reasonably hope for—and aim for—in a human culture that expresses and supports our shared lives of reason? Aristotle is used for occasional comparisons and contrasts. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band, der außer Husserls Freiburger Einleitung in die Philosophie von 1919/20 auch die noch erhaltenen Teile seiner beiden ersten Freiburger Einleitungen in die Philosophie von 1916 und 1918 enthält, bietet eine sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Hinführung zur transzendentalphänomenologischen Philosophie auf dem Weg über die Ontologie und die Erkenntnistheorie. Im Ausgang von der Darstellung des Anstoßes durch die Sophisitk entwickelt Husserl ausführlich Platons Entdeckung des Apriori als den für die Folgezeit maßgeblichen Schritt zu einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie und (...) verfolgt in kritischen Analysen deren neuzeitliche Entwicklung seit Descartes über die rationalistischen und empiristischen Systeme bis hin zu Kant. -/- In den systematisch orientierten Abschnitten der Vorlesung stellt Husserl zunächst die grundlegenden Disziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie dar: die Erkenntnistheorie, die formale Wissenschaftslehre und die Ontologie, die sich in formale Ontologie, die materialen Ontologien und die von Aristoteles begründete Ontologie der realen Welt differenziert. Die praktische Philosophie behandelt Husserl in einer detaillierten Skizze der apriorischen Wertlehre und der in dieser fundierten apriorischen Ethik; diese beiden Prinzipienwissenschaften bilden für ihn die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Ethik. Diese aus der Göttinger Zeit stammende, unter dem Einfluss Brentanos stehende Konzeption von Ethik erfährt in der Vorlesung von 1919/20 bzw. in den wenig später in diese eingefügten kritischen Reflexionen gewichtige Korrekturen. Diese Korrekturen sowie die detailierte Analyse und Entfaltung des von Platon und Aristoteles grundgelegten, durch den Siegeszug der ateleologischen Naturwissenschaft verdrängten Gedankens einer teleologischen Welterklärung deuten vor auf Husserls späte Ethik und seine metaphysische Weltdeutung. (shrink)

Why do I have to be ethical? That is the essential question of a logical foundation of ethics in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. This article proposes to see the basic motivation of an ethical reason in the relationship between the two fundamental poles, that is the «Lifeworld» («Lebenswelt») and the «I-subject» («Ich-Subjekt»). This connection will be considered to constitute ethics in this article. This kind of ethics as a «condition of possibility» is then an a-priori ontological necessity. The article (...) will demonstrate how the composition of Husserl’s Prolegomena and his argumentation are an example of a foundation for phenomenological ethics: in this book Husserl derived logic as the first «condition of possibility». With logic’s three main characteristics — theory, normativity and praxis — it is the theoretical basis of a phenomenological ethics. (shrink)

In the Kaizo articles, written between 1922 and 1924, Husserl drew on the intercultural relationship between Europe and non-Europe. The viewpoints he held in these articles do not deviate much from that in the Vienna lecture 1935, which is later included in Crisis. It is in the latter that Husserl delineates systematically what he thinks of the idea of Europe and what makes Europe different from the other parts of the world. Notably, these viewpoints were already disclosed in the Kaizo (...) articles, though in very different contexts. As is well known, the background of Crisis is the concern about the modern science which deviates more and more from the concrete lifeworld, whereas the Kaizo articles focus mainly on the ethical problems. Nevertheless both of them touch on the cultural as well as intercultural problematic, that Husserl deals with more and more intensively in his late philosophy. My essay will discuss the following questions: On what grounds does Husserl think that the philosophical rationality of Europe deserves being recommended to other cultures? How does he come to this conclusion in his discourse on ethics? In order to come to terms with these questions I will unfold my essay in three steps: first, I will sketch how Husserl understands ethics; secondly, explain the connection between ethics and philosophical rationality, and thirdly how these ethical thoughts have intercultural relevance. (shrink)

This paper pursues a Kantian critique of Husserl’s theory of moral consciousness as it is found in his lectures on ethics and other shorter pieces on political and moral philosophy from the interwar period. The critique centers on Kant’s conception of moral personality, arguing that Husserl fails to appreciate the force of this idea, subsequently leaving himself open to the charge of moral perfectionism. The paper ends with a positive assessment of Husserl’s thought, however, arguing that Husserl provides important resources (...) for understanding moral consciousness as a sensibility for the possible, adding an important dimension to approaches in ethics that tend to center exclusively on questions of motivation and principle. (shrink)

The crucial distinction for ethics is between the good and the apparent good, between being and seeming. Tradition is useful for developing our ability to make this distinction and to live ethically or in self-responsibility, but it is also threatening to this ability. The phenomenology of Husserl and of others in the Husserlian tradition, especially Robert Sokolowski, are helpful in spelling out how tradition works; how the difference between the apparent good and the good is bridged in the experience of (...) moral truth but also a permanent, challenging feature of human life; what ethics requires regarding self-responsibility or authenticity; and what the proper voice of tradition is in the ethical or moral life. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that Husserl, in his later ethics, reinterprets the philosophical content that discloses itself in the Kantian conception of a “fact of practical reason”. From 1917/18 on, Husserl increasingly ceases to pursue his initial idea of a scientific ethics. The reason for this move lies precisely in the phenomenological analysis of “Gemütsakte”, through which two main features of the fact of practical reason impose themselves more and more on Husserls thought: the personal concernment/obligation and the (...) primacy of the practical with the coeval call for universal validity. Husserl recognizes that the form of ethical facticity or entanglement cannot be grasped by a science of evidence, which speaks objectively and non-personally of acts of willing, valuing or preferring. Husserl thus gets to a reinterpretation of the fact of practical reason as the philosophical nucleus of his ethics, which is now a personal and affective ethics. He bestows a texture on this fact, however not as he would have thought in the first place: not as evident laws of a material apriori of “Gemüt”. In the person and her ethical experience as absolute affection Husserl rather discovers that which is per se not objectifiable and not to be made rationally evident. By this, Husserl captures and phenomenologically explains the non-objectifiable source of obligation and the possibility of complying with it. (shrink)

O texto apresenta uma análise sobre a fenomenologia husserliana e sua crítica ao objetivismo, que tem orientado a filosofia, as ciências e as demais práticas humanas. Inicia-se com a apresentação da origem da fenomenologia, seguida da crítica ao objetivismo, da concepção husserliana sobre a ética e das contribuições destas concepções para a educação. É uma pesquisa bibliográfica realizada a partir de obras de Husserl e de comentadores do pensamento deste filósofo.The paper presents an analysis of Husserl phenomenology and his critique (...) of objectivism that has guided philosophy, science and other human practices. It begins with the presentation of the origin of phenomenology, followed by the critique of objectivism, Husserl conception about ethics and the contributions of these conceptions for education. It is a bibliographical research realized from Husserl works and commentators of the thought of this philosopher. (shrink)